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INTRODUCTION
T/l
This thesis is concerned with the consequences for international fiscal law, and the 
development of international fiscal law, of unilateral anti-tax haven legislation. 
For the purposes of the discussion, anti-tax haven legislation of the U.S. and the 
U.K. has been taken as examples of unilateral legislation directed against the use 
of tax havens. There are a number of differences between the statutory form of 
the U.S. and the U.K. legislation and these are reflected in the analysis of the two 
sets of measures.
The thesis is divided into four parts, A-D. Chapter one of Part A commences 
with a discussion of the nature of international fiscal law and of the policies, 
principles and objectives underlying international fiscal law. It is noted that a 
primary objective underlying international fiscal law, determined by reference to 
economic criteria, can be identified. This objective, the removal of fiscal 
distortions to the free movement of capital and persons and goods and services, 
in turn dictates policies and principles underlying international fiscal law which 
seek to implement or deliver this primary objective. These policies and principles 
represent the prescriptive tools which are used in the analysis of unilateral anti-tax 
haven legislation throughout this thesis. After this first chapter on international 
fiscal law, the following two chapters deal with the concepts of international tax 
avoidance and tax havens respectively. Both concepts are of considerable 
relevance to international fiscal law, and, more importantly here, to the 
assumptions on which unilateral anti-tax haven (CFC) legislation is based.
Parts B and C are each divided into two chapters which consider the official 
attitudes to international tax avoidance and tax havens and the background to, and 
development of, the CFC legislation of the U.S. (in Part B) and the U.K. (in Part 
C).
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Part D represents the conclusion of this thesis and contains two chapters. The 
first is concerned with an evaluation of unilateral anti-tax haven legislation, 
according to the criteria of international fiscal law. The final chapter of Part D 
offers conclusions on the consequences for international fiscal law of the unilateral 
anti-tax haven legislation discussed in the main body of this thesis.
The law is stated as at 30 November 1988.
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PART A
INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL 
TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX HAVENS
T/l 10
CHAPTER 1
INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW
T/l 11
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the consequences for international fiscal law (IFL) 
and particularly the development of IFL of unilateral anti-tax haven legislation. 
The initial task must be, therefore, to set out what is meant by the concept of IFL 
and how the consequences for IFL of unilateral anti-tax haven legislation are to 
be measured and appraised. This requires an analysis of the policies and 
objectives underlying IFL as well as an analysis of the principles which are used 
as working tools to implement those policies and objectives. This analysis in turn 
cannot be done without reference to the phenomenon of international double 
taxation, which is, as will be demonstrated, the main reason for the existence of 
IFL. It is also necessary to outline the nature and effect of double taxation 
agreements (including model double taxation agreements) since such agreements 
have proved the primary means of developing IFL. Accordingly, all the above 
subjects are discussed in this chapter, which concludes with an analysis of the 
current status of the principles underlying IFL and an explanation of why the field 
of IFL is of major importance in its own right.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the concepts referred to above, it is necessary 
to state the reason that this thesis is concerned with unilateral anti-tax haven 
legislation and how this legislation is dealt with in the discussion that follows.
The larger topic underlying the discussion in this thesis is the appraisal of the 
implications of the general policy issues which determine the development of IFL 
for the enactment (on a unilateral basis) of anti-avoidance legislation directed at 
cross border structures or transactions. This potentially vast topic is reduced to 
manageable proportions for the purposes of this thesis by selecting unilateral anti­
tax haven legislation as an example of such unilateral anti-avoidance legislation. 
The U.S. and U.K. unilateral anti-tax haven legislation have in turn been selected 
(again, for reasons of containing the analysis and discussion within manageable 
limits) as representative of such unilateral anti-tax haven legislation. There are 
various reasons for selecting the U.S. and U.K. legislation. First, the U.S. and
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U.K. legislation is each representative of the two main types of unilateral anti-tax 
haven legislation, namely legislation directed at certain specified types of income 
(U.S. legislation) and legislation directed, in effect, at certain types of company 
(U.K. legislation). Second, the U.S. legislation has been in existence since 1962 
and therefore an analysis of that legislation provides an opportunity for a review 
of the development of such unilateral anti-tax haven legislation over a 
comparatively lengthy period. By contrast, the U.K. legislation has been enacted 
much more recently, in 1984, following a lengthy consultation process, and 
therefore provides an opportunity for a close review of that enactment process. 
Thus, although the review, analysis and conclusions contained in this thesis are 
based on the unilateral anti-tax haven legislation of the U.S. and the U.K., it is 
considered that the above factors facilitate the wider extrapolation of conclusions 
which are of relevance to unilateral anti-avoidance legislation more generally, 
although it should be emphasised that this wider extrapolation is by no means 
crucial to the arguments contained in this thesis. A third reason for the choice of 
the U.S. and U.K. legislation is that, in the course of preparing this thesis the 
writer has been based in both London and New York, and this has provided 
additional opportunities for researching the U.S. and U.K. legislation at a 
technical level and also through discussions with tax officials and tax practitioners.
Finally, it should be noted that although this thesis is concerned with legislation 
directed against tax havens, the concept of "tax havens" is itself somewhat 
problematic and this point is taken up specifically in Chapter Three.
THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW
The following discussion is intended to clarify the nature of IFL and its 
relationship with the principles or objectives which underlie it. This relationship 
is not a simple one and on close scrutiny it is apparent that there is a hierarchy 
of objectives, policies, principles and enactments of IFL which can be summarised 
in diagrammatic form as follows:^
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The primary objective underlying IFL: the removal of fiscal 
distortions to the free movement of capital and persons and the 
exchange of goods and services.
The policies underlying IF (e.g. equity and neutrality).
l
The principles or working concepts underlying IFL which are 
designed to implement the overall objective of IFL.
I
Pre-substantive patterns relating to IFL (e.g. unilateral model 
double taxation conventions).
r
Substantive enactments which constitute IFL (e.g. specific bilateral 
double tax treaties, specific unilateral tax provisions - including anti­
tax haven legislation etc).
The nature of the primary objective underlying IFL, and the policies, principles 
and enactments of IFL will be discussed separately below. It may, however, be 
useful to summarise the overall relationship between all these elements.
As will be explained below, the objective of IFL - the removal of fiscal distortions 
to the free movement of capital, persons and the exchange of goods and services - 
determines the policies of IFL - such as equity and neutrality - which are 
intended to ensure that the primary objective underlying IFL is secured. These 
"policies" might equally be characterised as sub-objectives of IFL or even as 
normative requirements of IFL. Although the labelling is therefore open to 
debate, the function of these policies or sub-objectives is relatively clear. The 
function is, as noted above, to ensure the primary objective underlying IFL is 
secured. Thus, referring to the two main "policies" of IFL - equity and neutrality - 
it is considered that fiscal distortions to the free movement of capital, persons 
and the exchange of goods and services can best be removed (or at least reduced) 
by following general fiscal policies which encompass fairness (or equity) to the
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total body of taxpayers and fairness between states and also neutrality in the sense 
that the impact of taxes is kept as neutral as possible (i.e. fiscal distortions to 
market behaviour is minimised).
The above policies in turn facilitate the creation of principles or "working tools" 
which are designed to shape concrete enactments of IFL. For example, these 
principles include the residence principle, the permanent establishment or genuine 
connection principle, the arm’s length doctrine, etc.
These principles are most commonly understood by tax practitioners because of 
their operation in comprehensive double tax treaties. The form of such treaties 
is significantly determined by certain model bilateral double taxation conventions.2 
Such model conventions provide a model draft on which specific double tax 
treaties, entered into between states, can be based. The model treaties are not 
therefore specific enactments of IFL in themselves but they are of enormous 
significance in influencing the form in which such specific enactments are enacted. 
It is for this reason that such model treaties are referred to separately in the 
above hierarchy as "pre-substantive patterns relating to IFL".
The final category referred to in the above hierarchy is that of the substantive 
enactments which constitute IFL. This category includes specific bilateral double 
tax treaties and specific unilateral tax provisions (which includes the type of 
legislation which is discussed throughout this thesis). The various different 
categories referred to above and their inter-relationships are discussed in further 
detail below.
Before proceeding to that discussion it is necessary to mention briefly the status 
of the existing "mainstream" discussions relating to IFL.
The concept of IFL (including the objectives, policies and principles of IFL) is not 
a familiar concept to most tax practitioners and discussion of IFL has remained 
predominantly an academic pursuit. In practice, domestic tax specialists who
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encounter the topic will often assert that to talk of "international" taxation or 
"international fiscal law" makes no sense since taxation, by its very nature, can be 
levied by a state on a domestic basis only. As a result, the debate over IFL has 
in the past concentrated on whether there are any substantive tax rules attaching 
to the concept of IFL or whether IFL merely describes the processes by which 
domestic taxation is allowed or not allowed to operate in situations where two or 
more states claim taxing rights in respect of the same international transaction. 
In short, the debate has addressed the status of the rules of IFL, i.e. the question 
of whether the "rules" of IFL are merely a set of rules about conflict law or 
whether they are substantive rules of tax law.3 Discussions on the status of the 
rules of IFL have also concentrated on whether there are limits under 
international law to the fiscal jurisdiction of a state.4
The status and nature of the "rules" of IFL are discussed later in this chapter. 
However, it is submitted that this "mainstream" debate has typically failed to place 
the rules or specific enactment of IFL in their context as a function of the primary 
objective and the policies underlying IFL. As will be demonstrated below, this 
seems to be because the primary objective and policies underlying IFL are so well- 
understood as not to require express clarification and are therefore taken as read. 
A discussion and a clarification of the primary objective and the key policies 
underlying IFL are, however, required as the preliminary step in this thesis 
because these matters are of fundamental important to this thesis. This is because 
the central part of the appraisal of unilateral anti-tax haven will be focused on the 
consequences for IFL - and particularly for the principles, policies and the primary 
objective underlying IFL - of such unilateral anti-avoidance legislation. It is 
therefore to these latter matters that the discussion will now turn.
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THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE UNDERLYING IFL
As has been stated above, the primary objective underlying IFL is the removal of 
fiscal distortions to the free movement of capital and persons and the exchange 
of goods and services. The "fiscal distortions" which have been identified as being 
of primary relevance in this context are those arising from the phenomenon of 
international double taxation. This perspective has become so widely-accepted as 
hardly to require explanation:
"The phenomenon of international juridical double taxation, which 
can be generally defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in 
two (or more) States on the same taxpayer in respect of the same 
subject matter and for identical periods, and its harmful effects on 
the exchange of goods and services and movements of capital and 
person, are so well known that it is superfluous to stress the 
importance of removing the obstacles that double taxation presents 
to the development of economic relations between OECD Member 
countries."5
A similar view is expressed by the UN Department of International Economic and 
Social Affairs:
"The growth of investment flows from developed to developing 
countries depends to a large extent on what has been referred to as 
the international investment climate. The prevention or elimination 
of international double taxation - i.e., the imposition of similar taxes 
in two or more States on the same taxpayer in respect of the same 
base - whose effects are harmful to the exchange of goods and 
services and to the movement of capital and persons, constitutes a 
significant component of such a climate. Broadly, the general 
objectives of bilateral tax conventions may today be seen to include 
the full protection of tax payers against double taxation (whether
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direct or indirect) and the prevention of the discouragement which 
taxation may provide for the free flow of international trade and 
investment.."6
A more detailed explanation of this primary objective underlying IFL is given by 
Arnold Knechtle in his work entitled "Basic Problems in International Fiscal 
Law".7 Knechtle surveys the increasing interdependence of trading areas and the 
consequential increasing importance of IFL which regulates the fiscal treatment 
of transnational affairs. Knechtle then considers the various factors behind this 
increasing interdependence (including dynamic technological progress, the 
widespread adoption by states of a liberal foreign economic policy - at least in the 
transatlantic area - and the quest for European unification before concluding:
"As a result of this worldwide liberalization and the creation of 
larger trading areas, economic development has accelerated, and 
international competition has intensified. Enterprises are forced to 
adapt their size and structure to the changed market dimensions, if 
they are to remain competitive. This restructuring encourages the 
rise of multinational enterprises; greater mobility and more flexible 
management methods enable these corporations to make an 
increasing number of investment decisions unencumbered by 
competition-distorting national influences. In order to follow the 
economic principle as closely as possible, such enterprises 
consistently apply the principle of the international division of 
labour by freely exploiting the advantages of location which the 
various States can offer as regards political stability, civil law, fiscal 
law, transport and production facilities, etc. As a result, 
considerable advantages are obtained and rationalization and
greater ability to weather economic depressions All these efforts
in the field of economic integration have led to considerable 
success. Nevertheless, freedom of movement in international 
business is only partly assured; what has been achieved largely
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amounts to an abolition of the classical trade restrictions (tariff 
protection) and of payment restrictions. After these primary 
obstacles are removed, the remaining restrictions weigh all the more 
heavily. "9
Knechtle divides the "remaining restrictions" to which he refers into fiscal and 
non-fiscal barriers to the freedom of movement of capital, persons, goods and 
services.
The non-fiscal barriers include non-tariff protection (such as trade and health 
regulations, industrial standards, state procurement practices, administrative 
procedures, etc) and foreign investment risks (which Knechtle categorizes as (a) 
political risks, such as wars, revolutions or nationalisation, (b) legal risks that arise 
from a national legislation and jurisdiction that are insufficiently developed and 
(c) currency and transfer risks, including such events as devaluation, transfer 
restriction and moratoria).10
This fiscal barriers are divided into two categories. First, there are the differences 
in the fiscal burden as competition and location factors. Second, there is the 
phenomenon of multiple taxation. By the first category, Knechtle refers to the 
differences in the structure of the national tax systems and in the rates of tax 
which can have an effect on prices and thus distort competition with the result 
that competitive advantages or disadvantages due to fiscal measures may arise:
"The influence which fiscal measures have on 
competition has thus been revealed, and they have 
become a decisive element in business calculations.
The reason for this is clear: so long as competition 
can be influenced by structural differences in the 
national tax systems, every transnational investment 
plan and business plan must, in order to be
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successful, take the effect of taxation into account as 
a cost factor in international competition."n
Commenting on the phenomenon of multiple taxation, Knechtle states
"Multiple taxation o f transnational activity is the most serious danger.
The ever increasing economic interdependence of States - although 
it is to be welcomed - has added to this risk and has led to a
considerable rise in the number of international tax cases the
consequences of multiple taxation are so detrimental that it is in the 
interest of all national economies to avoid it as far as possible."12
The concern over double taxation is not a recent development. Early measures 
to prevent double taxation can be traced back to at least 1819 and it is notable 
that all these early measures - in the Netherlands, and the U.K. - appear to be 
premised upon the proposition that the avoidance of double taxation is a pre­
requisite for the promotion of international trade.13
Much of the major early work on this subject was carried out by the League of 
Nations in the 1920s. The work of the League of Nations on the prevention of 
double taxation was begun as early as 1921 when its Financial Committee, acting 
on a recommendation of the International Financial Conference held the previous 
year in Brussels, entrusted the theoretical study of double taxation to four 
economists.14 This was followed in 1922 by further work on double taxation (and 
tax evasion) which was carried out by certain "technical experts", a group of tax 
officials of the tax administrations of seven European countries.15 After five 
sessions, from 1922 to 1925, the technical experts issued a report and resolutions 
dated 7 February 1925.16 This work ultimately led to the formation of a Fiscal 
Committee of the League of Nations and to the preparation of bilateral model 
double taxation treaties for the prevention of double taxation17 (these model 
treaties are discussed later in this chapter).
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Since that work in the early 1920s, the concept of international double taxation 
has been widely recognised and discussed. There is no universally accepted 
definition of what is meant by the term "international double taxation". However, 
the characteristics of international double taxation are described in the 
introductory remarks of the O.E.C.D. Model Double Taxation Convention on 
Income and Capital:
"The phenomenon of international double taxation  can be
generally defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two (or 
more) States on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject 
matter and for identical periods".18
Clearly, the possibility of international double taxation can only arise when a 
transaction or other form of business activity falls within the tax jurisdiction of 
more than one state. For example, a U.K. company opening a U.S. branch will 
find that the profits of the branch will be subject to tax in the U.S. and also in 
the U.K. Unless there is some form of relief in either tax system or in a tax treaty 
between the two countries, the profits of the branch will be taxed twice. The 
example illustrates the essence of international double taxation, namely that a 
transaction involving two or more states is more highly taxed than it would have 
been if it were a purely domestic transaction taking place entirely within the 
territory of any one of the states involved.
For an international enterprise, double taxation results in a heavier tax burden 
and also a loss of competitiveness, especially as compared to business rivals which 
operate exclusively within the borders of a single state. Given the growing 
interrelation and interdependence of the economies of individual states, 
international double taxation is an unwelcome and major impediment to the free 
movement of capital, persons, goods and services. It is for this reason that 
international double taxation has been regarded as the most pressing of 
international concerns in the area of IFL and has therefore been the subject to 
such attention for over seven decades.
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However, in practice such international concerns can be ignored by states which 
are constantly eager to extend their claims to taxing rights. In the words of W. 
Ritter, General Reporter of the 1975 IFA Congress in London;
"In practice there is a constant struggle between states as regards 
initial access to tax sources. And the struggle does not take the 
form of a dialogue designed to achieve an equitable balance, but 
rather the form of a one-sided and total exploitation of the sources 
of taxation at their disposal. Regardless of whether states proceed 
in such cases on the basis of residence or of territoriality, or of 
both, they will always seek to secure their share of tax revenue and 
will often take more than other states are prepared to concede".19
Juridical and Economic Double Taxation
The conventional view of international double taxation is that it occurs in one of 
two forms; juridical (or legal) international double taxation and economic 
international double taxation. The former limits itself to cases where the 
taxpayers are legally identical. The latter refers to cases where the same income 
or capital is taxed twice in the hands of taxpayers who are, legally, separate 
entities although, from an economic point of view, they are identical or closely 
associated. Economic international double taxation is also referred to as wider 
international double taxation or indirect international double taxation. In short, 
there is economic double taxation when the same income or capital is taxed twice 
but in the hands of different persons and there is juridical double taxation when 
the same income or capital is taxed twice in the hands of the same person. It is 
generally agreed that both types of international double taxation are equally 
harmful to international trade and business and should be avoided. However, 
efforts to prevent international double taxation have concentrated on juridical, 
rather than economic, international double taxation.20
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The Causes of international double taxation
All cases of international double taxation have a common cause, namely that two 
or more states claim the right to tax the same transaction of a multinational 
enterprise. Such conflicting claims of the right to tax arise for the following 
reasons:
1. States claim fiscal jurisdiction according to different bases. For example, 
state A claims its right to tax because the transaction takes place within its 
territory (the "source" basis) while state B exercises its taxing rights because 
the relevant taxpayer is a resident of country B (the "residence" basis). 
Here international double taxation arises due to the lack of a single 
internationally accepted rule on the correct basis of jurisdiction.
2. Alternatively, countries may adopt the same basis of taxation yet differ in 
their definition of that basis. For example, two states might each claim 
that the same taxpayer is a resident of theirs or that the same transaction 
takes place within their territory. Here international double taxation arises 
due to a lack of universally-accepted definitions.
3. A third cause of international double taxation arises where one state 
adjusts the profits of one member company of an international group 
without a corresponding adjustment being made to the profits of the 
associated enterprise. This cause of international double taxation has 
become increasingly significant following the widespread interest shown by 
tax authorities in the intra-group transfer pricing practices of large 
multinational corporations. Problems of international double taxation arise 
either when there is no mechanism available for the corresponding 
adjustment or because the states involved cannot agree a corresponding 
adjustment. Since most double taxation treaties now include an article on 
procedure for mutual agreement, this problem should be chiefly confined 
to cases where no tax treaty has been concluded between the states 
involved. Unfortunately, the treaty mutual agreement procedure does not 
require the states to reach agreement and, in practice, there are a number
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of cases where one state refuses to act to avoid double taxation in the 
context of a mutual agreement procedure. Further, as is well known, 
significant delays can arise under the procedure with the effect that, in 
practice, it represents little more than a "last ditch" remedy to the taxpayer.
The above three causes of international double taxation deal with conflicts 
involved in direct taxation, international double taxation may also arise by means 
of indirect taxes. However, cases of indirect taxes causing international double 
taxation are significantly rarer. Knechtle^ suggests the reasons for this are that 
indirect taxes are by their very nature territorially confined and the risk of 
international double taxation is diminishing owing to the trend towards value- 
added tax which may be payable only on imports but not on exports. For these 
reasons, there are virtually no general agreements between states governing 
indirect taxes, presumably on the ground that they are not necessary to prevent 
international double taxation.
From the taxpayer’s viewpoint, international double taxation results in a higher 
overall tax burden which in turn affects the ability of an international enterprise 
to compete with firms which operate on a purely domestic basis. Inevitably, this 
distorts international entrepreneurial activity. Since this may lead ultimately to a 
loss of potentially taxable profits, there is in some situations an immediate and 
direct economic incentive to tax authorities to mitigate the effects of international 
double taxation. For example, the U.S. Congress introduced a foreign tax credit 
mechanism as part of the Revenue Act of 1918.22 The basis of this was not 
merely to provide a "just" system but also "a very wise one", without which:
"We would discourage men from going out after commerce or 
business in different countries or residing for such purposes in 
different countries if we continue to maintain this double taxation"23
The source of funding for such activity is also affected by the imposition of 
international double taxation as potential investors perceive that the net return on
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investments fails to compensate for the greater risks inherent in such international 
activity.
From the macro-economic perspective, international double taxation acts against 
the international objectives of freedom of movement of capital and inhibits 
international trade. As such, it results globally in a less efficient use of available 
economic resources.
International double taxation can in theory be countered by unilateral, bilateral 
or multilateral measures. However, it has been mainly bilateral arrangements, 
contained in comprehensive double taxation conventions, that have been used to 
reduce the incidence of such double taxation. These conventions or treaties are 
discussed later in this chapter.
Although the removal (or, at least, reduction) of international double taxation has 
been the primary objective underlying the development of IFL, it has not been the 
only objective. In recent years particularly measures of IFL have been used as a 
means of combatting international tax avoidance and evasion and as a means of 
assisting by fiscal means developing countries.24 These other uses of provisions 
of IFL are discussed later in this chapter in the context of double tax treaties. 
However, it is necessary to discuss in a little more detail the relationship of the 
primary objective underlying IFL to the objective of combatting tax avoidance and 
evasion.
Although the earliest work of the League of Nations was concerned exclusively 
with the problem of international double taxation,25 it was not long before the 
subject of tax evasion was added to the agenda.26 By "tax evasion" was meant the 
non-payment of tax which is legally due, for example as a result of the taxpayers 
deliberate concealment of negligence.27 The early discussion of tax evasion makes 
it clear that this is by no means synonymous with the exportation of capital:
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"It may, perhaps, be useful to preface the following consideration 
by dispelling a misunderstanding and defining the scope of the 
questions relating to tax evasion, a subject which public opinion 
often confuses with the exportation of capital. Capital is exported 
abroad for many reasons. Some investors think that the rate of 
interest abroad is more attractive or suppose that their capital will 
be better managed abroad; some seek to protect themselves against 
risks of ultimate expropriation and yield to fears of a political 
nature; others desire in general to minimise their risks by dividing 
up their wealth in a number of different countries. Finally - and 
there have been many and striking instances of this fact in recent 
years - national of a country whose budget shows a deficit, and 
whose issues of paper money become more and more numerous 
fear above all the definite depreciation of their currency, which in 
that case is the cause of the export of capital abroad and its failure 
to return to the owner’s own country. In this flight of capital due 
to these various reasons, considerations of taxation play only a 
secondary part."^
A number of significant points emerge from these early discussions of tax evasion. 
Most important in the present context was the acceptance that the problem of tax 
evasion is of secondary importance to that of double taxation and that, by 
removing double taxation (primarily through double tax treaties), progress could 
be made in combatting tax evasion:
"The Assembly resolution envisaged the prevention of fiscal evasion 
as a subject apart from that of double taxation, but it is significant 
that clauses for various types of assistance have generally been 
inserted only in treaties for the prevention of double taxation, or in 
supplementary Conventions. In short, the consensus of opinion 
seems to be that States are unwilling to help each other to ensure
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their respective tax laws unless they first agree to remove the 
inequitable burden that results from double taxation."29
Second, it is clear from the early discussion (and particularly the quotation on the 
exportation of capital referred to above) that the commercial use and exportation 
of capital overseas was viewed as largely a commercial and not a tax matter.
Third, it was agreed that tax evasion could best be combatted by the use of 
double tax treaties, containing, for example, exchange of information provisions.
These points are important because they provide historical confirmation of the 
status of efforts to combat tax evasion, namely as an objective of secondary 
importance compared to the primary objective of removing fiscal distortions by 
removing the phenomenon of international double taxation.
It is submitted that it is therefore not correct to view efforts or measures against 
tax avoidance and evasion as representing a self-contained and independent 
objective of equal importance to what is referred to in this thesis as the primary 
objective underlying IFL. Indeed, it is arguable that early attempts to prevent tax 
evasion were directly attributable to the recognition of this primary objective: the 
idea being that the prevention of tax evasion is required to achieve the policy of 
fiscal equity and this must in turn be achieved in order to remove the fiscal 
distortions which would otherwise effect the free movement of capital and 
persons, goods and services. This interpretation seems to have been recognised 
in the detailed comments made by the Technical Experts’ report:
"Essentially, however, the connection between the two problems is 
much more a moral than a material one; the idea of justice in the 
distribution of taxes is the predominating consideration in all the 
investigations which we have conducted, both in regard to double 
taxation and evasion. The International Chamber of Commerce, 
which had, of course, only to investigate the first problem and which
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represents a large body of taxpayers throughout the world, clearly 
perceived this close dependence, and a delegation from that body 
in April 1924 informed us, throughout its spokesman, M. Clementel, 
that "business men, who are a very worthy class, will welcome any 
careful considered and equitable measures which the experts may 
think it desirable to propose for the prevention of tax evasion."30
THE POLICIES UNDERLYING IFL
What are referred to in this thesis as the policies underlying IFL were discussed 
in one form over two hundred years ago by Adam Smith in "The Wealth of 
Nations".31 Adam Smith set out four "maxims" with regard to taxes in general and 
these maxims are equally applicable to international tax law as to domestic tax 
law. These maxims or canons of taxation were intended to be criteria by which 
particular taxes or tax systems may be judged. The criteria may be summarised 
as follows :32
• equity: this requires fairness as between the body of tax payers. 
Theories of public finance now generally distinguish between 
vertical and horizontal equity. Horizontal equity requires that those 
in equal circumstances should pay an equal amount of tax and 
vertical equity means those in unequal circumstances should pay 
different amounts of tax.33
• neutrality: this requires that the incidence of taxation should not 
distort the market. A neutral tax system is therefore one which is 
designed to minimize as far as possible the impact of the tax 
structure on the economic behaviour of agents in the economy.34
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certainty: This is explained by Adam Smith as follows:
"The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought 
to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of 
payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be 
paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the
contributor, and to every other person  The
uncertainly of taxation encourages the insolence and 
favours the corruption of an order of men who are 
naturally unpopular, even where they are neither 
insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of what each 
individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so 
great importance that a very considerable degree of 
inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience 
of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very 
small degree of uncertainty."
Certainty therefore requires that there is a clear scope to any 
particular tax and that the tax can be and will be enforced.
• administrative efficiency: this requires the ease of collection of tax 
and that the costs of collection are acceptable given the yield.
The above maxims are still recognisable in the criteria used by economists in 
appraising tax systems3 5  although various other factors may now also be 
considered . 3 6
The above maxims of taxation were discussed by Adam Smith over two hundred 
years ago (the book first appeared in the Spring of 1776) and therefore clearly 
precede the discussions of international double taxation which have been 
conducted from the 1920s to date . 3 7  However, these maxims or criteria (which are 
in this section labelled "policies") - and particularly those of equity and neutrality -
T/l 29
are of fundamental importance to IFL and the primary objective of IFL. This 
was recognised by the first report on double taxation commissioned under the 
auspices of The League of Nations - The 1923 Report on Double Taxation by 
four eminent economists. 3 8  The very first question considered in that report 
relates to the economic consequences of double taxation from the perspective of 
"the equitable distribution of burdens" and "interference with economic intercourse 
and with the free flow of capital" . 3 9
The discussion in Knechtle’s "Basic Problems in International Fiscal Law " 4 0  also 
emphasises the importance of equity and neutrality which, for Knechtle, are the 
only two general objectives of IFL and which also determine the other special 
objectives of IFL. The special objectives Knechtle refers to are, first, the 
elimination or mitigation of international double taxation; second, the elimination 
of discrimination against foreign taxpayers; third the encouragement of investment 
in developing States; and, fourth, the prevention of "tax flight" (a generic term 
used by Knechtle to refer to tax avoidance in various forms) . 4 1
Knechtle does not seem expressly to recognise what is referred to in this thesis as 
the primary objective underlying IFL as such. Instead, he postulates that the 
general aim for IFL is to pave the way for equitable taxation of international 
economic affairs and, building on a view of what equitable taxation means, asserts 
that:
"Once the postulate of fiscal justice has been achieved, distortions 
of competition due to taxation disappear" 4 2
Thus, for Knechtle, equitable taxation is the pre-eminent objective which, when 
realised, will assist in achieving neutrality of taxation in transnational economic 
activity. Knechtle’s arguments proceed as follows:
""Neutrality" of taxation in regard to international competition in 
turn ensures the achievement of the second main aim of IFL: the
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maintenance and furtherance of freedom of movement in 
international business in the sphere of taxation . " 4 3
Knechtle’s views contain the same elements as reflected above in the discussion 
of the primary objective underlying IFL and the policies of IFL but his hierarchy 
is different. For Knechtle, equity, the main general aim of IFL, is logically prior 
to neutrality which in turn delivers the second aim of IFL which is effectively the 
removal of fiscal distortions to the free movement of capital and persons and the 
exchange of goods and services. It is considered by the author that the weakness 
in Knechtle’s perspective is that it is presumed upon the requirement for fiscal 
equity . 4 4  For Knechtle, therefore, a normative view of fiscal equity is the starting 
point of discussions on the objectives and role of IFL.
It is submitted, however, that the proper starting point for discussions on IFL 
must be the need to remove or minimise fiscal distortions to the free movement 
of capital, persons, goods and services; i.e. what is referred to above as the 
primary objective underlying IFL. The fact that this is the proper starting point 
of - or the primary objective underlying - IFL is attributable to the immense 
significance - in economic terms - of foreign trade. David Ricardo in "The 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation" 4 5  develops the analysis in a chapter 
"On Foreign Trade" : 4 6
"It is quite as important to the happiness of mankind that our 
enjoyments should be increased by the better distribution of labour, 
by each country producing those commodities for which by its 
situation, its climate, and its other natural or artificial advantages it 
is adapted, and by their exchanging them for the commodities of 
other countries, as that they should be augmented by a rise in the
rate of profits Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each
country naturally devotes its capital and labour to such 
employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of 
individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good
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of the whole. By stimulating industry, by rewarding ingenuity, and 
by using most efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, 
it distributes labour most effectively and most economically: while, 
by increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses general 
benefit, and binds together, by one common tie of interest and 
intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilised 
world . " 4 7
Ricardo’s argument - now an accepted tenet of economic theory - is therefore that 
foreign trade is connected with "the universal good of the whole" because it
improves the economic lot of all participants. Anything interfering with this
process of foreign trade (or the free movement of capital, persons, goods and 
services) is, on economic grounds, therefore to be avoided assiduously, a fact 
which is now clearly recognised. An examination of Ricardo’s proof for this 
conclusion - the Law of Association, better known under the name of law of 
comparative cost - is beyond the scope of this thesis4 8  and it must suffice to refer 
to certain comments on the work of Ricardo in this area which were made by one 
of the most influential of twentieth century economists, Ludwig Von Mises:
"The law of association makes us comprehend the tendencies which 
result in the progressive intensification of human cooperation. We 
conceive what incentive induced people not to consider themselves 
simply as rivals in a struggle for the appropriation of the limited
supply of means of subsistence made available by nature. We
realize what has impelled them and permanently impels them to 
consort with one another for the sake of cooperation. Every step 
forward on the way to a more developed mode of the division of 
labor serves the interests of all participants. In order to 
comprehend why man did not remain solitary, searching like the 
animals for food and shelter for himself only and at most also for 
his consort and his helpless infants, we do not need to have 
recourse to a miraculous interference of the Deity or to the empty
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hypostasis of an innate urge toward association. Neither are we 
forced to assume that the isolated individuals or primitive hordes 
one day pledged themselves by a contract to establish social bonds.
The factor that brought about primitive society and daily works 
towards its progressive intensification is human action that is 
animated by the insight into the higher productivity of labor 
achieved under the division of labor . " 4 9
The relevant background of economic theory explains why international double 
taxation has been the subject of such attention by international organisations5 0  and 
it is equally for this reason that the primary objective underlying IFL is the 
removal of fiscal distortions to the free movement of capital, persons, goods and 
services.
This objective is assisted by the policies underlying IFL, and particularly those of 
equity and neutrality. These concepts have already been referred to above but 
require further comment.
The criteria of fiscal equity have been described as universality and equality of 
taxation5 1  but in the international sphere it is clearly unrealistic to think that this 
must entail that taxpayers in all States should bear the same tax burden in similar 
economic circumstances. Instead, the requirement of fiscal equity is to be 
interpreted as requiring fairness between the body of taxpayers in any given State. 
In the context of IFL, the concept is therefore interpreted in a manner which is 
similar to the original statement of it by Adam Smith.
An example of the equity policy may assist in clarifying its relationship to the 
primary objective underlying IFL and to the principles underlying IFL and IFL 
itself.
One of the manifestations of the equity policy is the non-discrimination principle 
and thus ultimately the non-discrimination article that appears in most double
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taxation treaties5 2  and which is designed to prevent one treaty country from 
imposing discriminatory taxation on taxpayers of the other.
Even in its most concrete form as an article in a specific double tax treaty, the 
provision on non-discrimination is of direct relevance to the primary objective 
underlying IFL since it acts to prevent one form of fiscal distortion, namely the 
distortion that would otherwise arise from such discriminatory taxation being 
levied.
The distortion of market behaviour is similarly minimised by adherence to the 
neutrality policy:
"It may be stated as a basis for comment that double tax relief, if 
it is effective and genuinely has tax relief of the taxpayer as its 
objective, should achieve the situation where the taxpayer pays no 
more tax operating cross-border than it would if operating in one 
state alone. In other words, the system should be neutral to the 
decision to operate cross-border. " 5 3
It has been argued that neutrality is impossible:
"The essential point is that the object of many economists" quest, a 
neutral tax, i.e. a tax that will leave the market exactly the same as 
it was without taxation, must always be a chimera. No tax can be 
truly neutral; every one will cause distortion" . 5 4
It is certainly correct to say that no tax will leave the market undisturbed and in 
this sense no tax can ever achieve neutrality. However, a state can attempt to 
reduce the distorting effects of taxation within its territory by imposing standard 
rates of taxation on all similar activities and by phasing out existing fiscal 
privileges. These options are clearly not available in an international context.
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The huge differences across the globe in the tax burdens imposed by individual 
states guarantee a significant distorting effect by taxation on the world economy.
Given that international agreement on the basis and quantum of taxation is as 
remote as ever and given that a large number of states, including many low-tax 
states, have not so far made a major contribution to the development of IFL, it 
is very unlikely that progress can be made in achieving any sort of international 
tax neutrality in the sense of imposing globally standard rates of tax, etc. 
Moreover, it is not necessarily desirable for such a development to take place. 
The level and basis of taxation is a matter for each state to determine in the 
exercise of its own fiscal autonomy.
States take radically different views as to the function of taxation and there are 
considerable differences in the reliance placed upon tax revenues from one state 
to another. Indeed, there are often major policy shifts in respect of taxation within 
a single state . 5 5
Therefore, as a result of the fact that, judged in economic terms, taxation is 
certain to be non-neutral in its effect and the fact that levels of taxation will vary 
from one state to another, the goal of neutrality assumes in the context of the 
development of IFL a more realistic objective than that of global taxation on a 
uniform basis. This more realistic objective is the removal of international double 
taxation. The development of IFL over recent decades has already been 
responsible for the significant progress made towards eradicating such 
international double taxation and since such double taxation has a significant 
distorting effect on international trade and it is one of the early achievements of 
IFL to have addressed and partly resolved this problem.
Thus, the "neutrality" achieved by the removal of international double taxation is 
the removal of any extra tax burden as a result of a transaction being an 
international transaction rather than a domestic one. In general, taxation will 
continue to be a distorting factor in, for example, the choice between locating a
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new manufacturing subsidiary in either a high tax state or a low tax state. 
However, the removal of international double taxation will at least attempt to 
ensure that international transactions are taxed no more heavily than comparable 
domestic transactions.
As noted earlier, in recent years states have sought to achieve two additional 
objectives, both of which are relevant to the policies underlying IFL. A  strong 
lobby from the world’s developing countries has argued that IFL should be used 
to secure investment by fiscal means in their countries. This goal is reflected, for 
example, in the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention5 6  with its 
emphasis on higher withholding taxes on operations in developing countries.
Secondly, there is an is increasing concern on the part of states with the issues of 
tax avoidance and evasion. To some extent this concern can be seen as an aspect 
of the two major policies underlying IFL, the achievement of equity and neutrality, 
since it is frequently argued that these policies cannot be implemented where 
avoidance and evasion of taxes is possible. In recent years, however, the increased 
attention to this phenomenon of "tax flight" can only be explained by the fact that 
many states now see the development of IFL as an additional means of enforcing 
their taxation jurisdiction and thereby maximising their income from taxation.
These recent tendencies in IFL to assist developing countries and to prevent tax 
flight present a potential clash with the primary policies of IFL, equity and 
neutrality. The use of IFL to assist developing countries by fiscal means is hardly 
reconcilable with the objective of fiscal neutrality, although may be justified on 
one view of equity (vertical equity). Moreover, if, in an attempt to curtail tax 
avoidance and evasion, states concentrate on using IFL to this end, then 
significant progress towards achieving the primary policies of IFL is unlikely to be 
made.
The remaining two of the criteria referred to by Adam Smith - certainty and 
administrative efficiency (or "workability") - are obviously as valid for measures of
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IFL as they are for domestic law. They are self-evident criteria and require no 
further explanation at this stage, although are discussed later in this thesis in the 
discussion of the CFC legislation.
THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING IFL
The principles underlying IFL represent widely-agreed working tools or concepts 
which can be used in a practical way to promote the objective underlying IFL, 
consistent with the policies which have been discussed in the previous section.
These internationally-accepted principles of fiscal equity have been developed 
over the last six and a half decades5 7  and apply in respect of both corporate and 
non-corporate taxpayers but are considered here only insofar as they relate to 
corporate taxpayers. Such principles have significantly determined the provisions 
of international tax treaties between states and continue to be debated by 
international institutions, academics and other commentators. Most of these 
principles were initially developed by the Technical Experts Committee of the 
League of Nations, which, for example worked on concepts of fiscal domicile or 
residence and definitions of permanent establishment in the 1920s.58 There are 
countless examples of references to the principles of IFL in this sense. The 
O.E.C.D., for instance has spoken of:
"the generally accepted principles of double taxation conventions 
that an enterprise of one state shall not be taxed in the other state 
unless it carries on business in that other state through a permanent 
establishment situated therein " 5 9
The principles referred to above are of particular importance because they 
establish the nexus that is required to exist before one state may tax a company 
which is a resident of another. That nexus is "taxable presence" which has also 
become known as the "permanent establishment" concept as a result of its 
expression in both the O.E.C.D. and U.N. model double taxation conventions. 6 0
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Under this principle, tax may be levied by a state on non-resident companies on 
the profits generated by that company within its jurisdiction. For example, this 
principle will normally apply to tax the profits of a branch of an overseas 
company. It is generally accepted that tax is so levied only if activity of a non­
resident is such that it generates (or could generate) profits. Thus, a 
representative office which generates no profits would not amount to a taxable 
presence (i.e. it would not qualify as a permanent establishment). Equally, there 
is general acceptance that where jurisdiction to tax arises as a result of there being 
a permanent establishment, the profits subject to tax shall be those attributable 
to that permanent establishment.
These principles are of fundamental significance to IFL because they effectively 
arbitrate between the competing claims of the relevant fiscs. In so doing, they 
remove, or at least reduce, the likelihood of double taxation arising as a result of 
the separate application by different states of varying principles of taxation.
Other principles underlying IFL are no less important. An almost universally 
accepted approach to dealing with transactions carried out between associated 
companies which do not transact using arm’s length prices is an application of the 
transfer pricing principles.
In connection with this, the United Nations has observed:
"The most common approach taken by tax authorities dealing with 
artificial transfer pricing is to seek to assess the profits arising from 
international transactions between affiliated enterprises on the basis 
of the "arm’s length" principle. There is general acceptance of this 
principle which is incorporated in the O.E.C.D. Model Double 
Taxation Convention, the United Nations Model Double Taxation 
Convention between Developed and Developing Countries and 
most bilateral treaties for the avoidance of double taxation" 6 1
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The recognition and acceptance of the principles underlying IFL may in fact 
prevent tax authorities from promulgating domestic legislation which would 
potentially cause difficulties to the operation of those principles. 6 2  This yielding 
to principles underlying IFL is significant given a state’s unfettered ability to 
impose its own taxation measures on those within its jurisdiction. The point can 
be illustrated by reference to the attempts by various tax authorities to introduce 
or impose rules to tax "global trading" securities operations. The Senior Attorney 
in the IRS charged with this task in the U.S. has commented:
"In implementing a solution to the tax issues raised by global 
trading, unilateral approaches are severely constraining. Given the 
variety of trading arrangements and the need for acceptance by 
foreign jurisdictions, writing meaningful regulations on this topic is 
virtually impossible. Instead, bilateral and multilateral solutions are 
greatly preferable " 6 3
The "need for acceptance by foreign jurisdictions" requires that any taxation 
measures affecting international businesses conform to certain basic standards of 
equity - in this case such measures would need to conform fairly with the arm’s 
length principle.
Similar references to what are the fundamental principles underlying IFL are also 
common amongst commentators. For example, there is the comment of Dr. B. 
Runge that "Administrative assistance should not lead to taxation over and above 
the recognised principles of international tax law" . 6 4
The "recognised principles of international tax law", in so far as they relate to 
corporations, suggest, broadly, that a fisc is entitled to tax companies which are 
resident in its jurisdiction and also to tax non resident companies to the extent 
such companies have a taxable presence or permanent establishment within its 
jurisdiction. (The taxation of non-resident companies has already been dealt with 
above in the discussion of "taxable presence".)
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With regard to resident companies, some (but not all) states tax companies 
resident within their jurisdiction on their world-wide income. The U.S. and the 
U.K. are examples of this approach, (although it should be noted that there is no 
universally accepted test of the residence of a company65). The major alternative 
to this approach is some form of territorial basis whereby taxation is levied by a 
state only on income arising within its territory. This is achieved either by a basis 
of tax which seeks to tax only income arising within the territory (and Hong Kong 
is perhaps the most well known state using this basis66) or by a state which brings 
all worldwide income into charge but then gives an exemption from tax for foreign 
source income (e.g. the Netherlands). The key feature of these two general 
approaches to taxation is their treatment of foreign source income. Obviously, 
such income is not taxed under the territorial or exemption basis. The credit 
approach taxes such income but generally allows a credit for foreign taxes suffered 
on it. Although there is in general no clear agreement as to which basis of 
taxation is preferable, the credit basis is perhaps becoming the more prevalent . 6 7  
In the case of non-residents, (for example, a branch of a non-resident company), 
there is almost universal agreement on a single principle, namely that taxation is 
to be levied by a state on the income which relates to the activity carried on in 
accordance with the permanent establishment (or "taxable presence") principle 
already discussed.
Discussions on and establishment of the principles of IFL create the criteria by 
which specific measures of substantive IFL are judged. Thus, for example, the 
arm’s length principle, to which reference has already been made, is clearly an 
accepted principle of IFL and its enactment in most double tax treaties is to be 
welcomed . 6 8  Domestic provisions, such as the U.K. provision in ICTA1988, s. 209 
(2 )(e)(iv), which operate in breach of that principle (in this case by treating all 
interest paid to an offshore parent company as a distribution) and which are 
preserved in double tax treaties fall to be condemned by the criteria of IFL 
because they are in breach of the arm’s length principle. Further, since the 
principles of IFL referred to are framed as principles, no sophisticated tools are 
required for assessing adherence to them. For example, it is generally clear
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whether, in any particular case, taxation is levied by reference to the arm’s length 
standard or whether a branch of an overseas company is taxed according to the 
fiscal presence test and only to the extent of its profits which are attributable to 
that presence.
PRE-SUBSTANTIVE PATTERNS OF IFL
The category of pre-substantive patterns of IFL is intended to refer to model 
bilateral double tax conventions. However, before explaining the role of such 
model treaties, it is first necessary to clarify the nature of double tax treaties more 
generally and their role in combatting international double taxation.
In general, a double taxation agreement is a treaty concluded by two or more 
states with the objective of regulating taxing rights in situations where the 
application of each state’s taxing rights might otherwise result in international 
double taxation. Such treaties are usually bilateral and are founded on a mutually 
agreed set of waivers of taxing rights based on reciprocity. Double taxation 
agreements have also been concluded with the objective of preventing 
international tax avoidance or evasion. There are also double taxation agreements 
which have been entered into purely to encourage investment from each country 
into the other (e.g. the treaty between France and Saudi Arabia , ) . 6 9
It is not the purpose of double taxation agreements to reduce disparities between 
taxing policies of states or equalise the tax burden between states. The objective 
of a double taxation agreement is merely to reconcile the competing fiscal claims 
of states which are parties to a treaty by the allocation of tax jurisdiction, thus 
avoiding international double taxation.
A simplified example of the operation of a double taxation agreement is as 
follows:
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X is resident in state A and receives income from a source in state 
B. State A levies taxes according to the residency principle whilst 
state B taxes on the basis of the source principle. If no unilateral 
relief is available, X’s income from state B will be taxed by both 
states. The double taxation agreement negotiated between the two 
states will reconcile the differing tax systems by allocating the taxing 
right to either state A or state B or to both by a pre-arranged 
formula.
The example illustrates the primary objective of double taxation agreements, 
namely the avoidance of international double taxation and the consequent 
promotion and facilitation of the international exchange of goods and services and 
the free movement of capital and persons . 7 0
In theory at least, taxing rights are allocated to each state by reference to the 
criterion of which state has the better claim to exert the taxing right in question, 
the "better claim" being determined by the principles of IFL.
In practice, things are occasionally somewhat different. The process of negotiating 
double taxation agreements and allocating taxing rights reflects the self-interest 
of the countries concerned . 7 1  Since all states are eager to obtain the maximum 
amount of revenue at all times, they naturally seek the largest possible slice of the 
available tax cake, thus making the allocation of taxing rights a source of 
considerable contention during the negotiating process. As observed by Korn, 
Dietz and Debatin:
"In the final analysis, the conflict rules of each double tax 
agreement and the way in which they stress certain given connecting 
factors, are the result of tough bargaining over the economic and 
revenue interests of the two treaty partners'^
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An example of the self-interested attitude of states in the bargaining process is 
contained in the U.S. Senate Finance Committee report on the Australian and 
New Zealand treaties which notes that in tax treaty negotiations;
"[the] central issue is whether the final agreement represents a 
bargain which is sufficiently favourable overall to the United States 
that it should be ratified" 7 3
From the point of view of the development of IFL, it is a regrettable, if perhaps 
inevitable, fact that considerations of international fiscal equity and neutrality may 
be overlooked while the states involved tenaciously adhere to a purely "business 
basis" style of negotiating double tax agreements.
The conventional wisdom on the effect of double taxation agreements is that they 
have merely a "negative" effect since they cannot add to the domestic tax 
legislation of a state and work only to leave the power to tax restricted, repressed 
or unchanged. On this view, the taxpayer can only benefit from the operation of 
a double tax agreement. However, there are cases where the taxpayer may be 
adversely affected by a treaty. For example, the associated enterprise article 
contained in most double taxation agreements, is now being invoked by tax 
authorities to re-allocate profits from one country to another with the possible 
consequence of more profits being subject to a higher-tax jurisdiction^ or, as 
noted, the failure of the mutual agreement procedure can also lead to instances 
of double taxation. The article relating to exchange of information which is also 
contained in most double taxation agreements may also act against the taxpayer’s 
own best interests . 7 5
Notwithstanding the possible disadvantages which may accrue to a taxpayer from 
a double taxation agreement, the very existence of a treaty relationship is 
generally attractive to investors and in itself appears to bring benefits to the 
signatory states:
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"it is noticeable again and again, when investments are being 
planned, that legal certainty, dependable tax forecasts and reliable 
tax terms for investors rank high in importance. Accordingly, 
investment in a country with which a treaty exists for the avoidance 
of double taxation has a much better chance than other investment 
projects" 7 6
Since double taxation agreements are treaties between states in accordance with 
the principles of public international law, they become binding as soon as they are 
ratified. In some countries they also gain domestic validity on ratification. In the 
U.K., for example, any double taxation treaty which has been incorporated into 
U.K. law by an Order in Council will take effect under ICTA 1988 s. 788 and 
CGTA 1979 s. 107 7  to the extent it provides for:
(a) relief from income tax or corporation tax in respect of income or 
capital gains; or
(b) charging the income or capital gains arising from sources in the 
U .K  to persons not resident in the U.K.; or
(c) determining the income or capital gains to be attributed to persons 
not resident in the U.K. and their agencies, branches or 
establishments in the U.K. or to persons resident in the U.K. who 
have special relationships with persons not resident; or
(d) granting persons not resident in the U.K. the right to a tax credit in 
respect of dividends paid to them by U.K. companies.
The Types of DTAs
Whilst there are other types, three distinct types of treaty can be identified. First, 
there are limited agreements that deal only with the profits of shipping and air 
transport undertakings. 7 8  Such agreements cater for the situation where such an 
enterprise is resident in one country but carries on business in the other. The
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agreement will usually provide that only the country in which the undertaking is 
resident may tax its profits.
The second category of treaty relates to estate and gift taxes. These are becoming 
more common but are outside the scope of this thesis.
The third and most common type of treaty is the comprehensive double taxation 
agreement which has as its primary objective the relief of double taxation on all 
or substantially all forms of income. It is this type of treaty which is of central 
significance to the present discussion.
There is a highly developed network of comprehensive double taxation treaties 
between the more developed countries, 7 9  although developing countries have been 
slower to conclude such treaties. There are a number of factors that account for 
this. The chief problem seems to have been the feeling on the part of developing 
countries that the existing provisions of taxation treaties do not take account of 
the special treaty requirements of developing countries. The advent of the U.N. 
Model Double Taxation Convention in 1979, drafted with the specific intention 
of promoting taxation treaties between developed and developing countries, may 
lead to a reversal of this situation, though there still remain a number of factors 
weighing against such a development. 8 0
The first double taxation agreement between a developed country and an Arab 
state of the Persian Gulf was concluded between France and Saudi Arabia in 
1980. Treaties between capitalist and Soviet bloc countries were non-existent until 
the U.S.-Soviet Union treaty of 1973.
The Contents of Double Taxation Agreements
Although the detailed text of articles can vary quite widely, double taxation 
agreements generally follow a similar pattern, reflecting the fact that they will 
usually be based on one of the various model treaties (considered below).
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The U.S.-U.K. Agreement may be taken as an example . 8 1  The Agreement begins 
and ends with procedural matters. Articles 1 and 2 cover the personal scope of 
the Treaty and the taxes covered while the final two Articles, 28 and 29, deal with 
the entry into force and termination of the Treaty.
The main body of the Agreement comprises the substantive articles. The U.S. - 
U.K. Treaty follows the normal pattern of dealing first with the definitions of 
general terms (Article 3). The Treaty then delineates the fiscal jurisdiction of the 
two states with articles on what is to count as fiscal residence (Article 4) and what 
constitutes a permanent establishment (Article 5).
Most of the remaining articles assign the jurisdiction to tax different types of 
income and capital. There are generally three possible approaches to this 
assignment of tax jurisdiction.
The first approach is to assign exclusive jurisdiction to tax a particular type of 
income to one of the contracting states. For example, Article 8  of the U.S.-U.K. 
Treaty stipulates that "profits derived by an enterprise of a Contracting State from 
the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic shall be taxable only in 
that State".
The second approach is to assign non-exclusive jurisdiction to tax a particular type 
of income to one of the contracting states (usually the state of residence) but to 
allow the other state to impose a tax up to a maximum percentage which is fixed 
in the treaty. Article 10 of the U.S. - U.K. Agreement follows this approach in 
providing that dividends may be taxed in the state of residence of the payee, but 
that the state of source may also impose a tax not exceeding 15% of the gross 
amount of the dividend.
The third approach is to assign primary jurisdiction to tax a particular type of 
income to one of the contracting states (normally the state of source) but to allow 
the other state also to tax the income. Where the other state does also tax the
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income, relief from double taxation is given. Thus, in the U.S.-U.K. Treaty, 
Article 6  provides that income from real property may be taxed in the Contracting 
State in which the property is situated. If such income is also taxed by the other 
State relief from double taxation will be provided under Article 23 (Elimination 
of Double Taxation) by means of the credit method.
Article 22 provides that all income not specifically dealt with in the Articles of the 
Convention shall be taxable only in the state of residence.
As well as the provisions designed to avoid international double taxation, a treaty 
will normally contain other articles dealing with non-discrimination, mutual 
agreement procedure and the exchange of information and administrative 
assistance.
These are covered in the U.S.-U.K. Agreement by Articles 24, 25 and 26 
respectively.
Model Conventions
It is generally agreed that the best method of combating international double 
taxation is by bilateral tax conventions. It has further been perceived as desirable 
to harmonise these conventions in accordance with uniform principles, methods, 
rules and definitions. The O.E.C.D. has observed that it is;
"most desirable to clarify, standardise, and guarantee the fiscal 
situation of taxpayers in each Member country who are engaged in 
commercial, industrial or financial activities in other Member 
countries through the application by all Member countries of 
common solutions to identical cases of double taxation" 8 2
The field of IFL is still nascent and it is still too early to expect conventions to 
achieve a unification of international tax law such as is found in conventions on
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bills of exchange, cheques and international commercial law. Nonetheless, work 
carried out over the last sixty years has achieved some measure of agreement on 
the structure and main principles of double taxation conventions. A great deal 
of this work has been carried out in the preparation of model conventions. It is 
no exaggeration to state that a considerable amount of this work has contributed 
to the establishment of the general principles of IFL. It is for this reason that 
work on double taxation agreements has been of such importance in the 
development of IFL.
The aim of model conventions has been stated to be the provision of "a means of 
settling on a uniform basis the most common problems which arise in the field of 
international double taxation" . 8 3  These conventions normally comprise a draft 
model convention and detailed commentaries on the articles of the model treaty. 
The commentaries discuss the principles underlying the provisions of the model 
convention as well as the substantive content of the treaty. This makes them of 
great practical assistance in the interpretation and application of the convention 
and in the settlement of disputes. For example, the Commentary to the O.E.C.D. 
Model Convention has recently been referred to by the U.K. courts for this 
purpose . 8 4  Similarly, it will often be the case that statements or guidance based 
on the O.E.C.D. Commentary will be of direct assistance in the application of the 
substantive provisions which comprise IFL:
"As these commentaries have been drafted and agreed upon by the 
experts appointed to the Committee on Fiscal Affairs by the 
governments of Member countries, they are of special importance 
in the development of international fiscal law. Although the 
commentaries are not designed to be annexed in any manner to the 
conventions to be signed by Member countries, which alone 
constitute legally binding international instruments, they can 
nevertheless be of great assistance in the application of the 
conventions and, in particular, in the settlement of any disputes . " 8 5
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However, due to differences in taxation systems and interests involved, it is 
common to find model conventions accompanied by reservations lodged by some 
states on certain points where unanimous agreement was not possible.
History of Model DTAs
It follows from the comments that have already been made that the history of 
work on double taxation treaties is in large measure the history of the 
development of IFL. International collaboration on the subject of international 
double taxation goes back as far as 1921 when the League of Nations started work 
on the avoidance of international double taxation. This work led to the first 
model bilateral convention in 1928 and later to the Model Conventions of Mexico 
(1943) and London (1946). The O.E.C.D. carried on this work after World War 
2. In 1963, the Fiscal Committee of the O.E.C.D., which had been created in 
1956, submitted a report entitled "Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income 
and Capital" (followed in 1966 by a Draft Convention on the taxation of estates 
and inheritances) . 8 6  The 1963 O.E.C.D. Draft Convention has been revised and 
the result is a text of the Convention entitled "Model Convention for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital" , 8 7  which is more usually referred to as the O.E.C.D. Model Convention.
Meanwhile, in the mid 1960s, the United Nations began to renew its interest in 
the problem of international double taxation. Having noted the O.E.C.D.’s 
admission that "the traditional tax conventions have not commended themselves 
to developing countries, 8 8  the U.N. set out to provide a model convention which 
would promote the conclusion of taxation treaties between developed and 
developing countries. The United Nations Group of Experts on Tax Treaties 
Between Developed and Developing Countries was accordingly created in 1967 
and the Group’s efforts culminated in 1979 in the "United Nations Model Double 
Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries".
T/l 49
A third modern model convention is the U.S. draft of 1977, revised in 1981.89 
This model convention has been used as the basis for treaty negotiations by the 
U.S. but has not generally been adopted by other countries and has recently been 
withdrawn by the U.S.. There is also an Andean Pact model convention^ and a 
model convention used for negotiations between A.S.E.A.N. members . 9 1
The Use of Model Conventions
Virtually all modern comprehensive double tax agreements are either based on, 
or draw heavily from, one or more of the model conventions. This is to be 
welcomed since it reflects a general consensus on a wide variety of the important 
principles of IFL which are enacted in such treaties. Most recent bilateral taxation 
conventions follow the pattern of the O.E.C.D. Draft. The existence and influence 
of this Draft Convention has made it possible to negotiate bilateral treaties on a 
common basis thereby creating an important degree of harmonisation. The 
O.E.C.D. Model rests on two general assumptions:
(a) the country of residence will eliminate double taxation by using the credit 
or exemption method to prevent international double taxation.
(b) the country of source will in turn reduce the scope of its jurisdiction to tax 
at source and also the rates of tax where jurisdiction is retained.
The reference in (a) above to the credit and exemption methods is important and 
requires further clarification. As indicated, the two methods are both concerned 
with the removal of international double taxation. There are several possible 
methods of relief from international double taxation. The most commonly used 
methods are relief by exemption and relief by credit. Under the exemption 
method, income or capital which is taxable in one state (usually the state of 
source) is then exempted from tax in the other state (usually the state of 
residence). The exemption method is based on the assumption that the enterprise 
should be enabled to operate in the relevant country in the tax system prevailing
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in that country. It is therefore accepted that the country will fix the tax terms 
under which the enterprise may operate.
Where relief is given by the credit method, income or capital taxable in one state 
(usually the state of source) is then taxed in the other state (usually the state of 
residence) but the tax levied in the first state is credited against the tax levied by 
the second state.
"The essential feature of the credit method is that the investor’s 
country of residence treats the foreign tax, within certain statutory 
limits, as if it were a tax deemed to be paid to itself ' . 9 2
There are advantages and disadvantages to both these methods of relief from 
international double taxation. For this reason, the choice of methods is left to 
individual states in the O.E.C.D. Model Double Taxation Treaty. 9 3  However, 
there is an increasing tendency on the part of states in the developed world to 
prefer the credit method . 9 4  There are two explanations for this trend. First, the 
desire for ever-increasing tax revenues and, second, the aim to counteract tax 
avoidance schemes whereby assets are transferred to countries with low tax rates. 
Both the above reasons are based on the fact that the overseas income is brought 
into tax with a credit available to the extent overseas tax has been paid. Thus, the 
use of low tax states (for example, for overseas branch activities) will not, under 
the credit method, achieve a tax saving since the overseas income will ultimately 
be subject to the full domestic tax rate. Both the countries which are considered 
in this thesis (the U.S. and the U.K.) adopt the credit method to relieve 
international double taxation.
Other methods of relief from international double taxation may also be 
mentioned. A company may be allowed to deduct amounts of foreign tax paid as 
an expense in arriving at the figure of profits liable to domestic tax. Relief may 
also be granted by allowing a deferral of tax, for example, where a state taxes 
income from abroad only when it is remitted to the home country.
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The latter two methods of relief are applied unilaterally by a state. Relief by the 
methods of credit and exemption can be given unilaterally but they are also a 
common feature of bilateral double taxation agreements.
The approach reflected in the O.E.C.D. Model Convention has been accepted by 
developed countries, but it has not found favour with developing countries, 
principally because of their reluctance to reduce or yield taxation at source to the 
extent required by the O.E.C.D. Model. Therefore, the U.N. Draft, expressly 
geared to the requirements of developing countries, does not give any percentages 
for the rates of tax at source on dividends and interest and assumes that a tax at 
source on royalties is equally justified (whereas under Article 12 of the O.E.C.D. 
Model Convention royalties are taxable only in the state of residence of the 
taxpayer, provided that the resident is the beneficial owner of the royalties). 
Substantial departures from the O.E.C.D. text are also to be found in the United 
Nation’s definition of "permanent establishment" (Article 5).
The U.S. Model Treaty was produced in response to the fact that the United 
States has found it difficult to use the O.E.C.D. Model Convention in its present 
form. However, it has been suggested that the current tendency in the U.S. 
appears to be to move towards the O.E.C.D. Model on the assumption that it will 
gradually become acceptable to the U.S. taxation authorities . 9 5
Other Uses of DTAs
The primary objective of most double taxation agreements is, as has been noted, 
the allocation of taxing rights in order to avoid international double taxation. A 
secondary, but increasingly prominent function of double taxation agreements is 
their use as devices to attack international tax avoidance and evasion. In the light 
of the developments over the last two decades, treaties have become an important 
weapon in a state’s armoury against international avoidance and evasion. This 
aspect of double taxation agreements is considered separately below.
T/l 52
Double taxation agreements are also used to accomplish other secondary 
objectives. 9 6  The most important of these is perhaps the encouragement of 
private investment in developing countries. Whilst most agreements are stated to 
be conventions "for the avoidance of double taxation" , 9 7  some developing countries 
have argued that treaties should go beyond this and include specific provisions 
actively to encourage investment in their countries. An example would be a 
provision whereby a developed country gives a special tax credit or deduction to 
companies investing in developing countries.
None of the model conventions has adopted this approach and it has not met with 
a favourable response from developed countries. However, where developing 
countries have themselves introduced tax incentives in order to attract foreign 
investment (such as tax holidays, tax exemptions for re-invested profits and 
accelerated depreciation allowances), developed countries have often maintained 
the effect of this relief by appropriate mechanisms in their double taxation 
agreements with developing countries. Unless such relief is recognised by 
developed countries using the credit method for relief from international double 
taxation, the effect of tax incentives given in developing (source) countries is 
merely to increase the tax to be paid to the developed (residence) country . 9 8
Multilateral Agreements
The formulation and application of a multilateral convention is attractive from the 
perspective of IFL because it would involve a much improved uniform approach 
to a number of key issues of international taxation. Such an approach would 
further reduce the likelihood of international double taxation, whether juridical or 
economic, and enhance the conditions for international trade and investment. In 
the long term, the existence of such a convention might also influence the 
domestic law of contracting states, thus providing a further impetus to the 
harmonisation of domestic tax law which is relevant to the taxation of 
international business or investment.
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Despite the general acceptance that international double taxation should be 
eliminated and despite the increasing international co-operation between states 
and international organisations, the prospect of a multilateral international tax 
agreement remains almost as remote as ever. Calls have been repeatedly made 
for such a treaty since 1925.99 Although little has been achieved to date there is 
nonetheless, and notwithstanding a number of setbacks and difficulties, an overall 
trend toward increasing multilateral co-operation and collaboration in approaching 
a number of issues facing IFL. For example, the O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs is actively working on a number of matters relevant to the development 
of IFLjoq and the recent attempt to produce a multilateral convention on the 
exchange of information and mutual assistance between tax authorities 1 0 1  does 
at least reflect the overall trend toward a more concerted multilateral approach 
in a number of areas. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that both the above 
examples fall short of providing any evidence that a multilateral taxation 
agreement is still anything other than a long-term possibility. 1 0 2
There is however one multilateral taxation agreement in existence. This is a 
convention on the taxation of road traffic. In this treaty of 1956, which replaced 
an earlier agreement of 1931, thirty states originally agreed that tax on motor 
vehicles should be levied only by the state in which the vehicle is registered.
The principal difficulty facing any multilateral convention is that of reconciling the 
requirements of potential signatory states. Whilst the drafting of bilateral treaties 
can be tailored to take account of the participants’ domestic tax policies, it is 
doubtful whether a multilateral taxation convention could achieve the same result: 
Where a bilateral taxation treaty has the task of reconciling only two domestic tax 
systems, a multilateral convention would be faced with the task of satisfactorily 
reconciling the competing claims and requirements of several states . 1 0 3
This difficulty is exemplified by the efforts of a working party created by the 
Council of EFTA1 0 4  following the 1963 recommendations of the O.E.C.D. Council. 
The working party’s brief was to investigate the technical feasibility and
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practicability of a multilateral taxation agreement. After five years of work the 
working party reported that in the light of the technical difficulties facing such a 
project, the most that could be achieved was an outline convention incorporating 
the most basic areas of general agreement.
Since this would mean that the most important provisions would still have to be 
negotiated by bilateral treaty, the working party agreed that the conclusion of a 
multilateral taxation agreement could not be recommended at present . 1 0 5
The difficulties facing multilateral conventions have been recognised by both the 
U.N. Group and the O.E.C.D.’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs, the latter body 
having stated that it might, however; -
"be possible for certain groups of Member countries to study the 
possibility of concluding such a Convention among themselves on 
the basis of the Model Convention, subject to certain adaptions they 
may consider necessary to suit their particular purpose " . 1 0 6
The feasibility of regional conventions has also been noted by the U.N. Group of 
Experts . 1 0 7
The possibility of a regional convention is well illustrated by the efforts of the 
EEC to conclude a multilateral agreement. In 1962, the Neumark Report stated 
that:
"The best way for ensuring uniform provisions on double taxation 
is without doubt the signing of a multilateral agreement by the 
Member States of the E.E.C. The Fiscal and Financial Committee 
is also of the opinion that endeavours to eliminate double taxation 
within the E.E.C. should ultimately lead to the signing of a 
multilateral agreement based on the Model Convention of the 
O.E.C.D . . " 1 0 8
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Alongside efforts to prepare a draft multilateral tax convention have been efforts 
towards harmonising substantive fiscal law within the E.E.C. Since the main 
difficulty facing a multilateral convention is the variety of domestic tax systems, 
this process of harmonisation could be expected to facilitate the drafting of such 
a convention for the E.E.C. countries.
However, whilst progress has been made in some quarters, the project as a whole 
is proving considerably more difficult than expected. In view of the radical 
differences in domestic tax systems and policies, this is hardly surprising and it is 
not yet possible to report any real progress toward the preparation of an E.E.C. 
multilateral taxation convention, or, for that matter, toward the harmonisation of 
substantive fiscal law in the field of direct taxation within the E.E.C.
The longer-term prospects of a multilateral convention may be somewhat brighter. 
The increasing attention paid to issues of international taxation might in the long 
run lead to the development of generally accepted basic principles of IFL which 
would pave the way for such a convention. Since the primary goal of IFL is the 
removal of international double taxation and since taxation treaties are one of the 
primary vehicles used to this end, it is likely that efforts will continue to be made 
in future toward the preparation of a generally acceptable multilateral convention.
THE SUBSTANTIVE ENACTMENTS WHICH CONSTITUTE IFL
The substantive enactments which constitute IFL are in effect the legal expression 
of the prescriptive policies and principles discussed in the earlier sections of this 
chapter.
These substantive enactments include specific bilateral double tax conventions and 
domestic tax law and claims to jurisdiction, which may include provisions to relieve 
international double taxation as well as unilateral anti-tax haven legislation of the 
sort discussed in this thesis. The specific enactments contained in double tax
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treaties are often different in character to legislation dealing simply with domestic 
tax issues. For example:-
"Bilateral agreements for regulating some of the problems of double 
taxation began, at any rate so far as the United Kingdom was 
concerned, in 1946. The form employed in all agreements, is 
derived, I believe, from a set of model clauses proposed by the 
fiscal commission of the League of Nations. The aim is to provide 
by treaty for the tax claims of two governments both legitimately 
interested in taxing a particular source of income either by resigning 
to one of the two the whole claim or else by prescribing the basis 
on which the tax claim is to be shared between them. For our 
purpose it is convenient to note that the language employed in this 
Agreement is what may be call international tax language and that 
such categories as "enterprise", "industrial or commercial profits" 
and "permanent establishment" have no exact counterpart in the 
taxing code of the United Kingdom . " 1 0 9
With regard to the status of the "rules" of substantive IFL, there are two distinct 
points which are commonly debated amongst international tax commentators. 
The first relates to whether these rules are substantive laws in themselves or are 
merely conflict rules. The second is whether there are limits to the power of a fisc 
to legislate in the area of fiscal law. Each point will be considered briefly below. 
However, since they are of merely peripheral importance to this thesis, the 
discussion of them will be brief.
Dealing with the issue simply in the context of the U.K., it is acknowledged that, 
whatever the provisions contained in a double taxation treaty, that treaty must be 
incorporated into U.K. law before it will be recognised by the courts . n 0  This may 
suggest that the provisions of a double tax treaty merely regulate whether the 
various relevant provisions of domestic law are allowed or not allowed to operate 
in a situation in which the treaty applies. However, the fact that a treaty can
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change the position of a taxpayer from that which may have applied in the 
absence of the treaty and can impose different rates of tax, or remove a charge 
to tax, as compared with domestic law indicates the substantive effect of such 
treaties. Indeed, the Inland Revenue are occasionally known to take the view, 
based on an interpretation of ICTA 1988, s. 788, that double tax agreements are 
capable of imposing taxation where none would otherwise arise under domestic 
legislation.! n
Moreover, the fact that U.K. courts now seem prepared to consult such 
documents as the Commentary to the O.E.C.D. Model Double Taxation 
Convention in appropriate circumstances112 does, at the very least, indicate the 
different character of the provisions contained in double taxation agreements as 
compared to provisions having a purely domestic effect, notwithstanding that such 
agreements are required to be incorporated into U.K. law to be effective.
However, it should be emphasised that the view of the writer that the enactments 
of IFL in double taxation treaties should be regarded as substantive tax law is in 
no way related to the main arguments of this thesis, where the discussion 
concentrates on the principles of IFL, rather than the specific enactment of those 
principles.
The second focus of debate on IFL has been the question whether there are limits 
to the jurisdiction of a state to levy tax imposed by general international law. With 
regard to this debate, it seems to be established that:
"No rules of international law exist to limit the extent of any
country’s tax jurisdiction."113
However, the majority of exponents of this view114 accept that the extra-territorial 
ability of a fisc to enforce its tax laws render its ability to levy taxation without 
jurisdictional limit of academic interest only. This means that there is broad 
agreement between the two parties to this debate that taxation can in practice be
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levied (and collected) only if there is a reasonable link or connection between the 
tax subject and the fisc concerned. Several writers consider this position is a 
product of general international law115 whilst others, as explained above, do not 
agree with this view but admit that, unless such a connection exists, a state will be 
unlikely to enforce its jurisdiction.
Here again, this conclusion is not necessary or related to the arguments of this 
thesis. Indeed, this thesis provides some grounds for the view that the debate is 
misplaced. It is submitted that the more important topic, relating to the 
development of a consensus on what the bounds of jurisdiction should be (and 
why) has to some extent been obscured by the less-progressive and narrowly- 
academic concentration on what tax jurisdiction is or may be in the context of the 
debate referred to above.
CURRENT STATUS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF IFL AND THE POLICIES 
AND PRINCIPLES OF IFL
It is probably fair to say that the primary objective underlying IFL is reasonably 
well-known by tax practitioners but not often expressed or acknowledged. 
However, the principles (whether fully-formed or being currently developed) 
which seek to apply in more concrete form that concept are more familiar to all 
those involved in the field of international taxation. This state of affairs reflects 
the nascent or emerging status of IFL and also suggests that, while there is 
general acceptance at an academic level of the content and consequences of the 
objective and policies of IFL, that content and those consequences are not yet 
widely perceived in the conceptualised manner suggested by this thesis.116 Before 
concluding this chapter on the nature of IFL it is necessary to offer some further 
comments on the status and significance of IFL and particularly the policies and 
principles underlying IFL.
As has been demonstrated, the policies and principles of IFL are of fundamental 
importance because they have as their objective the realisation of the primary
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objective underlying IFL, which is broadly the facilitation of international trade 
and investment. As has been noted, this is an economic objective which in turn 
rests upon the proof, expounded by David Ricardo,117 that international 
collaboration by way of trade is advantageous to all concerned.! 18
It is submitted that the reason the particular major principles of IFL (discussed 
earlier) have developed (and continue to develop) is because they represent a set 
of practicable rules to achieve that primary objective for which there is such 
general agreement. In the opinion of this writer a convincing economic analysis 
of these principles could be made to substantiate this view, although such an 
undertaking is clearly outside the scope of this thesis.119
Whilst the substantive enactments which constitute IFL have merely a legislative 
(or quasi-legislative) force, these policies and principles underlying IFL, which are 
clearly of a different character, have a prescriptive character. Given that the 
policies and principles underlying IFL have such a prescriptive force and that it 
is possible to identify criteria or goals of IFL, it follows that the policies and 
principles underlying IFL can be applied both to evaluate and appraise existing 
legislation and also to develop new approaches to problematic issues of 
international taxation. Indeed, the use of IFL in this way is already a common 
feature of the literature dealing with matters of international taxation. For 
example, in a discussion of unitary tax systems (being methods for allocating 
global profits between associated companies) appearing in a 1985 O.E.C.D. 
document it is stated that:-
"....such systems do introduce an irritant in the taxation of 
international investment and may result in taxation not in accord 
with internationally accepted principles of taxation of income from 
such investment."120
The reason that these "internationally accepted principles of taxation" are of 
considerable significance is because they are intended as an application of the
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overall goals of IFL This point can be illustrated further. It is widely accepted 
that, as a matter of law:
"There is no general rule of international law which would prohibit 
international double taxation. Every state is free to establish its own 
tax system and to circumscribe the liability to its taxes."121
Whilst the above proposition may be true as a matter of strict law, there is a 
principle (or prescriptive rule) of IFL which does prohibit international double 
taxation for reasons which are as obvious as they are compelling. Thus, IFL 
requires that the revenue-raising function of the fisc is suspended or limited in 
certain cases where this is necessary to achieve the primary goals of IFL. Such 
prescriptive rules of IFL are therefore of fundamental importance to the 
development of good international tax law.122
It is therefore through the "concretized" principles of IFL that the primary 
objective underlying IFL may be implemented.
This point is illustrated by the very existence of the League of Nations’ Technical 
Experts Committee Report in 1925.123 The task of that Committee was to "bring 
about a more equitable assignment of taxation to prevent the evil effects of 
double taxation" but from an "administrative and practical point of view".124 In 
contrast to the work of the earlier group of eminent economists who were 
concerned with determining the most appropriate basis of taxation 125 the 
Technical Experts were concerned with practical ways of implementing measures 
to prevent double taxation. This led directly to the development of the principles 
underlying IFL, as explained by Mitchell B Carroll, writing in 1939:
"Persistently and quietly for the past two decades, technicians have 
laboured at Geneva to reduce the tax burdens and barriers that 
obstruct the movement of trade and capital between countries.
When they first began to meet, there were practically no generally
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recognised limits on tax jurisdiction, and the same overlapping of 
claims of different jurisdictions on the same income or property
resulted in confiscatory levies Where an enterprise does business
in several different countries (as, for example, where it produced 
raw materials in one, processes them in another, and sells them in 
a third) principles and methods of determining the income properly 
attributable to each have been devised. Correlative principles have 
been proposed for the imposition of property taxes. Principles for 
preventing the dual imposition of taxes on the death of individuals 
have also been proposed. To implement these provisions for relief, 
formulae for co-operation between Governments in assessing and
collecting taxes have been suggested These principles and
formulae have been incorporated in the draft Conventions of 1928 
and the subsequent years. During their development and since 
then, officials meeting at Geneva have followed these precepts in 
concluding bilateral treaties on behalf of their respective 
Governments. The pioneer work of the technicians at Geneva has 
been reflected in the practical accommodation of existing tax 
systems to these principles."126
In view of the discussion in this chapter, it will be appreciated that unilateral 
legislation enacted to tax the profits of companies located in overseas tax havens 
inevitably raises important questions relating to the policies and principles of IFL. 
For example, questions of the jurisdiction to tax in such circumstances, the degree 
to which such legislation conforms to the two major policies of IFL, equity and 
neutrality, or conforms to the various principles of IFL etc. will need to be 
considered in evaluating the effects of such legislation. The criteria which will be 
used to evaluate such legislation are those which flow from the policies and 
principles underlying IFL, as discussed in this chapter. These criteria are clearly 
the proper measure with which to review the legitimacy of such unilateral 
legislation since as, substantive enactments of IFL, this legislation should conform 
with the major policies and principles underlying IFL. If this were not the case,
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then, on the basis of the earlier discussion contained in this chapter, there would 
otherwise be a danger that this unilateral legislation created effects contrary to the 
primary objective underlying IFL.
However, before proceeding to a review and evaluation of the legislation itself, 
it is first necessary to examine the two relevant concepts "international tax 
avoidance", and "tax havens".
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CHAPTER 1 - NOTES
1 It should be emphasized that the hierarchy referred to and posited is the 
author’s own perspective of the relationship between all the elements 
included in that hierarchy. Other authors have attempted diagrammatic 
depictions of the scope of fiscal law -see for example, A Knechtle, "Basic 
Problems in International Fiscal Law" (Kluwer, 1979) at pp. 12-13 - but 
these tend to be concerned, as in Knechtle’s case, with whether the rules 
of IFL are merely a set of rules about conflict law or whether they are 
rules of tax law. It is in fact surprising how little discussion there is 
available of the conceptual framework in which IFL is located. This 
makes it particularly difficult to place the conceptual overview which is 
set out in the discussion in the chapter in the context of any existing 
analysis of the position.
2 There are various model bilateral double taxation treaties. The two 
leading texts are those of the OECD (Report of the OECD Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and 
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CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE
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INTRODUCTION
The topic of international tax avoidance and evasion has been discussed by fiscal 
authorities and international institutions for over sixty years. The League of 
Nations first considered the matter in the 1920s and in the 1980s the subject 
remains a major concern to the O.E.C.D., the U.N., the Council of Europe and 
virtually all domestic fiscal authorities.
In recent years the subject has taken on a greater importance in statements, 
documents and books on international taxation. To some extent, the issue now 
dominates discussions by tax authorities relating to the development of IFL, 
having displaced the topic of international double taxation. This concentration on 
the topic of international tax avoidance is not a development which is wholly 
supported by tax practitioners and commentators and, as will be seen, there are 
some who argue that such an emphasis is misconceived.
The E.E.C. first expressed its concern about international tax avoidance and 
evasion in a Council Resolution of February 10,1975 Two years later the E.E.C. 
adopted the Directive on Mutual Assistance between the Members States’ Tax 
Authorities^ In 1980, the O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs published a 
report "Tax Avoidance and Evasion" which discussed the concepts of avoidance 
and evasion and the measures available to combat them. In the same year the 
United Nations instructed its Ad Hoc Group of Experts in International Co­
operation in Tax Matters to concentrate its work on tax avoidance and evasion. 
The matter has also been considered in the late 1980s by, inter alia, the Council 
of Europe3, the International Bar Association^ the International Fiscal 
Association and various other bodies. This increased interest is due to a number 
of factors.
One suggestion is that, in the past, social and governmental sanctions have 
perhaps played a more effective role in deterring avoidance and evasion activities 
than is the case today.6 In recent years, respect for the tax law has in general
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diminished. This is presumably due to a number of factors including the increased 
rate of tax and perceived inequities of the various national taxation systems. This 
has in turn made the social and governmental sanctions less of a factor in 
deterring avoidance and evasion activities and therefore the potential for these 
activities has expanded.
The inevitable corollary of the continuing expansion of the economic and social 
role assumed by governments in recent decades up to the late 1980s has been the 
proliferation of new taxes and a continuing increase in the rates and bases of 
existing taxes.7 This development has intensified the search by taxpayers for 
methods of reducing the tax bill and concentrated attention on tax avoidance and 
evasion techniques. Moreover, as the tax system has expanded and become more 
complex, "loopholes" have unwittingly been created, thereby providing more 
opportunities for tax avoidance schemes.
At the same time, tax avoidance and evasion is considered to have assumed a 
significant international dimension with the expansion of international trade and 
a huge increase in the use of international communications. This view is based 
on the fact that international transactions, (which involve the movement of capital, 
assets and people across tax borders) are likely to offer opportunities for the 
concealment of tax liabilities.
Furthermore the international nature of a transaction may of itself give it certain 
characteristics which it would not have as a purely domestic transaction. Since 
such characteristics may offer opportunities for the avoidance of tax, revenue 
authorities and legislators have in recent years considered specifically the 
international element of transactions.
Most domestic tax avoidance can be extended to operations across frontiers. 
International tax avoidance however has the additional meaning of reducing tax 
liabilities through the use of different tax systems, as well as different tax rates and 
through the migration of persons, companies or funds to achieve this end.
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Another important factor in explaining the heightened interest on the part of 
states in international tax avoidance and evasion is their concern over the 
apparent loss of revenue resulting from such activities. Statistics are inevitably 
based on a certain amount of guess work, but it has been suggested that France 
loses F.Fr 30-50,000m and Belgium B.Fr. 200,000m through avoidance and 
evasion.8 It has also been estimated that the U.K. loses £100M due to the 
opportunities that arise as a result of the special position of the Channel Islands 
and the Isle of Man.9 In the U.S.A., it has been suggested that at least 10% of 
the total potential revenue from income taxation , U.S. $90 billion, is lost annually 
to tax evasion.10
Finally, there is a concern on the part of the fiscal authorities that if tax avoidance 
or evasion is allowed to prosper the result may be to undermine public acceptance 
of the tax system and to increase the temptation for tax payers not to comply with 
the tax laws or to seek artificial ways around them.
The Third Report of the United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts observes that:
"The habit of fraud, once acquired, even for relatively respectable 
reasons, may well outlast the abnormal circumstances which 
fostered its creation and growth"u
For all these reasons the topic of international tax avoidance continues to 
represent to tax authorities a prominent area of concern in the wider field of 
international fiscal law.
TAX SAVING. TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION
Before proceeding to the international elements of the concepts of avoidance and 
evasion and their significance to IFL, it is first necessary to consider the 
conventional definition of exactly what the concepts mean. Confusion between
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the attributes of avoidance and evasion is notorious12 and the situation is hardly 
helped by the recent introduction of the term "avoision".13
The concepts of avoidance and evasion cover a wide spectrum of activity to 
reduce or remove tax burdens.
The conventional view distinguishes three categories; tax saving, tax avoidance and 
tax evasion. The extent to which these categories are useful analytical tools for 
IFL will be discussed later in this chapter. However, this conventional 
categorisation is recognisable to a greater or lesser extent in many countries.
Tax Saving
The term "tax saving" is used to describe activity by the taxpayer in an area of 
behaviour which is not officially considered to be of any fiscal relevance. It may, 
in practical terms, be thought of as occurring when a taxpayer "sidesteps" a 
liability to tax as when, for example, he refrains from working and thus avoids 
income tax or when he refrains from selling certain of his assets, thus avoiding 
a capital gains liability. Tax saving in this sense is recognised as a legal and wholly 
legitimate form of behaviour.
"It is possible to reduce or remove tax liability... by refraining from 
consuming a taxed product and it is clearly not the intention of the 
Working Party [of the O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs] to 
combat activities of this kind".14
Tax Avoidance
There exist a number of suggested classifications and definitions of the concept 
of "tax avoidance". Professor Arthur Shenfield, in the Political Economy of Tax 
Ayoidance15, classifies avoidance into the following four categories:
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(i) The decision not to acquire capital or accept taxed employment, etc. taken 
in order to avoid tax;
(ii) The acceptance of tax exemptions, tax privileges or tax holdings offered by 
a government.
(iii) The pursuit of normal commercial objectives, but with an eye to the 
selection of that method which provides the least unwelcome tax result.
(iv) The pursuit of tax avoidance as the main or sole aim of a transaction.
Shenfield’s first category describes tax saving as opposed to tax avoidance as it is 
normally understood. This illustrates an alternative view of regarding "tax 
avoidance" as a wide concept embracing all forms of reducing tax liability other 
than those within the concept of tax evasion. However, it is considered that the 
separate categorisation of "tax saving" with the consequent more restrictive scope 
of the concept "tax avoidance" corresponds to normal usage.
While Shenfield approaches the definition of avoidance by explaining the 
categories it may be reduced into, Professor G.S. Wheatcroft, in an article entitled 
"The Attitude of the Legislature and the Courts to Tax Avoidance"16, approaches 
the definition by analysing the constituent elements of avoidance. Wheatcroft 
describes tax avoidance in general as "the art of dodging tax without actually 
breaking the law". More precisely, he defines it as follows:
"First of all, tax avoidance must be distinguished from tax evasion. 
Avoidance is legal; evasion illegal... Motive is also an essential 
element in tax avoidance. The man who deliberately adopts one of 
several possible courses must be distinguished from the man who 
adopts the same course for entirely different reasons. A  tax 
avoidance transaction is one which would not be adopted if the tax- 
saving element had not been present"17
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Wheatcroft also argues that the intention of the legislature must be taken into 
account because the legislature acts in a way which encourages or discourages 
certain practices. In summary, Wheatcroft defines tax avoidance as a transaction 
which:
(i) Avoids or reduces tax;
(ii) Is entered into for the purpose of avoiding tax, possibly involving some 
artificial or unusual commercial form;
(iii) Is carried out within the law; and
(iv) Is not a transaction which the legislature intends to encourage.
Whilst this is an adequate statement of the principal elements of the conventional 
view of tax avoidance, there are a number of problems, both conceptual and 
practical, with this definition. For example, test (iv) above depends in part on 
construing the intention behind the law yet this is a notoriously difficult exercise. 
These problems are discussed more fully below, after the conventional notion of 
tax evasion has been considered.
The distinguishing feature between tax saving and tax avoidance is the relevant 
legislative intent. This is clearly the distinction adopted by the O.E.C.D.:
"Those activities which fall within the scope of what is here called 
"tax avoidance" include schemes or arrangements which attempt to
reduce tax liability to a level below that which the Government
intended should apply to that particular income in those particular 
circumstances"18
In the case of tax avoidance, the taxpayer moves in an area of behaviour which 
the legislator intended to regulate but somehow failed to bring under control (for
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example, through defective drafting). Therefore, although the tax liability may be 
reduced by methods which are within the strict letter of the law, the circumstances 
of the reduction are such that it is felt that the underlying intention of the tax 
legislation would be to impose a charge to tax.
Tax Evasion
Tax evasion may be defined briefly as follows:
"Action by the taxpayer which entails breaking the law and which 
moreover can be shown to have been taken willingly with the 
intention of escaping payment of tax"19.
Although the payment is evaded, the tax liability is not. Examples of tax evasion 
are: failure to notify the tax administration of activities giving rise to taxable 
income, the use of fraud to claim tax allowances which are not legally due, etc.
The conventional view is that there are two elements to the definition of tax 
evasion. The objective element consists of the existence of specific circumstances 
which afford the taxpayer the opportunity of evading, in whole or in part, the 
payment of tax. The subjective element consists of a deliberate intent to defraud.
However, in defining whether tax has been evaded it is not always necessary to 
show that the taxpayer has acted in bad faith. Tax may be evaded in some cases 
by, for example, the failure to submit a tax return by a certain date, irrespective 
of the intention of the taxpayer.20 In such a case the defect may be due to the 
taxpayer’s negligence or his failure to exercise proper care. Therefore tax evasion 
does not invariably involve the subjective element of a "wilful" act by the taxpayer.
The Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the O.E.C.D. has observed that "within tax 
evasion proper a distinction is sometimes made between the less serious offence
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of omission, e.g., failure to submit complete returns of income, and more serious 
offenses, such as false declarations, false invoices, etc".21
The term "tax evasion" also describes what is often referred to as the "black 
economy", which involves jobs and income which are not disclosed to the fiscal 
authorities.
The Conventional View Considered
The next section considers the extent to which the concepts of tax saving, tax 
avoidance and tax evasion can be utilised in discussions of IFL. By way of 
preliminary, this section considers briefly the coherence of the conventional 
categorisation and a number of problems are explained and discussed.
The distinction between tax saving and tax avoidance depends solely on the 
"legislative intent". Only if the legislator intended to regulate a particular area of 
economic activity, but somehow failed, is activity within the area of tax avoidance 
rather than tax saving. The criterion of "intention" alone is unlikely to provide a 
sound basis for this distinction. There is the obvious difficulty in determining the 
precise intention behind the legislation. Even if this is possible, many legal systems 
discourage or do not permit the introduction to the judicial process of evidence 
relating to the original intention.
For example, in the U.K. there exists the "Hansard Rule" which arises from 
judicial decisions extending back over two hundred years.22 Under the Rule, 
Hansard and other similar sources cannot generally be reviewed by the courts. 
The Rule was referred to by Lord Reid in the case of Beswick v. Beswick:
"In construing any Act of Parliament we are seeking the intention 
of Parliament and it is quite true that we must deduce that 
intention from the words of the Act... For purely practical reasons 
we do not permit debates in either House to be cited".23
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The intention of a statute is therefore inferred rather than investigated:
"... but we can only take the intention of Parliament from the words 
which they have used in the Act, and therefore the question is 
whether these words are capable of a more limited construction. If 
not, then we must apply them as they stand, however unjust and 
unreasonable the consequences and however strongly we may 
suspect that this was not the real intention of Parliament".^
A recent U.K. commentator is well aware of the difficulties:
"I am often unable to understand "Parliament’s intent", and I should 
be more inclined to consider the fault as mine rather than 
Parliament’s were it not for incidents like the occasion when the 
Attorney-General, introducing a piece of anti-avoidance legislation, 
spoke to a brief for a different clause and subsequently apologised 
for his mistake, none of the Members present having noticed the 
difference. The same Minister can claim another distinction. In 
introducing another piece of anti-avoidance legislation he gave an 
assurance to Parliament about the limitation of its scope. In the 
fullness of time a case was brought under the section concerned and 
found its way to the House of Lords, where the Lord Chancellor 
supported the opposite interpretation to the one he had put before 
the Commons as Attorney-General."25
A further difficulty is that intention, by definition, applies only to those facts or 
circumstances which are foreseen. Where a wholly new situation arises and this 
situation was clearly not foreseen by those who originally framed the relevant tax 
law (which may or may not apply to it), it hardly makes sense, in dealing with this 
new situation, to consider what the intention of the legislation is.
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If the criterion of "intention" is unreliable, the concept of avoidance is obviously 
unclear and it is invidious to expect the taxpayer to respect - or even understand - 
the distinction between tax saving and tax avoidance and therefore refrain from 
the latter.
Similar problems arise if the motive of the taxpayer is taken as one of the defining 
elements of tax avoidance. It will often be extremely difficult to identify the 
particular motive of a taxpayer in taking a certain course of action and the 
problem is significantly exacerbated where there are a number of motives of a 
mixed kind. For example, a commercial decision may be made in order to achieve 
commercial, fiscal and social goals. It is difficult to see how a court can 
disentangle these motives and quantify the weight to be attached to each 
particular factor.
There are many situations in which arrangements may be made to minimise a tax 
burden. Some may be tolerated by governments and fiscal authorities whilst 
others may be attacked relentlessly. There appears to be a view that there exists 
some sort of boundary between using artificial or blatant avoidance devices 
("unacceptable" tax avoidance) and between simply taking advantage of the tax 
legislation by so arranging one’s affairs as to avoid the maximum incidence of 
taxation ("acceptable" tax avoidance).
It is of course possible to regard all these methods of reducing tax as avoidance 
activities, but it is difficult to draw a distinction between arrangements which are 
condoned by the fiscal authorities and those which are not. If there exists a 
distinction between "acceptable" tax avoidance and "unacceptable" tax avoidance 
it is not clear how this distinction is to be drawn.
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The distinction has been described as one of common sense.26 However, John 
Tiley is surely right in observing that the distinction:
"... is also one of degree rather than kind and the cynic would 
classify other people’s devices as artificial and the speaker’s own as 
legitimate. This imprecision is undesirable not only because it 
causes uncertainty in the administration of the law, but also because 
of the consequences of that uncertainty, with variations in the 
exercise of any discretionary power, resentment where taxpayers 
receive d ifferen t trea tm en t and the dangers of 
maladministration...".^
The arbitrariness of the situation is underlined by the fact that in some countries 
the legislation simply gives to the fiscal authorities the power to decide what 
constitutes avoidance in a wide range of situations without the obligation to 
provide criteria or guidelines in advance.^
The use of words such as "unacceptable" or "improper" suggests there exists an 
underlying moral element to the issue of international tax avoidance.
It is no answer to explain avoidance or the attitudes taken to avoidance by the fisc 
by reference to concepts of what is moral since, on any rigorous analysis, this 
merely relocates the problem in the realm of esoteric moral philosophy. 
Moreover, if evasion, and perhaps avoidance, is morally culpable, this may lead 
to the conclusion that the only morally acceptable conduct in tax matters is to 
maximise the tax bill. This is unlikely to be accepted by the vast majority of 
taxpayers nor by sections of the judiciary.29 Moral considerations are, in any 
event, not a key factor in the debate:
"We suspect that moral considerations are less important in tax 
enforcement than in any other single part of the law".30
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The O.E.C.D. takes a similar line in stating that it is not desirable for tax 
authorities to take a moral attitude towards tax avoidance:
"In combatting tax avoidance the tax authorities, in their official 
capacity, are simply administering the law in accordance with what 
they understand to have been the intention of Parliament, or in 
other words, the purpose of the law".31
Turning to the distinction between avoidance and evasion, here, too, there are 
difficulties in supporting the distinction. Certain types of (as it appears) avoidance 
schemes are treated in fact more like tax evasion and the opprobrium traditionally 
reserved for evasion is now frequently attributed to arrangements for the 
avoidance of tax.
Economically, avoidance and evasion are hardly distinguishable since it is of 
minimal importance economically whether a particular activity or transaction falls 
within the law or not. Legally, the distinction is, at the very least, blurred at the 
edges. An example will illustrate the difficulty: if a U.K. company pays a
management charge to an overseas company in respect of non-existent services, 
this is clearly evasion. If, however, the overseas company does provide 
management services but the charge is slightly above the comparable market rate 
in relation to the services provided, the reduction in the U.K. tax liability of the 
U.K. company is attributable to avoidance. If the fee charged by the overseas 
company is manifestly excessive in relation to the services performed, the position 
is less clear. Both companies are of course entitled to enter into whatever 
contractual relationship for the provision of management services they wish. 
However, there may come a point where the fee is so disproportionately large and 
the service so minimal that the genuine nature of the transaction must be called 
into question. In such a case the question as to whether the arrangement 
constitutes evasion must surely arise.
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THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
The last section has demonstrated that there are certain problems with the 
conventional categorisation of tax saving, tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
However, although the distinction between tax saving and tax avoidance does not 
appear to be tenable, the distinction between avoidance and evasion has been 
shown to be blurred at the edges rather than totally useless.
The question which now falls to be considered is the extent to which the concepts 
of avoidance and evasion can be used by IFL as analytical tools for classifying tax 
minimising behaviour.
The concepts are utilised by the United Nation’s Department of International 
Economic and Social Affairs3 2  and in a number of other books and publications 
addressed to an international audience which deal with matters affecting IFL.33 
This, presumably, suggests the concepts have a significance for IFL.
However, a closer analysis indicates that there may be difficulties in applying the 
concepts in this general way to IFL. There is the immediate difficulty of 
terminology - Germany, for example, uses the term "Steuerflucht" (literally, tax 
flight) for avoidance and the term "Steuerhinterziehung" for evasion, whilst the 
French use "evasion" for avoidance and "fraude fiscale" for evasion.
The difficulty is not purely semantic. For example, from a purely linguistic point 
of view, the Swedish terms "skatteflykt" and "skatteundandragande" seem to be 
rather exact translations of "avoidance" and "evasion".34 However, neither these 
words nor anything like them feature in the Swedish language to denote actions 
leading to a reduction in tax. In practice, the courts have decided, in cases where 
a certain action by a tax payer has led to a reduction of his tax liability, that the 
action has been accepted or not accepted for tax purposes without using the 
words "skatteflykt" or "skatteundandragande" or any other expression indicating 
an action leading to a reduction of tax. Obviously, this makes the definition of the
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terms "avoidance" and "evasion" for the purposes of Swedish law highly 
problematic.
Although the general distinction between evasion and avoidance is recognisable 
in many legal systems, in some countries the difference between tax saving and tax 
avoidance is not established. This must mean that such countries attribute a 
different all embracing meaning to the concept of avoidance as compared with 
those countries which make the tax saving - tax avoidance distinction. In Japan, 
for example, tax avoidance includes the generally accepted range of "tax saving".35 
Theoretically, it might be possible simply to expand the concept of tax avoidance 
to include "tax saving". In practice, however, there would still remain the disparate 
senses of avoidance and evasion. Taking Japan as an example again, Hiromitsu 
Ishi, Professor of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, has recently 
characterised the activity of treaty shopping as evasion whereas it is more 
normally considered an avoidance activity.36
The problem is not isolated to this one instance. As the U.N. Department of 
International Economic and Social Affairs has observed:
"Additional problems may arise because of the variations in legal
standards from country to country; a course of action which is 
clearly illegal in one country may fall within an ambiguous "grey 
area" in another".
The attitude to transfer pricing practices is a case in point. In most countries, 
transfer pricing techniques are viewed as avoidance activities. Yet, in Greece, 
Brazil, Argentina and Italy all non-arm’s length transactions are viewed as evasion, 
no matter how they are accomplished.
A further point can be made in connection with such avoidance mechanisms as 
transfer pricing: avoidance may be judged legal or not by reference to the effects 
it may have on exports. In France, for example, the arms length criterion does
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not apply if the resident company can demonstrate that the abnormality of the 
price results in increased exports or in an expansion of the company’s activities 
in foreign markets.
Moreover, some jurisdictions deny a legal meaning to the term "avoidance". 
There are two possible grounds:37
(i) Where only tax evasion is punishable, activities that might otherwise be
called "avoidance" are fully legitimate and the term "avoidance" is thus
legally immaterial.
(ii) Where avoidance activities may be penalised, the term "avoidance" is
immaterial because any illicit avoidance would be legally labelled as 
evasion which in the legal tax code includes all violations of tax laws.
Therefore, only certain countries recognise any legal significance in the concept 
of "avoidance". Even where it is recognised, there may also be problems in the 
concept of avoidance. In Canada, for instance, certain activities are regarded by 
the fiscal authority, Revenue Canada, as constituting proper tax planning and 
therefore legitimate tax avoidance whilst other arrangements are viewed as 
constituting improper tax avoidance. The line between the two cases is not always 
clear. Where circumstances are found to amount to improper tax avoidance, a 
taxpayer’s tax liability will be reassessed and in some cases a financial penalty of 
25 % of the tax improperly avoided plus interest charges will be imposed.38 Such 
penalties are more normally associated with evasion activities and indicate the 
very close similarity in the Canadian jurisdiction between evasion and improper 
tax avoidance.
Similarly in Australia, the present national climate vis a vis tax avoidance is to 
place it somewhat on a level with tax evasion:
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"In the current climate however, no attempt at a distinguishing 
definition [between avoidance and evasion] could successfully be 
made".39
The concept of evasion also varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Evasion 
constitutes a criminal offence in some but not all countries. In some jurisdictions 
the specific intent of the taxpayer to evade taxes leads to a particular form of tax 
evasion, namely tax fraud. Whether evasion is also tax fraud can be very 
significant. For example, under the Swiss Federal Law on International Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters legal assistance will be accorded by Switzerland 
only if the matter of the proceedings is a tax fraud and not a mere "evasion" 
according to Swiss terminology.40 Similarly, under the European Convention on 
Extradition (Protocol), extradition under the law of the requested state can take 
place only where the fiscal offence corresponds to a violation of the same 
nature.41
Evasion does not require intent on the part of taxpayer in all jurisdictions where 
it is recognised as a legal concept. In Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, 
France, Denmark, Switzerland, Israel and Italy, evasion does not generally require 
an intention to evade on the part of the taxpayer, though intention to evade is a 
pre-requisite to establishing a criminal offence.42
Usually, non-intentional evasion gives rise to the payment of interest on the 
additional tax levied by the fisc and no penalties are imposed.
In other states intention is required for evasion. In Canada, for example, tax 
evasion is specifically defined under the Income Tax Act of Canada.43 In the view 
of Revenue Canada, tax evasion means;
"the commission or omission of an act knowingly with the intent to 
deceive so that the tax reported by the taxpayer is less than the tax 
payable under the law, or a conspiracy to commit such an offence"44
T/2 92
The Spanish Parliament has recently approved an amendment to the law on "tax 
infractions" which permits punishment even in the case of simple negligence,45 
whereas in other jurisdictions, such as the U.S.A., civil and criminal fraud penalties 
can be imposed only where there is a finding of wilful intention to evade on the 
part of the taxpayer.
In the light of these numerous differences in the approach to evasion by fiscal 
authorities, it is no surprise that the International Fiscal Association observed in 
its 1983 General Report on Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion that:
"The survey of countries under review emphasises the impossibility 
of establishing common criteria or underlying concepts with any 
reasonable degree of certainty".46
International institutions have made similar observations. The O.E.C.D. has 
stated that although the tax avoidance-tax evasion distinction is frequently made, 
it is in reality:
"impossible to make this distinction in any consistent way as 
between countries. Not only do tax laws differ, but to frustrate the 
intentions of the law is, in some countries, already to break the law, 
so that in such countries there is no clear-cut distinction between 
tax avoidance and tax evasion".47
Recent thinking, therefore, suggests that it is misconceived to apply the concepts 
of avoidance and evasion, however they may be defined, in the field of IFL. The 
attempt to provide an internationally acceptable distinction between them is 
probably futile.48 Instead the trend appears to be to talk in terms of particular 
avoidance schemes. This trend is reflected in the discussions of the leading 
international institutions concerned with international fiscal policy. For example, 
this trend appears to be confirmed by the implicit conclusion of the Report by the 
O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs, "Tax Evasion and Avoidance".49 The
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Report was produced to set out the scope of activities which would be considered 
in O.E.C.D. Member countries as falling within tax evasion or avoidance. The 
Report also considers legal and administrative positions regarding anti-evasion and 
anti-avoidance activity.
No common definition of "tax evasion" could be agreed upon:
"The Working Party began by setting out to see whether, by 
collecting examples from the experience and practice of member 
countries, it was possible to reach a common definition of the scope 
of "evasion"... No single text proved to be fully satisfactory..."50
The Working Party came to much the same conclusion in the case of "avoidance", 
noting that the scope of what is considered tax avoidance varies from country to 
country, depending not only on the form a particular transaction may take but 
also on attitudes of governments, parliament, public opinion and the courts, which 
may themselves change within one country over time.
In spite of these statements the Working Party concludes:
"... but this does not imply that O.E.C.D. governments are not 
generally in agreement on what constitutes the range of tax evasion 
and avoidance they wish to combat or that they have problems in 
identifying it"51
This conclusion is somewhat confusing. If common agreement cannot be reached 
on the concepts of avoidance and evasion, it is difficult to see how O.E.C.D. 
governments can be "generally in agreement on what constitutes the range of tax 
evasion and avoidance they wish to combat".
The answer seems to be that tax authorities and international organisations are 
now beginning to single out and attack individual avoidance schemes which are
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considered unacceptable and they are now less concerned where such schemes fit 
into the traditional categories of avoidance or evasion. This means that although 
there is no prospect of a common international agreement on what constitutes tax 
avoidance or evasion, there may be such a consensus on the types of activity that 
the fiscs will seek to oppose. This type of approach, under which a concern over 
the nature of - and distinction between - avoidance and evasion is relegated in 
favour of a concern focused on particular types of activity, is a development which 
can be identified in various states.52 However, it is also clear that this 
development has taken place on a much broader footing and is reflected in the 
work of the leading international fiscal organisations. This is made clear by, for 
example, the stated purpose of the O.E.C.D. report referred to above:
"... in particular to show why certain activities and arrangements, 
even though those who have recourse to them try to keep within 
the letter of the law, cannot be tolerated by governments or by tax 
administrations who have to administer tax legislation1^  [emphasis 
added].
The type of avoidance schemes under attack will, according to the O.E.C.D. 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, typically have the following characteristics:
"the main feature is that there is an attempt to reduce tax liability 
to a level below that which the legislature intended....almost 
invariably there is present an element of artificiality or, to put this 
another way, the various arrangements involved in the scheme do 
not have business or economic aims as their primary 
purpose....Secrecy may also be a feature of modern avoidance....Tax 
avoidance often takes the form of taking advantage of 
loopholes...."54
The U.N. Department of International and Economic Affairs has also come to a 
similar conclusion.55 No attempt is now made to give a definition, as such, to
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"unacceptable" international tax avoidance as a generic phenomenon. Instead, 
international agreement is beginning to evolve amongst fiscal authorities on 
particular issues.
Perhaps the first example of this is in the area of transfer pricing practices, which 
were very widely debated in the mid 1970s. A similar approach to this method 
of international tax avoidance is now taken by many fiscal authorities. Topics 
which have been singled out more recently include treaty shopping and thin 
capitalization.^
The United Nations has recently noted that "it would be desirable... to achieve 
some international consensus on which practices of taxpayers could be regarded 
as acceptable or not".57 This, it is assumed, is precisely what is intended to 
happen when a body of international agreements between tax authorities on 
particular issues has evolved: it is presumably intended that such a consensus will 
contribute to the evolving principles of IFL and determine what activity is or is 
not acceptable in the international sphere. This approach is not without its own 
difficulties.
If there is a shift away from an analysis in terms of avoidance and evasion toward 
an analysis which considers whether behaviour is acceptable or unacceptable, 
where the criteria of "acceptable" are set by the fiscal authorities, then it becomes 
more difficult for the fiscal authorities to defend themselves from the charge that 
their criteria are arbitrary and that their whole approach has no conceptual 
foundation or justification. Therefore, the tax authorities are still left with the 
problem of explaining why the particular behaviour or activities they are opposing 
are unacceptable. It is not sufficient for them merely to describe the 
characteristics of "unacceptable" tax avoidance, as has so far been done. What is 
required is a statement of the criteria applied to determine "unacceptable" 
behaviour and an explanation of the assumptions on which those criteria are 
based.
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This point is of relevance to the discussion of equity in the last chapter. As is 
explained further in the following section below, anti-avoidance legislation is very 
often justified by reference to the need to restore fairness amongst taxpayers, the 
argument being that the avoider is side-stepping his fair share of the tax burden 
properly due to the state or states concerned. An argument along these lines 
clearly makes certain assumptions about the nature of "fairness" (or "equity") and 
certain of these (which are economic considerations) are discussed in the next 
section below. For the present, however, it should be noted that what is fair or 
equitable as between taxpayers - or indeed as between states - must, in a fiscal 
context be a function of the relevant rules. In the present context the relevant 
rules are the rules - or principles - of IFL. Thus, for example, (and subject to the 
comments on economic considerations which follow below) it may be argued that 
a taxpayer who is carrying on abusive transfer pricing practices offends against this 
requirement of fairness or equity because of his breach of the relevant rule of 
IFL. This rule is the arm’s length standard, as enacted in domestic legislation and 
double tax treaties.58 As a result of this breach, the offending taxpayer may be 
said to be violating the equity principle as regards his fellow taxpayers in the state 
which is losing the revenues which would otherwise be generated. That state may 
itself also take the view that there is a breach of the equity principle as between 
it and the state which, as a result of the abusive transfer pricing practices, is 
benefitting from increased taxable revenues. It is in this sense that matters of 
fairness or equity are relevant to the debate on international tax avoidance. 
However, it should be stressed that considerations of equity do not entitle states 
to impose any constraint or charge on taxpayers in the name of combatting 
international tax avoidance. As stated above, if particular activities or transactions 
are regarded as "unacceptable" an indication of the criteria or reasons behind that 
judgement should be forthcoming and those criteria or reasons should be 
consistent with the policies and principles of IFL.
The criteria which the tax authorities will seek to apply are unlikely to be simply 
those of IFL which were discussed in Chapter One: IFL sets out, inter alia, to 
limit the competing claims of the fiscs where this is necessary to achieve the
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primary goal of IFL (the avoidance of international double taxation). The tax 
authorities, on the other hand, have the quite different objective of levying taxes 
in order to raise revenue and they are normally anxious to raise as much revenue 
as possible. It would therefore be somewhat unrealistic to expect them to 
prioritise the goals of IFL quite without regard to their own objectives. However, 
for the reasons discussed in Chapter One, it is essential that in raising revenue, 
the fiscs attempt to conform to the requirements of IFL (i.e. avoiding double 
taxation, applying equitable and neutral taxation, etc).
It is in this context that the approach of the fiscs to combatting international tax 
avoidance is to be appraised. Therefore, whatever anti-avoidance measures are 
adopted must not in themselves create double taxation and they should be as 
neutral and as equitable in effect as possible. As will be demonstrated later in the 
context of the discussion on the U.S. and the U.K., the tax authorities recognise 
and accept these general points.
The opposition of the fiscs to international (and domestic) tax avoidance is 
grounded on their primary objective of raising revenue, the assumption being that 
there is a clear relationship between the prevention of avoidance and the 
collection of taxes. It is, therefore, this assumption which underpins and justifies 
the emphasis of the tax authorities on combatting international tax avoidance. The 
assumption is considered further in the next section.
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
It should perhaps be emphasised that this thesis is concerned with policy and legal 
issues not with economics. There is therefore no intention whatsoever to justify 
the discussions or arguments in this thesis by reference to economic 
considerations.^ However, the economic goals which it is assumed underlie the 
levying by states of taxation (being, primarily, the raising of public funds) are 
clearly relevant to the discussion in this thesis, especially as the phenomenon of 
international tax avoidance is normally regarded as an economic issue.
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It has been demonstrated that international tax avoidance is perceived by most 
fiscal authorities as a very significant problem. The official literature on the 
subject is full of references to international tax avoidance as, for example, a 
"violation of fiscal equity" and a side-stepping of the "fair amount" of tax due, 
resulting in a larger amount of tax being levelled on the "honest tax payer".60 For 
example, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the O.E.C.D. has stated that:
"The revenue loss from the proliferation of tax avoidance devices 
is assuming serious proportions and it is the taxpayer refraining 
from avoidance who has to foot the bill, whether in terms of higher 
taxation or reduced social welfare benefits or other public services.61
Similarly, the recent New Zealand Consultative Document on International Tax 
Reform states:
"... some residents... are avoiding tax on their foreign income, some 
of which is income that is diverted from New Zealand. This places 
an unfair burden on others and undermines the integrity of the tax 
system... It is overwhelmingly clear that the New Zealand tax base 
must be protected from international tax avoidance... Reductions in 
tax avoidance and lower rates of tax go hand in hand".62
Such statements reflect the traditional wisdom on the subject.
There is an alternative view, however, which stands this conventional wisdom on 
its head, suggesting that the current analysis is grounded on mistaken assumptions. 
Dr. Barry Bracewell-Milnes is the chief exponent of this view but not its only 
proponent.63 His argument is most clearly stated in his books Tax Avoidance and 
Evasion: The Individual and Society. The Taxation of Industry and The Economics 
of International Tax Avoidance.61 The central theme is that the tax avoider may 
well confer gains rather than losses on both fellow taxpayers and the fisc. This is 
clearly something of a revolutionary thesis. If correct, it would make a significant
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impact on current debates on international tax avoidance in particular and the 
development of IFL in general. This is because the initiatives and measures 
directed against international tax avoidance generally assume that such avoidance 
is an economically undesirable phenomenon.
The arguments propounded by Dr. Bracewell-Milnes appear to have been largely 
ignored by the international institutions where the fiscs meet to discuss 
international tax avoidance (e.g the U.N. Group of Tax Experts, the Council of 
Europe and the O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs) and they have do not 
seem to have been widely discussed by other commentators. It would be unfair 
to regard this as a reflection on the quality of the arguments themselves; as far as 
this writer is aware, there exists no comparable counter-argument, nor even an 
attempt at one. Instead, activity in suppression of both domestic and international 
tax avoidance continues without serious consideration of the assumptions and 
constraints of anti-avoidance efforts by the fiscs and their supporters.
However, Dr. Bracewell-Milnes analyses and criticises this universal assumption 
by fiscal authorities that pursuit of tax avoidance is correct without any need for 
justification:
"The economic argument that the avoider is adding to the burden 
on his fellows depends on at least three doubtful assumptions; first, 
that incentive effects are negligible (otherwise the avoider who 
increases his own prosperity may thereby increase the prosperity of 
his fellows); second, that the Government spends money more 
efficiently than private persons, even after allowance for costs of 
administration (otherwise prosperity can be increased by transfer of 
resources, through avoidance, from government to private persons); 
and third, that government spending is determined independently 
of income (otherwise any additional tax revenue may simply be 
absorbed in additional government spending) and this additional
T/2 100
government spending may be of little use or even worse than 
useless in increasing prosperity"65
In rebutting the assertion that avoidance activities are selfish whereas tax paying 
is public-spirited, Bracewell-Milnes refers to the general theme of the Wealth of 
Nations, namely the harmony between individual selfishness and the public 
interest: Adam Smith showed that, in a liberal order, a citizen best serves his 
fellows by serving himself.66
Bracewell-Milnes thus takes the view that conventional anti- avoidance measures 
reduce avoidance only by increasing evasion. This is because "avoidance and 
evasion are competitive with each other; the more the avoidance, the less the 
evasion, and vice versa".67 This inevitably means that "there are diminishing 
returns to anti- avoidance and to other expressions of hostility by the fisc; the 
more hostile the attitude of the fisc, the more hostile the attitude of the tax 
payer".68
The consequence of this is that anti-avoidance legislation will only be effective in 
the short term or where it has retrospective effect.
Bracewell Milnes suggests there is also the further danger anti-avoidance measures 
can actually lead to an increase in avoidance (and evasion) activities:
"Anti-avoidance and anti-evasion have something in common with 
attempts to put down civil commotions. They may propagate the 
disorders they were intended to suppress. They may increase 
resistance either extensively (by attracting more supporters to the 
cause) or intensively (by deepening the will to resist). Majority 
support is not enough to secure the suppression of riots or other 
political disobedience and majority support is not enough to 
suppress taxpayer resistance. The term disaffection is appropriate 
to both. It is chargeable taxpayers (the taxpayers liable to taxes in
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question) - perhaps only a minority of the population - where 
affections need to be won back if the political and moral costs of 
enforcing compliance are not to be unacceptably high".69
This view is not without some support, as is indicated by the following observation 
in a communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament:
"Moreover, the close link between honesty on the part of taxpayers 
and their level of taxation cannot be denied. Taxpayers, indeed, 
have much less recourse to evasion and avoidance when they 
consider their level of taxation to be fair and reasonable..."70
Developing the economic argument, Bracewell-Miles states:
"Hard core tax avoidance is the most beneficial not only to the 
outsider but also to his fellows not only in the taxpayers’ interest 
but also in the interest of the economy and society. The harder the 
better; the more artificial the taxpayer’s constructions the less the 
fiscal distortion of economic activity.71
The basis for this proposition is the fact that the incidence of taxation causes shifts 
or switches in economic activity and therefore results in inefficient distortions. 
The more formal and the less substantial the switch in economic activity the less 
the economic damage it causes and hence the preference for hard-core or "highly 
artificial" avoidance. Bracewell-Milnes criticises the anti-avoidance lobby for 
ignoring the shifting of activity that anti-avoidance legislation causes, especially 
when such legislation is levelled primarily at artificial constructions (which result 
in tax avoidance without the shifting of activity) from which other taxpayers gain. 
Tax saving, on the other hand, which is equated with "avoidance by inactivity" (not 
earning, not saving etc.) is invariably damaging for the fisc and the rest of the 
taxpaying community as a whole, yet it is not criticised by the fisc at all.
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Bracewell-Milnes also argues that tax avoidance may be beneficial by the effects 
it has of increasing economic activity either directly or by increasing savings. For 
example, where tax rates are high, avoidance may benefit the fisc by maintaining 
the incentive to activity that would otherwise be frustrated by taxation.
As a result of this, "It is concluded that the avoiding taxpayer may confer gains 
instead of losses on his fellows, including the fisc".72
According to the argument, avoidance can actually increase the yield of a tax and 
thus benefit the fisc where the rate of tax is beyond the point of maximum yield - 
the avoidance of part or all of such a tax may increase the yield not merely of the 
whole tax system but even of the tax avoided.73 The argument is arguably 
supported by empirical as well as theoretical evidence:
"The maximum marginal rate of taxation will be reduced from 65 % 
to 50%. It is expected that the reduced temptations for avoidance 
and evasion due to a lower rate will lead to an increase in tax 
collections through greater compliance with the law.74
For all these reasons, a case can be argued for saying that "avoidance and even 
evasion m ay  be a form of "public service" in consequence if not in motive".
Bracewell-Milnes theme can be summed up by stating his view that tax avoidance 
(and evasion) are in general not less likely to help than to harm the taxpayers’ 
fellows and that "artificial" and forbidden methods of avoidance are in general 
more likely to benefit the taxpayers’ fellows than "natural" and permitted ones, 
since the former have a less distorting effect on economic activity. In short, the 
market is the most efficient system for serving the individual and society:
"In so far as tax avoidance reduces the burdens on other taxpayers 
or at worse leaves them unchanged, the arguments against 
avoidance on moral grounds lose much of their force"75
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By reference to the conventional view of the subject referred to above, it is clear 
that the views of Bracewell Milnes are controversial and might be regarded as 
somewhat extreme. Nonetheless, it is evident that economic arguments have not 
been adequately considered in discussions on international tax avoidance. For 
example, even if much of the thesis propounded by Bracewell Milnes is rejected, 
it would still seem important to consider the important distinction highlighted by 
Bracewell Milnes between, on the one hand, activities by the fisc which raise 
revenue and, on the other, activities by the fisc which combat avoidance but do 
not raise revenue. It seems equally clear that the analysis of the phenomenon of 
international tax avoidance should logically start with value-free (or "positive") 
economics; i.e., in what situations is the fisc more likely to gain revenue from 
international tax avoidance and in what situations is it likely to lose. The 
determination of these questions is logically prior to discussions relating to the 
appropriate type of anti-avoidance legislation in any particular case. This is 
because the fisc has as its goal an economic objective, to raise revenue through 
the taxation system.
The wider economic perspective, and particularly the proposition that avoidance 
activity may benefit both taxpayers and the fisc, is potentially of considerable 
significance to discussions relating to the development of IFL. However, this thesis 
is not concerned with these economic arguments in any greater detail and, again, 
it should be emphasised that no reliance or justification is placed on these 
economic considerations beyond some very simple points. These are that 
economic considerations appear to have been largely ignored in the approach of 
the fiscs to international tax avoidance, that this seems illogical given the economic 
nature of the central objective of the fiscs and, finally, that there are suggestions 
that the assumptions made by the fiscs in connection with international tax 
avoidance are in any event false.
This suggests that, judged solely in terms of the goal of the tax authorities to raise 
revenue through taxation, the concentration of efforts on combatting international 
tax avoidance may be misplaced. If this is the case, the efforts of the tax
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authorities would be more productive in revenue raising terms if diverted 
elsewhere, perhaps to the clarification or development of legislation to deal with 
problematic transactions. This point can be illustrated by reference to the 
consideration by the U.K. Inland Revenue of possible anti-avoidance legislation 
aimed at thin capitalization. A number of representations were made to the 
Revenue on this topic and a large proportion suggested that such legislation was 
not necessary and would probably do more harm than good in revenue-raising 
terms. A representative of The Institute of Directors made the following point:
"My Committee also wishes to express its concern that scarce staff 
resources at Somerset House are being devoted to this topic, when 
the much more fundamental question of exchange differences 
remains unresolved. We... once again urge that the subject is given 
the staffing and legislative priority it deserves".76
There are therefore grounds for fearing that the approach of the fiscs to 
international tax avoidance may be of little use, or even counterproductive, in 
securing their own objective of raising revenue. Further, in view of the earlier 
discussion which suggested the apparent lack of criteria to justify the current 
"piecemeal" approach to fighting what is perceived as international tax avoidance 
and which also suggested that the combatting of international tax avoidance has 
now displaced the topic of international double taxation as the top priority of the 
tax authorities, there is a danger that the development of IFL is being arrested, 
and perhaps distorted, quite unnecessarily.
The above comments emphasise the need for a clear analysis of the phenomenon 
of international tax avoidance. Other points suggest the same conclusion. For 
example, the U.K. portion of the 1980 O.E.C.D. Report by the Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs entitled "Tax Evasion and Avoidance"77 is somewhat dismissive of 
the definitional problems attaching to the concept of avoidance and comments:
T/2 105
"It is difficult to describe an elephant, but we recognise one when 
we see it".78
Not only is the attempted analogy rather poor (an accurate description of an 
elephant can easily be given), but the implication of the statement itself is not 
correct: one of the major reasons behind the difficulties attaching to the concept 
is precisely the lack of any broad agreement as to what constitutes avoidance.79 
The difficulties are illustrated by the renowned Hoffman La Roche controversy 
which led to considerable public discussion following a Monopolies Commission 
Report on the matter.80 In that case, the profits accruing to a U.K. subsidiary 
from the sale of two newly discovered drugs, librium and valium, were 
approximately £3 million, whilst it was calculated that the total group profits on 
the same sales amounted to £27 million, the other £24 million coming from the 
mark-up on sale between the parent company and the U.K. subsidiary. As a result 
of the investigation, Hoffman La Roche was compelled to reduce its prices in the 
U.K. (which were already amongst the lowest in the world). The Inland Revenue 
also became interested in the matter and took the view that the transaction 
amounted to tax avoidance.81 However, it was argued that a very high transfer 
price was necessary in order for the parent company to recoup large research and 
development expenditure incurred in previous years. It was also pointed out that, 
despite enormous research costs, only one out of five thousand products it 
developed was likely to be a commercial success. In these circumstances it is not 
clear that the arrangements entered into by the group were other than sensible 
commercial practice. It is submitted that the case indicates the difficulties of 
identifying tax avoidance activities in the absence of a clear explanation of what 
is tax avoidance activity. As such, there are further grounds for doubting the 
benefit of the recent trend of the tax authorities of identifying the particular 
activities which are deemed unacceptable instead of setting out the reasons why 
such activities are opposed.
Tax havens, in particular are associated with the phenomenon of international tax 
avoidance82 and their existence raises further problems which require to be
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considered. However, before proceeding to consider the subject of tax havens in 
the next chapter, it is first necessary to set out the measures and approach 
normally adopted by tax authorities in opposing international tax avoidance. This 
matter is dealt with in the next (final) section of this chapter.
MEASURES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE
International tax avoidance may be combatted either by unilateral measures 
adopted by states separately or by bilateral or multilateral measures adopted by 
states acting in concert. Unilateral measures remain the more commonly used 
means adopted by fiscs to fight international tax avoidance. The relatively recent 
proliferation of anti-tax haven legislation, following the earlier 1962 anti-tax haven 
Subpart F legislation of the U.S.A., demonstrates the primary importance which 
most states attach to unilateral measures. However, the increasing number of 
international initiatives and the amount of international collaboration may suggest 
that bilateral or multilateral measures will assume a greater significance in future.
Unilateral Measures
Where unilateral measures are used to combat international tax avoidance the 
legislation utilised could often be exactly the same as that used to oppose purely 
domestic tax avoidance. The Carter Commission in Canada^ identified four 
possible approaches to combatting avoidance; the sniper approach (specific 
provisions to deal with specific activities or situations); the "shotgun" approach (a 
general provision aimed at a wide range of activities deemed to be unacceptable); 
the "arm’s length" approach (under which the fisc is entitled to substitute prices 
in transactions between associated enterprises); and the "administrative control" 
approach (under which wide powers are given to an official or administrative 
tribunal in order to counteract tax avoidance activities).
Although this categorisation is widely used, it is not comprehensive. Most 
significantly, it does not include the "substance over form" approach (known in a
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number of jurisdictions as "abus de droit").84 This is probably due to the fact that 
this doctrine is hardly recognised in Canada.85 It is however very important 
elsewhere, and has, for example, long been part of the U.S. tax authorities 
armoury, following the 1934 case of Helvering v. Gregory^  The doctrine has 
recently been subject to judicial development in the U.K. courts, notably in the 
cases of W.T. Ramsay Limited v. IRC.g:, IRC v. Burmah Oil Co. Limitedog and 
Furniss v. Dawson.89 The "substance over form" doctrine is similar in effect to the 
"shotgun" approach mentioned above, although it is often applied in the form of 
common law rather than as statute.
The Carter Commission statement of methods to combat tax avoidance activities 
also omits such approaches as "retrospection" (the enactment of specific provisions 
which operate retrospectively) and "rationalisation" (the elimination of tax 
anomalies in the tax system which themselves provide the opportunity for 
avoidance).
International Measures
The principal element common to bilateral or multilateral measures against 
international tax avoidance is the increased exchange of information between fiscal 
authorities.
There are three principal methods of exchanging information which are set out
in the O.E.C.D. Model Convention as follows:
(a) On request, with a special case in mind.
(b) Automatically, as where, for example, there is an agreement to transmit
systematically certain types of information.
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(c) Spontaneously, for example in the case where a state has acquired through 
certain investigations information which it supposes will be of interest to 
another state.90
There is no doubt that all these methods are used in practice nor that the amount 
of information so exchanged has considerably increased in recent years.91 As well 
as this increased exchange of information, there is also a general trend towards 
mutual assistance in tax matters.
This is illustrated by the publications of the United Nations document 
"International Co-Operation in Tax Matters" which is one of the most significant 
events in the field of international co-operation against evasion and avoidance of 
tax in recent years. Taken with Article 26 of the U.N. Model Double Tax 
Convention (dealing with exchange of information) to which it refers, the 
document gives the most comprehensive treatment of mutual co-operation and 
exchange of information between tax authorities. The document is the first truly 
international code to deal in detail with a variety of aspects of co-operation and 
exchange of information, including assistance in assessment and collection, visiting 
tax officials, information relating to tax haven activities, bank secrecy and the 
categories of information to be exchanged.
Other developments have also taken place over the last two decades or so. While 
the larger international institutions, such as the United Nations and the O.E.C.D., 
have played a significant role in increasing the international exchange of 
information, the smaller regional groupings have made progress in implementing 
a concerted attack on international tax avoidance. The multilateral Nordic 
Convention is a case in point. This binding international agreement concentrates 
on practical rather than theoretical issues and contains such innovations as 
providing for one state to assist in the collection of a tax owed to the other state.92
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The Member States of the E.E.C. are, similarly, moving to adopting a common 
approach to international tax avoidance. The Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, "Community Action 
to Combat International Tax Evasion and Avoidance" is perhaps the clearest 
statement of current E.E.C. thinking on the matter. The Communication clearly 
recognises the need for a community approach:
"International tax evasion and avoidance unquestionably have 
implications for the community and increasingly demand a 
community approach..."93
The action to be taken by the community is expressed to be:
(a) Increased collaboration between tax administrators within the community 
and establishing or improving co-operation with non-community countries. 
(For example, in 1980 the Commission asked the Council for authorisation 
to open negotiations with Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden with a 
view to their participation in the exchange of information provided for in 
Community Directives).94
(b) To prevent the abuse of tax shelters.
(c) To combat abusive transfer pricing practices carried on between companies 
belonging to the same group.
(d) The elimination of double taxation.
The Commission is critical of the way Member States have operated their mutual 
assistance on a bilateral basis and is keen to establish a fully multilateral exchange 
of information procedure:
"The member states still seem to be operating mutual assistance on 
a purely bilateral basis, as envisaged under traditional bilateral 
conventions, showing little awareness of the possibilities for a
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multinational exchange of information which it was the very purpose 
of the Community Directives to establish and develop.";95
The Commission has emphasised for some time the close link that exists between 
measures against tax avoidance and the prevention of international double 
taxation.96 Aware that international double taxation can arise in situations where 
fiscal authorities of two or more states are unable to agree in, for example, a 
transfer pricing dispute, the Commission has proposed a Directive aimed at 
establishing a procedure that would guarantee the elimination of double taxation 
in all cases.97
However, although the Communication provides evidence of the significant 
progress that can be achieved by regional groupings in taking a common stand 
against international tax avoidance, the communication also demonstrates the 
typical problems involved in such an exercise and these are a significant constraint 
on the ability of states to act wholly in concert on this issue.
The Communication document mentions two different sorts of constraint. On the 
one hand there is the inevitable difficulty in reconciling states to a single view 
when the positions of individual states may be widely disparate. In discussing the 
measures necessary to deal with letter box companies, the document states that:
"The Commission looked at a number of such measures already 
operative in some member states under which certain tax effects 
were applied to payments made to a tax haven from a Member 
State (e.g. charging a withholding tax on royalties, shifting the 
burden of proof, etc). A more thorough examination revealed that 
the generalised application of such measures on the basis of 
common rules would hardly be feasible".98
The document also points out that even if agreement could be reached, but the 
measures were implemented with varying success from one national administration
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to another, "this might engender fresh distortions of competition, making matters 
worse, not better".99
The other constraint arises even where agreement can be reached between all 
Member States and where the measures are implemented with uniformity. The 
difficulty is that the application of strong anti-avoidance measures may detract 
from the Community’s competitive position unless similar provisions were applied 
in a wider sphere:
"As regards the introduction of measures to resolve the problems 
of substance, whether the use of tax shelters or transfer pricing, 
considerable caution is called for if the Community’s position is not 
to be weakened or legitimate interests injured. It would also be wise 
to wait until unequivocal lessons can be drawn from the application 
of the O.E.C.D. directives".100
The O.E.C.D. has perhaps proved the most influential body in developing a 
multilateral approach to a number of issues. The Committee of Fiscal Affairs of 
the O.E.C.D. has recently published reports on tax havens, abuse of bank secrecy, 
treaty shopping, the use of base companies and thin capitalization.101 The 
intention behind these reports is to develop a common approach to a number of 
perceived problems relating to the taxation of international transactions and 
arrangements.
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INTRODUCTION
Tax havens are often considered, erroneously, to have arisen as a product of 
sophisticated international tax planning in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
In fact, tax havens have existed for some considerable time:
"Like taxes, tax havens have their origins buried deep in the past.
They vie in age with the world’s oldest profession and the pendulum 
of their respectability has swung through almost as wide an arc''^
In the Middle Ages, for example, the City of London exempted merchants of the 
Hanseatic League from all taxes in order to attract new commerce to the city. 
Later, in the fifteenth century, Flanders (formerly an extensive country in Europe 
now a part of Belgium and Holland) removed duties on much of its trade and 
imposed relatively few exchange restrictions. As a result of these measures the 
country became a flourishing commercial centre which attracted, in particular, 
English merchants who preferred to sell their wool in Flanders rather than in 
England where higher duties and greater restrictions were in force. Similarly, from 
the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the Netherlands imposed low duties and 
thereby created thriving business centres of its major ports.2
Although there is therefore nothing new in the availability of tax jurisdictions 
which provide a fiscally advantageous environment in which to conduct business, 
the extent to which these facilities can be and are utilised has changed radically 
in the twentieth century.
Historically, the type of trading or other economic activity carried on in tax havens 
has generally been limited to the local market of the tax haven. However, 
following the technological advances in communications made in recent decades 
a number of activities may now be efficiently conducted from tax haven locations 
which are far removed from the place or places where the impact of such
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activities will be felt. This is particularly true of the service sector in general and 
of financial services in particular. Therefore, it has in recent decades become a 
considerably more practicable option to use tax havens. This fact is inevitably 
reflected in the use currently made of tax havens:
"What has constituted a new phenomenon in the second half of the 
twentieth century is the scale on which individuals and corporations 
have shifted their operating bases from place to place in search of 
such relief [complete or partial tax relief] or refuge from political 
interference with their assets."3
It is now relatively easy to set up a business in a tax haven notwithstanding that 
such a business is dependent upon markets or commercial activities in locations 
which are a considerable distance away. Furthermore, since such businesses could 
be sited almost anywhere, it is to be expected that the choice of location is 
influenced by fiscal factors. Examples of the types of business for which a tax 
haven is a particularly appropriate location in this sense include captive insurance 
companies, leasing companies, group finance companies, investment management 
companies, licensing companies, etc.
It is this new-found ability to situate certain activities in tax haven locations that 
has radically changed the use that can be made of tax havens in general. Where 
such activities are carried on in tax havens, corporate entities, registered and 
protected under the laws of the tax haven jurisdiction, are often utilised as 
vehicles for gaining legal autonomy and legal personality under local law. The 
economic activities of such companies are not geographically restricted or 
dependent on the jurisdiction under the laws of which they have been 
incorporated. Indeed, the most favourable tax treatment accorded by some tax 
havens often arises only on the condition (imposed usually by the fisc of the tax 
haven country) that a company carries on no commercial activity within the 
borders of its host country.4 It is for this reason such companies have come to be
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called "base" companies. The operation of base companies is described later in 
this chapter.
There are a number of attributes which a tax haven is required to possess for it 
to represent an attractive location. Tax advantages are obviously required but it 
is important to note that a low tax rate is not in all cases the primary requirement. 
A  location may be regarded and used as a tax haven, notwithstanding it has a 
relatively high rate of tax, because, for example, it does not tax offshore income 
or because it has an extensive network of favourable double tax treaties. The 
various types of fiscal advantages offered by tax havens are surveyed later in this 
chapter.
In addition to tax factors, there are a number of non-tax attributes which also 
contribute to making a tax haven an attractive and viable location for commercial 
activity. Such attributes generally include some or all of the following: political 
and economic stability;5 secrecy of operations;6 professional services (i.e. banking, 
financial, accounting and legal services) and communications facilities. The 
complete lack of these basic attributes is the reason why certain would-be tax 
havens (e.g. Nauru) have not succeeded in attracting any volume of tax haven 
business.7
It is important that a tax haven has laws and regulations which promote, rather 
than detract from, its status as a tax haven. This usually means that, in the area 
of company law for example, the law should be conducive to the swift creation, 
running and winding-up of a company; should permit the use of bearer shares and 
nominees; and should not place restrictions on the nationality of shareholders and 
directors; etc.
The lack of currency and exchange control regulations is also regarded as an 
important aspect of the majority of tax havens.
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The domestic markets of the tax haven country may be an important factor for 
two reasons. Most obviously, the entity created in the tax haven may set about 
exploiting the local markets and thereby expand the scope of its activities. 
Secondly, it may be desirable in some cases for a company or other entity not to 
be situated in a state which is obviously a tax haven. A  number of companies have 
been set up in "respectable" tax havens such as Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
Hong Kong since all of these countries have strong economies which are not by 
any means based on their status as tax havens, in contrast to Liechtenstein, for 
example.
In addition to the above attributes which are generally required of a tax haven, 
there are a number of other characteristics which are often associated with tax 
havens. These are often in the nature of incentives made available to attract 
foreign capital.
Tax-free trade zones, free ports and similarly designated areas offer benefits such 
as freedom from customs tariffs, quotas and excise taxes,8 although these and 
similar incentives are offered by almost all countries in one form or another.9 In 
addition, several tax havens offer guarantees against unfavourable changes in tax 
rates or bases within a specified period of time.10
The governments of some tax havens have sought to enhance the attractiveness 
of their state by offering guarantees against the expropriation of assets or 
nationalisation by the state as part of their incentive or remittance laws. These 
guarantees provide a long-term measure of security and contribute in each case 
to the relative appeal of that tax haven, though they are of course dependent on 
the political and economic stability of the tax haven.
Before passing on to explore certain detailed issues relevant to tax havens, it is 
first necessary to address certain matters of nomenclature. The very use of the 
term ‘tax havens" may seem to indicate a clear grouping of territories which may 
be identified as tax havens. This is not the case and the various problems arising
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from the definition, or identification of tax havens are therefore dealt with later 
in this chapter. Certain preliminary comments may be made at this point. First, 
notwithstanding the definitional difficulties (and the varieties of the species) it is 
probably fair to say that whilst the "penumbra" of the tax haven population may 
be open to debate, its core is more readily identifiable. There are for example, 
few who would deny that the Cayman Isles represent a tax haven state.
Second, even those who are well aware of the difficulties of referring to "tax 
havens" as if the concept were unproblematic find themselves adopting that 
approach for convenience.n  Therefore, the term "tax havens" is used both in the 
title of this thesis and the discussion throughout it in a non-scientific manner and 
subject to the more detailed discussion of the definitional problems which appears 
later in this chapter under the heading "The Definition of a Tax Haven".
THE USE OF TAX HAVENS
Tax havens can be used in a wide variety of ways to achieve both tax and non-tax 
objectives. An influential U.S. Treasury Department report entitled "Tax Havens 
and their use by United States Taxpayers - An Overview"12 found that tax haven 
operations can be grouped into four main categories:
i) Transactions in which there is no tax motivation in the use of a tax haven.
ii) Transactions which are tax motivated but which are consistent with both 
the spirit and the letter of the law governing the particular operations.
iii) Transactions which are tax motivated and which are technically legal but 
take advantage of an unintended legal or administrative loophole.
iv) Tax evasion through the fraudulent use of tax havens.
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This categorisation is a helpful starting point in defining the types of activity that 
involve tax havens, though the distinction between categories (ii) and (iii) does 
rest on the assumption that it is sensible to separate "acceptable" from 
"unacceptable" tax avoidance. This assumption was considered in the last chapter 
and, on the basis of that earlier discussion, it is perhaps preferable to modify the 
categorisation suggested by the U.S. Treasury Study and group tax haven 
operations into three main categories; non-tax-motivated operations, tax-motivated 
operations within the law and fraudulent or questionable operations.13 This 
categorisation will be adopted below in a short discussion of tax haven activities.
Non-Tax-Motivated Operations
There are very many ways in which tax havens can be used for non-tax-motivated 
objectives.
Tax haven locations may be used to circumvent rules and regulations which apply 
in the state in which the taxpayer is resident. For example, U.S. banks may 
establish branches in a tax haven to avoid the reserve requirements or interest 
rate ceilings that would apply had the branch been established in the U.S. 
Similarly, foreign exchange restrictions, strict disclosure requirements, minimum 
wages legislation, safety legislation and other bureaucratic controls which apply in 
the domestic state of the taxpayer might all be avoided by the use of a tax haven 
entity. Where a company considered itself to be under threat of nationalisation 
| or vulnerable to trade union actions, relocation in a tax haven may also be
considered.
The use of an intermediary company located in a tax haven can be used to
i
I
| disguise the origin or the destination of goods in order to avoid the effects of
i
| boycott legislation. Such an intermediary company situated in a tax haven would
!
' also prove an appropriate vehicle in cases where it was not possible to do business
with another country except from a base in a neutral state.
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The secrecy surrounding tax haven operations may also be an important factor to 
a taxpayer who wished to avoid publicity or to remain anonymous. The 
permissible use of nominee shares and bearer instruments in a tax haven would 
naturally assist this objective.
Where regional rules or regulations apply, these may also be avoided by resorting 
to the use of a tax haven. For example, companies in E.E.C. countries may move 
to havens in order to avoid E.E.C. Directives on company law.
Finally, a presence in a tax haven may also be necessary where a company seeks 
to penetrate the domestic market of the haven or where a company seeks to 
exploit the resources (whether natural or human) that are available there.
The above discussion of the various uses of tax havens is clearly not exhaustive 
but is intended merely to provide an indication of the wide variety of non-tax uses 
to which a tax haven may be put. However, in acknowledging a distinction 
between tax and non-tax uses of a tax haven, it is important not to obscure the 
fact that, although non-tax-motivated uses of havens clearly do exist in abundance, 
these transactions often have significant tax effects and may offer a potential for 
tax avoidance and evasion. It is primarily for this reason that fiscal authorities take 
a keen interest in apparently non-tax motivated activities in tax havens and have 
sought to restrict the free use of certain types of tax haven operations.
Tax-Motivated Operations
From a purely tax perspective, tax havens exist as a result of the fact that not 
every country in the world has the need or the ability to impose the same tax 
burden. Prior to the 1980s, the huge rise over the last hundred or so years in the 
tax rates levied by certain (usually the more developed) countries has led to a 
widening of the differential tax rates between high-tax and low-tax states, 
(although this trend has to some extent been reversed over the last few years with 
the reduction of tax rates in a number of developed states).
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There appears to be general agreement that the existence and use of so many tax 
havens has come about as a direct response to the high levels of taxation in 
virtually all modern industrialised countries. This response is, of course, to be 
expected:-
"Action causes reaction; demand creates supply. The taxpayer’s 
demand for a lower tax burden is an almost automatic reaction to 
the heavy weight of present taxes. The response is just a specialised 
type of business - the tax haven business - and is as logical and 
natural as any other market response".14
The tax-motivated uses of tax havens can be engineered by a taxpayer to achieve 
one or more of a wide variety of tax objectives. The following examples give some 
indication of the possible range of tax benefits that may be sought:-
i) A reduction of the taxpayer’s overall tax burden as a result of moving
business operations from a high tax jurisdiction to a tax haven.
ii) A deferral of the payment of taxes on income from foreign sources by the
use of a tax haven vehicle, thereby enabling profits to be accumulated in 
a tax haven at a low (or no) tax cost.
iii) A circumvention of potential future taxes that might arise in a high tax
zone.15
iv) A reduction of the average foreign tax burden in order to minimise the loss
of foreign tax credits. This may be necessary either because there is only 
a source by source tax credit system available or because foreign taxes as 
an average are relatively higher than domestic taxes.16
There are of course a number of other ways in which tax-motivated actions can 
be effective: the common element is that fiscal advantages are procured.
John Chown offers an alternative explanation of the ways in which a haven can 
be used for fiscal ends. For Chown, the uses of a tax haven for tax reasons can be 
separated simply into activities of profit diversion and activities of profit 
extraction.17 The categorisation of tax motivated operations involving tax havens 
as either profit extraction or profit diversion is not sufficiently comprehensive and 
fails, for example, to take account of the use of tax havens to reduce the average 
foreign tax burden (see (iv) above). However, the concepts of profit extraction 
and profit diversion are important and will be referred to later in this thesis. They 
therefore require clarification.
Profit diversion consists of diverting profits to a tax haven where little or no tax 
is payable. An example of such a manoeuvre in the field of transfer pricing 
illustrates the concept. For example, if the rate of tax in country A is 50% and the 
rate in country B is 30% and a subsidiary company (SI) in country A sells goods 
to a fellow subsidiary (S2) of the same multinational group in country B, the 
group as a whole would gain from the lowest possible invoice price. If, say, 10,000 
units of raw material were sold at £90 instead of £100 each, the profits accruing 
to SI in country A would be reduced by £100,000 and the profits of S2 in country 
B would be increased by the same amount in pre-tax terms. However, because 
of the difference in tax rates, there would be an after-tax saving of £20,000 (being 
50-30% x £100,000).
An even greater saving is possible if the goods were invoiced through a fellow 
subsidiary, S3, in a third country, C, which levies no tax at all. In this case S3 
would buy from SI at a low price and sell to S2 at a high price, thus collecting or 
"diverting" all the profits, by means of the transfer price mechanism, to S3 in 
country C. Moreover, such use of transfer prices, being a form of diversion rather 
than extraction of funds, will not be subject to withholding taxes and will therefore 
render a double benefit. If required, the profits in S3 could be made available to 
either SI or S2 by means of an "upstream loan", the interest payments on which 
are deductible for the purposes of the tax computation of SI or S2 and tax-free 
in the hands of S3.18
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Profit extraction consists in taking profits from a high tax country to a country 
where they will be subject to little or no tax. In many circumstances it will be 
necessary to arrange the payments in such a way that they qualify as an allowable 
deduction against the taxable profits in the country of origin, thus reducing the 
taxable profits there. For example, payments of interest and royalties from a high 
tax country to a tax haven associate will generally lead to a reduction of taxable 
profits in the former state and an increase in profits in the tax haven associated 
company.
A "base company" vehicle located in a tax haven can be used for the purposes of 
both profit diversion and extraction. A base company can be any sort of 
company, (i.e. a finance company, a holding company, a trading company etc.) 
which is set up in a no- or low-tax haven to collect income which would otherwise 
arise directly to a taxpayer and be subject to taxation in the taxpayer’s state of 
residence. The base company is effective in sheltering the income from tax in this 
way because it is in law an entity with its own separate personality and recognised 
as such in the taxpayer’s state of residence. As a result, income accruing to the 
base company is not regarded as income of the taxpayer and is therefore not 
subject to tax in the hands of the taxpayer. This sheltering from tax will exist only 
so long as the income of the company is not distributed and is therefore arguably 
a means of tax deferral rather than a complete avoidance of tax.
A base company can be used for the purposes of profit diversion by arrangements 
which route income to it away from associated companies in high-tax jurisdictions. 
Profit extraction using a base company would entail remittances of profits from 
a company in a high-tax state, such payments being disguised as royalties or 
interest, for instance.
The existence (and use) of base companies is a matter of concern to most tax 
authorities and a number of measures have been enacted by them to prevent the 
tax-motivated use of such companies.19
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Fraudulent or Questionable Operations
The use of tax havens for fraudulent or questionable operations may or may not 
involve tax factors. Non-tax motivated but fraudulent uses of tax havens include 
such activities as money laundering and commercial fraud operations.20 Tax- 
motivated uses would include all activities involving the evasion of taxes. Whilst 
certain activities clearly can be recognised as international tax evasion, there is, 
as has been noted, no absolutely clear border between international tax avoidance 
and international tax evasion. This difficulty has already been discussed in the last 
chapter and it will suffice to observe here that fiscal authorities frequently assume 
the same suspicious attitude to activities in tax havens, irrespective of whether 
they are apparently non-tax-motivated or tax-motivated and whether they are 
perfectly within the law or "unacceptable" avoidance as judged by the fisc.
Although the above categorisation of tax haven usage should assist in the analysis 
of tax haven activities, it must be remembered that in practice it will rarely be 
possible to attribute a single, clear motive exclusively to explain the use of a tax 
haven. There is in practice usually a range of political, financial, commercial and 
tax considerations underlying the decision to use the facilities of a tax haven. It 
is probably for this reason that tax authorities are usually interested in the tax 
haven activities conducted by persons within their jurisdiction, notwithstanding that 
such activities may seem, prima facie, to have no tax implications or motivation.
ATTITUDE OF DEVELOPED STATES TO TAX HAVENS
The general perception of, and attitude to, tax havens by developed states is 
reflected in the introductory remarks to the recent New Zealand Consultative 
Document on international tax reform:
"The Government is determined to prevent the erosion of the 
income tax base by cross-border transactions which enable the 
deferral or complete avoidance of tax properly payable in New
Zealand. The use of tax havens in particular has become 
widespread and has been a drain on government revenue".21
The use of tax havens is therefore generally regarded as a major factor in the 
facilitation of international tax avoidance. It is therefore no surprise that the fiscs 
of the developed states generally adopt a hostile attitude to the use of locations 
which they perceive as tax havens.
The most comprehensive discussion of tax havens, which provides an authoritative 
view of the attitude to such states by developed states, is contained in the recent 
report by the O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs, "Tax Havens: Measures to 
Prevent Abuse by Taxpayers".22 In view of the broad composition of the
O.E.C.D.23 and the influence of the work in the fiscal domain carried out by its 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, the report is undoubtedly an important document 
in the development of an international approach to tax havens by fiscal 
authorities. The concerns of those authorities are stated in the first paragraph of 
the paper:
"International tax avoidance and evasion through the use of tax 
havens is one of the most important and long-standing concerns of 
the tax administrations of most O.E.C.D. Member countries. The 
use of tax havens by various types of taxpayers (individuals and 
firms) has been increasing over the past decades to the detriment 
of both tax revenues and tax morale. Insofar as investment decisions 
are influenced by tax motives, the use of tax havens leads to 
decisions at variance with what a neutral tax system would 
command, and results in undesirable economic distortions, 
particularly capital flows. Also, competition is being distorted 
between those taxpayers who make use of taxpayers and those who 
do not".^
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The above statement identifies the three concerns held by developed states in 
connection with tax havens: they lead to a depletion of tax revenues in developed 
states; they have a non-neutral effect economically, particularly in capital flows; 
and they lead to a distortion in competition. Of these three concerns, the first (the 
loss of taxable revenue) is undoubtedly the most significant to the tax authorities 
and this explains why the majority of the O.E.C.D. report is given over to a review 
of the measures available to combat the unacceptable use of tax havens with a 
view to preventing the tax leakage caused by the use of havens in general. This 
point, relating to the perceived loss of tax revenues, is discussed below. The other 
two points, relating to competition and non-neutrality are discussed later in this 
chapter.
After discussing the characteristics of tax havens, the report goes on to examine 
"the size of the tax haven problem", stating that the "report is concerned with 
losses of revenue to tax authorities caused by the use of tax haven facilities".25 
The report notes that it is extremely difficult to determine how much tax is lost 
by the relatively high tax countries but that available data shows that certain types 
of financial activities, such as direct investment and bank deposits, are found at 
disproportionately high levels when compared with the actual economic base of 
the state concerned. The report draws on information provided in both the 
Gordon Report^ and a further report which relates to Caribbean tax havens, "Tax 
Havens in the Caribbean Basin".27 The overall conclusion of both reports is that 
the use of tax havens is increasing. This conclusion is accepted by the O.E.C.D. 
report and, by implication, interpreted as meaning that the "tax haven problem" 
is escalating,^ although no specific evidence is adduced by the O.E.C.D. report 
itself.
In broadly assuming a "tax haven problem", the report is representative of an 
attitude which is clearly adopted by the fiscs of most developed states. This 
attitude, insofar as it has been expressed by the fiscs of the U.S. and U.K., will be 
discussed in later chapters in this thesis.
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The O.E.C.D. report is also representative of another feature which is constantly 
evident in official papers and discussions on tax havens and international tax 
avoidance generally, namely the paucity of evidence adduced to support official 
claims about the effect of tax havens or of "the size of the tax haven problem". 
This feature will also be reconsidered in the later chapters dealing with the U.S. 
and U.K. position.29
There are of course difficulties in establishing the economic effects of tax havens 
on developed states and in quantifying the amount of taxable revenue that may 
be concerned. However, such difficulties are broadly those facing all forms of 
economic research and should not prove insurmountable. The chief problem, it 
is submitted, is that the fiscal authorities have broadly assumed there is a sizeable 
problem from the mere existence and use of tax havens and are therefore more 
anxious to consider ways of containing this perceived problem than to devote 
resources to establish whether and to what extent such a problem actually exists. 
It is to these counteracting measures that attention is now turned.
ANTI-TAX HAVEN MEASURES
The fact that it is now possible to set up a base company, for example, in a tax 
haven, often with minimal expense, has led to frequent challenges by the fiscs of 
higher tax jurisdictions as to the legitimacy of such companies and the use of tax 
havens in general. The various anti-tax haven measures of the U.S.A. and the 
U.K. will be considered in detail later on. For present purposes, it will suffice to 
outline the general types of measures used by states to combat the use of tax 
havens by companies.
Where a tax haven company is effectively managed by another company located 
in a non-tax haven, the tax authorities of the controlling company’s state may 
claim, for this reason, that the two companies cannot be considered as separate 
entities. Consequently, the income of the tax haven company would be attributed 
to the controlling company for tax purposes by the fisc in the state of the
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controlling state, thus negating the advantages arising from the use of a tax haven.
A number of countries have legislation which prohibits the transfer of assets or 
of business overseas. Such legislation is frequently supported by very heavy 
penalties in the event of non-compliance. In the U.K., for example, failure to 
obtain Treasury consent to the transfer from the U.K. of a trade or business 
resulted until 15th March 1988 in a criminal conviction and imprisonment for a 
term up to two years or to a fine not exceeding £10,000 or to both.30 Exchange 
control legislation, whilst not being tax legislation, may also be used to similar 
effect.31
There exist various legal doctrines relating to legal form which have been used to 
counteract tax haven activities which lack substance. A "letter-box" company is an 
example of the type of tax haven company that could be attacked under these 
concepts because such companies are merely formal legal constructs and lack 
commercial substance. In the U.S. and U.K. the "substance over form" doctrine 
(considered briefly in the last chapter) could be used by the fiscs to attack these 
companies.32 In Europe; the similar concept "abuse of legal form" (abus de droit) 
is available to the fiscal authorities. Many countries may also ignore "sham" 
transactions effected merely for tax avoidance purposes. There are also general 
anti-avoidance provisions which may be relevant. In New Zealand, for example, 
there is the aptly named "annihilation provision" under which any agreement shall 
be absolutely void insofar as "it has or purports to have the purpose or effect in 
any way, directly or indirectly", of avoiding tax.33 The broad effect of all these 
doctrines would be to attribute the income of the tax haven company elsewhere, 
bringing it into the charge to tax of the state applying the anti-avoidance doctrine.
Virtually all states have requirements that transactions carried out by taxpayers 
in that state are entered into on arm’s length terms, or, where this is not the case 
(for example, in dealings with an associated company), that a full market value be 
used as the price in such transactions. Transfer pricing legislation is the most 
obvious example of the measures available to the fisc in this context.
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The imposition of withholding tax on payments to non-residents of interest, 
dividends, royalties, rents, management fees, etc is also a measure which acts as 
a disincentive to the use of tax havens. The withholding tax is usually reduced or 
removed by double tax treaty but such treaties will not generally be concluded 
with such an effect between high tax and low tax states or, at least, not without 
some undertaking of administrative assistance and exchange of information 
between the two signatory states. A further measure which may be directed 
against tax havens, though not one which has been adopted widely, is to shift the 
burden of proof from the tax authorities to the taxpayer in certain instances. 
Measures for this purpose were introduced in France in 1974. The measures 
provide that certain types of payment made to non-residents in a state giving 
"preferential tax treatment" are not deductible for tax purposes "unless the payer 
furnishes proof that the expenses correspond to genuine transactions and are not 
abnormal or excessive". If the expenses are not justified by the taxpayer, they are 
added back to the taxpayer’s taxable income.34
As a result of the increased use of tax havens for the location of investment 
companies (mutual trusts, unit trusts, etc) a number of states, including the U.S., 
U.K., Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands, have legislation which either taxes 
investors annually on the amount of income of the investment fund relating to the 
year in question (as in the Netherlands, Canada and Germany) or which taxes as 
income any gain made by the investor on a disposal of an interest in the fund (as 
in the U.S. and the U.K.).35
Whereas the foregoing measures have been developed unilaterally, there is an 
increasing move to combat the use of tax havens by the use of exchange of 
information between fiscal authorities. Indeed, the broad conclusion of the
O.E.C.D. report discussed earlier in this chapter is that increased co-operation in 
the exchange of information is necessary to counter tax haven activities.36 The 
methods of exchanging information have already been discussed in chapter two.
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Finally, there exists the type of unilateral measure which is the particular concern 
of this thesis. The U.S., Canada, Germany, France, Japan, and the U.K. have laws 
regarding the apportionment of undistributed income accumulated by a tax haven 
company. These laws attribute to shareholders resident within these states the 
undistributed income of certain tax haven companies owned by them. There are 
broadly three basic features to this type of legislation. First, the tax haven 
company must be controlled by residents of the state where the legislation is 
applied. Second, the company must be subject to a low level of tax in relation to 
the tax burden it would have been subject to had it been situated in the state 
applying the legislation. Third, if the above two preconditions are met, income of 
the tax haven company is attributed to its controlling shareholders by one of two 
approaches. In the U.S., Canada and Germany the income so attributed is only 
the "tainted" passive income. In the U.K., Japan and France all the income of the 
tax haven company is attributed to its controlling shareholders unless certain 
exemptions apply. Notwithstanding the two basic differences in approach, the 
legislation of all six states has a substantially similar effect.
In contrast to the various measures considered earlier the provisions aimed at the 
undistributed income of certain tax haven companies are designed specifically to 
counter the use of tax havens whereas the earlier measures are of a general 
character and are used in combatting a variety of tax avoidance arrangements, and 
not necessarily those involving the use of tax havens.
There are broadly two different approaches in the anti-tax haven legislation of 
these six countries.37 Canada and the United States adopt what may be called a 
"transactional" or "functional" approach. This focuses on the nature of income 
received by a controlled foreign corporation; if this income is "tainted" then the 
income will be attributed pro rata to U.S. or Canadian shareholders. Since both 
countries provide relief for foreign taxes suffered, any tax paid by controlled 
foreign corporations will be offset against U.S. or Canadian tax on the tainted 
income. Where such foreign tax exceeds or is equal to the U.S. or Canadian tax 
rates, no tax will be payable in the U.S. or Canada under the anti-tax haven
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legislation. In effect therefore, it is only controlled foreign corporations in low or 
no tax states receiving tainted income which are subject to the legislation. 
However, as a result of the "functional" approach taken by these countries, the 
U.S. and Canada have effectively enacted legislation dealing with operations in 
certain tax havens without having to define what a tax haven is.
This is not the approach adopted by the other four countries. There the scheme 
of the legislation is to concentrate not on the type of income but on the location 
of - or (and which often comes to the same result) level of tax suffered by - the 
controlled foreign corporation. Where a controlled foreign corporation is 
established in certain low-tax havens the legislation of these countries will apply. 
Since the legislation focuses on the location of the company rather than on the 
type of income it receives, the problem of defining a tax haven requires to be 
tackled. Therefore, the legislation of these four countries gives a definition of tax 
havens and supplements this by certain lists.
In three of these four countries (Japan, France and the U.K.) a low-tax state 
(effectively, a tax haven) is defined by means of comparing the foreign tax levied 
on the relevant company with the domestic tax that would be payable if the 
company were subject to the domestic tax jurisdiction. In the fourth country 
(Germany) this method of comparison is not used. The German legislation is 
something of a hybrid of the "transactional" approach of the U.S. and Canada and 
the "designated jurisdiction" approach of Japan, France and the U.K. German 
shareholders of a CFC are taxable on its tainted income where such income is 
subject to low taxation in the foreign country. Broadly, "low taxation" is a total tax 
burden of less than 30%.
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH TAX HAVENS
So far in this chapter the word "tax haven" has been used as if the concept were 
clear and unproblematic. This is not the case. There are a number of problems 
with the concept which have a significant impact on the conventional
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understanding of tax havens. The following sections of this chapter explore the key 
areas of difficulty, starting with the primary problem, the definition of a "tax 
haven". This is obviously a major issue because whilst a number of states are 
opposed to the use of "tax havens", it is not clear that there is any generally 
accepted understanding of what a tax haven is.
Following the discussion of the definitional problem, the impact of the existence 
of tax havens on tax neutrality and commercial capacity to compete is considered, 
before a consideration of the fiscal sovereignty of tax havens. Finally, there is a 
discussion of the place of tax havens in the development of IFL.
THE DEFINITION OF A TAX HAVEN
Attempts to Define the Concept
The expression "tax haven" is commonly used in a very wide sense. However, it 
is an entirely separate concept from that of "tax shelter", which is capable of 
rather more precise explanation:
"Broadly speaking, any investment that receives some tax favoured 
treatment, such as long-term capital gains or the tax exemption accorded 
interest on state and local obligations could be called a "tax shelter". In 
practice, however, that term tends to be applied mainly to some specialised 
investments such as oil and gas drilling ventures, real estate syndications 
and equipment leasing arrangements".38
A number of attempts have been made to offer a satisfactory definition of the 
concept of a tax haven. Commencing with the most literal definition, J. Van 
Hoorn suggests:
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"The word "haven" means harbour and thus, figuratively, refuge or place 
of safe retirement. "Tax haven" would then indicate a place to which one 
goes, or which one uses, in order to avoid taxes."39
Definitions are frequently based on the low or no-tax status of havens:
"Tax havens are countries which levy very low or no taxes at all, at least on 
certain categories of income and profit."40
The difficulty with definitions which focus on the low-tax aspect of tax havens is 
that no account is taken of certain important tax havens where, although domestic 
tax rates are fairly high, transactions may in certain cases be arranged so as to 
significantly reduce the burden of tax that might otherwise apply (for example, 
The Netherlands is a prime example of a high-tax tax haven).
The broad notion of tax havens is defined more realistically by Chown and 
Edwardes-Ker:
"A tax haven is a territory where assets can be held and profits can 
be earned without any local tax consequences or at a cost of a tax 
liability materially less than that ruling in the major industrialised 
countries."41
The reason it is so difficult to produce a wholly satisfactory and comprehensive 
definition of tax havens is due to the diverse types of tax haven: some are 
industrialised countries, some are developing countries, and some, although not 
independent nations in their own right, have the authority to establish their own 
tax regime. It is easier, therefore, to identify the various categories of tax haven. 
To offer a single definition which encapsulates the salient attributes of each 
category is considerably more problematic. The United Nations has observed that:
141
"Despite the widespread use of the term "tax haven", no 
internationally accepted definition of it has yet been formulated."42
However, it is precisely because the term is used to refer to so many different 
forms of tax advantages offered by states that a unifying description is not 
achievable. This explains why it is possible to produce only a very generalised 
definition, such as those considered above, or the following, which could apply to 
almost every state in the world:
"Any country which by features in its tax law (or the absence
thereof) attracts the attention of tax planners."43
Almost any state can be considered a tax haven (in this sense) in comparison with 
another country. Even countries levying very high rates of taxes in general might 
be regarded as tax havens with respect to other countries where lower tax rates 
apply in respect of specific transactions or situations. Whilst this is no doubt true, 
the resulting notion of a "tax haven" would be so all-embracing as to be virtually 
meaningless. For this reason, it is easier, and certainly more useful, to identify the 
categories of tax haven than to offer a single all-embracing definition of the 
concept "tax haven".
The Categories of Tax Haven
The Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies enumerate three categories of tax 
havens.44 The first category contains those havens levying no or very low taxes. 
The second category is divided into two sub-sections: (i) states with some direct 
taxation on local and/or foreign items of income or capital but nevertheless special 
tax advantages for foreign operations; and (ii) states offering exemptions from tax 
only on foreign income. The third category comprises those states with normal 
taxation but certain special tax advantages. The Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal 
Studies also acknowledges there is a residual class of states offering investment 
incentives such as accelerated depreciation, investment allowances, etc. However,
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on the ground that this class would contain more or less every country not falling 
within the three previous categories, this class is not considered as a separate 
substantive category. Saunders45 has a similar categorisation but differs in taking 
rather more account of this latter residual class of states, which he merges with 
what is the third category for the Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies, namely 
those states with normal taxation but certain special tax advantages.
Spitz46 takes a similar line though with a more restricted third category than is 
adopted by Saunders. Spitz also introduces terms (tax paradises, tax shelters and 
tax resorts) to denote his categorisation in offering the following three classes of 
jurisdiction: -
(i) countries where there are no relevant taxes (tax paradises)
(ii) countries where taxes are levied only on internal taxable events, but 
not at all, or at very low rates, on profits from foreign sources (tax 
shelters)
(iii) countries which grant special tax privileges to certain types of 
companies or operations (tax resorts)."
This categorisation is similar to that offered by both the Rotterdam Institute for 
Fiscal Studies and Saunders and it is also similar to the categorisation adopted by 
Japan for the purposes of its CFC legislation.47 However, the terms "tax 
paradise", "tax shelter" and "tax resort" have not gained general currency and may 
not prove helpful when used in this context. In particular, the use of the term "tax 
shelter" to denote states where there is no or very low taxation on foreign source 
income may prove rather confusing in some quarters since this term already has 
a different established meaning (which was considered at the beginning of this 
chapter).
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The major weakness with this accepted classification of tax havens is that no 
account is taken of tax havens whose importance is derived primarily from their 
network of double tax treaties. The existence of a treaty network may be a very 
significant asset of a tax haven48 and this is particularly so in the case of countries 
such as the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland.49 The tendency to 
leave this type of tax haven out of the classification of tax havens may be due to 
the fact that such havens are frequently used in the creation of international 
conduits for the remittance of royalties, interest, etc, and not for the purposes 
traditionally associated with tax havens, such as the accumulation of capital in a 
tax-free environment.
To take account of this oversight, it is considered that the appropriate 
categorisation of tax havens for the purposes of the present brief analysis will be 
as follows
1. Havens levying no tax.
2. Havens exempting foreign source income from taxation or offering special 
tax advantages for foreign operations
3. Havens whose primary attraction is their network of double taxation 
treaties.
4. Havens which tax both domestic and foreign source income but which 
nonetheless offer special tax advantages.
Each of the above categories is discussed briefly below.
1. Havens levying no tax.
Tax haven states falling into this category include such locations as the 
Bahamas, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. All these islands have no 
direct taxes (i.e. no income, corporate, capital gains, withholding, gift or
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estate taxes) nor have they negotiated double tax treaties with any other 
country.
Taking the Cayman Islands as an example, the only taxes that do exist in 
Cayman are duties at the rate of 20% on merchandise imported to the 
Islands and stamp duties which are required on most documents. There are 
also various business licence fees. Since the Cayman Islands is not a party 
to any income tax treaties, the tax authorities of other states have no right 
to receive information from their counterparts in the Cayman Islands.
2. Havens exempting foreign source income from taxation or offering special 
tax advantages for foreign operations.
Havens in this category include jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, Barbados, 
Costa Rica, Gibraltar, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Panama.
By way of example, direct taxes in Hong Kong are levied exclusively on 
Hong Kong source income and comprise property tax, salaries tax, profits 
tax and interest tax. There is no general income tax as such. Since Hong 
Kong levies tax on a source basis, the place of residence of a company 
does not of itself affect liability to Hong Kong tax.
3. Havens whose primary attraction is their network of double taxation 
treaties.
Havens in this category normally have three important attributes from a 
tax perspective: limited or no withholding tax on incoming cash flows; 
limited or no tax on the receipt of that income under domestic law; and 
limited or no withholding tax on outbound cash flows.
The Netherlands is the most obvious example of a haven within this 
category. As a tax haven, the major attraction of this state is its very wide
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network of double taxation treaties. Many of these treaties contain some 
of the most favourable provisions negotiated by any country on behalf of 
its residents. This fact has been recognised by a number of other states and 
there has been much discussion on the use of Netherlands companies as 
"stepping stone" or "conduit" companies to reduce corporation taxes and 
withholding taxes in other countries.
Other special provisions complement the Netherlands’ favourable network 
of tax treaties. The Dutch participation exemption, contained in Article 13 
of the Dutch Corporation Tax Act, is particularly important. Under this 
exemption dividends and capital gains received by a Dutch company from 
a foreign subsidiary are exempt from Dutch tax.
For the exemption to apply, the following conditions must be met: the 
Dutch company must hold at least 5 % of the paid up capital of the foreign 
subsidiary from the beginning of the fiscal year in which the dividends are 
paid; the shares must not be held simply as an investment (which means 
generally that the Dutch company must perform some function in the 
operations of the group as a whole); and the overseas subsidiary must be 
subject to a foreign income tax which is similar to the Dutch corporation 
tax.50
This last condition, that the subsidiary must be taxed on its profits, means 
that where the subsidiary is located in a no-tax haven, any dividends 
remitted will bear full Dutch corporate tax whilst remittances from 
subsidiaries taxed at low rates will not be taxed at all in the Netherlands. 
For Dutch corporate groups, this inevitably makes the location of 
subsidiaries in low-tax havens, such as Switzerland and Cyprus, considerably 
more attractive than locations in no-tax havens (Bahamas, Barbados, 
Cayman, etc.). It also provides one reason why a company which decides 
to locate in Gibraltar, for example, may choose to use a qualifying 
company (which bears tax at the rate of 2% or 27% depending upon
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whether or not the income is remitted) rather than an exempt company 
(which is not subject to income tax as such but is subject to the flat-fee 
rate of annual tax, irrespective of the level of its profits).
Other countries with sophisticated tax treaty networks are the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Belgium and France.
4. Havens which tax both domestic and foreign source income but which 
nonetheless offer special tax advantages.
Countries in this category include Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom.51
Taking Belgium as an example, two features of the tax legislation should 
be mentioned: the so-called "T-zones" and also the special provisions 
applying to headquarters companies.
T-zones were introduced by Royal Decree in 1982 as an incentive for high 
technology companies to set up in designated areas in Belgium.52 The 
principal benefit accorded to such companies doing business in T-zones is 
an exemption from corporate tax on profits (whether retained or 
distributed) and an exemption from withholding tax on dividends, interest 
and royalties paid abroad. The exemption applies for a period of ten years. 
A further concession exempts the company from capital duty on 
incorporation if it is set up for qualifying operations.
With regard to the provision for headquarters companies, the original law 
of 198253 was modified by a 1984 decree54 following E.E.C. pressure. 
However, the new rules still result in very low taxes for new headquarters 
or officially recognised financial centres. Originally the law gave such 
companies a 10-year tax holiday. The new rules state that taxable income 
is determined by a mark-up (normally approximately 8%) on operating
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expenses. However, all staff and financial expenses (usually a major portion 
of operating costs) are excluded from the mark-up base. The new rules are 
not restricted to the 10-year limit but apply indefinitely.
To qualify, the work of the company must be limited to an auxiliary or 
planning role for the benefit of the corporate group of which it is a 
member and the group must have a consolidated net worth of at least 
B.Fr. 1 billion and annual turnover of at least B.Fr. 10 billion. There are 
in addition provisions whereby the companies’ foreign executives are 
eligible for reduced income taxes and do not need to obtain work permits 
and other forms of professional registration which are usually required.
Having briefly surveyed the various types of tax haven it is now possible to 
conclude that attempts to find a single definition to cover all types of tax havens 
is unlikely to prove successful because of the very diverse uses that can be made 
of such states.
It is also possible to draw some further conclusions on the policies of those states 
which are opposed to the use of tax havens for fiscal reasons. It is clear that such 
states are concentrating their attack on havens in categories 1 and 2 (i.e. no tax 
havens and havens exempting foreign source income or offering special tax 
advantages for foreign operations). However, even with the targeted attribute of 
no-tax or low-tax regimes, there are still some significant differences in precisely 
what countries fall to be regarded as tax haven states by the developed states. 
This point is taken up in Part C of this thesis in the discussion of the U.K.’s 
approach to tax havens in the context of the U.K. controlled foreign company 
rules.
The developed states are generally opposed to the use of states for "treaty 
shopping" purposes (category 3) but this does not appear to be perceived by them 
as part of the tax haven issue. Developed states do not appear to wish to oppose 
the use of havens falling within category 4 (special tax advantages).
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TAX HAVENS AND NEUTRALITY
It was noted earlier that three reasons are given in the O.E.C.D. document on tax 
havens as the basis for the tax authorities’ opposition to the use of such locations. 
The first, relating to the adverse effect on revenues collected, has already been 
considered. The second reason given is the prejudicial effect of tax haven usage 
on tax neutrality:
"Insofar as investment decisions are influenced by tax motives, the 
use of tax havens leads to decisions at variance with what a neutral 
system would command, and results in undesirable economic 
distortions, particularly capital flows"55
It is not clear what this objection is directed at and no further details are given in 
the O.E.C.D. paper in which it appears. If the statement refers to a disruption of 
neutrality on an international level, it appears to be a totally misconceived 
objection. This is because the differing rates of tax applying from one state to 
another will in any event completely rule out any possibility of a "neutral" 
environment for commercial decisions from a tax perspective. (There would in 
addition be the concern that the tax authorities were adopting a position which 
does not recognise the fiscal sovereignty of the tax haven states, but this point is 
considered later in this chapter).
If, on the other hand, the statement refers to a disruption to the neutrality that 
would otherwise apply on a domestic basis, the opposition appears equally 
misconceived. It would always be open to a domestic participant in a commercial 
transaction to structure the transaction using a vehicle from any country (whether 
or not a "tax haven") outside the state, thus denying the possibility of tax neutrality 
in any event. In other words, the use of companies located in tax havens is in 
itself merely one aspect of the disruption to the neutrality principle (viewed on a 
purely domestic basis) that arises more generally whenever an overseas company 
is involved in the transaction. Moreover, the existence of tax incentives and reliefs
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promulgated in the domestic legislation of virtually all states (e.g. The Business 
Expansion Scheme incentives in the U.K.56) is hardly reconcilable with the goal 
of tax neutrality. For these reasons, the objection to tax havens on the grounds 
of tax neutrality appears somewhat strained.
Furthermore, objections based on neutrality (such as the one cited above) are in 
reality often based as much on objections to tax avoidance or on the effect on 
competition as on neutrality. In economic terms (and as has been explained in 
Chapter 1) the concept of "pure" neutrality that such objections are based on is 
a chimera.
TAX HAVENS AND COMPETITION
The third and final reason given earlier for the tax authorities opposition to the 
use of tax havens is the adverse effect on commercial competition:
"... competition between taxpayers is seriously distorted by the fact 
that some taxpayers can use tax havens to avoid or reduce their 
liability, while others do not or cannot."57
This is, in principle, a similar objection to that based on tax neutrality and it 
appears to be no more well-grounded. As before, the existence or non-existence 
of tax havens will not affect the existence of "distortions" to commercial 
competition arising as a result of the varying rates of tax applicable from one 
country to the next and the various incentive schemes, particularly in relation to 
the export of goods and services, that exist in many states, most of which are not 
tax havens.
Further, the "competition" (and also "neutrality") issue is an argument which can 
be mounted in opposition to anti-tax haven measures as well as in support of 
them. This is reflected in the representations made by the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the O.E.C.D. (this committee is generally
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responsible for representing the views of the private sector to the O.E.C.D.). In 
commenting on the anti-tax haven measures adopted by fiscs, BIAC commented:
"... faced with restrictive legislation, companies will either 
discontinue existing operations or, more likely, change the method 
of conducting the operations so as to minimise the effect of the 
legislation, the latter course often involving higher (non-tax) costs.
Since not all competitors will be equally affected by the legislation, 
it may have unfortunate competitive effects."58
There is little response to this counter argument in the O.E.C.D. paper beyond 
the following:
"The use of tax havens itself distorts competition and the 
Committee hoped such arguments would not be used to justify 
attempts to avoid the impact of countering legislation."59
The above response hardly answers the objection raised by BIAC. In addition, it 
is not self-evident (contrary to the implicit assumption in the above quotation) 
that the use of tax havens necessarily distorts competition. There is an argument 
that, in some cases, the use of tax havens fulfils an important role in facilitating 
competition. This would be achieved by permitting companies resident in high tax 
states to compete more effectively with their counterparts in lower-tax states. By 
using tax havens in their international operations, companies otherwise facing a 
more punitive rate of tax may be able to compete with companies from lower tax 
countries on a more equal footing.
There is support for this argument in some further comments made in the 
O.E.C.D. paper by BIAC:
"Much of the use of tax havens is not motivated by a desire to pay 
little or no tax, so much as an economic necessity to reduce costs,
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including taxes, to a bearable level in circumstances where the laws 
of countries are uncoordinated, and even the laws of individual 
countries are inconsistent insofar as they relate to the treatment of 
international business".60
In the absence of sufficient empirical evidence on the matter, no conclusions can 
be drawn. However, the point is relevant in demonstrating the scant regard which 
is paid by official bodies to arguments which tend to substantiate the necessary or 
desirable use of tax havens.
Thus, the argument is not by any means concluded and it still remains for the tax 
authorities, as those responsible for anti-tax haven measures, to make a case for 
such measures on the grounds of commercial competition (and neutrality).
One further point on competition should also be considered. It may be objected 
that if a country with a high tax rate imposes CFC legislation then that is no more 
anti-competitive (or, indeed, anti-neutral) in the international arena than 
distortions in tax rates themselves: in other words it would be as reasonable for 
such a state to introduce CFC legislation as it would for it to raise (or lower) its 
domestic rate of tax.
In one sense this entire thesis is directed at precisely this type of objection. 
However, the objection can be answered briefly here by drawing a distinction 
between business competition amongst taxpayers and competition amongst states 
for Revenue. As between taxpayers, tax havens are available in principle to 
anyone who cares to use them and are therefore an element in competition and 
competitive factors (just like domestic tax rates, management efficiency, access to 
markets, etc).
It is only when the use of tax havens breaches the accepted rules (ie. broadly the 
principles of IFL, as enacted in domestic legislation of states and tax treaties 
between states) that such use is to be objected to. States have implicitly (if not
152
expressly) accepted this viewpoint by subscribing to the policies and principles of 
IFL as reflected, for example, in double tax agreements. In short, the introduction 
of CFC measures will be a breach of competition between states (and will have 
an anti-competitive effect on domestic taxpayers affected by them) if such 
measures are in breach of the policies and principles of IFL. It is considered that 
this thesis demonstrates that this is indeed the case.
FISCAL SOVEREIGNTY OF TAX HAVENS
One further problem, to which reference has already been made, is the degree to 
which developed states are prepared to respect the fiscal sovereignty of states they 
regard as tax havens (particularly no-tax or low-tax havens). The general attitude 
is summed up by the United Nation"s Department of International Economic and 
Social Affairs, which records the international recognition (or, more accurately 
perhaps, reluctant acceptance) that:
"Any country in the exercise of its sovereignty is entitled to adopt 
a tax system which reflects its economic preferences to charge taxes 
at low rates or to refrain, if it so desires, from imposing taxes at 
all."6i
However, the same document goes on to state the perceived problem resulting 
from the exercise of sovereignty by tax havens:
"the tax and regulatory structures adopted by any country in 
exercise of its sovereignty may result in tax advantages for 
foreigners which may have a serious impact on the tax revenue of 
other countries."62
Unfortunately, the apparent tension between the exercise of sovereignty by low-tax 
havens and the ability of other countries to fully recover tax revenues is not 
explored in the document from which the above quotations are taken (nor is it
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explored in any other official document, to the knowledge of the writer) although 
the discussion in that document does go on to note the following:
"A slightly different point, which ought also to be borne in mind in 
this analysis is that no criticism is intended by it of those countries 
where tax systems (or lack of tax systems) are used to provide 
advantages to the taxpayers of other countries. It was pointed out 
that those countries were free in the exercise of their sovereignty to 
shape their tax laws in their own way, just as it was also the 
sovereign right of states affected by international tax differentials to 
take the steps necessary to exercise the justice, equity or neutrality 
of their national tax systems"63
The statement is particularly revealing in that it reflects the real ambivalence in 
attitude of the fiscs of high tax states towards the fiscal sovereignty of low-tax 
havens. The position of most developed states seems to be that because tax 
havens adversely affect their tax systems (an assumption based in turn on 
economic assumptions for which relatively little supporting empirical data exists), 
unilateral (and increasingly, bi-lateral or multi-lateral) measures may be enacted 
to prevent the perceived detrimental effects to them resulting from the use of tax 
havens. In taking such a line, there is virtually no recognition of the possible 
effects such legislation may have on the tax system or fiscal sovereignty of the 
havens against which the measures are directed.64 Therefore, notwithstanding the 
apparent "even-handed" attitude that appears in certain official documents, such 
as that referred to above, the reality on closer inspection is that the approach of 
most high-tax states to the fiscal sovereignty of tax havens is rather more one­
sided; such sovereignty is in effect accepted only to the extent it does not have any 
adverse fiscal consequences for those high-tax states. Further, since many high-tax 
states often take the view that the mere existence of tax havens will necessarily 
have such adverse effects, the recognition of the fiscal sovereignty of tax havens 
is in practice somewhat thin.
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The juxtaposition of the final two propositions in the last quotation (i.e. the 
freedom of tax havens to shape their own tax laws and the freedom of high tax 
states to act to preserve justice, equity or neutrality of their tax system) raises a 
number of questions without providing any answers. For example, what if the 
taking of steps "to ensure the justice, equity or neutrality" of a national tax system 
contradicts the fiscal sovereignty of a low-tax state? In what way is the fiscal 
sovereignty of a low tax state to be respected, if at all, by other states? Is the 
justice, equity or neutrality of the tax system of the low-tax haven to be respected 
with the same priority as applies in the case of high-tax jurisdictions and, if not, 
why not? These questions naturally lead on to the much larger question of the 
place of tax havens in the development of international fiscal law. This matter is 
considered in the next, and final, section of this chapter.
TAX HAVENS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IFL
It is the tax authorities of the relatively high-tax states which express most concern 
over operations involving tax havens. Not surprisingly, these tax authorities usually 
develop a concept of tax havens which is based on the no-tax or low-tax status of 
such countries and wholly disregard the fact that, in many instances, high-tax states 
can also be effectively used as tax havens.
In addition, the perspective of high-tax states with regard to low tax states is 
somewhat indiscriminate. There is practically no account taken of the varying 
uses made of tax havens in cases where tax avoidance is not the motivation. 
Instead, all such uses are generally objected to by high-tax states in their 
opposition to the use of tax havens by their residents. Given the blanket 
opposition to international tax avoidance by most developed states, this is an 
understandable (if not entirely justifiable) position. However, the tax authorities 
of high-tax states also seem at times to regard the use of tax havens for the 
purposes of tax avoidance as being synonymous with usage for tax evasion 
purposes.65 For example, in the United Nations document ‘International Co- 
Operation in Tax Matters"66 there is an implication that avoidance activity is to
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be regarded as a fiscal crime.67 Similarly - and which comes to the same thing - 
tax authorities may not properly distinguish between avoidance and evasion:-
"Tax administrations are concerned about both tax evasion and tax 
avoidance, since the tax losses resulting from them may impinge 
very forcibly upon the effectiveness of their operations and the 
equity of their tax systems. In the context of non-compliance with 
the tax laws, it may be considered irrelevant whether a specific 
activity on the part of a taxpayer is classified precisely as evasion or 
avoidance".68
The result of the above attitude taken by the tax authorities of high-tax states is 
that the tax haven question has become bluntly transformed into an "us/them" 
issue between the high-tax states on the one hand and the low- or no-tax states 
on the other. This development is unhelpful for a variety of reasons, not least 
because it obscures a number of key points which do require addressing if the 
development of IFL is not to be unduly prejudiced.
What is required in place of the generalised objections to tax havens is a more 
detailed analysis of the specific tax haven activities and uses which developed 
states are opposed to, together with the reasoning behind those objections. This 
would permit a more detailed review of the tax haven issue and develop a more 
rigorous analysis away from the current (and inadequate) perspective which simply 
equates use of tax havens with abuse.69
As well as a more detailed analysis of the grounds on which developed states 
object to the variety of uses of tax havens, there is also a need for the different 
types of tax haven to be more fully comprehended. At the moment, the attention 
is virtually exclusively turned to no- or low-tax havens, with little or no attention 
to the other types of tax haven. Indeed, the emphasis of the official scrutiny is 
perhaps already inadequate given the increasing attention being paid by tax
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planners to the possibilities of higher tax havens, a development already reflected 
in the literature on the use of tax havens.70
It is therefore concluded that closer analysis is necessary of both the types of tax 
haven and the uses made of tax havens which are opposed by developed states. 
If such an approach is adopted the job of applying the policies and principles of 
IFL to the debate will be greatly facilitated. IFL is here relevant for two reasons.
First, the policies and principles of IFL could be applied to rationalise the issues 
and to determine which anti-haven measures are, and which are not, justified in 
terms of IFL. This first point is also relevant to the second; if IFL is applied in 
this way, then it will inevitably mean an increase in the sphere of application of 
IFL, which in turn will assist the development of IFL. Both these points (the 
application and the development of IFL) are central to this thesis in the context 
of the tax haven issue and they will be developed in future chapters by reference 
to the analysis of the controlled foreign company legislation.
Therefore, conclusions on the relevance of IFL to anti-tax haven legislation and 
to the regulation of fiscal relations between developed states and states designated 
as tax havens cannot be drawn until the final part of the thesis, in chapters eight 
and nine. However, in concluding this chapter, it is appropriate to make certain 
further comments in support of the general relevance of IFL to the subject of tax 
havens.
First, in connection with the application of the policies and principles of IFL, it 
should be observed that, as demonstrated in Chapter One, those policies and 
principles are basically generally-accepted policies and principles of taxation which 
lead to applicable substantive enactments of IFL. As such, they provide relatively 
unproblematic criteria to asses the rights and wrongs of the treatment of tax 
havens by developed states. In this case (and reverting back to the discussion in 
Chapter One) the relevant criteria will be those principles which deal with the 
situations in which one state may tax the profits of a company from another state
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(ie. the nexus that is required to exist before such taxation may be levied) as well 
as the criteria of residence (and, possibly, the criteria which follow from the arm’s 
length principle) .71
Second, in connection with the development of IFL in this sphere, there are a 
number of comments to be made.
It may be questioned whether the subject of tax havens - or tax havens themselves 
- should be involved in the development of IFL at all. However, in view of the 
central importance of tax havens to the subject of international tax avoidance 
(which latter subject has become a dominant point in the discussion of IFL in 
general), it is self-evident that the subject of tax havens must be considered in the 
development of IFL. With regard to involving tax haven states themselves, the 
chief benefit of enfranchising tax havens in the development of IFL is that the 
major problems which are perceived to arise as a result of the existence of tax 
havens could be tackled by a generally accepted single approach. Thus, for 
example, the question of the rights of both haven and non-haven states arising 
from their entitlement to fiscal sovereignty might more readily be resolved by a 
development of the applicable rules of IFL, affecting both haven and non-haven 
states. Similarly, the application of IFL in this sphere may determine the 
legitimacy of the various forms of anti-tax haven legislation which have been 
considered earlier in this chapter. In the absence of such criteria being applied, 
it is difficult to see how such legislation could otherwise be appraised and 
evaluated.
If tax haven states are not involved in the development of IFL or if the subject of 
tax havens is not approached by developed states in accordance with the 
principles of IFL, the development of IFL is likely to be frustrated: IFL is
developed most effectively by states co-operating to achieve its ends. If a large 
number of states (i.e. tax havens) are excluded from this process, the sphere of 
application of IFL is necessarily reduced significantly. Further, if havens perceive 
they are being deliberately excluded and economic activity within their jurisdiction
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is subject to what they consider to be unjustifiable taxation by overseas states, this 
may lead to aggressive counter-measures being enacted by them. Such measures 
might be enacted deliberately to frustrate all anti-tax haven legislation of 
developed states (e.g. the enactment of wide secrecy laws to disguise completely 
the identity of the parties involved in tax haven transactions) or alternatively to 
attract further business to the tax haven in question by making it known that, for 
example, all business, irrespective of its legitimacy, would be welcomed. These 
developments would obviously aggravate relations between haven states and non­
haven states and would in addition be detrimental to the development of IFL.
If tax haven states are enfranchised in the development of IFL as has been 
suggested above, they would be entitled to its full protection. In practice, this 
should mean they would not be subject to anti-tax haven measures which are in 
breach of the agreed principles or conventions of IFL. (For example, a tax haven 
state in this position should be entitled to protection from an overseas fisc 
arbitrarily attempting to tax economic activity in the haven state). However, the 
benefits would not accrue solely to tax havens. Since participation in the 
development of IFL brings with it certain obligations, developed states would be 
entitled to expect the co-operation of tax havens in applying and enforcing certain 
accepted bases of taxation where those bases are acceptable on the criteria of 
IFL. In practice, this is likely to mean that low-tax havens would be required to 
communicate with other states in cases involving, for example, manipulation of 
transfer prices or artificial allocations of profits.
Although it can be expected that such increased participation in exchanges of 
information would raise a number of significant issues for various tax havens with 
strong secrecy provisions, many tax havens are already aware of the importance 
of preserving their reputation and standing as bona-fide business centres. This 
awareness has already led to various developments or initiatives, which include the 
provision or exchange of information (including information relevant to tax fraud 
and evasion) by such states to other states including the U.S.72
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The foregoing discussion assumes that tax haven states can be (and are willing to 
be) involved in the development of IFL. Partly due to the nascent state of 
development of IFL and partly due to the current attitude to tax havens by certain 
developed states, the mechanics and practicalities of such an involvement will 
inevitably be problematic. However, there is nothing in principle to prevent the 
participation of tax haven states in the development of IFL and, for the reasons 
already discussed, such participation would be of general benefit to the 
development of IFL. This matter is taken up again in the final part of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3 - NOTES
1 C. Doggart; Tax Havens and their Uses 1987, Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Special Report No. 1084, (London, 1987).
2 These historical details are derived from: United Nations, Department of
International Economic and Social Affairs, "International Co-Operation in
Tax Matters" (New York), 1984, SI/ESA/142, page 30 and from C. Doggart 
(op. cit at note 1 above) p. 1.
3 Note 2, Ibid.
4 For example, a Gibraltar "exempt company" may not carry on local activities
as a condition of its exemption from Gibraltar income tax under the 
Companies (Taxation and Concessions) Ordinance.
5 Switzerland, a well known tax haven, is a good example of a tax haven with 
a very long record of such stability. Without this stability the security of the 
taxpayer’s assets and investments cannot be relied upon and the tax haven 
will become markedly less attractive. An illustration of this is the Bahamas, 
which, as a tax haven, suffered badly from the unexpected election in the 
early 1970s of a new government which adopted a hostile attitude to the tax 
haven business (See further M. Grundy, The World of International Tax 
Planning (Cambridge, 1984), page 62). In consequence, a great deal of the 
business formerly carried on in the Bahamas was withdrawn and relocated 
elsewhere, in large part to the Cayman Islands and to a lesser extent to the 
British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, and others.
6 The secrecy required may relate to the actual operations of a tax haven 
company, or to the owners of the company. Often, disclosure required for 
the purposes of annual returns or other financial information to local tax 
authorities is of a very limited extent in tax havens. Bank secrecy is another 
important element. Many tax havens do not permit the inspection of bank 
accounts by fiscal authorities, including both domestic and foreign fiscs. 
Indeed, a number of countries make it a criminal offence for bank 
employees to reveal information to which they have access. (For example, 
in the Cayman Islands a provision which has this effect is the Cayman Islands 
Bank and Trust Companies Regulation Law 1966, (Law No. 8 of 1966), s. 10.) 
The effect of such provisions is that it is often difficult to establish the legal 
persons involved in tax haven operations and to establish the transactions 
effected.
7 B. Spitz, International Tax Planning, (Butterworths, 1972) page 101.
8 This subject is covered in greater detail in W.H.Diamond and D.B. Diamond 
Tax Free Trade Zones of the World (New York, 1984).
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9 See further; W.H. Diamond, "What to Look for when Choosing a Foreign 
Non-Tax-Haven Base" in "U.S. Taxation of International Operations" 
(Prentice Hall, 1981) 7631.
10 For example, the Administrator in Council of the Cayman Islands may grant 
a guarantee against direct taxes being imposed for a period of twenty years 
from the date of a company"s incorporation, (Tax Concessions Law (No.s 20 
and 21 of 1962) as amended). A longer period of fifty years is guaranteed if 
the taxpayer is an exempted trust, (Trusts Law (No 6 of 1967)).
11 See, for example, D W Williams, op cit at note 51 at p 162.
12 R.A. Gordon "Tax Havens and their Use by United States Taxpayers - An 
Overview", Report to Internal Revenue Service, 12 January 1981.
13 This is the categorisation favoured by the United Nations, even though the 
U.N. does appear to distinguish occasionally between acceptable and 
unacceptable tax haven operations. See note 2 Ibid page 32.
14 J. Huiskamp et al; International Tax Avoidance - A Study by the Rotterdam 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (Deventer, 1979) Volume A, page 72.
15 Marshall Langer has pointed out that: "An investor may establish a tax-haven 
company or trust to prevent the authorities in his country from knowing of 
assets and income he may have abroad. Sometimes this is done to avoid 
present taxes and controls. More often this is done to protect against the 
possibility of future taxes and controls or against possible future 
confiscation". M.J. Langer: How to Use Foreign Tax Havens, Practising Law 
Institute, (New York, 1975) page 11.
16 See further International Fiscal Association Seminar Paper "Recourse to Tax 
Havens - Use and Abuse" (Kluwer, 1980), page 76.
17 J. Chown, Taxation and Multinational Enterprise (London, 1974) Chapter 
1 1 .
18 For a fuller description of upstream loans, see Board of Inland Revenue; 
International Tax Avoidance (London, 1981) page 59 et seq.
19 See, for example, the comments in the recent O.E.C.D. paper dealing with 
tax havens (cited at note 22), paragraph 24-32, which also contain a fuller 
description of the operation of base companies.
20 See generally; T. Clarke and J.G. Tigue, Dirty Money, (Millington Books, 
1975).
21 New Zealand Ministry of Finance, Consultative Document on International 
Tax Reform, December 1987, p.i.
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22 O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs; Tax Havens: Measures to Prevent 
Abuse by Taxpayers, in International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Issues in 
International Taxation No. 1, (Paris, 1987),
23 The O.E.C.D. comprises Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, The U.K. and the U.S.
24 Note 22, Ibid, paragraph 1.
25 Note 22, Ibid, paragraph 39.
26 "Tax Havens and their Use by United States Taxpayers - An Overview", by 
Richard Gordon, U.S. Department of Treasury, (1981).
27 "Tax havens in the Caribbean Basin" report by the U.S. Department of 
Treasury, (1984).
28 Note 22, Ibid. The escalation is clearly implied in paragraph 40, read 
together with paragraphs 41 and 42.
29 For the present, it is perhaps worth recording that even countries which 
target measures against tax havens accept this point. In the case of the U.K., 
see further Board of Inland Revenue, ‘Tax Havens and the Corporate 
Sector" (June, 1982) para. 5.
30 ICTA 1988, s. 765 (formerly ICTA1970, s. 482) which was partially abolished 
with effect from 15 th March 1988.
31 In Australia, for instance, the Reserve Bank of Australia, which is 
responsible for administering exchange control, is required not to grant 
exchange control for most agreements with residents of certain designated 
countries listed in a notice under the Banking Act unless a tax clearance 
certificate has been issued by the Commissioner of Taxation.
32 Assuming a letter box company created by a U.K. parent, for example, a 
challenge by the U.K. fisc would in practice be based on one of two possible 
arguments that, in substance, the real business operations were carried on 
in the U.K.. The U.K. authorities might argue that such a letter box 
company was in reality resident for tax purposes in the U.K. on the basis 
that its "central management and control" (see further De Beers 
Consolidated Mines v Howe, 5TC 198) - ie. the highest level of executive 
authority of the company - was exercised in the U.K. or alternatively might 
argue that the company had - as a result, say, of activities carried out on its 
behalf in the U.K. by employees of other group companies - a taxable 
branch in the U.K.. The U.K. technical analysis would be different in each 
case (a company resident in the U.K. is taxable on its worldwide income -
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ICTA 1985, ss. 6,8,11 - whilst a non-resident company with a taxable branch 
in the U.K. is taxable only on the profits attributable to that branch based 
on the rules in ICTA 1988, s. 11) but the result would probably be the same 
since the Inland Revenue would in such a case usually argue that the only 
profits of the company were those attributable to its U.K. activities so that 
all its profits should be subject to U.K. tax, whether it were resident in the 
U.K. or merely had a U.K. branch.
33 Income Tax Act 1976, s. 99.
34 Article 238A, Code General des Impots. See also the detailed Administrative 
Instructions of June 26th, 1975 (4C-8-75) which has specified the terms of 
application of Article 238A.
35 The U.K. legislation, for example, is that contained in ICTA 1988, sections 
289 -312.
36 Note 22, Ibid, paragraphs 114-124.
37 It is occasionally objected that in reality the two different approaches cannot
be distinguished in the broad manner adopted in the text. It is considered
by the author that this objection is unfounded as economically different 
results may arise depending on whether CFC legislation is targeted at the 
type of income involved (broadly, whether active or passive) or whether at 
the location in which the CFC is based. However, it should be noted that 
the broad distinction is not an absolute divide. For example, the U.K. CFC 
legislation, as finally enacted, contains an "exempt activities" test (ICTA 1988, 
sch 25, para, s 5-12) designed to accommodate what may be referred to as 
genuine trading activities.
38 Professor L.J. Seidler, Everything You Wanted To Know About Tax Shelters, 
But Were Afraid To Ask (New York, 1981) page 5.
39 J. Van Hoorn, "The Use and Abuse of Tax Havens" in J. Avery-Jones (ed) 
Tax Havens and Measures against Tax Evasion and Avoidance in the E.E.C. 
(London, 1974).
40 J. Chown, Taxation and Multinational Enterprise (London, 1974) chapter 11.
41 J. Chown and M. Edwardes-Ker: "Tax Havens and Offshore Investment 
Centres", The Banker, May 1974, page 479.
42 Note 2, Ibid, page 30.
43 International Fiscal Association Seminar Paper, Recourse to Tax Havens - 
Use and Abuse (Deventer, 1980) page 15.
44 Note 14 above, Ibid, page 71.
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45 R. Saunders, International Tax Systems and Planning Techniques (London, 
1984) page 7001.
46 B. Spitz, International Tax Planning (Butterworths, 1972) page 82.
47 The Japanese classification is as follows:
(i) countries with low rates of taxation
(ii) countries with low rates of taxation on income from foreign sources
(iii) countries with low rates of taxation on income from specified
business activities.
48 Professor V. Uckmar states "some tax havens are indeed more attractive 
because of the existence of certain bilateral tax conventions with 
industrialised countries, which permit the routing of income from world-wide 
sources". See General Report, Tax Avoidance and Evasion, IFA Cahier de 
Droit Fiscal International 68a (Kluwer, 1983), p. 44.
49 As is discussed in more detail later in this chapter, it is not sufficient for 
states in this category merely to have a wide network of double tax treaties. 
It is in addition necessary that there is (1) limited or no withholding tax on 
incoming cash flows (though this is largely achieved through a favourable 
treaty network); (2) limited or no tax on the receipt of income under 
domestic law and (3) limited or no withholding tax on outbound cash flows.
50 Whether a foreign income tax is "similar" to the Dutch corporation tax under 
article 13(3) of the Corporation Tax Act is not always clear and in practice 
advance rulings on the status of remittances are obtained from the Dutch 
fisc.
51 The inclusion of the U.K. may seem somewhat surprising but, as the later 
discussion in chapter 6 will explain, there are good reasons for its inclusion - 
see further Economist Intelligence Unit, Britain as a Tax Haven, (London 
1986. Britain is also referred to in the context of tax havens by Professor 
David Williams - see D.W. Williams, Trends in International Taxation 
(Amsterdam, 1991 p. 163. It is well known that the U.K. is a particularly 
attractive state to non-U.K. domiciled individuals.
52 RD 118 of 1982, T-zones.
53 RD 187 of 1982.
54 Co-ordination Centres, Law of 27th December, 1984.
55 Note 22, Ibid.
56 ICTA 1988, ss 289-312. The Business Expansion scheme was abolished by F 
(No2) A 1992, s. 38.
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57 Note 22, Ibid, paragraph 77.
58 Note 22, Ibid.
59 Note 22, Ibid, paragraph 80.
60 Note 22, Ibid, paragraph 74.
61 Note 2, Ibid.
62 Note 2, Ibid.
63 Note 2 above, Ibid, at p. 32.
64 The argument that CFC measures represent a breach of the fiscal
sovereignty of the tax haven states affected by such measures is developed
in the latter two chapters of this thesis. For the present, it is sufficient to 
note that such a breach of fiscal sovereignty will be avoided only if such 
taxation of CFCs is consistent with the widely - accepted relevant principles 
of IFL and (as considered throughout the first three chapters of this thesis) 
this appears not to be the case. Neither is it considered an adequate 
argument that because CFC legislation generally gives credit for overseas 
taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries of the companies in states operating that 
legislation, there is no effect on the "fiscal sovereignty" of the states in which 
these subsidiaries are located. If such states do not wish to levy taxation or 
wish to levy taxation at a reduced rate, there seems no sound reason why 
economic activity conducted in the CFC state by the subsidiaries affected 
should be taxed at levels of taxation in excess of the domestic rate. The 
credit mechanism (which in any event often works in a restricted manner - 
e.g. the U.K. rules for "branch" tax of CFCs) merely ensures that, to some 
extent, there is no double taxation in addition to a breach of fiscal 
sovereignty.
65 The manner in which the two are run together is reflected in the position
taken by the O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which has stated that 
"International tax avoidance and evasion through the use of tax havens is one 
of the most important and long-standing concerns of the tax administrations
of most O.E.C.D. countries" (see note 22, Ibid).
66 United Nations, Dept of International Economic and Social Affairs, 
"International Co. Operation in Tax Matter". (New York, 1984).
67 Note 66, Ibid, at paragraph 203.
68 Note 66 Ibid, at para. 27.
69 There are many examples of the tendency by fiscal authorities to equate use 
of a tax haven with abuse of a domestic tax system. This was one of the
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major assumptions implicit in the Gordon Report (see note 25 above). A 
more recent example is contained in the O.E.C.D. paper entitled "Tax 
Havens: Measures to Prevent Abuse by Taxpayers" (cited at note 22 above), 
paragraphs 39-45.
70 See, for example, L.E. Wenehed and W.G. Kuiper, "High Tax Countries: an 
Alternative for Tax Havens?", European Taxation, (April, 1988), pp. 103-107.
71 In chapter one it was pointed out that the development of IFL is at a 
relatively nascent state and that, for example, the principles are not yet 
sufficiently accepted and defined on an international basis for a multilateral 
double tax convention to be a practicable possibility. Whilst there is no 
broad and detailed consensus on all aspects of the principles of IFL, this 
does not invalidate the comments made in the text on the acceptability and 
suitability of the relevant principles of IFL (taxable nexus, residence and 
arm’s length principles) to act as the relevant criteria in the situation 
discussed. These principles of IFL are widely accepted by states, as 
evidenced by the fact they are central to most double tax agreements.
72 For example, partly in response to concerns about the use of offshore 
centres for money laundering purposes, on October 5 th and 6th 1992, 
twenty-six governments of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 
(CFATF) agreed to adopt a number of important measures against 
international money laundering, including the provision of information to 
third countries and international regional organisations (see the journal 
Offshore Investment issue 33, January 1993, at pp 4-5). Of more direct 
relevant to tax issues are the recent tax treaties between the U.S. and the 
Cayman Islands and the U.S. on Bermuda. The U.S. Cayman Islands treaty, 
signed on 3 July 1986, provides inter alia, for the two countries to co-operate 
in each other’s investigations into tax crimes arising from the profits of 
certain criminal matters covered by the treaty. The U.S. and Bermuda 
treaty, signed on 11 July 1986, pledges Bermudian co-operation in U.S. civil 
and criminal tax investigations. The treaty has been described as "a real 
breakthrough" for the U.S. by Roger Olsen, the assistant attorney general of 
the U.S. Justice Department’s tax division (see further, Tax Planning 
International, Vol. 13, No. 8 (August 1986) p. 33).
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PART B
CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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CHAPTER 4
THE APPROACH TO TAX AVOIDANCE, ATTITUDE TO TAX HAVENS 
AND U.S. ANTI-AVOIDANCE LEGISLATION
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the official approach in the U.S. to the topics of tax 
avoidance (particularly international tax avoidance) and tax havens. Following the 
analysis of the above, there is a discussion of a variety of general U.S. anti­
avoidance measures. The chapter then examines the "hexapus", a series of 
legislative measures directed at preventing corporate tax-free accumulations. The 
chapter closes with an overview of the detailed controlled foreign corporation 
(Subpart F) legislation.
THE APPROACH TO TAX AVOIDANCE
In theory, there is in the U.S. a distinction between tax avoidance and evasion:
""Tax evasion" in the U.S. involves a wilful violation of the law to 
escape the payment of a tax. A finding of an intent of wilful 
evasion may subject a taxpayer to civil and criminal fraud penalties, 
including imprisonment. By contrast, "tax avoidance", broadly 
construed, includes all tax minimisation techniques not deemed to 
constitute tax evasion".!
Inevitably, however, the purported distinction is subject to those difficulties 
discussed in detail in the earlier chapter on international tax avoidance so that it 
is not surprising to discover that authors of the above explanation later concede:
"Given that there is no clear line between legitimate tax avoidance 
or minimisation behaviour and unacceptable minimisation schemes, 
taxpayers and their counsel are frequently unable to distinguish 
between the two".2
T/4 170
There exist also the difficulties of distinguishing avoidance transactions or 
activities which are permitted by the fisc and those which are not, i.e. the 
distinction between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" tax avoidance.
Untroubled by these difficulties, the U.S. fisc has devoted considerable resources 
to the fight against both domestic and international tax avoidance. In its 
legislation, administration, litigation and treaties a number of techniques have 
been adopted to counter avoidance devices.
With regard to legislation, detailed and aggressive statutory provisions have been 
passed on a large number of occasions with the sole intention of preventing tax 
avoidance. These provisions are almost invariably backed up by even more 
complicated and extensive regulations having general application^ Some of these 
provisions will be considered below.
In general, the U.S. fisc has been able to rely on the support of the courts where 
cases involve transactions or activities engineered for tax avoidance purposes. The 
courts have developed a number of anti-avoidance doctrines to thwart what are 
deemed unacceptable tax avoidance schemes. Transactions involving the use of tax 
havens may be subject to challenge in the courts under these doctrines.
It is difficult to define these doctrines precisely as the various theories underlying 
them tend to converge.4 The "business purpose" doctrine is used to attack 
transactions which have been entered into solely for tax avoidance purposes. The 
absence of a business purpose may cause the transactions to be disregarded for 
tax purposes, notwithstanding literal compliance with the tax statute. The leading 
case in this area is Gregory v Helvering.c
Under the "substance over form" theory, the courts may look to the substance or 
economic effect of a transaction and ignore the form in determining tax liability.6 
A similar doctrine is the "step transaction" theory under which two or more 
artificially separate steps may be amalgamated and treated as a single or
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composite transaction directed at a particular end result. It is arguable that this 
theory is merely an aspect of the substance over form doctrine since courts often 
need to establish the substance of the transaction in deciding whether to apply the 
doctrine. Under the "sham" transaction doctrine, the court will deny the tax effect 
of a transaction if, although complying with the literal terms of the statute, the 
transaction is in fact a sham.7
Finally, there is the "assignment of income" doctrine under which the court may 
examine the labour or capital which produced an income stream in order to 
identify the appropriate taxpayer to whom to attribute the income for tax 
purposes. The doctrine is usually applied where a person who has earned income 
assigns his rights to it to a third party.8
It appears that there is no underlying principle unifying these various doctrines.9 
Taken as a whole, these broad and relatively subjective anti-avoidance doctrines 
may be used in the courts by the fisc to great effect in denying the tax effect of, 
inter alia, tax haven transactions.
The policy of the U.S. in vehemently opposing international tax avoidance activity 
and the use of tax havens is also manifested in its tax treaty policy. The treaty 
policy of the U.S. has been publicly explained by Treasury representatives as 
follows:
"it is the policy of this Administration [the Reagan administration] 
not to enter into new treaties which permit the unwarranted 
granting of benefits to residents of third countries and, as 
appropriate, to negotiate, or, if necessary, to terminate, existing 
treaties to accomplish this objective.10
All U.S. treaties negotiated in recent years contain anti-treaty shopping measures. 
Since 1977 all treaties entered into by the U.S. contain the "beneficial owner" 
principle with regard to remittances of U.S. source interest, royalties and
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dividends. Under this principle reduced treaty withholding rates will not apply if 
an intermediary entity is interposed between the U.S. payer and ultimate 
beneficiary unless both the intermediary and ultimate beneficiary are residents of 
the treaty country.n
In Article 16 of its Model Tax Treaty, the U.S. has expanded upon Article 10 of 
the 1977 O.E.C.D. Model Convention which concerns disallowance of withholding 
rate reductions on dividend remittances to foreign holding companies. Article 16, 
entitled "Limitation on Benefits",12 is perhaps the harshest anti-abuse provision in 
existence with regard to treaty shopping. The article denies treaty benefits to a 
corporation unless:-
(a) it is not controlled by persons resident outside the Contracting State other 
than citizens of the U.S.; and
(b) the income of the corporation is not applied in substantial measure, 
directly or indirectly, to meeting the liabilities of such persons; or
(c) it did not have as a principle purpose the obtaining of treaty benefits.
The exchange of information and mutual assistance provisions contained in the 
U.S. tax treaties are actively used by the IRS to exchange information about 
transactions and activities of taxpayers. The U.S. also engages in simultaneous 
examination procedures whereby the U.S. and a treaty partner simultaneously 
audit the affairs of designated taxpayers with a co-ordinated exchange of 
information. The main benefit of this approach is that it allows each country to 
examine the relevant transactions from both sides and at the same time.
The increasingly aggressive treaty policy of the U.S. is reflected by its termination 
in 1982 of its tax treaty with the British Virgin Islands. This treaty had become 
notorious for its use by treaty shoppers. Following the unacceptability of Article 
16 to the British Virgin Islands negotiators, the U.S. gave formal notice that the
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treaty was to be terminated in pursuance of its policy to limit treaty benefits to 
those legitimately entitled.
In conclusion, there is a very clear intention in the legislation, administration, and 
tax treaty policy of the United States, as well as in judicial proceedings initiated 
by the fisc, to prevent a wide variety of forms of avoidance activity in order to 
ensure the intended functioning of the U.S. tax system. However, as will be seen, 
this policy is only one of several U.S. policies and there appear to be significant 
difficulties in satisfactorily reconciling the various (and competing) objectives 
arising from these different policies in a manner which results in the application 
of a co-ordinated and coherent anti-avoidance strategy. This is particularly so as 
regards anti-avoidance measures in the field of international, rather than merely 
domestic, tax avoidance. The clash of policy objectives is discussed more fully 
below.
THE ATTITUDE TO TAX HAVENS
The concept "tax haven" is nowhere defined in either the Internal Revenue Code 
or in the Regulations which apply to it. However, although the concept is not 
actually referred to in the tax legislation,13 a number of legislative provisions have 
been designed with tax havens in mind and there is much official pronouncement 
on tax abuses being facilitated by the existence of tax havens.14 The concept is 
therefore of some importance, although discovering the criteria used by the fisc 
to establish tax haven status remains difficult. It would appear that Internal 
Revenue Service sources have indicated that, although no precise definition of a 
tax haven exists, the term will be appropriate to certain countries which possess 
one or more of the following characteristics:^
1) either impose no tax or impose a low tax when compared with the U.S.;
2) have a high level of bank or commercial secrecy which the country refuses 
to break even under an international agreement;
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3) recognise the relative importance of banking and similar financial activities 
to its economy;
4) have modern communications facilities available;
5) do not impose currency controls on foreign deposits or foreign currency; 
and
6) engage in self-promotion as an offshore financial centre.
The approach of the U.S. fisc to tax havens is the subject of a 1981 U.S. Treasury 
Department report entitled "Tax Havens and Their Use by the United States 
Taxpayers - An Overview".16 The report is more conveniently referred to as the 
Gordon Report after its author, Richard Gordon. The Report was commissioned 
by The Oversight Subcommittee of the House of Representatives’ Ways and 
Means Committee following two days of hearings on the use of tax havens by 
Americans. Certain aspects of this influential Report have been considered 
already in the earlier chapter dealing with tax havens.
The stated aim of the Report is to provide an overall view of tax havens and their 
use by U.S. tax payers as well as providing suggestions as to how the fisc might in 
future regulate the use made of havens by U.S. tax payers. The Gordon Report 
considers mechanisms of international tax avoidance which date back to 1921 but 
observes that concern on the part of the Fisc relating to the use of tax havens by 
U.S. tax payers has existed only since the mid 1950s.
This is not strictly true since, as will be seen, the IRS was concerned as early as 
the mid 1930s about the use of tax havens by Americans. It is probably true to 
say, however, that the pattern of use of tax havens has undergone a fairly 
significant change since that time. Whereas the fisc’s early concern related to the 
use made of tax havens by U.S. citizens and residents, its emphasis in more recent 
years has switched to concern over the use of tax havens by multinational 
corporations. This is principally due to the much larger monetary amounts that
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are involved in the transactions of multinational corporations and the relative ease 
with which a group of companies with a multinational structure can employ the 
techniques of profit diversion and profit extraction. This shift of emphasis took 
place in the 1950s.
The Gordon Report explains tax havens to be, broadly, states with low tax rates 
compared to rates prevailing in the U.S. and a relatively high level of bank or 
commercial secrecy which is generally not breached even under international 
agreement.17 Statistics are given to demonstrate the growing involvement by U.S. 
persons in tax havens and it is stated that the use by U.S. taxpayers of havens as 
a site for foreign corporations has increased faster than worldwide foreign activity. 
For example, U.S. Commerce Department data indicated that in the period from 
1968 to 1978 direct investment in U.S. controlled tax haven business increased five 
fold, from $4.7 to $23 billion, while direct investment levels in non-tax haven 
business during that period grew from $57.2 to $145.1 billion, an increase of 
approximately two and one half times.18
Although the conclusions drawn by the Report are open to debate, it is certainly 
clear that the Gordon Report demonstrates anxiety on behalf of the U.S. fisc that 
the use of tax havens by U.S. tax payers requires very careful monitoring and, it 
is stated, corrective measures to prevent abuse. These statements in the report 
confirm the view that the U.S. does not wish to eliminate entirely the use of tax 
havens by U.S. taxpayers, but merely wishes to regulate such activity. The Report 
suggests three types of approach that could be adopted to fight tax haven usage. 
In view of the undoubted significance of the Gordon Report and the degree of 
development (and hence influence) of the U.S. anti-tax haven measures generally, 
these suggestions for future tax policy in respect of tax havens are of some 
importance. The three types of approach suggested are as follows:
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1) Options that can be adopted administratively.
a) Requirement that records and books of foreign subsidiaries are 
made easily available to the IRS.
b) Requirement that deductions, valuations, pricing, etc is more 
thoroughly substantiated by the taxpayer.
c) Introduction of simplified transfer pricing rules and reduction in 
lengthy and complicated audits.
d) Consideration of unauthorised use of treaties.
e) Simplification of reporting obligations placed on taxpayer and
enhancement of value of reporting requirements to the IRS.
f) Improved international co-operation.
g) Expansion of international tax training given to IRS staff.
h) Improvement of information channels.
2) Legislative options.
a) Expansion of Subpart F (U.S. anti-tax haven legislation) to add a
jurisdictional test that would tax U.S. shareholders of a controlled 
foreign corporation formed in a tax haven on all of its income 
(rather than on some items of its income as at present).
b) Addition of a management and control test to the present
jurisdictional test for subjecting corporations to U.S. tax to bring 
within the U.S. tax jurisdiction businesses which are in fact run in 
or from the U.S.
c) Simplification of taxation of tax haven income, combining the
Foreign Personal Holding Company provisions with Subpart F (this 
legislation is discussed below).
d) Withdrawal of deductions for tax haven transactions unless 
adequate evidence is provided by the taxpayer.
e) Imposition of penalties, etc to discourage avoidance devices.
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3) Treaty options.
a) Termination and renegotiation of treaties where necessary.
b) Conclusion of treaties only where necessary for trading purposes 
and never with tax havens.
c) Aim for exchange of information provisions which override domestic 
bank secrecy laws and practices.
d) Periodic review of operation of treaties in existence to ensure that 
they serve the purpose for which they were initially negotiated.
e) Pursuance of mutual assistance treaties with important tax havens.
f) Encouragement to abusive tax havens to enter into exchange of 
information agreements with the U.S., possibly by adopting 
measures to increase taxes on payments to these havens.
g) Limitation of abuse of treaties by incorporation of strong provisions 
to limit the use of treaties to residents of a treaty country.
It is clear from a consideration of the above measures (which are put forward as 
serious possibilities to combat perceived abuses involving tax havens by U.S. 
taxpayers), together with the Gordon Report as a whole, that U.S. tax policy is 
decidedly against tax haven use. However, it is noted that a wholly 
uncompromising and aggressive policy against tax havens by the U.S. authorities 
would interfere with other general policy objectives such as the following which 
are set out in the Report:19
1) Maintaining the competitive position of U.S. businesses investing abroad,
exporting, or otherwise competing with foreign businesses.
2) Maintaining tax equity as between investment in the U.S. and investment
abroad.
3) The need to provide fair rules for taxing foreign investment.
T/4 178
4) Administrative efficiency.
5 ) Foreign policy considerations including political or diplomatic relations with
tax haven countries.
6) Promotion of investment in the U.S.
The Report recognises that, in practice, U.S. tax policy is ambivalent, representing 
unresolved conflicts between the types of policy objectives listed above:
"The result has been policy ambiguities and compromises in 
legislation which have failed to resolve these conflicts, and which 
have left U.S. law without a clear focus with respect to tax havens. 
Concern for administrative feasibility has been nonexistent."20
By reason of these unresolved conflicts, the U.S. Congress has never sought to 
eliminate wholly tax haven operations by U.S. taxpayers. Instead, specific abuses 
have been identified and legislation passed to eliminate them. The result is a 
patchwork of anti-avoidance provisions, some specifically relating to tax havens 
(but nonetheless of general application) and some intended to deal with more 
general abuses. There is still no provision in the Internal Revenue Code which 
on its face deals specifically and exclusively with tax havens per se notwithstanding 
the fact that tax haven abuse in general has long been perceived by the U.S. fisc 
as requiring corrective measures.21
Richard Gordon states that nowhere is the tension between the differing policy 
objectives more apparent than when it is focused on tax havens:
"Nowhere is the failure to resolve the policy issues more obvious. 
Congress over the years, while maintaining deferral of tax on the 
earnings of foreign corporations controlled by U.S. persons, has at 
the same time passed numerous anti-avoidance provisions generally
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intended to solve perceived tax haven related problems. All have 
numerous exceptions, have been complex and difficult to administer 
and all have had gaps (many intended, some not)."22
This theme is of some importance and will be re-examined in the particular 
context of the passing of the 1962 U.S. CFC legislation below.
U.S. ANTI-AVOIDANCE LEGISLATION
For reasons of available space, the patchwork of numerous anti-avoidance 
provisions to which reference has been made cannot be considered in detail. 
However a number of the more important general provisions will be surveyed 
relatively briefly before a discussion of the main measures directed against 
overseas accumulations, including an explanation of the U.S. Controlled Foreign 
Corporation (Subpart F) legislation.
1 Transfer pricing legislation - section 482
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code is the main U.S. provision 
directed against abusive transfer pricing practices. The section provides a 
very broad power to re-allocate income, deductions, credits and allowances 
between related parties on an arm’s length basis so as to prevent avoidance 
of tax. A version of the section has had statutory force since 1921.23 
Though the section has undergone several amendments since that time,24 
its overall tenor has remained unchanged so that it is still true to say that 
the:-
"Intention of Congress... since 1921 was to prevent 
corporations from taking advantage of separate 
corporation structures all within the same corporate 
family to diminish the overall tax liability of the 
family through the use of various kinds of inter-
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corporate transactions which served no business 
purpose other than the reduction of the family’s total 
tax liability"^
The section prevents a shifting of income or deductions between related 
parties in order to benefit from differentials in tax rates. Although this may 
arise in a domestic context, it is more usual to associate section 482 
reallocations with international transactions, often involving foreign related 
parties in tax haven jurisdictions.
In the international setting, section 482 fulfils a secondary role of 
protecting what is perceived by the tax authorities as the United States’ 
appropriate share of tax revenues in international transactions. Even 
where international inter-company transactions result in no overall 
reduction in the tax burden on the multinational group as a whole, the IRS 
can invoke section 482 to allocate income to the U.S., thus ensuring an 
appropriate proportion of the profits arising on the transaction are subject 
to U.S. taxation.
Although section 482 appears to be a deceptively simple provision 
containing only two sentences in its statutory expression,26 the section is 
supported by complicated Regulations which were adopted in April 1968. 
The regulations deal not only with prices for products but also with 
royalties, loan interest, services and other income paid or received by U.S. 
foreign corporations. Additional Regulations concerning service payments 
were added in 1969.27
There is no doubt that section 482 is one of the most important U.S. anti­
avoidance provisions in the Code.
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In 1979 the tax value of section 482 adjustments proposed by international 
examiners was $500 million which represented 36% of the tax value of all 
adjustments proposed by the international examiners.^
2 Foreign Source "Effectively Connected" Income
The Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1966 to prevent the effective 
use of the United States as a tax haven by foreign companies selling 
through U.S. offices without reporting the U.S. activity as taxable.
Certain foreign-source income can now be treated as effectively connected, 
and therefore taxable, if a U.S. office contributes significantly to the selling 
activity .29
3 S. 269 Internal Revenue Code
S. 269 permits the Secretary of the Internal Revenue Service to disallow a 
tax benefit if the principal purpose of the acquisition of control of a 
corporation is evasion or avoidance of federal income tax by securing a tax 
deduction, credit or other allowance which would not otherwise arise.30 
This provision applies to foreign corporations as well as domestic 
corporations.31
4 S. 367 Internal Revenue Code
Under U.S. law a number of transactions involving the formation and 
reorganisation of corporations are accorded "non-recognition" treatment.32 
This means that immediate recognition of any gain arising is deferred and 
the taxpayer is taxed only when the stock or other property received in the 
transaction is disposed of at some future date. In 1932 Congress recognised 
that these Code provisions could be used to transfer property beyond the
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U.S jurisdiction and thus constituted a "serious loophole for the avoidance 
of taxes".33
For reorganisations involving transfers from the United States to foreign 
corporations, section 367 requires the taxpayer to obtain a ruling within 
183 days of the transfer occurring that the transaction does not have as one 
of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes. If such 
a ruling is not obtained non-recognition treatment will not be available.34
5 S. 1491 Internal Revenue Code
The original version of s. 1491 was also enacted in 1932 and, like s. 367, was 
designed to prevent tax avoidance by the transfer of property to an entity 
outside the U.S. jurisdiction. Section 1491 imposes an excise tax at the rate 
of 35 %35 on any appreciation inherent in any property which is transferred 
by U.S. persons (including domestic corporations) to a foreign corporation 
as a contribution to capital or to a foreign partnership, trust or estate.
The excise tax does not apply to a transfer described in s.36736 or to a 
transfer for which an election has been made under section 1057.37 Under 
s. 1057 the taxpayer may elect to treat a transfer described in s. 1491 as a 
taxable sale or exchange and thus recognise a gain equal to the excess of 
the fair market value of the property transferred over its adjusted cost 
basis for the purposes of determining the gain.
The excise tax will not be payable if it is established before the transfer to 
the satisfaction of the fisc that the transfer is not in pursuance of a plan 
which has as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income 
taxes.38
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6 Information Returns
One of the notable features of the U.S. tax system is the depth of reporting 
required of resident taxpayers. The Internal Revenue Code requires 
numerous information returns relating to the activities of U.S. taxpayers in 
foreign tax havens. For example, in relation to transfer pricing, Form 5471 
must be completed each quarter and state the relationship between the 
U.S. taxpayer and the foreign affiliate as well as details of all relevant 
transactions and shareholdings. Failure to comply with the requirement 
may lead to a civil penalty of up to $10,000 and imprisonment of those 
responsible for up to one year.39
The immense amount of information required by the IRS provides an 
additional disincentive to tax haven activity.
THE HEXAPUS Iformerlv Pentapus^
Whilst the foregoing measures may be applied generally to combat perceived
cases of international tax avoidance, there are now six sets of rules which attempt
to combat the use of corporate entities for the purpose of accumulation. Four of
these are specifically directed at overseas entities.
These rules, and the years in which they were first enacted, are as follows:-
1. Accumulated Earnings Tax (1913).
2. Personal Holding Company (1934).
3. Foreign Personal Holding Company (1937).
4. Foreign Investment Company (1962).
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5. Controlled Foreign Corporations (Subpart F) (1962).
6 . Passive Foreign Investment Company (1986).
Each set of rules is extremely complex in itself. The relationship of each set of 
rules to the other sets of rules raises further complications. In many ways, the 
very existence of these highly complex and unco-ordinated rules which, broadly, 
seek to attack similar types of perceived abuses is a prime example of the wholly 
unsatisfactory "patchwork" approach to anti-avoidance legislation in the U.S. This 
is, presumably, the observation of Professor Harvey Dale of the New York 
University Law School who (prior to the introduction of the Passive Foreign 
Investment Company provisions in 1986) coined the term "pentapus" to describe 
the first five sets of rules, drawing an analogy between them and a sea monster 
with five wholly uncoordinated tentacles.40 With the introduction of the PFIC 
rules, the term "hexapus" has now been introduced.41
This series of rules is of relevance to this chapter for a number of reasons. First, 
it places the controlled foreign corporation (Subpart F) rules in their historical 
and legal context in terms of legislation specifically promulgated to prevent 
corporate accumulations. Second, there is a clear relationship between the various 
sets of rules; for example, one of the more significant types of income subject to 
the subpart F provisions is based on Foreign Personal Holding Company income. 
Third, the very development on a piecemeal basis of a number of anti-avoidance 
measures (which together comprise the hexapus) reflects the approach adopted 
by the tax authorities in dealing with perceived tax avoidance by means of 
corporate accumulations. The rules will be discussed in chronological order.
1. Accumulated Earnings Tax
Sections 531 to 537 of the Code provide the fisc with a mechanism to tax 
"unreasonably accumulated" income. Given that the U.S. operates a 
"classical" system of corporation tax whereby corporate earnings are taxed
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at both corporate level and then in the hands of shareholders on 
distribution, the retention of profits in a U.S. corporation could, in the 
absence of this tax, result in either a reduction or deferral of the total tax 
burden. The imposition of the Accumulated Earnings Tax was designed 
to discourage such accumulations.
The Accumulated Earnings Tax was the earliest anti-abuse measure, being 
introduced with the income tax by the Revenue Act of 1913. As originally 
framed, where a corporation was "formed or availed" to accumulate 
income, each shareholder’s rateable share of the corporation’s profit would 
be taxed as if distributed to the shareholders.42 The law was amended in 
1921 to impose a penalty tax on a corporation when it unreasonably 
accumulated earnings for the purpose of avoiding the income tax charge 
on its shareholders rather than distributing those earnings.43 Section 533 
of the Code states that the purpose of avoiding the income tax on 
shareholders is to be determined by whether the earnings and profits of a 
corporation are permitted to accumulate "beyond the reasonable needs of 
the business".44
The determination of the "reasonable needs of the business" is dealt with 
in the Treasury Regulations.45 An involved inquiry into all aspects of the 
corporation’s business will be required and a number of factors, such as 
plans for expansion, replacement of business assets, provision of working 
capital, will be taken into account.
It should be noted that the Accumulated Earnings Tax base includes only 
U.S. source income and income "effectively connected" with a U.S. trade 
or business. The Accumulated Earnings Tax applies to neither Personal 
Holding Companies nor Foreign Personal Holding Companies.46 Both 
types of companies are described below.
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The legislation does not specifically deal with the application of the 
Accumulated Earnings Tax to foreign corporations. The wording of 
Section 532(a) suggests, and the Regulations confirm47, that the Section will 
be applicable to foreign corporations which have U.S. source income if any 
of the shareholders of the corporation would be subject to U.S. income tax 
on the distributions to the corporation by reason of being:
(a) citizens or residents of the United States;
(b) non-resident alien individuals subject to the federal income tax;
(c) foreign corporations in which beneficial interest is owned directly or 
indirectly by any shareholder described in (a) or (b) above.
However, it would appear that the IRS does not actively pursue the 
application of the Accumulated Earnings Tax to foreign corporations.48
The fundamental concept of the Accumulated Earnings Tax, is that of 
"unreasonably accumulated" income, which is both broad and highly 
subjective. For this reason, the effect of the legislation is in a large part 
determined by the way the IRS have sought to apply it. The history of the 
provisions demonstrates the difficulties this inherent subjectivity has caused. 
When the provision first appeared in 1913, it was designed to prevent the 
fraudulent use of companies for the purpose of evading taxes. The 
requirement of fraud was eliminated in 191849 because this requirement 
was found to weaken the effect of the Statute. This was because, as the 
Senate Finance Committee observed, proof of fraudulent intention is very 
difficult to establish:
"The section of the present law .... providing that 
undistributed profits of a corporation may in certain 
cases be treated as part of the income of its 
stockholders subject to surtax, has proved to be of 
little value because it was necessary to its application
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that intended fraud on the Revenue be established in 
each case".50
Tax legislation requiring the fisc to determine the commercial acceptability 
and necessity of corporate actions will often prove unpopular in practice 
since the taxpayer will inevitably feel the fisc are not qualified to make 
such a decision. No doubt such frictions arise in practice with regard to 
the determination of "unreasonably accumulated" income.
The Accumulated Earnings Tax has, over a long period of time, been the 
subject of some controversy between the Treasury Department and 
Congress. As early as 1924, the Treasury were complaining about the 
ineffectuality of the law.51 At the same time Congress, on the other hand, 
had quite contrary concerns relating to the impact of the tax as an 
unreasonable burden on business. It was argued that the tax would 
penalise taxpayers for having done nothing wrong; prevent business 
building up surpluses for the purpose of expanding; and affect legitimate 
businesses as adversely or more adversely than those trying to avoid tax.52
Again, in 1954, the Ways and Means Committee observed:
"Your Committee has received numerous complaints 
that the provision is prejudicial to small businesses, 
that it has been applied in an arbitrary manner in 
many cases, and that it is a constant threat to 
expanding business enterprises. Fear of the penalty 
tax is said to result frequently in distribution of funds 
needed by the corporation for expansion or other 
valid purposes".53
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The conflicting attitudes to the legislation of the Treasury Department and 
Congress demonstrate the extent to which differing policy objectives may 
prove difficult to reconcile in practice.
2. Personal Holding Companies
The Accumulated Earnings Tax attacks the accumulation at corporate level 
by corporations in general. Sections 541-547 of the Code impose a special 
penalty tax on the undistributed income of a particular class of corporation, 
Personal Holding Companies (PHCs). The rules were promulgated 
specifically to deal with the "incorporated pocket book", a scheme which 
was "perhaps the most prevalent form of tax avoidance practised by 
individuals with large incomes".54 The incorporated pocket book scheme 
worked by interposing a corporation between the tax payer and his passive 
income. Without the intervention of the corporate entity, the passive 
income would have been taxed directly in the hands of the taxpayer. 
These Personal Holding Company provisions were apparently necessary 
because the Accumulated Earnings Tax could not prevent all the perceived 
abuses in this area:55 Since the Accumulated Earnings Tax provisions 
attack unreasonable accumulations by corporations, they could not be used 
where the U.S. fisc wished to deter the very existence of certain types of 
corporate income, regardless of whether or not the corporation has 
unreasonably accumulated income.
The PHC provisions have a clear target and are more precise than the 
Accumulated Earnings Tax: unlike the subjective criteria relating to that 
tax, the PHC provisions apply if and only if certain objective conditions are 
met.
The provisions, which were added to the law in 1934 and extensively 
revised in 1937 and 1964, were intended to thwart the creation and use of 
certain closely-held corporations deriving a substantial part of their income
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from PHC source income which includes income from passive investment, 
interest, royalties, estates, trusts, rents (unless rents constitute more than 
50% of adjusted ordinary gross income) and the performance of personal 
services by a substantial shareholder.56 It is for this reason that the 
definition of a PHC is framed with reference to stock ownership and type 
of income.57
A corporation is a PHC if at least 60% of its adjusted gross ordinary 
income is PHC income (as described above) and more than 50% in value 
(rather than control) of its stock is owned by 5 or fewer individuals at any 
time during the last half of its tax year.58 Stock ownership is determined 
by reference to a complex set of attribution rules59 which are similar but 
not identical to the attribution rules under Subpart F, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter.
Since most U.S. closely-held corporations will fall within the stock 
ownership test, it is usually the presence of PHC income that determines 
whether such corporations are subject to these provisions. PHC status may 
also be achieved inadvertently by ordinary trading companies which achieve 
low trading profits and also receive certain passive income.
The undistributed PHC income of a PHC is subject to an additional 
penalty tax at the rate of 28%. The rate was until recently a highly 
punitive 70%.60 The PHC provisions are designed to force distribution of 
PHC income to the shareholder in whose hands it will be subject to income 
tax at graduated rates. The tax is imposed on the corporation and not the 
shareholders.
The PHC provisions do not apply to banks, insurance companies, and 
finance companies if they are conducting an active business, even though 
receiving various types of PHC income.61
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A foreign corporation can be a PHC if it meets the criteria set out in 
sections 541-547. However, whilst the foreign corporation can be subject 
to the PHC rules, the application of the rules will be restricted to its U.S. 
source PHC-type income because under section 882(b) of the Code the 
gross income of a foreign corporation includes only U.S. source income.
Even where the foreign corporation enjoys U.S. source income, the PHC 
rules will not apply if all the shareholders are non-resident alien 
individuals. If the U.S. ownership of stock amounts to less than 10% the 
PHC penalty tax is in effect limited to the U.S. shareholders’ proportionate 
interest in the corporation.62 Where the 10% threshold is exceeded, this 
pro rata limitation does not apply and the PHC tax is applied in full.
3. Foreign Personal Holding Companies
Three years after the enactment of the PHC provisions, and following a 
request of President Roosevelt and the report of the Joint Committee on 
Tax Evasion and Avoidance of the U.S. Congress, Congress again acted 
against "incorporated pocket books". The Joint Committee had observed 
that tax avoidance efforts were "so widespread and so amazing both in 
their boldness and ingenuity" that action was immediately necessary to 
contain the abuses.63 One of these tax avoidance devices was pointed out 
to be;
"the device of evading taxes by setting up foreign 
personal holding corporations in The Bahamas,
Panama, Newfoundland and other places where taxes 
are low and corporation tax is lax"64
The principal reason behind the success of this method of tax avoidance 
was the inability, through lack of jurisdiction, of the U.S. fisc to impose the 
PHC penalty tax on such foreign corporations. The Foreign Personal
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Holding Company (FPHC) provisions were a radical response to the 
perceived problems. Based on the fact that the foreign company itself was 
beyond the U.S. jurisdiction but that the controlling shareholders (who 
were U.S. residents or citizens) were within that jurisdiction, the new 
proposal put forward was that the shareholders would be taxed pro rata 
on the income of Foreign Personal Holding Companies, whether or not 
such income was actually distributed to them. The justification for this 
"departure from accustomed methods" was stated to be:
"the necessity of protecting the integrity of our 
revenue system by effectively closing one of the most 
glaring loopholes now existing"65
The Senate recognised the radical nature of this new method but 
nonetheless expressed itself to be satisfied with its necessity and 
justification:
"your committee is of the opinion that it is justifiable 
on all grounds, including constitutional grounds, to 
provide for a method of taxation which will reach the 
shareholders who own stock in such companies and 
over whom the United States has jurisdiction."66
This approach of attributing to shareholders their pro rata share of 
earnings in a foreign corporation is followed in the Subpart F legislation 
which was enacted twenty-five years later.
FPHC provisions, therefore, are directed against pocket book companies 
which have been incorporated abroad by U.S. persons.67 As has been 
seen, a foreign corporation can be subject to the PHC rules under sections 
541 to 547 of the Code. This means that a foreign corporation can be 
subject to the PHC rules or to the FPHC rules or to both sets of rules, in
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which latter case section 542(c)(5) of the Code dictates that the FPHC 
rules prevail. However, the Subpart F rules take precedence over the 
FPHC provisions.68
The PHC rules impose a penalty on corporations in respect of their 
accumulations. The FPHC rules, on the other hand, tax the U.S. 
shareholders of the foreign corporation directly on its undistributed 
income. In this sense the FPHC rules are the forerunner of the 1962 
Subpart F legislation.
A foreign corporation is a FPHC if at least 60%69 of its gross income for 
the year is Foreign Personal Holding Company Income (FPHCI) and if 
more than 50% in value of the corporation’s stock or voting power is 
owned directly or indirectly by not more than five individuals who are 
citizens or residents of the U.S..70 If a foreign corporation meets these 
conditions its U.S. shareholders are taxed on their proportionate share of 
undistributed FPHCI.71 Complicated attribution rules apply for the 
purpose of determining whether the stock ownership requirements are 
met.72 The definition of FPHCI is similar but not identical to PHC 
income. FPHCI is defined in section 553 and includes income from 
dividends, interest, royalties, estates and trusts, certain personal service 
contracts, rents (unless constituting 50% or more of gross income), net 
gains from the sale of securities, futures transactions and certain 
commodities and also compensation for the use of corporate property by 
shareholders owning 25 % or more of the stock of the corporation.
FPHCI also includes the undistributed FPHCI of a subsidiary FPHC in 
which the parent FPHC hold shares. The income attributed to the parent 
is taken into account in calculating the parent’s gross income for the 
purpose of the 60% gross income test.73
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4. Foreign Investment Companies
The Revenue Act of 1962 adopted sections 1246 and 1247 as a means of 
attacking foreign investment companies. Prior to 1962, such companies 
avoided PHC or FPHC status by selling shares widely among U.S. person. 
A foreign investment company could, prior to 1962, be created in a tax 
haven and invest in non-U.S. securities or similar assets and accumulate 
income offshore. Section 1246(b) defines a Foreign Investment Company 
as a company of which more than 50% in vote or value of its stock is 
owned directly or indirectly by any number of U.S. persons at any time and 
whose business is primarily trading in securities.
The general rule of section 124674 is that any gain received by the taxpayer 
on the sale or redemption of his stock in a foreign investment company will 
be treated as ordinary income to the extent of his rateable share of its 
earnings accumulated after 1962 and during the time the shareholder held 
the stocks.75
The Foreign Investment Company provisions are generally aimed at 
portfolio investors and therefore, whilst the provisions are of some 
relevance to the present discussion, they need not be discussed in any 
further detail here.
5. Controlled Foreign Corporations fSubpart F)
The Subpart F provisions are discussed later in this chapter and for 
present purposes a very brief introductory summary will suffice.
The objective of the 1962 Subpart F legislation is to tax U.S. shareholders 
of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) on their proportionate share of 
certain categories of the undistributed profits of such corporations.76
T/4 194
A CFC is, broadly, any foreign corporation which is owned as to more than 
50% by United States shareholders.77 Any United States person, including 
a domestic corporation, can qualify as a United States shareholder if it 
owns 10% or more of the foreign corporation’s voting stock.78 Therefore, 
all wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent corporations 
automatically fall within the definition of a CFC.
Certain earnings of the CFC are attributed pro rata to the principal United 
States shareholders in the year in which they are earned by the 
corporation, provided such shareholders control the foreign corporation for 
an uninterrupted period of 30 days or more during its tax year. If the 
profits are subsequently distributed by way of dividend, no further tax is 
imposed. However, it is only the "tainted" income of the CFC which is 
attributed to U.S. shareholders in this way: the non-tainted income of the 
CFC will not be subjected to U.S. tax until it is repatriated to the U.S. 
Tainted Subpart F income includes: Foreign Personal Holding Company 
Income, foreign base company services, sales and shipping income, income 
from the insurance and reinsurance of United States’ risks and earnings 
from investment in U.S. property.79
The requirement that U.S. shareholders should report their pro rata share 
of the tainted income of a CFC follows the approach first adopted in the 
Foreign Personal Holding Company provisions in 1937. However, because 
the 1962 CFC rules embrace foreign operations engaged in ordinary 
trading activities, they are significantly more important than the FPHC 
rules.
Although not a feature of the CFC legislation contained in Sections 951- 
964 of the Code, there is an important provision, introduced at the same 
time as the CFC provisions, which deals with the disposition of stock of a 
CFC. Any gain arising from the sale or exchange of the stock of the CFC 
is subject to tax as ordinary income to the extent that it is attributable to
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profits of the CFC accumulated after 31st December 1962, provided the 
U.S. shareholder whose stock is sold or exchanged has owned 10% or more 
of the voting stock of the CFC at any time during a five-year period ending 
with the date of sale or exchange.80
Although the scheme of the legislation may appear relatively 
straightforward, the host of statutory definitions, qualifications, exceptions 
and limitations that comprise Subpart F make it one of the most complex 
areas of U.S. tax law.
The Subpart F legislation was passed because, in spite of the earlier anti­
avoidance legislation, U.S. corporations and individuals still found 
advantages in placing their foreign income generating activities in a foreign 
corporation under their control. This was because the foreign source 
income of the foreign corporation was not immediately subject to U.S. tax. 
As a result, U.S. tax would only be payable when the earnings were directly 
remitted to the shareholder as dividends or indirectly in the form of a gain 
on the disposal of the foreign corporation’s stock. Subpart F legislation 
stopped this possibility, but only selectively.
6 . Passive Foreign Investment Companies fPFIQ
The reason for the introduction of the latest "tentacle" of the hexapus has 
been explained recently as follows:
"Because with careful planning the five tentacles
of the pentapus could be successfully avoided, and 
U.S. persons thus could invest in passive assets 
through foreign corporations so as to achieve deferral 
and conversion of ordinary income to capital gain,
Congress decided to add the sixth tentacle - the 
PFIC.".81
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Prior to the enactment of the PFIC provisions, Subpart F and the Foreign 
Personal Holding Company provisions would require current taxation of 
certain passive income of U.S. controlled foreign companies. Other 
provisions prevented U.S. shareholders of CFCs and Foreign Investment 
Companies from disposing of their stock in such companies and taking out 
earnings that had escaped current taxation at capital gains tax rates.82 
However, these latter provisions could be avoided if no U.S. person owned 
10% or more of the stock of the foreign company or if U.S. shareholders 
in total owned less than 50% of the shares. This meant that a U.S. person 
could invest in an offshore fund in these circumstances and avoid U.S. tax 
on the income of the fund until it was distributed. In addition, if the U.S. 
taxpayer sold stock in the fund, the transaction would be subject to capital 
gains tax treatment.
The new PFIC provisions in sections 1291 -1297 of the Code now either 
currently tax U.S. shareholders in such a fund on the passive earnings of 
a PFIC or impose an interest charge on U.S. shareholders who defer 
current taxation, thus removing any tax incentive to invest in foreign 
offshore funds instead of U.S. domestic funds.
A PFIC is any foreign corporation if 75 % or more of its gross income is 
passive income or if 50% or more of the average annual value of its assets 
held during the tax year do not produce active income.83 There are no 
ownership thresholds similar to the Subpart F rules and thus, once the 
income or asset test is satisfied, the PFIC rules will apply to any U.S. 
shareholder regardless of the overall degree of U.S. ownership.
Foreign holding companies that own operating subsidiaries will not 
generally be caught by the PFIC rules because if they own 25 % or more 
of the stock of an operating company they are treated as owning a 
proportionate share of that company’s assets and income directly.84
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The PFIC provisions, like the FIC provisions, are concerned chiefly with 
the portfolio investor and therefore need not be considered in any further 
detail.
Summary
Before proceeding to the detailed consideration of Subpart F, it is worth 
recapitulating the broad objectives of the "hexapus" legislation as described in the 
previous pages.
The earliest measure, the Accumulated Earnings Tax, attacks "unreasonable" 
accumulations within a corporation. This tax was ill-suited to dealing with 
incorporated pocket books where the fisc sought to challenge the very existence 
of a corporation in circumstances where it was interposed between the taxpayer 
and certain sources of income. Accordingly, the PHC provisions were enacted to 
combat the use of such corporations. The FPHC provisions were introduced to 
prevent avoidance of the PHC provisions by the device of using foreign- 
incorporated companies. The FIC provisions, aimed at portfolio investors, 
effectively prevent the use of widely-owned overseas corporations being used by 
U.S. shareholders to achieve tax-free accumulations. The diversified stock holding 
would, in the absence of the FIC provision, take such companies outside the ambit 
of either the PHC or FPHC provisions. All the measures so far discussed are 
directed chiefly at preventing tax avoidance by individuals, i.e. U.S. citizens or 
resident aliens. This is not the case with regard to the Subpart F provisions.
As has been observed, there occurred in the 1950s something of a shift in 
emphasis from concern over the tax avoidance of individuals (demonstrated by the 
concern with closely held corporations) to tax avoidance by corporations. This is 
evidenced by the passing of the Subpart F provisions in 1962, which, for the first 
time, target foreign income of overseas subsidiaries of non closely-held U.S. 
multinational corporations.
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It is of course true that the Subpart F provisions do also attack the use of 
controlled foreign corporations by individuals (as opposed to U.S. corporations) 
but it is clear from the available material relating to the promulgation of the 
legislation that the real target was American firms operating through foreign 
subsidiaries located in tax havens. This material will be considered in the next 
section, dealing with the background to the Subpart F legislation.
Finally, the most recent addition to what is now a "hexapus", namely the PFIC 
legislation, is directed chiefly at individuals who were able to avoid the FIC (and 
other) provisions by carefully choosing investment vehicles where the appropriate 
U.S. ownership restrictions were not breached. The PFIC provisions represent a 
fundamental change in the U.S. taxation of foreign corporations because they 
apply without regard to the level of U.S. control.
BACKGROUND TO THE SUBPART F LEGISLATION
The introduction of the subpart F legislation was heralded in President Kennedy’s 
1961 tax message.85 This followed a two-year period of protracted discussions on 
federal tax reform which had commenced in 1959. In that year the House Ways 
and Means Committee considered ideas for broad tax reforms based on 
submissions from practitioners, academics and other interested parties.86 The 
overall tenor of these hearings was towards liberalising the tax treatment of 
foreign income. This would probably have included simplifying the operation of 
the FPHC rules. However, there was also some suggestion that the FPHC rules 
should be extended to include other than foreign passive income.
By 1961 thoughts of liberalising the tax treatment of foreign income had all but 
disappeared. In that year, the Treasury asked Congress to provide detailed rules 
for the allocation of income and expenses relating to overseas operations of U.S. 
taxpayers. Further evidence of a new tougher approach was stated by President 
Kennedy in his important 1961 tax message:-
T/4 199
"Changing economic conditions at home and abroad, the desire to 
achieve greater equity in taxation, and the strains which have 
developed in our balance of payments position in the last few years, 
compel us to examine critically certain features of our tax system 
which, in conjunction with the tax system[s] of other countries, 
consistently favour U.S. private investment abroad compared with 
investment in our own economy"87
Before analysing the detail of the President’s tax message it is important to 
appreciate the primary factors, outlined in the quotation above, that underlie the 
new approach. Three specific points are identified:
(a) "changing economic conditions at home and abroad"
(b) "the desire to achieve greater equity in taxation"
(c) "the strains which have developed in our balance of payments position in 
the last few years".
"(a)" is a reference to the relative strength and growth of the European and 
Japanese post-war economies (in comparison to the U.S.) and "(c)" refers to the 
U.S. growing balance of payments deficit. Both these points are poor justifications, 
judged from the perspective of international fiscal law, for extending the taxation 
of foreign income in the manner achieved by the Subpart F legislation. The 
second point, "(b)", is an excellent justification for the legislation from the point 
of view of IFL but only, of course, if the legislation does indeed achieve greater 
equity in the taxation of such income (a point considered in greater detail in the 
appraisal of the legislation in the next chapter).
Having stated the rationale underlying the new proposals, the President went on 
in his message to deal with the specific target, namely "the elimination of tax
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deferral privileges in developed countries and "tax haven" deferral privileges in all 
countries".88 The perceived problem and its consequences were first set out as 
follows
"Profits earned abroad by American firms operating through foreign 
subsidiaries are, under present tax laws, subject to U.S. tax only 
when they are returned to the parent company in the form of 
dividends. In some cases, this tax deferral has made possible 
indefinite postponement of the U.S. tax; and in those countries 
where income taxes are lower than in the United States, the ability 
to defer the payments of U.S. tax by retaining income in the 
subsidiary companies provides a tax advantage for companies 
operating through overseas subsidiaries that is not available to 
companies operating solely in the United States".89
The President made it clear that his attack on the elimination of tax deferral 
privileges was part of an aggressive approach to international tax avoidance and 
tax havens generally:-
"The undesirability of continuing deferral is underscored where 
deferral has served as a shelter for tax escape through the 
unjustifiable use of tax havens such as Switzerland. Recently, more 
and more enterprises organised abroad by American firms have 
arranged their corporate structures - aided by artificial 
arrangements between parent and subsidiary regarding 
intercompany pricing, the transfer of patent licensing rights, the 
shifting of management fees, and similar practices which maximise 
the accumulation of profits in the tax haven - so as to exploit the 
multiplicity of foreign tax systems and international agreements in 
order to reduce sharply or eliminate completely their tax liabilities 
both at home and abroad... ".90
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The President therefore recommended in his tax message legislation which would 
tax American corporations on the current share of the undistributed profits 
realised in that year by foreign subsidiary corporations. However his proposals 
related only to foreign subsidiary corporations located in developed countries, on 
the ground that:-
"certainly since the post-war reconstruction of Europe and Japan 
has been completed, there are no longer foreign policy reasons for 
providing tax incentives for foreign investment in the economically 
advanced countries".91
The approach to the use of the "deferral privilege" in developing countries was 
not quite as straightforward. The President first stated that tax deferral should 
continue for income from investment in the developing economies, but:-
"On the other hand, I recommend elimination of the tax haven 
device anywhere in the world, even in the underdeveloped 
countries, through the elimination of tax deferral privileges for those 
forms of activities, such as trading, licensing, insurance and others 
that typically seek out tax haven methods of operation. There is no 
valid reason to permit their remaining untaxed regardless of the 
country in which they are located".92
A number of the points raised in the President’s message were amplified by the 
Treasury Secretary before the House of Representatives’ Ways and Means 
Committee, particularly the claim made by the President that the legislation would 
have a neutral effect on genuine business activities
"There is absolutely no thought of penalising private investment 
abroad which rests upon genuine production or market activities..."93
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It will be clear from all the preceding quotations that the objectives of the parties 
introducing the legislation were not simple: the legislation was primarily intended 
to:- help cure the balance of payments deficit; assist in restoring the position of 
the U.S. in the light of the thriving economies of Europe and Japan and achieve 
greater equity in taxation. There was also the desire to contribute to the fight 
against international tax avoidance and tax havens in general; to withdraw tax 
deferral in the case of developed countries in so far as it was used in conjunction 
with tax haven activities and yet to retain, for policy reasons, tax deferral for 
investment in less developed countries. On top of all that it was also intended not 
to prejudice or penalise in any way "private investment abroad which rests upon 
genuine production or market advantages".
The extent to which the legislation achieves its objectives will be considered in the 
following chapter. For the present, it is reasonable to observe that, based on the 
degree to which specific tax legislation in general is able empirically to meet a 
variety of objectives simultaneously, the hope that the Subpart F legislation would 
achieve the multitude of objectives that have been set out above was possibly 
somewhat optimistic.
Following the 1961 tax message, testimonies and submissions from a variety of 
businesses, academics and professional tax advisors were made to the House Ways 
and Means Committee94 before the passing of the House of Representatives’ Bill 
10650. This bill did not go as far as the President had recommended; it merely 
provided that U.S. shareholders of foreign corporations were to return for tax 
purposes the undistributed earnings of certain controlled foreign corporations.95 
Commenting on the measures the Treasury Secretary made it clear that the 
legislation in the form proposed by the House was not adequate. He criticised the 
fact that the foreign tax deferral issue had not now been treated fully and directly 
and stated that this inevitably resulted in the retention of a substantial tax 
advantage for investment abroad in comparison to investment at home:-
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"Tax deferral... serves as a special tax stimulus for American capital 
to go abroad and to stay abroad. No useful purpose or American 
interest is served when this artificial diversion is to highly developed 
countries. The efficient allocation of our own and world resources 
is upset".96
The Senate made a number of significant amendments to the House bill and 
produced a number of measures which ultimately became Subpart F. The design 
of the Senate proposals was "to end tax deferral on "tax haven" operations by U.S. 
controlled corporations".97
The Senate measures included the attribution of certain types of undistributed 
income to the U.S. shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation where 50% 
or more of the combined voting stock of the corporation was held by U.S. 
shareholders, each having at least a 10% or greater stock interest. Consequently, 
the holdings of foreigners or Americans with less than a 10% interest were not 
taxed by the provisions.
The Senate proposed that two categories of income should be attributed to U.S. 
shareholders in this way: income derived from the insurance or reinsurance of U.S 
risks and foreign base company income, which was comprised of base company 
personal holding company income, base company sales income and base company 
service income. These two categories of income were collectively "Subpart F 
income", though the categories of Subpart F income have since been expanded. 
As well as attributing undistributed Subpart F income to U.S. shareholders, the 
Senate bill also provided that earnings invested in U.S. property (with certain 
exceptions) be similarly taxed to U.S. shareholders of the CFC.98
Following the Senate amendments the bill was passed without further changes in 
conference99 and it became law for taxable years beginning after 31st December
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Before proceeding to consider and evaluate the main issues raised by the U.S. 
approach to anti-tax haven legislation it will first be necessary to set out the main 
provisions of the legislation as it now stands. The main principles of the 
legislation are therefore outlined in the following final part of this chapter.
THE CURRENT SUBPART F PROVISIONS
To attempt anything like a comprehensive description of the legislation would be 
quite impossible within the confines of a few pages due to the enormous 
complexity of the statutory provisions. The difficulty is well expressed by one 
commentator:-
"In an effort to cover every contingency, the rules of Subpart F 
reach and never leave a lofty plateau of complexity that the Internal 
Revenue Code had previously attained only in occasional 
subsections....".101
The recent detailed amendments to Subpart F contained in the Tax Reform Act 
1986 have done nothing to simplify the complexities to be negotiated in the 
statutory provisions. Therefore, the description of the legislation must necessarily 
be limited to a short consideration of the major features of the provisions of 
Subpart F. A brief overview of the relevant statutory provisions is contained in 
Appendix I.
The kernel of the legislation is the "controlled foreign corporation" itself. This is 
defined in s. 957(a) to mean any foreign corporation of which 50% or more of 
stock in terms of value or voting power is owned by United States shareholders 
on any day during the taxable year. However, for the purposes only of taking into 
account income derived from the insurance of risks outside the country of 
incorporation of the CFC, the meaning of the term "controlled foreign 
corporation" is revised. The effect is that the legislation applies to corporations 
of which 25% (rather than 50% ) or more of the stock (in value) is owned by U.S.
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shareholders on any day during the taxable year if the gross amount of premiums 
received by the foreign corporation during the taxable year which are attributable 
to the insurance of U.S. risks exceeds 75 % of the gross amount of all premiums 
received for insuring or reinsuring all risks.102
A "U.S. shareholder" is a "U.S. person" owning 10% or more of the CFC’s voting 
stock.103 In general, overseas subsidiaries which are wholly owned by U.S. 
corporations will be easily identified as being CFCs by the rules of s. 957 
considered above. In other cases where there exists a more complicated pattern 
of ownership, the detailed rules of s. 958 applying to direct ownership, ownership 
through foreign entities and constructive ownership will be applied.104 The 
general rule is that "stock owned" means stock owned directly or indirectly. Where 
stock is owned through foreign entities (corporations, partnerships, trusts, estates) 
such stock is considered as being owned proportionately by its shareholders, 
partners or beneficiaries as relevant. The effect of this rule is to create a chain of 
ownership, though attribution under the rules stops with the first U.S. person in 
the chain of ownership running from the foreign entity (or entities).
There are in fact two distinct sets of attribution rules of stock ownership which are 
applied for separate purposes:-105
(a) To determine whether a U.S. person owns 10% or more of the stock of the 
CFCs whether owned directly, indirectly or constructively. If so, the U.S. 
person is taxed by the rules below (even if the actual holding is less than 
10%) and the U.S. person’s attributed stock is taken into account in 
determining whether the 50% control test is met.
(b) To determine what part of the CFC’s income is taxed to each shareholder 
identified by the above test. In this case only the stock owned directly and 
indirectly is considered. Stock owned constructively by the shareholder is 
not taken into account.
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Difficulties will arise in cases where the ownership of the stock is not relatively 
stable since the complicated determinations as to stock ownership would then be 
applied not only at the year end but also throughout the year on a day to day 
basis. This is because a corporation may qualify as a CFC for part of the year 
only. In such a case, the amount of income attributed to its shareholders (under 
s. 951) is reduced proportionately. However, there is a de minimis rule in s. 951 (a): 
if a foreign corporation qualifies as a CFC for less than thirty days during a 
taxable year, none of its income is apportioned to its shareholders. Where the 
thirty day period is exceeded the general requirement is that every "U.S. 
shareholder" of a CFC must report in his gross income his pro rata share of the 
"tainted" income of the CFC.
In very broad terms, the categories of the tainted income so taxed are those from 
the insurance of risks outside the country of organisation of the CFC; income 
from sales, service or shipping subsidiaries; certain types of passive income 
(dividends, interest and rents); and the sum of bribes paid and income arising 
from boycott related operations. The various different types of income attributed 
to U.S. shareholders of CFCs are discussed in more detail in a separate section 
below.
The amount attributed to the U.S. shareholder by s. 951 is computed to exclude 
amounts actually distributed by the CFC. Where the Subpart F rules operate to 
tax undistributed income in the hands of the shareholder, an adjustment under 
s. 961 is made to the basis of the stock in the CFC held by the U.S. shareholder. 
The broad effect of s. 961 is to increase the taxpayers basis of stock by the 
amounts required to be included in his gross income under s. 951 (a) (i.e. as 
though the amount attributed to him had been reinvested in the stock of the 
CFC). S. 959 contains rules designed to ensure the U.S. shareholder is not taxed 
twice and thus subsequent distribution of these previously taxed amounts can be 
distributed tax-free, although the basis of stock is adjusted down to prevent a 
double benefit.
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An individual stockholder may elect under s. 962 to be taxed at corporate rates on 
Subpart F income. He is then entitled to the foreign tax credit in accordance with 
rules similar to those applied to corporations.
ATTRIBUTABLE INCOME
One of the more complicated areas of the Subpart F legislation is that concerning 
the income attributed to U.S. shareholders of the CFC. This income has already 
been referred to as including a number of components. These, together with their 
respective sub-components, are as follows
1. Subpart F income:106
(a) Income from the insurance of risks outside the CFC’s country of 
incorporation.
(b) Foreign base company income:
(i) Foreign personal holding company income.
(ii) Foreign base company sales income.
(iii) Foreign base company services income.
(iv) Foreign base company shipping income.
(v) Foreign base company oil related income.
(c) Income attributable to operations in boycotting countries.
(d) Illegal payment of bribes, kickbacks, etc.
2. Increase in earnings invested in U.S. property.107
Even where income is prima facie within the Subpart F categories, it does 
not constitute Subpart F income if it is actually distributed to U.S. 
shareholders108 or if it is income which is effectively connected with the
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conduct of a U.S. trade or business by the CFC (unless the income is 
excluded from tax or subject to tax at reduced rates under the terms of a 
double tax treaty).109 In both cases, the income would be subject to U.S. 
tax in any event. The categories of income subject to the Subpart F 
provisions are explained in more detail below.
1. Subpart F income.
(a) Income from insurance of risks outside the CFCs country of 
incorporation.! 10
Under s. 953, the net income from insurance or reinsurance of risks 
outside the CFC’s country of incorporation (whether relating to life 
or property) is computed as if the CFC were a domestic 
corporation, subject to certain modifications.m
(b) Foreign base company income.112
Foreign base company income is a component part of "Subpart F 
income" but is itself comprised of the following categories of 
income :-113
(i) Foreign personal holding company income.
(ii) Foreign base company sales income.
(iii) Foreign base company services income.
(iv) Foreign base company shipping income.
(v) Foreign base company oil related income.
(i) Foreign Personal Holding Company Income fFPHCIT
FPHCI is computed as if the CFC were a FPHC so that 
the definition of FPHCI is as given in s. 553 of the Code
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(discussed earlier in this chapter). However, there are 
several amendments to the FPHC rules for the purposes 
only of the CFC rules.114 For example, rents (unless 
excluded by the provisions discussed below) are taken into 
account whether or not they exceed 50% or more of gross 
income (whereas they are only included in FPHCI by s. 533 
if they constitute less than 50% of gross income). Prior to 
the Tax Reform Act 1986, dividends, interest and gains 
from the sale or exchange of stocks and securities received 
from unrelated persons in the active conduct of a banking, 
financing or similar business, or from an insurance 
company’s investment of unearned premiums, were 
excluded from FPHCI. This exclusion has now been 
repealed and the scope of FPHCI for the purposes of 
Subpart F been considerably expanded by the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act. Following that Act, other types of income are 
now also included as FPHCI: gains from the sale of 
property that give rise to passive income; income from 
commodities transactions; foreign currency gains; income 
equivalent to interest; passive leasing income; and income 
payments from related corporations in the same country 
that reduce the Subpart F income of the payors (e.g. 
interest, rents, royalties). Certain income derived from 
related parties is also excluded from FPHCI, though only 
in certain restricted cases (e.g. dividend and interest 
received from a related company which is created or 
organised, and which has a substantial part of its assets, in 
the foreign country in which the CFC is located).
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(ii) Foreign Base Company Sales Income.
Broadly, such income is defined by s. 954(d) as income from 
the purchase or sale of property other than realty. In 
general, this type of income is limited to sales and 
purchases between related parties where the property is 
resold to a non-related party without any significant work 
being carried out on the property by the seller. The 
provision applies only in the case of property which is 
manufactured, produced, grown or extracted outside the 
country in which the CFC is organised.115 Effectively 
therefore "foreign base company sales income" is the 
income of sales subsidiaries.
(iii) Foreign Base Company Services Income.116
This type of income is income derived from technical, 
managerial, industrial, commercial or other skilled services 
which are performed for any related person outside the 
country of organisation of the CFC. It does not include 
income derived in connection with the performance of 
services which are related to the sale by the CFC of 
property it manufactures or produces provided the services 
are performed prior to, or in connection, with its sale.
(iv) Foreign Base Company Shipping Income.^
Such income is income attributable to the use of aircraft or 
ships in foreign commerce or to the performance of 
services in connection with such use.
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(V) Foreign Base Company Oil Related Income.
Foreign base company oil related income follows the 
definition of foreign oil-related income which is defined 
elsewhere in the Code.118
In all cases (i) to (v) above, the gross amount of each item 
is reduced by deductions properly allocable to such 
income.j 19 Further, an important exemption provides120 
that foreign base company income and insurance income is 
not to include any item of income received by a CFC if it 
is established to the satisfaction of the Treasury that such 
income was subject to an effective rate of income tax 
imposed by a foreign country which is greater than 90% of 
the maximum rate of U.S. corporate tax.121
Where this provision does not apply the proportion of 
gross foreign base company income should be considered. 
Under a special rule,122 where the foreign base company 
income is less than the lower of 5% (prior to 1987, 10%) 
of gross income or $1 million, it is not to be treated as 
gross income for the purposes of attribution to U.S. 
shareholders. Where such income exceeds 70% of gross 
income, the entire gross income of the taxable year shall be 
treated as foreign base company income. Where the 
foreign base company income is between 5% and 70%, 
only the items comprising that income are taken into 
account.
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(c) Income Attributable to Operations in Boycotting countries.
Under s. 952 (a)(3) earnings of a CFC which are attributable to 
operations in connection with which there was an agreement to 
participate in or co-operate with an international boycott are 
Subpart F income. This is a policy measure designed to frustrate 
the requirements of those countries which demand participation in 
such boycotts as a condition of doing business with them.
(d) Illegal Payments such as Bribes. Kickbacks. etc.123
These payments are payments which would be unlawful under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 if the payor were a U.S. 
person and which are paid, directly or indirectly, by a CFC in the 
tax year.
2. Increase in Earnings Invested in U.S. Propertv.l21
The reason this type of investment is included in the amounts attributed 
to U.S. shareholders is that the acquisition by the CFC of U.S. property is 
generally regarded as having the practical effect of a distribution to its 
shareholders. There is a wide definition of U.S. property125 which includes 
any tangible property acquired after 1962 that is located in the U.S.; 
intangible property such as patents, inventions, etc which may be used in 
the U.S.; and stock of a domestic corporation. The Subpart F rules will 
therefore include as attributable income a variety of methods of effectively 
repatriating foreign earnings to a U.S. parent; for example, the making of 
a long term loan by a CFC to its U.S. parent.
Complex rules exist for computing the change in earnings invested in U.S. 
property and there are also certain exceptions to the definition of U.S. 
property.126
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Because other types of Subpart F income are defined by reference to their 
source and this category relates to an increase in investment in U.S. 
property, without regard to the source of that investment, the same 
earnings could be counted twice. However this possibility is specifically 
prevented by a rule under which "tainted" income is excluded in computing 
the increase in earnings invested in U.S. property.127
Having set out above in outline the major elements of the Subpart F 
legislation, it is now possible to proceed to an evaluation of the U.S. 
approach in more general terms, concentrating in particular on the key 
policy issues from the perspective of IFL. This discussion is contained in 
the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4 - NOTES
1 International Fiscal Association, Tax Avoidance/Tax
Evasion, Cahier de Droit Fiscal International, vol. 68a (Kluwer, 1983). p. 333.
2 Note 1, Ibid.
3 This is the case with the Subpart F provisions in particular where the
Regulations are more extensive and detailed than the legislation itself.
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Corporations and Conclusions" [1988] BTR p. 108.
5 69F. 2d 809 (2nd Cir. 1934) affirmed 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
6 See, for example, Bazlev v. Commissioner (331 U.S. 737 (1947)).
7 Barnett v. Commissioner 364F. 2d 742 (2nd Cir. 1966) cert, denied, 385 U.S.
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interestingly, makes specific reference to "tax haven" regimes (in Art 24(4)).
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treaty provisions.
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11 .
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A more recent commentator makes a similar comment in remarking that 
"’war’ was first declared on tax havens in 1961 by President Kennedy. This
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19 Note 16, Ibid. p. 43
20 Note 19, Ibid.
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January 1993 of the "temporary regulations" covering transfers of tangible 
and intangible regulations.
25 Spaeth, "Section 482 Past and Future", 47 Taxes 45 cited in 45 TLQ 95
26 s. 482 was last amended in 1986 by the Tax Reform Act (see s. 1231 (e)(1)
of Public Law 99-514). Prior to that the section consisted of only one 
sentence.
27 See note 24 for comment on the latest regulations under s. 482.
28 Note 16, Ibid, p 52
29 IRC s. 864(c)(4)(B)
30 IRC s. 269(a)(2)
31 This follows from the statutory drafting of the provision - see s. 269(a)(1), 
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32 See code sections 332, 351, 354, 356 and 361.
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34 See Revenue Act of 1932, s. 112(k); Revenue Act of 1934, s. 112 (i); Revenue 
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CHAPTER 5
SUBPART F - DETAILED CONSIDERATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
For present purposes the analysis and evaluation of the Subpart F legislation will 
be separated into three parts, each considered in a separate section below.
First, the "internal" coherence of the legislation will be considered with analyses 
of the central concepts applied in the statute.
Second, there will be a consideration of the degree to which the policy objectives 
set for Subpart F have been achieved by the legislation.
Third, and most important from the perspective of IFL, the approach of the 
Subpart F legislation will be examined from the general perspective of IFL.
SUBPART F - CENTRAL CONCEPTS
The Nature of a CFC.
There are obviously three elements of a CFC, namely that it is a corporation, 
which is foreign and in respect of which there exists the requisite degree of 
control. Each element is crucial as a prerequisite to the operation of Subpart F.x
(i) The Nature of a Corporation.
Legally, it will be necessary to determine whether the overseas entity is a 
joint venture, a foreign branch or agency, a partnership or a corporation. 
Only in the latter case can the Subpart F rules come into play.2
The IRS’s rules relating to corporate characterisation appear in Reg. s. 301. 
7701-2.3 It appears that these regulations were initially drafted with the 
objective of making it difficult to qualify as a domestic corporation for the 
purpose of limiting the availability of corporate fringe benefits which were
T/5 224
not available to non-corporate entities.4 However, as the use of domestic 
tax shelters involving corporations grew, the IRS, without ever changing the 
regulations themselves, has changed its approach to their interpretation. In 
effect;-
"the service has done an in-house about-face and now 
tends to see corporations where partnerships used to 
exist"5
This somewhat partial approach by the U.S. tax authorities is to be 
regretted as it both reduces taxpayer confidence in the IRS to administer 
the law fairly and increases the uncertainty attaching to questions of 
interpretation of the legislation. This latter problem of uncertainty may be 
particularly relevant in the case of foreign operations since the legal 
entities used may not readily conform to recognisable U.S. legal entities, 
thus making the determination of their status for U.S. purposes all the 
more problematic. Further, the determination may dictate whether Subpart 
F has any application.
The difficulties in certain cases of identifying the status of the entity are 
compounded by the fact that the status is determined neither by local law 
exclusively nor by U.S. federal tax law exclusively but by an application of 
the two. Although s. 7701 of the Code and the regulations thereunder 
provide the facts and standards to be applied to classify the foreign entity, 
the local law of the foreign jurisdiction must also be applied to determine 
the relevant legal rights and relationship of the members of the 
organisation, as well as to determine the interests of the members of the 
organisation in its assets.6 Thus, the local law is relevant in establishing 
whether or not the facts of the U.S. federal tax law have been met. Owing 
to the fact that the characteristics of corporations, partnerships, etc may 
overlap, the Regulations provide that an entity has corporate status if it
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more nearly approximates to a corporation than to a partnership, trust, 
etc.7
(ii) The Foreign Corporation.
There is no definition as such of a foreign corporation other than the 
statement in the Regulations that "a foreign corporation is one which is not 
domestic".8 A domestic corporation is one that is "created or organised" 
in the U.S. or under the law of the U.S..9
The inclusion of the word "organised" in this criterion for domestic 
corporations is potentially problematic. If, for example, the articles of 
association or similar documents were drafted in the U.S. but executed 
outside the country it is not at all clear whether the corporation would 
have been "organised" in the U.S. However, in practice such matters rarely 
cause difficulties.
(iii) Control.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act 1986, the test of control depended solely on 
voting power. That Act has extended the test to include consideration of 
the total value of the stock. Whether or not the requisite degree of control 
now exists in the case of a foreign corporation depends upon the 
ownership of the aggregate total value of its stock or the total combined 
voting power of all classes of voting stock. If more than 50% of either is 
owned by U.S. shareholders on any day during its tax year then it is a 
CFC.10 The Regulations give extensive commentaries on these rules.n
As has been stated in the last chapter, it is clear from the original 
President’s Tax Message, Committee Reports, etc. that the real target of 
the 1962 Subpart F legislation was the overseas subsidiary companies of 
U.S. firms which it was considered were being used at the time for profit
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diversion and profit extraction purposes, and thus perceived to be 
depriving the U.S. Treasury of revenue.12
It might be expected, therefore, that the notion of "control" used would 
clearly follow accounting or statutory provisions which stipulate when the 
parent-subsidiary relationship exists. This appears to have been the 
intention of the legislation, though the original casting of the test in terms 
of voting power is the product of a number of different concepts and 
cannot be clearly attributed to any one specific source.13 Presumably, 
other established criteria of control, such as that relating to Personal 
Holding Companies (which refers to ownership in terms of value alone 14) 
were not considered acceptable for the purposes of Subpart F. Perhaps, 
given the emphasis on attacking corporations where a situation of de facto 
control exists, the then current FPHC test was felt to be inadequate given 
the ability of a minority (in terms of ownership of value of stock) to 
exercise actual management and control of the overseas entity. However, 
the recent amendment to the test of "control" to include ownership in 
terms of value alone15 indicates a partial failure of the original "voting 
power" test.
The requirement that more than 50% of stock in terms of value or voting 
power is to be held before an overseas entity can qualify as a CFC follows 
a widely applied percentage criterion used for accounting purposes. In the 
United States, for example, the test of control applied for the purposes of 
preparing consolidated financial statements turns on whether the parent 
has direct or indirect control of over 50% of the voting power in the 
subsidiary.16 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, where a company holds 
more than half of the nominal value of the equity share capital of another 
or controls the composition of its Board of Directors, a parent-subsidiary 
relationship is deemed to exist.17 Since a subsidiary is, in essence, a 
controlled company, this would indicate that the approach adopted by
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Subpart F conforms with accepted measures of identifying whether or not 
a situation of "control" exists.18
There is no doubt that this was the intention behind the legislation:-
"what we are talking about here as we specifically 
define them is American controlled subsidiaries, so 
we are talking about the ones where the control, a
majority of the stock is held by .....  American
stockholders, individuals or corporations. That is the 
definition"19
The principle is underlined in the case of Garlock Inc v. C.I.R.:
"The basic purpose of the 50% test in section 957 (a) 
was clearly designed and intended to exclude from 
the definition of a "controlled foreign corporation" 
only those foreign corporations which were not 
subject to the dominion and control of U.S. 
shareholders".20
The concept of control is also used in defining a related person. (Whether 
CFC income is foreign base company income may depend on whether it 
is received from a related person.) Under new provisions introduced by the 
Tax Reform Act 1986, the question whether a person is a "related person" 
turns on whether that person controls or is controlled by the CFC.21 
"Control" is established by the existence of a holding of 50% or more in 
value or voting power of the relevant stock.
Against this background, the special rule for insurance income, whereby 
only a 25% rather than a 50% ownership of stock is required before 
Subpart F can apply,22 seems incongruous. There is nothing in either the
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legislation or the Regulations which accompany it to justify this 
discrimination in the case of insurance income.
The reason for the introduction of this particular provision (which until the 
Tax Reform Act 1986 attacked only the insurance of U.S. risks but which 
now attacks the insurance of all risks other than those in the CFC’s country 
of organisation23) was that:
"Since the passage of the Life Insurance Company 
Income Tax Act of 1959, which for the first time 
imposed a tax on underwriting gains of these 
companies, it is understood that a number of 
companies involved have attempted to avoid tax on
the gains by reinsuring their policies abroad To
meet this problem the bill provides that where a 
controlled foreign corporation receives premiums or 
other consideration for reinsurance or the issuing of 
insurance or annuity contracts on property in, or 
residents of, the United States the income 
attributable to this is to be taxed to the U.S. 
shareholders as a part of Subpart F income"^
At the time of the introduction of the provision, it would not apply unless 
the CFC received U.S. note premiums or annuities in excess of 5 % of gross 
premiums. This de minimis provision was repealed by the Tax Reform Act 
1986. In justifying the alternative rule of a 25% as opposed to a 50% 
holding, it was explained:
"This alternative rule for control is designed to cover 
cases where the principal business is the U.S. risks 
but the control is decreased in order to avoid the 
application of this provision"25
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However, if it is the case that a foreign company has genuinely been 
"decontrolled" so that less than 50% is controlled by U.S. persons it is 
difficult to see, on the conceptual approach of Subpart F, what justification 
remains for the 50% threshold being reduced to 25% in this one case 
only.26 The fundamental approach of the legislation is to attack controlled 
overseas corporations. Whether a corporation is or is not controlled by 
U.S. persons depends in general on their influence over that corporation 
and this in turn is best measured by the amount of stock they hold, 
whether in value or voting power. However, the alternative treatment 
accorded to insurance income (the 25% threshold) would seem to imply 
that the type of income has some bearing on the issue of control of a 
corporation. Even if this proposition were true, (and no evidence is 
adduced in favour of it), it would still remain to be demonstrated why 
insurance income alone had an influence on the "control" of a CFC and 
thus justified the lower 25% threshold for the purposes of s. 957.
U.S. Shareholders.
A  foreign corporation will be a CFC if more than 50% of the voting power or
value of stock is owned by "United States shareholders", a class defined in s. 951
(b) as "United States persons".27
The term "U.S. person" is assigned a meaning by s.7701(a)(30) for the purposes
of the whole Code^ and includes:-29
(a) A citizen or resident of the United States.
(b) A domestic partnership.
(c) A domestic corporation.
(d) Any estate or trust (other than a foreign estate or trust).
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The term is further specifically defined in s. 957 with respect to corporations 
organised under the laws of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands or any other U.S. 
possession.
The 1937 FPHC rules are directed at "U.S. shareholders" without mention of "U.S. 
persons". A "U.S. shareholder" was formerly defined^ in the terms of s. 7701 (a) 
(which now defines "U.S. persons") without any mention of a U.S. person31 but 
this definition was later amended in 1962 to include the term "U.S. person". At the 
time of the amendment, the House said the term had the same substantive 
meaning as the then current term "U.S. shareholder".32 Quite why the "U.S. 
person" concept should be introduced and defined in terms of an apparently 
adequate existing notion ("U.S. shareholder") is somewhat mysterious. At best, the 
meaning of the term is circular and a needless complication.
To qualify as a "U.S. shareholder" for the purposes of Subpart F, it is necessary 
not only to be a "U.S. person" but also to own (or be deemed to own) 10% or 
more of the total combined voting stock or value of stock.33
The most fundamental characteristic of a CFC is the fact that it is controlled by 
U.S. shareholders. Whether or not the requisite degree of control exists depends 
on the ownership of voting power and value of the shares. There is therefore a 
very close link between the tests of "control" discussed above and the stock 
ownership rules.34
It has been observed that the real target of Subpart F was (and is) overseas 
subsidiaries of U.S. companies.35 In most cases, the U.S. parent will hold 100% 
of the stock of its subsidiary and there will be no doubts that the requisite amount 
of stock is held and that the subsidiary is, in consequence, "controlled" as defined. 
In other cases, for example a more widely held foreign corporation, the situation 
is not so straightforward and the highly complex stock ownership provisions will 
need to be applied.36
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However, the notion of control underlies not only the 50% ownership test, but 
also the 10% test which is applied in determining whether a stockholder is to 
count as a U.S. shareholder. Whereas the 50% test is broadly reasonable having 
regard to recognised notions of what constitutes control, the reasoning behind the 
application of the control concept to the 10% threshold is rather more 
questionable. In the House Hearings on the original legislation, Secretary Dillon 
explained how the concept of shareholder control had been applied to produce 
a requirement of 10% ownership for U.S. shareholders
nWe thought 10 per cent [the draft proposal] was reasonable 
considering the form which new foreign investments have been
taking  I do not think any American company or individual
would make an investment that large in a foreign company or in, 
for that matter, a domestic company unless he had a voice in the 
management and had some say in what was going to happen. And 
I would think that with that voice he could make the necessary 
arrangements to be sure that an adequate amount of dividends 
would be returned to him at home or else he would not make the 
investment on that basis".37
The 10% threshold is therefore designed to reflect the control that a 10% 
shareholder is assumed to have. Whether a 10% shareholder has anything like 
the "voice in the management" he is assumed to have is open to doubt. In terms 
of recognised accounting concepts a 10% holding in the stock of a company would 
not generally constitute anything more than a mere investment. In the U.K. for 
example, equity accounting (accounting applied to "associated" but non-subsidiary 
companies) is permitted only if the interest of a company in another company is 
something more than a mere investment. Broadly, the requirement is that the 
interest is effectively that of a partner in a joint venture or consortium and the 
investing company can exercise significant influence over the company or, 
alternatively, the investing company has a long term substantial interest and can 
exercise significant influence over the company. In both cases, a presumption is
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raised that significant influence exists if 20% or more of the equity voting rights 
of the company are held by the investing company. Where the holding of such 
rights is less than 20%, significant influence is presumed not to exist.38
In setting the minimum stock ownership requirement at 10%, the legislation is in 
effect recognising that some minimum level of stock must be held before any 
control or influence over the corporation can be exercised. This is no doubt true 
in practice. However, setting the threshold at 10% is somewhat harsh. Only in 
relatively restricted circumstances (for example, a consortium with ten members 
each with an equal holding in the consortium company) is the 10% figure, or 
something slightly above it, likely to give the shareholder the "voice in the 
management" that is an assumption of the legislation. The arbitrariness of the 
figure is underlined by the fact that if there are 11 U.S. shareholders amongst 
whom ownership of a foreign corporation is equally divided, CFC status will be 
entirely avoided. Thus, whilst these U.S. shareholders could each hold 9.1%  with 
impunity, Subpart F would apply in full if the number of shareholders were 
reduced to ten, each with a 10% holding.39
On the other hand, it may be argued that the 10% threshold is reasonable 
because this is the level at which an indirect credit is available under the U.S. tax 
legislation. The U.S. indirect credit applies in respect of the overseas tax borne 
by a non-U.S. company and, broadly, the credit is available to the extent the 
profits of that overseas company are used to fund a dividend back to the U.S. 
shareholder.40 Such an argument was in fact put forward by the Inland Revenue 
in justifying a similar 10% threshold under U.K. CFC rules.41 However, it is 
considered that this argument is misconceived. The "U.S. shareholder" test for 
Subpart F purposes seeks to identify shareholders who are to be taken as 
controlling the overseas company concerned. The indirect tax credit test, on the 
other hand, is designed to identify in what situations a shareholder may be taken 
to be a non-portfolio investor and thus entitled to a tax credit in respect of 
dividends received. It is not designed to identify shareholders controlling the 
overseas company concerned.
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It is of course true that the setting of any threshold or minimum requirement will 
always produce marginal examples, such as the one given above, which suggest a 
certain arbitrariness in the legislative requirement. However, what makes the 
10% requirement rather more suspect is the fact that it is, in a practical sense, set 
at such a low level. The result is that the legislation is more likely to have the 
effect not of bringing into charge U.S. shareholders who really can exercise any 
degree of control but rather to provide a major disincentive to potential minority 
investors in overseas corporations.
A further problem with the minimum 10% requirement is that it can operate in 
favour of U.S. partnerships, simply by virtue of the difference in legal status 
between a partnership and a corporation. Whereas Subpart F will apply to a 
wholly owned tax haven subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, the same may not be 
true in the case of a U.S. partnership, such as a large U.S. stockbroking 
partnership. It would be relatively easy to create a directly owned foreign 
subsidiary with all the U.S. partners each taking a small percentage of the stock 
of the tax haven company. This difference would be attributable solely to the fact 
that a corporation is regarded as a single, separate legal entity, distinct from its 
shareholders, whereas a partnership is not. If the existence of Subpart F is 
acceptable in terms of IFL, there seems no good reason why it should not apply 
uniformly to foreign corporations whether owned by U.S. partnerships or owned 
by U.S. parent corporations.
Attributable Income Under Subpart F
The variety of types of income which may be attributed to the U.S. shareholders 
of a CFC raises a number of questions. Most obviously, the different character 
of the income invites comment. Whereas foreign base company income in all its 
forms is determined solely by reference to the source of the earnings (very 
broadly, transactions with related parties), this characteristic is totally irrelevant 
in the case of another element of attributable income, namely "increase in 
earnings invested in U.S. property". In the latter case, the increase in earnings in
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U.S. property is attributed pro rata to the U.S. shareholders on the totally 
separate theory that earnings of the CFC have been effectively repatriated to the 
U.S., despite the lack of any formal dividend payment.42 There is a link between 
this theory of "effective repatriation" and the anti-deferral concept underlying 
Subpart F in general. In both cases, a charge to tax arises under the provisions of 
Subpart F where it would otherwise not do so: in the case of "effective 
repatriation" it would, but for s. 956, be possible for a corporation to avoid U.S. 
taxation on its income but still make that income available to its U.S. 
shareholders. However the two concepts are certainly distinct. Whereas the other 
provisions of Subpart F deal with categories of tainted income in respect of which 
deferral is denied, the "effective repatriation" concept is not aimed at such tainted 
income at all. This is because the source of the earnings that result in an increase 
in investment in U.S. property is irrelevant. Moreover, such earnings are 
specifically directed not to include the CFC’s Subpart F income to ensure that 
such income is not taxed twice.43
Therefore, whereas Subpart F income in general consists of categories of income 
in respect of which the ’deferral privilege’ is specifically removed, the ’effective 
repatriation’ provision is a broader anti-avoidance doctrine to prevent a CFC 
making available its income to its U.S. shareholders without paying U.S. taxation. 
In fact, the rules in s. 956 are basically an enactment of the ’constructive dividend’ 
doctrine which is itself part of the wider, substance-over-form concept.44
The scope of Subpart F income was expanded by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 
and two new categories of attributable income were introduced. The theoretical 
bases of these two new categories are again quite different from those discussed 
above. First, there is the category of CFC earnings from participation in or co­
operation with an international boycott which is to be taxed on the U.S. 
shareholders of the CFC. Although this is a ’source based’ category of income it 
has little in common with the earlier Subpart F income (which concentrates on 
reaching related party transactions) and it is based on a quite separate tax policy. 
Second, certain payments are deemed to be income for the purposes of Subpart
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F. Section 952 (a) (4) includes as Subpart F income the aggregate amount of 
illegal bribes, kickbacks and other payments of a similar character that are paid 
by the CFC to any foreign government official or agency.
The fact that the scope of attributable income has been expanded by these two 
different categories of ’income’ evidences that broader policy decisions (on the 
desirability of boycotts and illegal payments, the latter being identified by U.S. 
criteria) have been implemented via the Subpart F legislation.
The difference in bases by which the various types of income are identified might 
be more readily explicable if there was nonetheless a common link between the 
variety of forms of income specified to be within the operation of Subpart F. 
However, this is manifestly not so as the legislation is drafted to hit a number of 
quite different targets. First, and perhaps foremost, related party transactions are 
caught by the provisions. Then there are a series of other provisions which reach 
certain types of income: the insurance of risks outside the country of incorporation 
or organisation of the CFC; and income from boycott operations. Finally, there 
are the types of ’income’ which are basically outgoings or payments: the increase 
in earnings invested in U.S. property, which is based on a broad anti-avoidance 
doctrine, and the illegal payment of bribes, kickbacks, etc which is a specific policy 
measure.
It is not clear how these different forms of income fit into a coherent statutory 
scheme and this leads to the impression that Subpart F has become something of 
a rag bag of different provisions each with varying objectives and different targets. 
(It is difficult to justify the inclusion of boycott income and, especially, payments 
of bribes and kickbacks on almost any explanation of what the Subpart F 
provisions are supposed to be achieving.) This impression is in no way countered 
by recent provisions, contained in the Tax Reform Act 1986, which extend the 
definition of FPHCI to include such items as commodities transactions, foreign 
currency gains and income equivalent to interest.
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The fact that the legislation may have become stratified in this way is not per se 
a matter to be necessarily criticised. However, there are certain consequences 
which arise as a result of this stratification which cannot be welcomed.
The sheer complexity of the legislation^ brings with it a number of problems: the 
difficulty of administration; comprehensibility; taxpayer hostility; the problem of 
compliance for any taxpayers not advised by experienced specialists in 
international taxation; and the inevitable high cost in terms of professional fees 
of ensuring continuing compliance. These difficulties would certainly be reduced 
by a separate set of provisions to deal with distinct perceived abuses.46
More importantly, the stratification of Subpart F may have a bearing on its 
acceptability from the standpoint of IFL. This is discussed later in this chapter.
THE OBJECTIVES OF SUBPART F
It was demonstrated in the last chapter that the objectives which the Subpart F 
legislation was designed to achieve were various and wide-ranging. Other 
objectives have been added during the twenty-five year life of the legislation, in 
which time the legislation has been continually amended.
The inclusion of the new categories of Subpart F income added by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 (boycott income and illegal payments) was clearly a policy 
decision to deter illegal payments and participation in boycotts. Stringent reporting 
requirements were also imposed in respect of these two income categories. 
Subpart F nearly became the vehicle for other policy matters in 1977. In April of 
that year President Nixon introduced a highly protectionist Trade Reform Bill and 
simultaneously the Treasury released recommendations for corporate tax reform. 
These recommendations would have expanded significantly the scope of Subpart 
F so that, for example, income from manufacturing and processing abroad and 
benefits from local tax holidays would all be subject to U.S. tax.47 The Treasury 
recommendations were finally shelved, (partly due to the Watergate crisis) but
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they illustrate the degree to which legislation such as Subpart F is regarded as 
being freely available for implementing other policy objectives.
At the time of the 1976 amendments, it is possible to identify the following broad 
historical objectives of the legislation, which was intended to:
(i) help cure the balance of payments deficit
(ii) assist the economic position of the U.S.A.
(iii) achieve greater equity in taxation
(iv) contribute to the fight against international tax avoidance and tax 
havens in general
(v) withdraw tax deferral in the case of developed countries
(vi) permit tax deferral in less developed countries for policy reasons
(vii) avoid prejudicing or penalising in any way genuine foreign 
investment
(viii) provide fiscal disincentives to foreign controlled corporations 
making illegal payments
(ix) prevent, or assist in the prevention of, boycotts.
However, notwithstanding all the above points, in 1984 the Joint Committee of 
Finance stated quite unequivocally that:
’The purpose of Subpart F of the Code is to enforce capital export 
neutrality by preventing the shifting of earnings to a jurisdiction 
having no natural business nexus with the income and where the 
income will not be taxed. Otherwise, there would be an incentive to 
shift earnings into tax havens and away from the United States’.48
On the basis of the above statement, it appears that the grounds for opposition 
to tax deferral have shifted in some measure from those emphasised in 1962. 
Comments made and objectives set on the introduction of the legislation were 
primarily concerned with preventing tax avoidance whereas the more recent
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concern appears to be with capital export neutrality. The result of these shifts of 
policy underlying Subpart F is that the task of evaluating the success of the 
legislation is made considerably more difficult. This applies both to the Subpart 
F legislation in isolation and to Subpart F in the context of wider U.S. fiscal 
policy.
The ’patchwork’ nature of the U.S. tax legislation discussed earlier has already 
been noted;49 what is evident from the above discussion is that Subpart F, itself, 
is in microcosm a ’patchwork’ product of various policies and objectives.
These shifts in policy and emphasis underlying Subpart F have important 
consequences for the appraisal of Subpart F from the point of view of IFL. These 
are considered in the next section.
Notwithstanding the above comments, it is arguable that one common strand 
running through the official view of the objective of Subpart F can be identified. 
This is the notion that Subpart F is an attack on unjustified tax deferral. With 
regard to the effectiveness of Subpart F in preventing tax deferral, Marshall 
Langer was able to report in 1980 that:
’It is generally accepted that these rules [the pentapus], especially 
the Subpart F rules, have been effective in deterring Americans 
from using tax havens’.50
However, although tax deferral has been selectively prevented by the legislation 
it is nonetheless true that, as will be seen, this has been achieved at a cost from 
the perspective of IFL.
Even from the point of view of the IRS, the legislative rules have not been a 
complete success. Since the basic objective of Subpart F was (and remains) to 
prevent the use of corporations in tax haven countries to divert or extract profits
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and thereby achieve tax deferral, it must therefore be somewhat surprising to find 
that the detailed rules can be used to the taxpayer’s advantage in certain cases.
This may be illustrated in the case of s. 956, with regard to investment in U.S. 
property by way of loan. For example, where a U.K. subsidiary of a U.S. parent 
is subject to a low effective tax rate and does not want to attract advance 
corporation tax^ on making a distribution from the U.K., the simple method to 
repatriate funds to the U.S. would be to lend the available profits to the U.S. 
parent and ensure that the Subpart F rules apply to deem the loan to be foreign 
source income of the U.S. parent. A foreign tax credit for the taxes associated 
with that income would therefore arise. The end result is not only that there has 
been a repatriation of profits without a U.K. tax cost (by way of advance 
corporation tax) but that a foreign tax credit is attained. In the absence of 
Subpart F legislation it would be possible to repatriate the profits without a U.K. 
tax cost but no foreign tax credit would be obtained. The foreign tax credit 
derives entirely from Subpart F.
This is not the only way the Subpart F rules can be used to advantage.52 The fact 
that the legislation can be used in this way undermines its effectiveness as anti­
avoidance legislation and suggests that highly complicated provisions will often 
provide unintended effects or opportunities to the taxpayer which may run counter 
to the intended objective of the legislation in question.53
The best recent example of this phenomenon arises in connection with the very 
broad new Passive Foreign Investment Company rules which were discussed in the 
last chapter:
’In enacting the PFIC provisions, Congress may have gone beyond 
its purpose. The statute seems to result in some unintended tax
consequences  In particular, the PFIC provisions may have the
unintended indirect effect of ending tax deferral for non-Subpart F 
earnings (e.g. trading, service or manufacturing profits) of many
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highly profitable controlled foreign corporations, something which 
both the Kennedy and Carter Administrations unsuccessfully 
attempted to do directly.’54
Because of the unusual complexity of the CFC rules and the PFIC rules, and 
because there are no statutory provisions co-ordinating the PFIC interest charge 
rules and Subpart F, a foreign corporation subject to the operation of Subpart F 
may also be subject to the PFIC rules with a number of apparently unintended^ 
and highly complex results.56
It makes a nonsense of U.S. fiscal policy in this area if unintended complications 
are able to achieve by accident what could not be achieved by the policies of two 
governments. Moreover, if such changes have been effected virtually by accident 
the whole process of discussion and debate surrounding the enactment of U.S. tax 
legislation is seriously undermined. For these reasons, the above example is a 
particularly striking instance of the undesirability of over-complicated legislation. 
The subject of the complexity of the U.S. and U.K CFC legislation is taken up 
later in this thesis.
SUBPART F AND IFL
In appraising Subpart F from the perspective of IFL it is of course the criteria of 
IFL (considered in Chapter One) which must be applied. The existence of Subpart 
F raises certain general fundamental questions such as the deferral ’privilege’ 
itself, the approach to tax haven corporations, etc. However, these questions are 
common to all types of CFC legislation and will be considered after discussion of 
the U.K. provisions. For the present, the consideration of Subpart F and IFL will 
be restricted to those aspects of IFL which have a bearing on certain specific 
provisions and the particular approach adopted by the U.S. in enacting Subpart 
F.
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Subpart F will be considered in relation to the two key policies of IFL, equity and 
neutrality, before certain other general matters relating to IFL are raised.
SUBPART F AND EQUITY
The Categories of Tainted Income
In broad terms, Subpart F income includes passive income of the CFC and other 
income from specified activities. The official view appears to be that the specified 
activities caught by Subpart F are those in respect of which income is likely to be 
shifted offshore in order to deliberately avoid U.S. taxation. However, this 
interpretation is hardly borne out by the legislation itself. The insurance income 
derived by a CFC illustrates the point. Until recently, all income from the 
insurance of U.S. risks and foreign risks of related parties, where the risks were 
located outside the country in which the CFC was organised, was Subpart F 
income. Given the apparent desire on the part of the U.S. fisc to counter 
categories of income which can be shifted offshore, the inclusion of these types 
of income as Subpart F income is understandable. Consistent with this approach, 
the CFC could insure foreign risks of unrelated parties without generating Subpart 
F income. However, significant changes in this area have now been made by the 
Tax Reform Act 1986 which, as has been noted, provides that income from the 
insurance of any risk located outside the country in which the CFC is organised 
is Subpart F income. Thus, where income is derived by a CFC from the insurance 
of foreign risks (located outside the country of organisation of the CFC) of 
unrelated persons, such income is now caught as Subpart F income. At the same 
time the 5% de minimis rule that prevented Subpart F inclusion of insurance 
income which was less than 5 % of the CFCs gross income has been repealed. The 
combined effect of these changes is that, for practical purposes, virtually all 
insurance income of a CFC is currently taxable under Subpart F.
In the case of insurance income therefore, there is now no distinction to be made 
between tainted and non-tainted income. There is, in effect, a legislative
T/5 242
assumption that if a CFC is carrying on an offshore insurance business then it is 
appropriate for Subpart F to apply.57
In the case of other categories of income, Subpart F seems to have an entirely 
arbitrary application. For example, in the case of a CFC which carries on banking 
and similar activities, any interest income received in the conduct of its business, 
whether from related or unrelated parties, will be taxed currently in the U.S. 
under Subpart F following changes made in the Tax Reform Act 1986.58 
However, the CFC would still be able to earn amounts of income from other 
traditional banking activities which are not subject to the operation of Subpart F.59 
For example, fees for merger and acquisition advice, advisory fees and profits 
from issuing Eurobonds should all not be subject to Subpart F. In the case of a 
bank, interest income and other categories of income derive from similar trading 
activities. It is not clear why Subpart F is so discriminatory in its application such 
that some income from activities or transactions with third parties will be caught 
and other types of similar income will not.60
The justification for the extension of Subpart F to include income which has 
nothing to do with the U.S. and which is not derived from transactions between 
related parties is not clear. Given the lack of any apparent justification for the 
extension of Subpart F in this way, it is difficult to draw any other conclusion than 
that such an extension is inequitable.
However, this extension is also of significance for three other reasons. First, there 
is the impact on the ability of the CFC to compete with foreign corporations in 
non-U.S. markets. Second, the extension of Subpart F calls into question the 
conceptual basis on which Subpart F is founded. Third, the extension of Subpart 
F discussed above has significant non-neutral effects on general commercial 
operations. All three matters are discussed in later sections below.
Losses
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The first point to note with respect to losses (’deficits’) is that there is no 
provision for their attribution to the U.S. shareholders of a CFC to mirror the 
current attribution to such shareholders of the profits of the CFC. From the 
perspective of equity, this imbalance is to be objected to since it leads to an 
asymmetry which will always favour the fisc.
The Subpart F treatment of losses has changed significantly following the Tax 
Reform Act 1986. Under law in force prior to that Act the amount of Subpart F 
income of a CFC to be currently taxed in the hands of U.S. shareholders could 
not exceed the CFCs earnings and profits as reduced by losses brought forward 
from prior years. The losses in any other associated foreign corporation above or 
below the CFC in a chain of companies could also reduce the CFCs earnings and 
profits (this is the so-called ’chain-deficit’ rule).61
The 1986 Act, however, repealed the chain deficit rule and introduced a number 
of other significant limitations on the use that may be made of losses in the 
CFC.62 The Tax Reform Act retained the earlier rule that current losses in 
earnings and profits in any income category, including non-Subpart F income 
categories, may be offset against Subpart F income for that year. The Act also 
retained the rule that Subpart F income cannot exceed the CFCs earnings and 
profits of the year as reduced by losses brought forward, but this rule is 
substantially modified so that accumulated losses relating to tax years beginning 
before 1987 may not be carried forward to reduce Subpart F income.63
There are further restrictions on losses from periods of account beginning on or 
after 1987. Such losses can be carried forward without limit if they arise out of 
activities that give rise to certain narrow categories of income such as foreign-base 
company oil-related income.64 However, in these cases the losses in respect of 
each category can be offset only against the future income of those respective 
categories.
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Not only is there this new requirement for the ’streaming’ of losses but there are 
also conditions to be met in each case before losses can be utilised. For example, 
Subpart F insurance income can be reduced by losses under the new rule only if 
the CFC receiving the income was predominantly engaged in the active conduct 
of an insurance business (as defined65) in both the year in which the income was 
earned and the year in which the loss arose.66 Similarly, FPHC income can be 
reduced by losses under the new rule only if the CFC in receipt of the income was 
predominantly engaged in the active conduct of a banking, financing or similar 
business as defined67 in both the year in which the loss arose and the year in 
which the income was earned.68
There are also provisions to prevent the use of losses from other companies: pre­
merger losses of a CFC that is merged into a CFC may not reduce post-merger 
Subpart F income unless the shareholders of the CFC were also shareholders in 
the merged CFC.69
Certain other categories of Subpart F income may not be reduced by accumulated 
losses at all. Thus, for example, a loss arising in one year from Subpart F sales 
activities may not be carried forward to offset Subpart F sales income in the next 
year. This means that in the absence of any Subpart F income in the year in which 
such losses arose, the losses would go unrelieved. In consequence of the other 
changes discussed above, losses from non-Subpart F activities of the CFC can 
never be carried forward to offset Subpart F income in a later year. The general 
effect of these changes is to further restrict the use that can be made of losses in 
offsetting currently taxable Subpart F income.
In consequence, the asymmetry between the treatment of profits and losses of the 
CFC, to which reference was made above, has markedly increased. Several 
reasons are given in the 1986 Conference Report to support the new restrictions 
on the use of losses to reduce Subpart F income.70 One important theme running 
through the discussion in the Report appears to be the view that without these 
new restrictions ’too much tax haven income’ could be sheltered by U.S. tax
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payers through the use of losses.71 The criteria by which sheltered tax haven 
income is judged to be ’too much’ are neither stated nor explored. However, it 
appears that a chief factor in this judgement was the ability of CFCs in the pre- 
Tax Reform Act period to set off losses from non Subpart F income categories 
against other Subpart F income.72 For example, in discussing the chain deficit rule 
the Conference Report states that:-
’This rule is inconsistent with the "hopscotch rule", which requires 
that Subpart F income of a controlled foreign corporation be 
included currently in the gross income of the corporation’s ultimate 
U.S. shareholders without regard to the income of any intermediate 
foreign corporation interposed between those owners and the 
controlled foreign corporation.’73
The consideration by the Committee of the use of losses by CFCs takes place 
almost wholly in the context of preventing avoidance of the Subpart F provisions: 
there is nowhere in the discussion any significant consideration of the proposals 
from the point of view of equity and there is absolutely no mention of the 
relationship (or asymmetry) between the treatment of profits and the treatment 
of losses. This leads to the conclusion that the very significant restrictions 
affecting losses brought in by the 1986 Act are motivated primarily by an intention 
to prevent tax avoidance. This intention is translated into a set of legislative 
restrictions on the use of losses which are relatively heavy handed. It would 
appear that consideration of the changes from the perspective of equity has 
largely been ignored.
’Genuine Production or Market Activities’
In 1961, a significant emphasis was given over to the neutral effect of the 
legislation on genuine commercial activities and it was stated that ’there is 
absolutely no thought of penalising private investment abroad which rests upon 
genuine production or market activities’.^ As has been noted, a test was
T/5 246
incorporated into the legislation to grant exemption for income where it could be 
demonstrated that the CFC is not used for the purposes of tax avoidance. The test 
was subjective and turned on the question whether the CFC was ’formed or 
availed of’ to reduce its U.S. tax liability. This has now been changed to an 
objective test by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.75 Under that Act a CFC is not 
treated as having foreign-base company income or insurance income subject to 
Subpart F if its income is taxed at 90% or more of the maximum U.S. tax liability 
on such income. Based on the top rate of U.S. corporation tax of 34% (effective 
from 1st July 1987), this means that a CFCs income must be subject to a tax of 
at least 30.6% (34% x 90%) to avoid being Subpart F income.
There are a number of comments to be made. First, the scope of the test is not 
sufficiently comprehensive. The test applies to insurance income and foreign-base 
company income but the exception does not apply to foreign-base company oil- 
related income. Presumably,76 this is due to the very large amounts of income that 
are associated with oil related activities. Such large amounts of income might 
make it worthwhile to use a CFC which is subject to a rate of tax of 90% of the 
U.S. rate in order to avoid U.S. tax on the remaining 10%. However, if this is the 
reason oil related income is excluded, it seems illogical that the exemption is 
withdrawn purely because of the amounts of income involved. Whether or not 
genuine commercial activity is being carried on is generally not indicated by 
reference to the monetary size of the relevant transactions or arrangements. If 
very large amounts of income are involved this may indicate that ’non genuine’ 
motivations to avoid tax may be in point. However, it does not of itself indicate 
the motivation behind business transactions or arrangements. In short, the fact 
that the exemption does not include oil-related income is an inequity of the 
legislation.
The percentage rate of tax which must be achieved (90% of U.S. tax) is also 
somewhat high. For example, where a U.S. CFC is established and becomes 
resident in the U.K. and has profits of less than £100,00077 such that the lower
T/5 247
rate of U.K. corporation tax of 25 % applies, it will not be possible to claim the 
protection of the exemption.
The example illustrates the major difficulty with the exemption. This is that the 
percentage amount of tax suffered is an extremely unsatisfactory indicator of 
whether or not ’genuine’ business activities have been carried on. Merely by 
setting the requirement at the 90% rate, the rules necessarily preclude the 
possibility of carrying on ’genuine’ activities for the purpose of the Subpart F rules 
in a considerable number of jurisdictions, where the tax rate is less than 30.6%. 
As such, the test, which is supposed to guarantee that investment abroad which 
rests upon "genuine production" or "market activities" is not to be penalised by the 
Subpart F rules, cannot be considered a success.
The 90% test does not make any allowances for differences in computing taxable 
income between the U.S. and foreign countries. A recent private letter ruling 
illustrates the point. A foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent was subject to tax at 
52% but offset brought-forward losses against its income. The losses arose partly 
due to business expenses which would have been required to be capitalised under 
U.S. tax principles. The IRS ruled that the exemption could not apply and the 
company’s income therefore fell to be included in the income of the shareholder.78
The fact that Subpart F operates in respect of "genuine" business activities in 
jurisdictions with an effective tax rate of less than 30.6% is itself a disincentive to 
U.S. CFCs to compete in such markets. The effect of Subpart F on the 
competitiveness of U.S. CFCs in foreign markets is considered later in this 
chapter.
Delegation to Treasury Regulations and IRS
In spite of the immense detail of the legislation, a number of tasks are turned 
over to the Treasury to discharge by regulations. This, in effect, gives the IRS an
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important discretion not merely in applying the legislation but also in 
implementing certain delegated functions.
The significance of the regulations was demonstrated during the Conference 
Agreement stage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The House Bill suggested an 
amendment which would have decreased the ownership requirement for CFCs 
from more than 50% to 50% or more. However, in Conference Agreement the 
amendment was not included partly due to:-
"The conferees understanding that, under an existing Treasury 
regulation, the IRS can, in specified circumstances, deem foreign 
corporations effectively controlled by 10% U.S. shareholders to 
meet the more than 50% ownership test even though that 
requirement would otherwise not technically be met".79
The high profile of the Treasury Regulations and the discretionary tasks delegated 
to the IRS have become largely accepted in the U.S. Certainly, the publication of 
regulations and rulings which assist the interpretation and understanding of the 
primary legislation contained in the Internal Revenue Code is to be welcomed. 
However, where important rules are not contained in the Code but are delegated 
to be discharged by the IRS or by Treasury Regulations then the situation is less 
welcome since in such a case the primacy of the legislation is undermined.
SUBPART F AND NEUTRALITY
The Relevance of Neutrality
Throughout the deliberations on and history of Subpart F, there is no doubt that 
the existence of tax deferral has been seen by the U.S. Government, the IRS and 
Treasury officials as having a major distorting effect. For example
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"The most important feature of our tax system giving preferential 
treatment to U.S. investment abroad is the privilege of deferring 
U.S. income tax on the earnings derived through foreign subsidiaries 
until these earnings are distributed as dividends. The lower the rate 
of foreign income tax, the more significant is the privilege of tax 
deferral" .80
It was noted earlier that, in 1984 at least, the stated purpose of Subpart F was to 
"enforce capital export neutrality by preventing the shifting of earnings to a 
jurisdiction having no natural business nexus with the income"81 - in other words, 
to remove the fiscal attraction of tax havens which might otherwise be used for 
profit extraction and profit diversion. This concern to achieve neutrality was also 
raised in the House of Representatives’ Ways and Means Committee 1962 
hearings.82
Given the official view that tax deferral was a serious problem because it was 
having a distorting (i.e. non-neutral) effect on capital export, it might be expected 
that the concept of neutrality would be followed rigorously in the legislation. At 
best there is some doubt as to whether neutrality is a significant concept 
underlying Subpart F. The matter is to be judged in two ways. First it is necessary 
to analyse the role of Subpart F in the context of the U.S. tax code itself to 
determine whether Subpart F fulfils its role as part of a wider, coherent tax code. 
Second, the "internal" aspects of the provisions of Subpart F should be considered 
to determine whether the specific rules achieve neutrality.
The Place of Subpart F in the Internal Revenue Code
With regard to the place of Subpart F in the tax code as a whole it is clear that 
shifts in policy have led to somewhat contradictory legislation elsewhere in the 
Code. Certainly, with regard to its taxation of overseas vehicles owned or invested 
in by U.S. people, U.S. tax policy does not seem to prioritise the achievement of 
tax neutrality.
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The degree to which U.S. Government policy influences tax legislation affecting 
overseas investment should certainly not be underestimated. In the light of the 
1971 DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporation) legislation, a leading 
international tax commentator observed in 1973:-
"The U.S. Subpart F legislation on the setting-up of tax-haven sales 
subsidiaries has become far less relevant since the introduction of 
the DISC legislation .... In the U.S., trade war and balance of 
payments factors seem to have overruled anti-avoidance 
considerations".^
The DISC legislation was widely seen as a fiscal package to salvage the U.S. 
balance of payments position. The objective of the legislation was to create 
significant export incentives. Under the legislation, companies which derived 95 % 
or more of their income from export related activities paid no U.S. tax on half 
their profits. This favourable postponement could continue indefinitely until the 
DISC distributed its profits or ceased to qualify as a DISC. The DISC legislation 
was replaced by the less advantageous Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) rules by 
the 1984 Tax Reform Act.84 The change was made as a result of pressure from 
trading partners of the U.S. who argued that the DISC tax benefit treatment 
constituted an illegal export subsidy in violation of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
It is difficult to see the justification by which the Subpart F legislation and the 
DISC legislation could be reconciled as each being complementary portions of a 
coherent tax code with an even approach to foreign investment and it seems more 
probable that the two areas of legislation merely represent two separate (and 
contradictory) official policies:
"Ironically, while trade policy has accorded a high priority to 
opportunities for service exports, U.S. tax policy has proceeded
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along a separate track and appears to have raised new obstacles to 
American competitiveness."^
Subpart F in Isolation
Turning to the "internal" characteristics of Subpart F, the most obvious aspect of 
the legislation is its discriminatory nature: If tax export neutrality is achieved at 
all, it is achieved only selectively. This follows from the scheme of the legislation 
itself. The very existence of the categories of "tainted income" to which Subpart 
F applies means that the provisions have an inherently uneven effect. Of course 
this does not of itself preclude the achievement of tax neutrality. If the 
discriminatory provisions (i.e. the categories of tainted income) were designed to 
prevent all cases of fiscal distortion (i.e. tax avoidance mechanisms and use of tax 
havens, etc) then the provisions might seek to achieve neutrality by dealing 
selectively with the perceived abuses. Whether the provisions of Subpart F do this 
in practice is open to doubt. For example, the very existence of s. 956 (investment 
in U.S. property taxed currently as a deemed distribution) is, ceteris paribus, itself 
a fiscal incentive to direct investment away from the U.S. As has been noted, the 
basis of this provision is the belief that the use of untaxed earnings by a CFC for 
the purposes of investing in U.S. property is "substantially the equivalent of a 
dividend".
Any international tax practitioner will confirm that the use of "upstream loans" 
and similar devices has indeed been an important method of effectively 
repatriating overseas profits. From the point of view of the fisc, such devices 
should be prevented. However, the very broad provision of s. 956 attacks and 
deters not merely these schemes but also projects of investment into the U.S. 
based on sound commercial principles. This point was recognised by the Joint 
Committee of Taxation in 1976, some fourteen years after the first enactment of 
the rule:-
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"The Congress believed that the scope of the provision was too 
broad. In its prior form it may, in fact, have had a detrimental 
effect upon our balance of payments by encouraging foreign 
corporations to invest their profits abroad. For example, a 
controlled foreign corporation looking for a temporary investment 
for its working capital was, by this provision induced to purchase 
foreign rather than U.S. obligations".86
In recognition of the excessive breadth of the provision, the 1976 Act excluded 
from the definition of U.S. property stock or debt of a non-related domestic 
corporation and movable drilling rigs. In spite of the changes made, s. 956 operates 
in a number of situations in which it is hardly credible to argue that a constructive 
dividend to the U.S. shareholders has been made. For example, all the following 
would be caught:-
(a) the loan of funds to any U.S. person other than a domestic corporation, 
even where the U.S. person owns no stock, whether directly or indirectly, 
in the CFC;
(b) the licensing of technology developed by the CFC for use in the U.S. by an 
unrelated licensee in its business operations;
(c) the guarantee by a CFC of the debt obligation of a related domestic 
corporation or of any other non-corporate "U.S. person". The fact that 
such a guarantee is caught is in conflict with court decisions holding that 
such a guarantee is not considered to be a constructive dividend under 
general tax principles.87
Further examples could also be mentioned.88
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The Subsidy Theory of Subpart F
Notwithstanding the official statements that Subpart F is designed to achieve 
capital export neutrality, a radically different interpretation is given by Professor 
Paul McDaniel.89 McDaniel starts his analysis by stating that tax deferral granted 
to U.S. CFCs is inconsistent with the decision to adopt the foreign tax credit 
(indirect credit for taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries) as the basic mechanism for 
applying the U.S. tax system to international transactions. This is because a 
properly constructed foreign tax credit system would tax currently the income of 
U.S. corporations, giving credit for overseas taxes paid, without regard to 
remittances by way of dividend. This leads McDaniel to the view that:-
"The income and activities left outside the scope of Subpart F are 
those that the U.S. wishes to subsidise with an interest-free loan 
(through tax deferral) or outright grant (if tax is deferred 
indefinitely). The intricate rules, exceptions, limitations and 
exclusions contained in Subpart F, under this view, are not rules 
necessary to limit exceptions to an otherwise proper tax rule (i.e. 
deferral) but instead function to impose limits on a subsidy 
programme that the U.S. has elected to run through its income tax 
system.... In very general terms, then, the income and activities that 
are excluded from Subpart F are those that the United States 
wishes included in its tax subsidy programme".90
McDaniel substantiates his theory by pointing to the CFCs that sell or buy 
products to or from, or provide services to, related corporations in the country to 
which the CFC is located. In this situation, the point of the subsidy is to help 
those CFCs compete with foreign competitors operating in the same market. 
However, where a CFC merely buys goods, for example, from a related party in 
one country and sells to a related party in another, no such purposes is served by 
any subsidy - hence the operation of Subpart F in such a case. The analysis is also 
applied to foreign base company income
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"The FBCI rules focus on activities by the CFC outside the country 
in which it is located. Again, the purpose of this is clear when the 
deferral rules are seen as a subsidy programme. The subsidy is to 
enable a U.S.controlled subsidiary to compete in its country against 
other foreign companies operating therein. If the subsidiary is not 
really operating a trade or business in that country, then no subsidy 
will be given".91
McDaniel also states that the inclusion in CFC earnings of illegal payments and 
boycott income rests on a policy decision to limit the federal financial subsidy 
programme effected through the tax system because granting the subsidy in these 
cases would run counter to U.S. non-tax policy objectives.
McDaniel’s theory is not, in the light of the legislative history of Subpart F, a 
convincing view of the intentions behind the enactment of Subpart F. It may 
nonetheless be a correct explanation of the operation of Subpart F in practice. 
The significant point relating to McDaniel’s theory, for present purposes, is that 
far from supporting the "capital export neutrality" objective, McDaniel’s theory 
runs in quite the opposite direction.92
It was stated that even on the "capital export neutrality" interpretation, there are 
a number of aspects to the legislation which act in opposition to its having a 
neutral effect. With regard to the very different theory that Subpart F is basically 
a part of a subsidy programme, the essence of the legislation clearly runs counter 
to the neutrality principle of IFL.
Subpart F as Anti-Avoidance Legislation
Notwithstanding the above discussion as to whether the legislation is 
fundamentally designed to achieve capital export neutrality or is the enactment of 
a subsidy theory, it might also be argued that Subpart F is simply an elaborate 
piece of anti-avoidance law. A recent explanation of the provisions that comprise
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Subpart F talks of its "anti-tax haven" rules.93 The current belief in the anti­
avoidance character of the legislation is most clearly conveyed in the 1986 
Conference discussion of the applicability of Subpart F to captive insurance 
companies:-
"The conferees do not believe that U.S. persons utilising offshore 
captive insurance companies should be able to avoid current U.S. 
tax on the related person insurance income of these companies....".94
A similar sentiment is expressed with regard to the use of losses:-
"The conferees believe that the present law deficit rules allow U.S. 
taxpayers operating abroad through controlled foreign corporations 
to shelter too much tax haven income from current U.S. tax".95
Although these quotes are taken from the recent Tax Reform Act of 1986 
deliberations, similar remarks emphasising the anti-avoidance character of the 
legislation have been made throughout the legislative history of Subpart F.
The changes made by the recent Tax Reform Act of 1986 emphasise the 
aggressive attitude now being taken by the U.S. fisc to counter what are regarded 
as avoidance activities. The extension of Subpart F income to include all forms of 
insurance income has already been noted. In more general terms, the 1986 Act 
made a number of changes which expand the categories of Subpart F income, 
narrow the exceptions to the Subpart F, and alter thresholds. The combined effect 
of these changes is to increase the significance of the Subpart F rules and to 
increase the amount of income of CFCs which is now liable to be taxed currently 
under Subpart F.
If Subpart F is more properly viewed as being primarily anti-avoidance legislation, 
this does not necessarily mean that it will breach the principle of neutrality. 
Indeed, an incidental effect of the legislation may be to support that principle
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through the correction of fiscal distortions arising from avoidance opportunities, 
although the earlier discussions of the categories of income which are subject to 
the operation of Subpart F may suggest that this proposition is hardly correct in 
the case of Subpart F. However, it is possible to evaluate the effect of anti­
avoidance legislation from the perspective of the neutrality principle only when 
the impact of the legislation in question on legitimate business activities is known. 
This in turn requires an understanding of the concept of "legitimate". Since, in 
this thesis, the neutrality concept is a concept of IFL, the question whether or not 
business activity counts as "legitimate" must also be judged according to the 
criteria of IFL.96
In framing Subpart F, the U.S. fisc has clearly determined which activities or 
transactions of CFCs constitute legitimate business activity and which do not, the 
latter category being made subject to current taxation under Subpart F. This 
determination may not necessarily accord with the approach adopted from the 
perspective of IFL. This fundamental point is discussed in detail in the final part 
of this thesis.
OTHER ISSUES OF IFL RELATING TO SUBPART F 
The Ability to Compete in Foreign Markets
Despite the statement of intent in 1961 that there was no intention to disrupt 
genuine business activities^, it is apparent that the Subpart F legislation may have 
had such a disrupting effect.
Facing the current U.S. burden of tax on all its insurance income, a U.S. CFC may 
well be at a significant disadvantage in attempting to compete with its foreign 
rivals in respect of foreign business. When competing with foreign competitors in 
jurisdictions with a lower rate of tax than that prevailing in the U.S., U.S. CFCs 
may find themselves priced out of the market because the premiums for insurance 
required by U.S. CFCs are calculated to produce a (relatively higher) return due
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to the need to take account of current U.S. taxation. In such a situation the effect 
of Subpart F may be wholly negative since there is a severe disadvantage to 
entering the market. In this situation, therefore, Subpart F acts not to tax 
currently overseas income but rather to rule out the possibility of such income 
being generated.98
The problems caused by Subpart F are not limited to the insurance sector. The 
banking and financial services sector is affected similarly. Interest received by a 
U.S. controlled foreign bank, whether from a related or unrelated party, is 
currently taxable as FPHCI (unless the bank receives interest in connection with 
financing exports of a related party). Any U.S. CFC which is active in this sector 
must generate a return which covers costs and provides a profit of an acceptable 
level. However, the fact that such profit will be subject to current U.S. taxation 
may require an increase in interest rates, for example, to keep the net return at 
an acceptable level. Again, this may lead to U.S. CFCs being underpriced (and 
therefore rendered uncompetitive) by foreign competition in jurisdictions where 
the tax rate is lower than that applying in the U.S. The conclusion of a recent 
survey on the effects on competitiveness of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (and 
particularly the 1986 Subpart F changes) in the context of banking services was 
that:-
"the 1986 Act had a substantially negative effect on an industry
already hard pressed by international competition".99
This is significant because the banking, financial, insurance, etc sectors have 
recently enjoyed considerable growth and expansion. Much of this growth has 
taken place in the traditional financial centres, such as London and Tokyo, where 
tax rates are generally high enough to avoid Subpart F problems. However, there 
are a number of other financial centres where tax rates are relatively low 
compared to the U.S. and where expansion and growth in the financial sector 
matches or exceeds that enjoyed by the traditional financial centres. The 
international financial services centre in Dublin is an excellent example. Given
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that the corporate tax rate is only 10%, it is highly questionable whether U.S. 
CFCs can compete in places such as Dublin on equal terms with other foreign 
competitors.
Avoiding and Evading Subpart F
At the time of the introduction of Subpart F there were a number of cases of 
attempted de-control of CFCs to avoid the operation of Subpart F.100 This 
indicates that in practice some shareholders of CFCs will prefer to rearrange their 
investment in a CFC to avoid current taxation in the U.S. In broad terms, such a 
reorganisation could be carried out in one of two ways.
First, some form of re-distribution of the equity of the CFC could be arranged so 
as to avoid (or mitigate) the operation of the Subpart F rules. For example, equity 
in the company could be sold by a majority shareholder to a number of third 
parties so that it would no longer be the case that 50% or more of stock in that 
CFC was owned by U.S. shareholders as defined. To compensate for the reduced 
stake in the CFC (and subject to any agreement that might be made with the new 
owners of the shares sold), it might be possible for the former majority 
shareholder to arrange that the profits of the company be extracted not exclusively 
by way of dividend but partially by way of management fees, etc paid for 
management services rendered by the former majority shareholder. Alternatively, 
it may be possible for the former shareholder to retain a significant interest in the 
company by advancing to the company a long term loan in exchange for loan 
stock. Interest paid on such stock would be an additional method for the 
extraction of the profits of the enterprise.
The above approach to avoiding Subpart F operation would be an entirely 
legitimate means of avoiding Subpart F but it would involve a real loss of control 
of the company, notwithstanding the fact that certain arrangements might be 
concluded largely to maintain the level of profits extracted by the former major 
shareholder or shareholders. However, the significant disadvantage would be the
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loss of flexibility which would follow from the loss of control. Assuming the 
shareholders to be other than entirely passive with regard to the affairs of the 
company, the existence of more shareholders will, from the point of view of the 
former major shareholder, inevitably lead to more constraints on the activities of 
the company and a consequent reduction in flexibility. This demonstrates that the 
ability to compete with other companies not subject to Subpart F legislation may 
be affected not merely by the actual operation of Subpart F but also by 
arrangements entered into to avoid such an operation of the Subpart F rules.
The second type of method to side-step Subpart F current taxation is by unlawful 
means. For example, a sham "sale" of shares by a major U.S. shareholder to 
foreign parties who in substance act as mere nominees may achieve its goal in 
deflecting the operation of Subpart F if the "sale" were accepted as genuine by the 
tax authorities.
Information with regard to the prevalence of this type of method for avoiding 
Subpart F  is inevitably not publicised. However, it would be somewhat naive to 
suppose that the introduction of Subpart F has not promoted such a reaction in 
certain cases. Indeed, in the light of the discussion on international tax avoidance, 
such a reaction, on the part of some taxpayers at least, is to be expected.
The key difference between the lawful and unlawful methods of avoiding Subpart 
F is that whereas the lawful method is inflexible and inconvenient and results in 
a significant change in the controlling interests of the company, the unlawful 
method maintains exactly the majority shareholders control of, and effective 
interest in, the company. The ability of the CFC to compete with other companies 
is also not affected. As such, there are clear economic advantages to this latter 
method if the taxpayer in question is prepared to entertain the use of unlawful 
methods to avoid the operation of Subpart F.
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CONCLUSION
The scheme of this thesis is to postpone consideration of the key elements 
applying in common to the legislation of the U.S. and the U.K. until both 
countries have been considered. However, certain "localised" conclusions on 
Subpart F may be made at this stage.
The most striking feature arising from the analysis of Subpart F is the lack of any 
clear conceptual foundation. The legislation unambiguously opposes deferral in 
certain cases. What is not clear is whether the basis for this is on anti-avoidance 
grounds; or to achieve capital export neutrality; or as part of a subsidy programme 
(or, indeed, to increase U.S. tax revenues or to discourage foreign investment). 
Clearly, if the conceptual foundation of Subpart F cannot easily be identified, this 
will make the task of assessing the success of the legislation somewhat difficult.
The truth is that at different times all these bases have been used to justify the 
creation of, and adjustments to, the legislation. As such, there is a lack 
(conceptually at least) of any clear foundation for the legislation. This point can 
be illustrated by a recent example. The same 1986 Joint Committee which agreed 
amendments to Subpart F to extend the categories of FPHCI, on anti-avoidance 
grounds, specifically preserved tax deferral for interest derived in connection with 
certain export sales101 without any apparent difficulty. After twenty-five years, the 
cumulative effect of this treatment of the legislation is the existence of an 
incongruous and highly complex set of rules.
It is of course to be expected that domestic fiscal policy will shift over a period of 
time. However, from the point of view of IFL, there are a number of reasons (not 
least, the problem of double taxation) why policy shifts affecting tax legislation of 
an international character should be circumscribed. The relationship between 
domestic tax policy and the policy dictates of IFL is considered in detail in the 
closing chapters of this thesis.
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In May 1985, President Reagan identified three problems with the current U.S. 
tax system: It is unfair; too complicated; and impedes growth.102 Unfortunately, 
what was said in macrocosm for the U.S. tax system appears equally true in 
microcosm in the case of Subpart F.103
It would be preferable if the rules of Subpart F were more clearly defined to 
achieve a specific objective. For example, if the rules are principally anti­
avoidance rules (and this seems to be the case in practice) then Subpart F should 
be rationalised to concentrate on related party transactions. This would result in 
a simplified set of provisions, more readily comprehensible due to the obvious 
policy objective. This would entail the removal from Subpart F of all those 
provisions which are not related to the central objective (e.g. the provisions 
relating to illegal payments and boycott income) so that only related party 
transactions fell within the scope of Subpart F. On this approach, the provisions 
relating to investment in U.S. property, for example, would be changed so as to 
ensure only constructive dividends made to related parties in the U.S. were caught 
by Subpart F; at the very least this would mean an expansion of the exclusions 
from "U.S. property" caught by the operation of s. 956.
At the same time, by concentrating on the conceptual rationale of Subpart F, it 
would become easier to discuss the operation of controlled foreign companies 
legislation in general - for example, the necessity for and the effectiveness of the 
legislation could be analysed rather more rigorously than is currently possible.
However, although such a change would certainly improve Subpart F, there still 
exists a number of issues relating to IFL that remain to be considered in 
connection with Subpart F and the taxation of controlled foreign companies in 
general. This consideration is postponed until the legislation of the U.K. has been 
considered.
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CHAPTER 5 - NOTES
1 Although reference is made throughout the chapter to various secondary 
sources dealing with Subpart F, it may be helpful to the reader to note 
that the standard exposition of U.S. corporate taxation is contained in 
B.I. Bittker and J.S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporates and 
Shareholders, 5th edition (Boston, 1987). The CFC provisions are 
discussed in Part D of Chapter seventeen. An international tax focus 
from a U.S. perspective is given in R.L. Kaplan, Federal Taxation of 
International Transactions (Minnesota, 1988) where the discussion of 
Subpart F is contained in Chapter 6 of Part II.
2 In the other cases mentioned, a U.S. corporation would be subject to 
U.S. tax in any event. This is because a U.S. corporation is taxed on its 
worldwide income, including income derived from a joint venture, foreign 
branch or agency, or partnership - see IRC, s. 11.
3 The regulations specify six characteristics which are ordinarily found in 
corporations:- associates; an objective to carry on business for joint 
profit; continuity of life; centralisation of management; limited liability; 
free transferability of interests.
4 M. Mulroney, Subpart F - Background, Basic Concepts and Terminology, 
Tax Management Portfolios, Tax Management Inc., U.S.A., 1982, p. A- 
12 .
5 Note 4, Ibid.
6 See Revenue Ruling 73-254, 1973-1 C.B. 613.
7 Reg. s. 301 7701-2 (a) (1).
8 Reg. s. 301 7701-5.
9 Note 8, Ibid.
10 IRS, s. 957(a). There was an amendment proposed in the 1986 House
Bill to amend the test to 50% or more but this revision was not enacted.
See Committee Report (note 70), Ibid, at 11-612.
11 The Regulations state that "consideration will be given to all the facts
and circumstances of each case". (1.957 - 1(b)(1)). However, U.S. 
shareholders are deemed to own the requisite percentage of total 
combined voting power in certain cases, for example if they have the 
power to replace a majority of the directors of the foreign entity. These 
provisions are designed to catch U.S. shareholders who have effective 
control over the foreign entity, even if they do not hold more than 50% 
of the voting power or value of the total shares. Similarly, the
T/5 263
Regulations deal with attempts to shift formal voting power in order to 
"de control" the CFC: "Any arrangement to shift formal power away 
from United States shareholders of a foreign corporation will not be 
given effect if in reality voting power is retained." The main point 
arising from cases relating to this area of the legislation is the necessity 
to demonstrate that non-U.S. shareholders possess real voting power 
which can be, and actually is, exercised. See, for example, CCA Inc. 64 
TC No. 12 (1975) as compared to Garlock Inc. v CIR 489 F. 2d 197 (2d 
Cir 1973).
12 See also the discussion in Bittker and Eustice (cited at note 1) at pp. 17-
30.
13 For example, Michael Mulroney (see note (2)) at p.A17 comments:
"Thus, in justifying the concept, and, therefore, the definition now in 
s. 957 (a) Treasury submitted a memorandum to the House which 
references the voting control concept to, inter alia, the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 
certain national banking statutes and the ownership provisions of s. 902, 
all of which were grounded on different considerations".
14 S. 542 (a) (2).
15 S. 957 (a) as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
s. 1222(a)(1).
16 See U.S. Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51 as amended by Financial
Accounting Standard No. 94.
17 Statement of Standard Accounting Practice Number 14,
"Group Accounts", issued September 1978.
18 The position in Canada is broadly similar to that applying for accounting 
purposes in the U.S. and the U.K. - see Coopers & Lybrand Accounting 
Comparisons: U.S., Canada and U.S.A. (London, 1992) p. 53.
19 1 House Hearings on the President’s 1961 Tax Recommendations, pp
340-341 (87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)).
20 Garlock Inc. v. C.I.R. 58 TC 423 1972 aff’d, 489 F. 2d 197 [2d Cir. 1973], 
cited in full in W.C. Gifford and W.P. Streng, International Tax Planning, 
Tax Management Inc, 2nd ed 1979, p. 409, at p. 410.
21 S. 954 (d)(3).
22 S. 953 (c)(1).
23 IRC, s. 953.
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24 See section XII of Senate Report No. 1881, 87th Cong. 2nd Sess., 
(Report of Senate Finance Committee to Accompany HR 10650), 
Subsection C2 (reproduced in M. Mulroney; Subpart F - Background, 
Basic Concepts and Terminology, BNA Tax Management Portfolios No. 
432 (Washington, 1986) p. B.701 at pp. B-702-703).
25 Note 24, Ibid.
26 No further explanation is given in the Committee Report (op. cit. at note 
70) as to why the change has been made.
27 This category is in turn explained in s. 957 (d) according to the meaning 
given in s. 7701.
28 Note 8, Ibid.
29 s. 7701 (a) (30).
30 Note 8, Ibid.
31 S. 6046, as amended in 1960.
32 H. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. 94, A-170 (1962).
33 S. 951 (b).
34 However, these complex rules on "control" and stock ownership will not 
generally cause difficulties in the case of wholly-owned subsidiaries of 
U.S.-based multinational companies either because they will be directly 
owned from the U.S. (making the rules on indirect or constructive 
ownership irrelevant) or because they will be 100% owned by another 
100% overseas subsidiary (in which case the rules on indirect and 
constructive ownership can be readily applied) - see Bittker and Eustice 
(op. cit. at note 1, at 17-31).
35 Bittker and Eustice (op. cit. at note 1) concur by their observation (at
17-31) that the most important foreign corporations in size if not in 
number are wholly owned subsidiaries of domestic corporations.
36 In such a case it is of course necessary to apply these rules not merely 
at year-end but also from day to day since if a corporation is a CFC for 
any portion of a year the amount taxed in the hands of its shareholders 
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INTRODUCTION
The scheme of this chapter is, broadly, to consider the attitude of the U.K. fisc to 
international tax avoidance and tax havens insofar as that attitude is currently 
expressed and, particularly, as it has been expressed in the consultative documents 
which state the rationale and justification of the U.K. CFC legislation.
The discussion of the current attitude of the Revenue to international tax 
avoidance is followed by an outline of the major anti-avoidance legislation which 
was available prior to the enactment of the CFC provisions and which remains in 
force. Consideration is then given to the three-year consultative background to the 
enactment of those provisions and, finally, there is a brief description of the CFC 
legislation currently in force.
A summary guide to the specific sections which comprise the current CFC 
legislation is given in Appendix III.
ATTITUDE TO INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE
Tax Saving. Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion
There is no statutory definition of tax saving, tax avoidance or tax evasion in U.K. 
law and the definitions of and distinctions between these concepts (which were 
considered in the earlier chapter on international tax avoidance), are as 
problematic in the U.K. as they are in most other jurisdictions.
The crucial distinction between avoidance and evasion is frequently pinned on a 
distinction between honesty and dishonesty, the former being the hallmark of 
avoidance activity, the latter of tax evasion:-
"No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or 
other, so to arrange his legal relations to his business or to his
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property as to enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest possible 
shovel into his stores. The Inland Revenue is not slow - and quite 
rightly - to take every advantage which is open to it under the 
taxing statutes for the purpose of depleting the taxpayer’s pocket.
And the taxpayer is, in like manner, entitled to be astute to prevent, 
so far as he honestly can, the depletion of his means by the Inland 
Revenue'^ (emphasis added).
Tax evasion, on the other hand, is generally understood to involve a deliberate 
and dishonest understatement of revenue or overstatement of deductible 
expenditure. As might be expected, the U.K. fisc is implacably opposed to all 
forms of evasion activity and guilty parties are subject to financial penalties or 
imprisonment^
Precisely what amounts to tax avoidance is, as noted, not entirely clear and the 
"emerging principle" of the Ramsav? line of cases (discussed below) has done little 
to clarify the position.
The most recent judicial overview of the subject was given by Lord Templeman 
in the Challenge Corporation case4, a New Zealand case heard on appeal by the 
Privy Council.5 Lord Templeman acknowledged the "well-known difficulties 
encountered in the formulation and enforcement of effective anti-tax avoidance 
provisions'^ and went on to consider the distinctions which may be drawn between 
a transaction which is a sham, a transaction involving the evasion of tax, a 
transaction involving the avoidance of tax and one which mitigates a tax liability 
(a "tax saving" transaction).
The facts of the case (which concerned the use of a provision for tax relief as an 
instrument of tax avoidance) did not, according to Lord Templeman, involve a 
sham on the ground that the transaction "was not so constructed as to create a 
false impression in the eyes of the tax authority".7 Lord Templeman went on to
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say that tax evasion also was not in point as the company had fulfilled their duty 
of informing the fisc of all relevant facts:-
"Evasion occurs when the Commissioner is not informed of all the 
facts relevant to an assessment of tax. Innocent evasion may lead to 
a re-assessment. Fraudulent evasion may lead to a criminal 
prosecution as well as re-assessment".8
His Lordship therefore concluded that the critical distinction at issue in the case 
was between tax mitigation and tax avoidance. Mitigation could be explained as 
follows
"Income tax is mitigated by a taxpayer who reduces his income or 
incurs expenditure in circumstances which reduce his assessable 
income or entitle him to a reduction in his tax liability".9
On the other hand, with regard to tax avoidance:-
"In an arrangement of tax avoidance the financial position of the 
taxpayer is unaffected (save for the costs of devising and 
implementing the arrangement) and by the arrangement the 
taxpayer seeks to obtain a tax advantage without suffering that 
reduction in income, loss or expenditure which other taxpayers 
suffer and which Parliament intended to be suffered by any 
taxpayer qualifying for a reduction in his liability to tax".10
With due respect to Lord Templeman, there remain a number of conceptual 
questions which arise from his categorisation of tax avoidance, tax evasion, sham 
transactions and tax mitigation, and, in consequence, his consideration of these 
matters is unlikely to break new ground in the analysis of these concepts.n  Lord 
Templeman’s understanding of the concept of avoidance is certainly somewhat 
narrower than that of most taxation practitioners and the Inland Revenue.12
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However, the case is of some significance in indicating the current attitude of the 
courts to arrangements or transactions which reduce the tax liability of the 
taxpayer. Clearly, not all forms of such activity are attacked by the fisc and some 
are arguably encouraged.13 In broad terms, it would appear that apart from 
avoidance activity which is attacked by specific anti-avoidance legislation, the type 
of avoidance activity which is not to be tolerated by the fisc is that which can be 
challenged under the Ramsay doctrine, to which attention is now turned.
The "New Approach"
Until 1981 it was generally thought that if a document or transaction was not a 
sham it would have effect for tax purposes. As such, it would not be possible for 
the fisc or judiciary to look behind it at the substance rather than the form of the 
transaction. This understanding of the law was based, inter alia, on the 1936 case, 
IRC v. Duke of Westminster.^ In 1981, this understanding was reversed with the 
Ramsay decision which was later consolidated by the cases of Burmah and Furniss 
v. Pawson.15
The facts of the Ramsay case are complex. The case concerned an attempt by the 
taxpayer to generate a tax allowable loss to offset against a taxable gain. The 
characteristics of this scheme (and several other similar schemes used at the time) 
were described in the case as involving a ready-made scheme prepared in advance 
by tax consultants by which the taxpayer ended up in the same position as the one 
in which he started, having proceeded mechanically through all the various steps 
to the end:16
"The scheme consists, as do others which have come to the notice 
of the courts, of a number of steps to be carried out, documents to 
be executed, payments to be made, according to a timetable, in 
each case rapid... In each case two assets appear, like particles in 
a gas chamber with opposite charges, one of which is used to create 
the loss, the other of which gives rise to an equivalent gain which
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prevents the taxpayer from supporting any real loss, and which gain 
is intended not to be taxable. Like the particles, these assets have 
a very short life. Having served their purpose they cancel each other 
out and disappear. At the end of the series of operations, the 
taxpayer’s financial position is precisely as it was at the beginning, 
except that he has paid a fee, and certain expenses, to the promoter 
of the scheme".17
The court held that in such circumstances it could and should look at the series 
of transactions as a whole and was not confined to considering each separate step 
in isolation.
There is already a huge amount of material available on the Ramsay line of 
cases18 and it is not proposed to consider the doctrine in further detail here save 
to observe that this line of cases has been interpreted and applied very broadly 
by the Revenue in practice (particularly in the international sphere). As such, the 
development of the doctrine has introduced a significant constraint on U.K. tax 
avoidance activities in general.
The recent House of Lords’ decisions in Craven v. White (and associated 
appeals)19 appear to have introduced significant constraints on the circumstances 
in which the Ramsay line of cases may now be applied, although it is still a little 
early to conclude on the practical effect of those decisions, particularly as regards 
the attitude to certain tax-saving schemes or transactions on the part of the Inland 
Revenue.
The development of the Ramsay principle demonstrates a concerted attack on 
relatively artificial tax avoidance schemes in respect of which the judiciary have 
broadly accepted the Inland Revenue’s arguments that such schemes should not 
succeed. Notwithstanding the recent decisions in Craven v. White, there is no 
doubt that the principle represents a new, tougher attitude to tax avoidance efforts
T/6 277
by the taxpayer in general. For example, in the case of IRC v. Burmah Oil Co. 
Ltd,0 Lord Scarman made it clear that:-
"It is of the utmost importance that the business community (and 
others, including their advisers), should appreciate, as my noble and 
learned friend Lord Diplock has emphasised, that Ramsay’s case 
marks "a significant change in the approach adopted by this House 
in its judicial role" towards tax avoidance schemes".21
However, notwithstanding the attention given to the "new approach" of Ramsay 
and succeeding cases, it would be quite wrong to consider this the only significant 
recent development in the area of U.K. attitudes to avoidance. Arguably a more 
significant, if less sudden, development has been the gradual change in attitude 
to tax avoidance, particularly international tax avoidance, on the part of the 
Revenue which has taken place over the last two decades or so. Two recent 
examples of this will be given. The first, relating to the use of transfer pricing 
legislation demonstrates the expanded scope of the attacks now made by the U.K. 
fisc. The second, concerning the use of dual-resident companies, suggests the 
reasoning behind this change in attitude.
Use of Transfer Pricing Legislation
In recent years, there have been two significant new developments in the 
application of transfer pricing legislation in the U.K.
First, the fisc is beginning to extend its anti-transfer pricing efforts using new 
forms of attack. The "thin capitalisation"^ challenge is a good example.23 A 
company is regarded by the tax authorities as being "thinly capitalised" when its 
level of debt is unacceptably high in relation to its equity. The view frequently 
taken by the fiscal authorities is that payments of excessive interest on the debt 
to an offshore (usually associated) entity in such cases amounts to a disguised 
remittance of profits.^
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There appears to be some confusion as to what will be accepted by the fisc as a 
"safe haven" ratio of debt to equity. Whereas formerly a 3:1 ratio was acceptable 
there is now a more rigorous requirement of a 1:1 ratio. To complicate the picture 
there are often different acceptable ratios for different sectors (for example, U.K. 
financial institutions are generally allowed a higher rate) and there are no clear 
guidelines on what is to count as "debt" or "equity". It is therefore frequently 
impossible to predict in advance what arrangements for the capitalisation of a 
company will be acceptable from a tax point of view.25
The inevitable result of this development is major uncertainty as to the tax 
treatment of inward investment into the U.K. coupled with, in some cases at least, 
manifestly inequitable results.
The second development that has been evident is the extension of traditional 
transfer pricing challenges to transactions between companies where both are 
located in relatively high tax jurisdictions. In such cases, the challenge is somewhat 
unexpected because there is generally no advantage to be gained by the taxpayer 
in artificially shifting profits from one high-tax jurisdiction to another.
The problem with this more aggressive use of transfer pricing legislation is that 
very significant practical difficulties are encountered in demonstrating to the tax 
authorities involved that a proper pricing policy has been adopted. There are 
some industries, notably the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors, in which there 
may be no independent market or arm’s length prices available to compare with 
the transfer prices adopted for specific products. In such cases, it is frequently 
necessary to compile a huge amount of information to persuade the tax authorities 
that a proper pricing policy has been implemented. Even then, there is certainly 
no guarantee of success.26
Both major developments identified above demonstrate the degree to which the 
scope of the transfer pricing legislation has been extended in recent years by the 
fisc.27
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Attitude to Dual-Resident Companies
The Revenue statements on the use of dual resident companies provide some 
indication of the reasoning behind the official attitude toward international tax 
avoidance and the use of tax havens.
Dual resident companies are companies resident in two jurisdictions by reason of 
the application of different criteria for residence. For example, a U.S.-U.K. dual 
resident company will be resident in the U.S. if incorporated there and also 
resident in the U.K. if centrally managed and controlled there. Where the dual­
resident company makes profits, its position is no different to any other doubly 
taxed company since one country will generally give relief for the tax levied in the 
other. Typically, however, such companies borrow funds to finance investment by 
the multinational group of which they are a member. The interest payments made 
on the borrowings by the dual resident company create a tax loss which is 
normally set off under the group relief or corresponding provisions in both 
countries in which it is resident, thus effectively securing a double deduction for 
the interest payments.
There have been two Consultative Documents published on this subject, the first 
in November 1984^ and the second, with accompanying draft legislation, in 
December 1986.29 The most striking feature of the two papers is the assumption 
on the part of the fisc that the use of a dual resident company is largely motivated 
by the objective to avoid tax and that this necessarily results in a cost to the 
Exchequer and a loss or disadvantage to other taxpayers who do not arrange their 
group funding arrangements in this way:
"Between them the two Exchequers are paying for the bulk of the 
cost of the borrowing... Multinationals are thus obtaining a very 
substantial tax benefit through the use of dual resident companies, 
with a corresponding loss of tax revenue to the Exchequers of the 
countries involved"30 (emphasis added).
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It is probably true that the overwhelming motivation for the creation of a large 
number of dual resident companies is the objective of securing a double relief for 
interest payments. The Consultative Document of November 1984 states that 
approximately 50 multinationals were investing into the U.K. through a dual 
resident company, with relief given for interest payments of approximately £150 m 
a year. However, what surely requires analysis in this context is the relationship 
between the existence of dual residence facilities and the amount of inward 
investment into the U.K. (The same argument can also be applied to outward 
investment using a dual resident company.)
It is highly likely that the existence of the dual residence facility promotes inward 
investment to (and outward investment from) the U.K. That same investment, 
whether inward or outward, may lead to greater wealth generation in the U.K., 
which may lead to an increase in aggregate profits chargeable to tax in the U.K. 
despite the double relief for the interest payments.
The above proposition may or may not be the case and no claims are made here 
for either side of the argument. In any event there would be a number of other 
questions which would require addressing - for example, the desirability of such 
incentives, the distorting effects of the incentives from an economic perspective, 
etc. However, the significant point is that the analysis of the "problem" and its 
effects is virtually non-existent in the two consultative papers. It is true that the 
1984 paper mentions that a dual resident company can be interposed in an 
existing multinational structure with a "paper shifting of finance between different 
companies owned by the multinational which creates an interest deduction, and 
hence a tax loss, in the dual resident", yet it is admitted that this is an example "at 
the extreme".31 There is no indication of the economic impact of the dual resident 
facility nor of the economic consequences of the draft legislation proposed to 
prevent the effective use of dual resident companies. Indeed, of the seven pages 
which comprise the 1984 paper, only half a page represents anything even 
remotely approaching an analysis of the position. The rest of the paper is given 
over to describing the phenomenon and suggesting "possible solutions". The 1986
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paper, issued with a two-page Press Release, comprises four pages of discussion 
and fourteen pages of draft clauses. The (rather thin) analysis takes up no more 
than a quarter of one page.32
Another theme running through the two papers is the necessity to avoid 
prejudicing the affairs of "genuine" dual resident companies:
"The new rules will not apply to dual resident companies which are 
genuinely trading...".33
However, the criteria by which such "genuine" companies are to be identified are 
not elaborated.
The discussion in the two Consultative Papers of the dual resident issue is 
indicative of the Revenue’s attitude in general: avoidance activity is regarded as 
inevitably involving a loss of revenue to the Exchequer and it is therefore to be 
opposed. However, such opposition should not prejudice the activities of "genuine" 
trading companies.
It is submitted that the lack of any proper analysis of the phenomenon in the case 
of dual resident companies is also typical of a more general approach by which 
certain assumptions (often relating to the existence of tax avoidance) are readily 
made and adopted, quite without adequate criticism or analysis.
ANTI AVOIDANCE LEGISLATION
There are a number of provisions which are used by the U.K. Inland Revenue to 
attack arrangements or transactions with an international character. The most 
important of these are surveyed briefly below, although the list is not exhaustive.
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(i) Transfer Pricing Legislation - ICTA 1988. s. 770
The U.K. legislation on transfer pricing is contained in s. 770 of the Income 
and Corporation Taxes Act of 1988 (formerly ICTA 1970, s. 485).
The first requirement for the operation of s. 485 is that the seller, or 
alternatively the buyer, should be a body of persons.34 That includes all 
companies and partnerships but not individuals. The other party to the 
transaction need not be a company or a partnership.
Secondly, the buyer must be able to control the seller, or vice versa, or 
both must be under the control of some third party.35 The definition of 
control means that s. 770 cannot generally apply to dealings by a 49% 
owned tax haven subsidiary with its U.K. shareholder, or to a U.K. 
company in its dealings with its tax haven parent if that parent company 
owns only 49% of its shares.36 However, in such cases artificial transfer 
prices may be challenged by other provisions in the tax legislation. The 
object of the legislation as currently applied is to prevent the export of 
profits from the U.K. through excessive payments of whatever form 
between associated parties. Although the legislation is expressed primarily 
in terms of sales and purchases, its scope has been considerably extended 
by an amendment which applies all the provisions of s. 770, with the 
necessary adaptations, to a wide variety of situations including "the giving 
of business facilities of whatever kind as they have effect in relation to 
sales".37 In practice this amendment is interpreted broadly by the 
Revenue.38 The legislation may be invoked only on a direction by the 
Board of the Inland Revenue. If such a direction is made and the 
requisites of the section have been established then an adjustment of 
taxable profits, based on the arm’s length principle, will be made.
In practice, section 770 is used very rarely indeed and there is not a single 
reported case illustrating its application. However, the existence of a power
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to make a direction is normally sufficient to enable the Revenue to achieve 
a negotiated settlement without formal direction in cases of dispute. The 
section, therefore, operates "in terrorem" - the existence of a power to 
make a direction normally being sufficient to enable appropriate 
adjustments to be reached by negotiations without a formal direction being 
made. Analysis of the section is complicated by the lack of any general 
guidelines or principles, although the Inland Revenue has issued some 
informal notes on the section.39
If section 770 is found to apply, adjustment of the transfer price will be to 
an arm’s length price. In ascertaining such a price the Inland Revenue will 
usually consider prices used in similar transactions between independent 
parties who are operating at arm’s length (if such prices are available).
Alternatively, they may start with the cost of goods or services and add an 
appropriate mark-up to arrive at an arm’s length price. In practice, any 
method will be used which leads to a satisfactory result.
(ii) ICTA 1988. s. 74
A payment between associated companies could be challenged by using 
legislation other then s. 770. Section 74 (formerly ICTA 1970, s. 130) would 
permit such a challenge on the grounds that a payment is not incurred 
wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the trade.40 In the context of 
transfer pricing disputes, s. 770 is a more precise weapon and is generally 
used by the Inland Revenue in preference to section 74. However, in cases 
where the degree of control required for the use of s. 770 does not exist 
(e.g. dealings between a U.K. company and its 49% offshore subsidiary) 
s. 74 could be used in certain circumstances to challenge the transfer pricing 
arrangements.
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(iii) Migration of Companies - ICTA 1988. s. 765
The legislation now contained in ICTA 1988, s. 765 was introduced in 1951 
and made illegal certain transactions by a U.K. company unless the prior 
consent of the Treasury had been obtained.41
Such prior consent was required until 16 March 1988 before a U.K. 
resident company could:
(a) cease to be so resident,
(b) transfer all or part of its trade or business to a person not resident
in the U.K.,
(c) permit a non-resident company over which it has control to create 
or issue any shares or debentures, and
(d) transfer to any person any shares or debentures of a non-resident
company which it controls.
The provision was partially abolished by the Finance Act 198842, with the 
effect that (a) and (b) above are now no longer effective, although new 
charging provisions have been introduced and will apply in certain cases 
when a company ceases to be resident, except when Treasury consent has 
been given.43 As a result of changes made in 1988, it is now no longer 
possible for a company incorporated in the U.K. on or after 16 March 
1988 to have anything other than a U.K. residence for tax purposes.44
The purpose of the section (and the new charging provisions referred to 
above) is to prevent the loss of tax on corporate profits being earned or 
received outside the jurisdiction of the U.K. fisc in the hands of a non­
resident company.
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An application under s. 765 will not be required in respect of transactions 
falling within certain classes to which the Treasury has already given its 
general consent.45
The legislation is not aimed exclusively at tax havens but the fact that a tax 
haven is involved may increase the likelihood of permission being withheld 
or being given on a conditional basis.
It would appear that the section is the only example in the world of a 
criminal penalty for tax avoidance as opposed to evasion.46 Persons guilty 
of an offence under s.482 are liable to a fine of up to £10,000 and/or 
imprisonment for a period up to two years.47
There have in fact been no prosecutions under s. 482, although the practical 
effect of these very severe penalties is to secure a high level of compliance 
with the requirements of the provision.
(iv) Capital Gains Tax Act 1979. s. 15
The function of CGTA 1979, s. 15 is to prevent the use of overseas 
companies to avoid U.K. capital gains tax. This is possible because capital 
gains tax (even in the case of U.K. assets) is generally imposed only where 
the taxpayer is resident or ordinarily resident in the U.K. The section 
provides that where chargeable gains accrue to an overseas company which 
would be a close company if resident in the U.K., then every shareholder 
(whether an individual or a company) who is resident or ordinarily resident 
(and, in the case of an individual only, domiciled) in the U.K., is treated 
as if their pro-rata portion of the capital gain made had accrued directly 
to them. The pro-rata portion is determined by reference to the proportion 
of assets of the company to which the shareholder would be entitled on a 
liquidation of the company.48 The section does not apply where the 
relevant chargeable gains are in fact distributed to the company’s
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shareholders within two years from the time the gains accrued to the 
company.49 There are a number of other exemptions.
There is a parallel provision to section 15 in section 17 of the same Act. 
Section 17 imposes a similar charge to capital gains tax in the case of 
chargeable gains accruing to trustees of a settlement. In certain instances 
gains may be attributed to U.K. beneficiaries under the settlement if the 
trustees are not resident or ordinarily resident in the U.K. and if the settlor 
is domiciled and either resident or ordinarily resident in the U.K. at the 
time of the gain or when the settlement was created.
(v) Distributions - ICTA 1988. s. 209
Under section 209, interest paid by a U.K. company on certain loans is 
treated as a distribution^ This means not only that such payments of 
interest do not qualify as a deduction in computing profits for tax 
purposes51 but also that a payment of advance corporation tax is required 
to be made to the fisc within three months of the interest payment being 
made.52 The rule will apply when interest is paid to a non-resident 
company of which the paying company is a 75 % subsidiary or, in certain 
instances, to a non-resident company where both companies are 75% 
subsidiaries of a third company which is not resident in the U.K.
This provision is normally overridden by double tax agreements. However, 
it will usually apply to payments of interest to associated companies in tax 
havens where there is no applicable double tax agreement. The effect of 
the provision, therefore, is to limit severely the ability of a U.K. company 
to borrow from an associated company in a tax haven and obtain a 
deduction in the U.K. for the interest paid on the loan to the tax haven 
associate.
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It should also be noted that the distribution provisions form the basis of 
the "thin capitalisation" challenge referred to earlier in this chapter.53
(vi) Offshore Funds - ICTA 1988. ss. 757-764
The legislation on offshore funds applies to material interests in such funds 
and operates to treat gains arising from certain offshore funds as income.
One of the principal features of offshore funds has been the ability to have 
the interest earned on the investment rolled up in the fund and ultimately 
paid out as capital, instead of being paid out as interest throughout the 
term of the investment. The attraction of this arrangement to the U.K. 
participant was principally that the rolled-up income would be taxed at the 
lower capital gains tax rates rather than at the full income tax rate. (This 
attraction is no longer valid given the fact that capital gains are now taxed 
as if the chargeable gain made is income subject to tax at the appropriate 
marginal rate, in the case of an individual and at the applicable rate of 
corporation tax in the case of companies.54
Under the provisions introduced in the Finance Act 1984, and consolidated 
in ICTA 1988, ss. 757-764 the general rule now is that gains arising from 
the disposal after 31st December 1983 of a "material interest" in a "non­
qualifying offshore fund" are chargeable to corporation tax or income tax 
as investment income under Schedule D Case VI to the extent such gains 
accrue after that date.55
The legislation divides offshore funds into two groups: distributing funds, 
which must meet specified investment restrictions and distribute at least 
85% of their income and profits, and other non-qualifying funds. An 
offshore fund is a non-qualifying fund unless it is certified by the Inland 
Revenue as being a distributor fund within the above criteria.56 For a 
"material interest" to exist, the investor, at the time of acquiring an
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investment in the fund must have a reasonable expectation of being able 
to realise it within seven years for an amount reasonably approximate to 
that portion which the investment represents of the market value of the 
entity’s underlying assets.
(vii) Transfer of Income Abroad - ICTA 1988. s. 739
The legislative title to s. 739 (formerly ICTA 1970, s. 478) is a complete 
description of the purpose of the section: "provisions for preventing 
avoidance of income tax by transactions resulting in the transfer of income 
to persons abroad". The provision applies to individuals not companies, but 
it is of relevance to this thesis as one of the more significant anti-avoidance 
provisions in the U.K. legislation.
The section applies where individuals ordinarily resident in the U.K. have 
transferred assets outside the U.K. so that income which they have, or will 
have, power to enjoy is receivable by non-resident individuals or 
companies. In such cases, assessments may be raised on the U.K. 
transferor in respect of that income.57 The section has been interpreted 
in an extremely broad fashion, much to the disadvantage of the taxpayer: 
it would appear that the income in question need not flow from the 
transferred assets and that the assets need not be transferred abroad but 
may instead be transferred between third countries. The section is certainly 
penal in nature and can therefore result in the taxation of much more than 
the actual benefit which the taxpayer has in fact received from the 
transaction. In connection with s. 739, one commentator (writing prior to 
the 1988 consolidation) has observed:
"Amongst professional advisers perhaps the most feared anti­
avoidance section of TA 1970 is s. 478.... in practice no argument has 
been too esoteric for the Revenue to pursue in connection with 
s.478... ".58
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Other Measures
In addition to the legislative measures discussed above, there are two important 
anti-avoidance doctrines which are based on common law rather than statute.
First, there is the recently developed general anti-avoidance approach enunciated 
in the cases of Ramsay, 5 9  Burmah , 6 0  and Furniss v. Pawson . 6 1  This has been 
discussed briefly earlier in this chapter.
Second, the U.K. concept of residence is frequently applied by the Inland 
Revenue in the context of companies located outside the U.K. but ultimately 
owned from the U.K . . 6 2  As has been mentioned, there have been recent changes 
to the U.K. criteria applying to determine whether a company is U.K. resident. 
The traditional test has been that, for tax purposes, a company is resident in the 
U.K. if its "central management and control" is exercised in the U.K . . 6 3  This test 
continues to apply but, with effect from 16 March 1988, there is the new rule6 4  
that U.K. companies incorporated on or after that date are necessarily regarded 
as resident in the U.K . . 6 5  Notwithstanding the new rules, the Inland Revenue are 
likely to continue to use the doctrine of residence in the case of foreign 
subsidiaries of U.K. companies. If it can be shown that a foreign subsidiary whose 
directors meet abroad is in fact under the central management and control of the 
U.K. company or its directors and that the foreign directors are merely acting as 
agents executing decisions taken in the U.K., then the foreign subsidiary may be 
held to be resident in the U.K . . 6 6  The effect of this would be to confer on the fisc 
the legal right to tax such a U.K. resident foreign company on its worldwide 
income and gains. 6 7  In the absence of a finding of U.K.-residence, the profits of 
the foreign company would be taxed in the U.K. only to the extent they are 
remitted to the U.K. or derived from a U.K. branch or agency. 6 8
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Summary
In summary, the measures traditionally used in the context of overseas subsidiaries 
of U.K. companies located in states with tax rates lower than those prevailing in 
the U.K. have been s. 765 and s. 770, although challenges under the residence 
doctrine have also been common. S. 765 and the new legislation imposing a tax 
charge in the case of certain migrations of companies6 9  effectively permit the fisc 
to prevent a resident company taking all or part of its profit generating activities 
without tax cost outside the scope of the U.K. tax jurisdiction. S. 770 is used to 
regulate the pricing policy between U.K. companies and offshore associates to 
prevent any form of profit shifting from the U.K.. Throughout the life of an 
offshore company it is potentially liable to attack on the grounds it is in fact 
resident in the U.K.
The above description of the traditional application of anti-avoidance rules to 
overseas companies is entirely consistent with the principles underlying the 
substantive enactments of U.K. tax legislation relating to the taxation of non­
resident companies. Under these relevant substantive enactments, such 
companies are not liable to U.K. corporation tax save on profits arising from a 
trade carried on in the U.K. through a branch or agency, or on gains arising from 
a disposal of U.K. assets used in connection with that trade . 7 0  These enactments 
are a fundamental part of the U.K. law and have been reinforced by all double 
tax agreements concluded with other countries. However, there are now7 1  four 
statutory provisions which are arguably7 2  exceptions to this basic approach, all of 
which are of an anti-avoidance character:
(a) ICTA 1988, s. 739, whereby income arising from assets transferred outside 
the U.K. is taxable on U.K. residents.
(b) CGTA1979, s. 15,73 whereby gains of non-resident companies which would 
have been close companies if resident in the U.K. can be taxed in the 
hands of U.K. participators.
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(c) The offshore funds legislation of ICTA 1988, sections 757-764.
(d) The Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) legislation of ICTA 1988, s.s. 
747-756.
The CFC legislation is arguably the most significant of the four exceptions and it 
is to the background to that legislation that attention is now turned.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND - THE ATTACK ON TAX HAVENS
Tax Havens
There is no definition of the term "tax haven" in the U.K. legislation. However, 
legislation has been promulgated with the apparent intention of reducing the use 
that can be made of transactions involving tax havens. Primary examples prior to 
the U.K. CFC legislation include the provisions of ICTA 1988 sections 739, 765 
and 770, all of which were discussed in the last section.
Due to the perceived close connection between tax havens and international tax 
avoidance, the Revenue attitude to tax havens has tended to be determined by its 
attitude to international tax avoidance. The attitude to tax havens has possibly 
been somewhat less straightforward until recent years as a result of the fact that 
many tax havens are located in former colonies with which the U.K. has enjoyed 
a special relationship.^ In consequence, an even handed approach to tax havens 
may have been on some occasions displaced as a result of other political 
considerations. However, this situation has now certainly been replaced by a 
uniform hostility to what the U.K. fisc regards as tax havens.
With the exception of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man with which the U.K. 
has limited double tax treaties (and also with the exception of Cyprus), the U.K. 
has not entered into tax treaties with any of the conventionally recognised tax
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haven states (i.e. no or low tax havens). As a result, co-operation and exchanges 
of information between the U.K. fisc and tax haven authorities do not occur.
The clearest indication of recent official thinking on tax havens (and international 
tax avoidance) was given in the series of Revenue consultative documents 
produced from 1981 to 1983 in the course of discussion of the proposed CFC 
legislation and other proposed legislation. It is to these documents that attention 
is now turned.
The Consultative Process. 1981-1984
The process of consultation relating to the CFC legislation was not carried out in 
isolation but as part of a significant attempt by the Inland Revenue to overhaul 
certain key features of the law relating to international tax avoidance activities. 
This can be seen most clearly from the chart featured in Appendix II which 
outlines the various developments over the period January 1981 to July 1984. The 
generality of the Revenue’s interest in this case is reflected in the titles of the two 
largest documents they published in this three year period, namely "International 
Tax Avoidance" and "Taxation of International Business" . 7 5
In the course of this consultative process, the Revenue pursued three issues in 
detail: company residence, upstream loans (loans made by an offshore subsidiary 
to a U.K. parent), and the issue of tax havens (in response to which the CFC 
legislation was advocated by the Revenue).
In 1981, the Revenue effectively set out to achieve the following objectives:
(a) to promulgate a statutory definition of residence
(b) to introduce anti-tax haven legislation in the form of the CFC provisions
(c) to prevent the use of upstream loans as a means of tax avoidance
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(d) to repeal ICTA 1970, s. 482, as it then was (now ICTA 
1988, s. 765).
(e) to prevent the transfer to the U.K. of loss-laden companies without some 
form of clearance machinery.
Of the above objectives, only objective (b) has been achieved at the time of 
writing, although objectives (a) and (d) have been partially achieved as a result 
of the 1988 changes discussed earlier . 7 6
With regard to the residence issue, the Revenue proposed the enactment of a 
statutory definition of residence based on the OECD and European concepts of 
"effective management", "control and administration" and "principal place of 
business" . 7 7  This proposal was dropped almost two years after being raised 
following particularly adverse public reaction.
The upstream loan proposals were based on the Revenue’s perception that these 
loans represented overseas profits which, in the absence of tax charges on 
dividends (notably withholding taxes), would have been repatriated to the U.K. in 
the form of dividends rather than loans. The Revenue solution to this situation 
was the suggestion that such loans should be taxed as income . 7 8  However, the 
proposal was dropped at the same time as the changes on residence were shelved. 
Again, the reason given for not proceeding with the change was the "widespread 
unease amongst the business community" . 7 9  This was also the reason given for the 
decision not to abandon s. 765. However, to have retained s. 765 yet to have 
proceeded with the CFC legislation is somewhat confusing since, on the Revenue’s 
own reasoning, the CFC legislation is, partially at least, a replacement for the 
legislation contained in s. 765.80 The desire on the part of the Inland Revenue to 
oppose the importing of companies into the U.K. was not a matter on which 
detailed statements or papers were made publicly available and it was not 
proceeded with as a separate issue, although certain aspects of the CFC legislation 
would prevent certain abuses identified by the Revenue.gl
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Turning to the development and enactment of the CFC legislation itself, there 
were five separately identifiable stages to the process before the final enactment 
of the legislation in the Finance Act 1984 (which received Royal Assent on 26th 
July 1984). The legislation then enacted has been consolidated into ICTA 1988, 
s.s. 747-756 and Schedules 24, 25 and 26.
The first stage of the development was the issue in January 1981 of the 
consultative document "Tax Havens and the Corporate Sector" . 8 2  This document 
announced for the first time that a new charge would be introduced on certain 
income of tax haven companies under United Kingdom control. Only one 
sentence in the entire document offers any kind of rationale for the introduction 
of such a measure:
"The use of tax havens for tax avoidance companies has shown a 
marked growth in recent years, and the Government is particularly 
concerned to counter avoidance of United Kingdom tax by the 
accumulation of profits and investment income of United Kingdom 
groups in tax haven subsidiaries" . 8 3
There is no discussion or quantification of the "avoidance of United Kingdom tax" 
nor is there any discussion of the operative concepts "tax havens" and "tax 
avoidance".
Following a period in which representations were made, a second paper, together 
with draft clauses, was issued eleven months later in December 1981. The paper 
and clauses were contained in the document "International Tax Avoidance", which 
also contained papers and clauses dealing with the residence issue and upstream 
loans . 8 4  This paper makes clear that:
"The purpose of these provisions is to remove the tax advantage of 
accumulating income in low tax areas" . 8 5
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However, there is still no rationale put forward for the provision. There is, in the 
paper, a section entitled "the need for anti-tax haven legislation" but this does no 
more than note the various reactions received to the proposals and no case for 
the legislation is specifically put forward.
The concept of "privileged tax regime" which was first raised in the January 1981 
paper is discussed further. It is explained that the proposed charge will arise only 
if the controlled foreign company is resident in a country with such a tax regime. 
However, whilst such a regime is identified in the January paper as one in which 
taxation is "significantly lower" than in the U.K., the December paper introduces 
a more objective test: an overseas company is regarded as enjoying a "privileged 
tax regime" if it is subject to tax in its country of residence at an effective rate of 
less then 50% of the corresponding U.K. tax in those circumstances.
The next paper in the series, distributed in June 1982, states an expanded purpose 
for the proposed legislation: not only is the legislation to remove the tax 
advantage of accumulating income in low tax areas, it is also to remove any tax 
advantages that might otherwise arise from the artificial diversion of trading or 
business activities from the U.K. to overseas companies. This paper is considerably 
larger than the earlier two but most of its length is taken up with a consideration 
of the main criticisms of the details of the proposed legislation, although there is 
one section given over to more general considerations. This section notes that "the 
need for legislation of some sort to counter tax haven abuse is generally 
accepted " 8 6  but that some representations continue to oppose further anti­
avoidance measures for one or more of a variety of reasons. Four reasons are 
then given and considered. However, the analysis is hardly rigorous. For example, 
against the objection that the legislation might adversely affect the competitiveness 
of U.K. companies, the Revenue response is merely that "much of this criticism 
is misconceived, indicating that the purpose of the proposals has not been fully 
understood " . 8 7  In answer to the objection that no evidence as to increased abuse 
has been adduced, the response is that:
T/6 296
"It is difficult - by the very nature of international tax avoidance - 
to obtain a complete picture of the extent of current abuse... 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that even before the abolition of 
exchange control, the number of tax haven subsidiaries controlled 
by U.K.-resident companies increased sharply" . 8 8
The document states that a detailed review of several U.K. multinationals is 
underway and hope is expressed that, when completed, that review will "throw 
more light on the extent of the current abuse".
A number of matters here require comment. Whilst it may be very difficult to 
"obtain a clear picture of the extent of current abuse", such a finding seems 
logically a prerequisite to the promulgation of any legislation. The review of 
multinationals should have been completed and its results considered in advance 
of the consultative process (and not in its closing stages). A further point relates 
to the statement that the number of tax haven subsidiaries controlled by U.K.- 
resident companies has increased sharply. This proposition (for which no empirical 
data is given) is simply not adequate. What is required to be shown is not that the 
incidence of the use of overseas subsidiaries has increased, but that there has been 
an increase in the use of such subsidiaries and that this development is, wholly or 
in part, attributable to the carrying on by those subsidiaries of "abusive" activities. 
It would in addition be necessary to demonstrate, rather than assert, why the 
activities carried on constituted "abuse".
In view of the profound effect the CFC proposals were to have on many U.K. 
multinational groups, it is somewhat staggering to see that the case for them has 
hardly been introduced, let alone concluded, after eighteen months of the 
consultative process.
Some of the defects discussed above are corrected in the "Taxation of 
International Business" document of December 1982. This document states that 
the case for introducing CFC measures remains compelling as a result of the
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increased evidence of special arrangements, "in which normal commercial activities 
are distorted largely for tax reasons" . 8 9  The "increased evidence" to which the 
document refers arises from the special survey undertaken by the Revenue to 
determine "the extent to which U.K. companies are making use of low tax 
countries to shield income from U.K. tax".
The survey is stated to confirm:
"the earlier conclusion that such countries are currently being used 
on a large scale by a wide range of U.K. companies. There is 
evidence of companies being established in low tax countries both 
to accumulate income from the investment of surplus funds free of 
U.K. tax and to take some of the profits of other business income 
that would otherwise have been subject to U.K. tax" . 9 0
Five examples of such companies are given which are explained by the Revenue 
as follows
1. "Money box" companies (offshore investment companies whose return on 
investments is not taxed or taxed only at low rates ) . 9 1
2. "Dividend trap" companies (holding companies which are interposed 
between a U.K. parent and its overseas trading subsidiaries to "trap" the 
dividends from those subsidiaries without subjecting them to taxation in the 
U.K . ) . 9 2
3. Offshore captive insurance companies (used for insuring the risks of the 
group).*,
4. Sales, distribution or service companies (used for the diversion of profits 
to low tax areas ) . 9 4
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5. Patent holding companies (used to shelter royalty income from U.K. 
taxation ) . 9 5
There is an attempt to quantify the amounts of money involved in these 
companies but on the Revenue’s own admission the incomplete and estimated 
figures make it very difficult to translate the available information into estimates 
of the annual tax at stake . 9 6  However, undeterred by the imprecise (or in some 
cases non existent) information the document states that:
"This information suggests that sizeable sums of money are 
currently at stake, and that the annual loss to the Exchequer may 
already be of the order of £ 1 0 0  m . " 9 7
On the information given it is impossible to see how this figure is computed or 
derived.
Space does not permit a full discussion of the five types of companies identified 
by the Revenue nor of the amounts of money identified by the Revenue to be at 
stake. Such companies clearly do exist but whether they should be perceived in 
the pejorative light suggested by the Revenue paper is another matter. All the 
types of company cited can be viewed in less partial terms. For example, "money 
box" companies use funds which are either earned (and therefore taxed) in the 
U.K. or earned elsewhere (and therefore of no concern to the U.K. fisc.). 
Moreover, so called "money box companies" often do rather more in practice than 
facilitate the diversion of profits from high to low tax jurisdictions. For example, 
they may be used to raise funds from outside the group, for example by bond 
issues. Similarly, "dividend trap" companies are an established and legitimate 
means of ensuring that profits earned in overseas countries are subject to no 
greater effective tax charge than the standard U.K. corporation tax rate of 35%. 
Similar comments can also be made regarding the remaining three types of 
company cited. Moreover, whether the existence of such companies leads to a 
reduction of U.K. tax revenues is a matter on which no conclusion can be drawn
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on the basis of the Revenue consultative papers due to the lack of any empirical 
or analytical evidence.
It has already been observed that the completion of the Revenue survey should, 
logically, have occurred in advance of the consultative process. However, given 
that the survey was at last carried out it is difficult to see what value it has. There 
is almost no analysis of the central point the survey should have addressed, namely 
the correlation between the existence of certain offshore companies and the 
reduction in U.K. revenues. What information there is is inconclusive and 
incomplete. Moreover, on the Revenue’s own admission:
"These limitations mean that the recent special survey by the Inland 
Revenue - which covered only a small sample of the U.K. corporate 
sector - cannot be presented as evidence about the full extent of 
current arrangements designed to reduce U.K. tax" . 9 8
This means that the case for the legislation remains largely unproven. It is of 
course recognised that carrying out a survey of a representative portion of the 
U.K. corporate sector is fraught with difficulties of obtaining information, 
interpreting it, drawing valid conclusions, etc. Nonetheless, it remains the case 
that the introduction of the CFC legislation represents a fundamental change to 
the U.K. taxation of overseas companies. As such, the burden of proof with 
regard to the necessity for such legislation lies with the proponent of the change 
(namely, the Inland Revenue).
According to the June 1982 document, the purpose of the CFC legislation is to 
prevent the diversion of income to, and accumulation of tax in, tax havens. This 
opposition on the part of the U.K. Inland Revenue to the diversion and overseas 
accumulation of profits is not in itself novel. However, the official perception of 
the scope of transactions which constitute unacceptable activities takes on a much 
broader aspect in the official CFC consultative documents as compared to 
previous statements on the matter. This can be demonstrated by reference to the
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earlier discussions by the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and 
Income in 1955 concerning the provision which is now ICTA1988, s. 765 (formerly 
ICTA 1970, s. 482) and which was discussed earlier . 9 9
What is of interest to the current circumstances is the view expressed on s. 765, 
particularly with regard to the propriety of companies seeking to become non- 
U.K. resident and earn profits outside the U.K. tax jurisdiction:
"But although the word avoidance thus appears in the section, the 
avoidance that is in question can hardly be ranked with any of the 
kinds of avoidance that we have been speaking of. It consists 
simply in taking steps to earn profits as a non-resident of the 
United Kingdom when the profits have hitherto been earned as a 
resident of the United Kingdom.... we do not see what we can be 
expected to say about a section of this kind. It has no real 
connection with the subject of tax avoidance, and we take it that we 
ought to regard it as a temporary regulation to deal with an 
emergency, the existence of which made it imperative for the 
Government to take measures to maintain the yield of revenue, 
even at the cost of an interference as extreme as this. The reasons 
which lead a company, hitherto resident, to wish to emigrate may 
be in part that the United Kingdom rate of tax on its profits, if 
earned abroad, is higher than the rate of tax borne by its 
competitors: but they may also be due to the political or other 
advantages of the control of a company being actively present in the 
area where it conducts its main activities" . 1 0 0
The above comments of the Royal Commission (which were supported 
unanimously by the members of the Commission) are of relevance because they 
suggest the acceptance by the Royal Commission that there may be reasons for 
a company moving its residence outside the U.K. other than the avoidance of a 
liability to U.K. taxation. It must be remembered that the Commission was here
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considering what is arguably the more extreme case: U.K. resident companies 
wishing to emigrate and earn profits without being subject to U.K. taxation. In 
the case of most CFCs, on the other hand, the CFCs would never have been 
subject to U.K. taxation in the first place . 1 0 1
The Royal Commission accepts there may be various reasons for a company 
wishing to emigrate from the U.K. It is noteworthy that one of the reasons given 
(and quoted above) is the wish to face a lower tax burden as a result of being no 
longer U.K.-resident for tax purposes. This is clearly regarded as a legitimate 
reason, particularly in view of the comment that the section "has no real 
connection with the subject of tax avoidance".
By the time of the CFC provisions in 1981-1984, this attitude has completely 
disappeared. The wish to pay less tax has in all circumstances become an 
unacceptable reason for any arrangements from the official perspective . 1 0 2
The underlying assumptions behind the current official opposition to what is 
perceived as international tax avoidance are not stated expressly but are 
nonetheless clear. In the foreword to the "Taxation of International Business" 
document, John Wakeman, Treasury Minister states:
"One essential component of a stable framework for international 
business is a balanced fiscal regime which distributes the inevitable 
tax burdens in a just way. Unfortunately, the efforts of a few people 
are directed towards paying less than their fair share which operates 
to the disadvantage not only of the Exchequer but also of other 
taxpayers. The Government would not be fulfilling its 
responsibilities if it either failed to curb such tax avoidance or 
tackled it in a heavy-handed way. As the Chancellor said in his 1982 
Budget Speech: "We must tread a very careful path between 
safeguarding the interests of the taxpaying community on the one 
hand and avoiding economic damage on the other" . 1 0 3
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Elsewhere in the document it is stated that:
"Fiscal justice demands that, in fairness to the vast majority of 
taxpayers who make their full contribution to the U.K. Exchequer, 
the Government take some action" . 1 0 4
From these statements, it would appear that the particular type of tax avoidance 
activity which is being discussed is perceived as an inequitable activity carried on 
by a "few people" to the detriment of the "vast majority of taxpayers". These basic 
assumptions about the phenomenon of tax avoidance through the use of offshore 
companies (which generally correspond to the assumptions of the U.S. fisc in this 
matter) will be considered in more detail in the final part of this thesis.
The other major concept underlying the discussion of offshore companies is that 
of the tax haven. The January 1981 paper states that the Government is 
particularly concerned to counter avoidance through the use of tax haven 
subsidiaries1 0 5  and this provides the rationale for the introduction of the CFC 
provisions. Throughout the consultative process, tax havens are regarded as being 
synonymous with "low tax countries" and, beyond this characteristic, very little is 
said of what a tax haven is.
The basic test of a "tax haven" (contained in "Taxation of International Business") 
hinges on a comparison of the actual tax borne by the overseas company in its 
country of residence with the tax that the company would have paid had it been 
U.K. resident. However, it is stated in that document that, for the purposes of 
achieving a greater amount of certainty, the Revenue will publish a list of 
countries which would not be regarded as low tax countries under this legislation. 
This list was duly published in July 1984.106
The list raises a number of questions relating to the concept of a tax haven, but 
the discussion of these is more properly reserved for the next chapter.
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In concluding on the consultative process, it should be noted that the changes 
made to the proposed legislation from its first announcement in January 1981 to 
its enactment in 1984 were not fundamental and the key elements of the proposed 
legislation in the initial document of January 1981 appear in the legislation which 
was ultimately enacted in 1984.
The U.K. as Tax Haven
In spite of the declared policy of the U.K. fisc to prevent international tax 
avoidance and the use of tax havens, the Economist Intelligence Unit has recently 
reported that Britain is the finest "pure" tax haven in the world, offering incentives 
at least as good as those of the Cayman Islands or Luxembourg . 1 0 7  The report 
rates Britain higher than most tax havens because of its vast range of tax and 
financial incentives.
The Report notes that Britain has the world’s largest network of double taxation 
agreements with other countries, making it a prime location in treaty shopping 
and international tax planning. Moreover, it is stated that the British tax system 
is one of the most favourable in the world for business, with a top rate of 
corporation tax of 35%, and a reduced rate of 25% for smaller companies . 1 0 8  The 
Report accepts that highly artificial tax mitigation schemes are no longer viable 
due to the change in judicial opinion but argues that there remain a significant 
number of tax planning opportunities.
The major observations drawn by the Report are certainly correct. The U.K. 
continues to be widely used in particular for international tax-treaty planning and, 
for companies wishing to set up business operations in Europe, the U.K. is often 
considered to be the most fiscally-advantageous location . 1 0 9
This situation is of importance for a number of reasons. It demonstrates the 
differences that exist in the view of what constitutes a tax haven (the U.K. fisc do 
not appear to consider the U.K. a significant tax haven) and suggests a fiscal
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policy designed to be directed against tax havens (the CFC rules, for example) is 
somewhat anomalous, at least, if Britain itself enjoys some form of "tax haven" 
status . . 1 1 0  Further, the somewhat paradoxical situation of a "tax haven" state 
having an anti-tax haven attitude itself reflects the practical difficulties of pursuing 
a completely coherent fiscal policy when it is desired to fulfil a number of 
different and irreconcilable policy objectives (for example, the prevention of 
international tax avoidance and the creation of a fiscal environment which is 
attractive to non-resident investors).
THE CURRENT U.K. CFC PROVISIONS
The provisions relating to CFCs are set out in ICTA 1988, ss. 747-756 and 
Schedule 24, 25 and 26. A brief overview of these provisions is set out in 
Appendix III. Under the legislation a company is deemed to be a controlled 
foreign company if it meets the following three conditions in any accounting 
period:-m
(i) It is resident outside the U.K.
(ii) It is controlled by persons resident in the U.K.
(iii) It is subject to a lower level of taxation in the territory in which it is 
resident.
If a company is a CFC by the above tests then the charging provisions of the 
legislation may apply to apportion to U.K. shareholders the overseas profits of 
that company, together with its creditable tax, if any. 1 1 2  The apportionment will 
apply only if a direction to that effect is made by the Board of Inland Revenue^ 1 3
However, before the direction can be made certain further conditions need to be 
met : - 1 1 4
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(iv) The company is not resident and carrying on business in a country listed 
on the "excluded countries" list published by the Inland Revenue.
(v) The company cannot satisfy any of four statutory exemptions, which 
comprise:
motive test1 1 5  
exempt activities test1 1 6  
acceptable distribution test1 1 7  
public quotation condition1 1 8
(vi) The company does not fall within certain de minimis exemptions. 1 1 9
The six elements identified above will be considered in outline before a brief 
analysis of the consequences to a company of being a CFC which cannot satisfy 
any of the statutory exemptions and which is not resident and carrying on business 
in a country listed on the "excluded countries" list published by the Inland 
Revenue.
(i) Resident outside the U.K.
A CFC has the requisite foreign character for the purposes of the 
legislation if it is resident outside the U.K . 1 2 0  Other than to ascertain that 
the company concerned is not resident in the U.K. (and is therefore 
"resident outside the U.K." for the purposes of ICTA 1988, s.747(l)(a)), 
the tests of residence which apply generally for the purposes of the tax 
legislation (U.K. incorporation or U.K. central management and control) 
do not apply to determine what constitutes residence in this context. There 
is instead a statutory rule:
"In any accounting period in which a company is resident outside the 
United Kingdom, it shall be regarded... as resident in that territory in
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which, throughout that period, it is liable to tax by reason of domicile, 
residence or place or management " . 1 2 1
If there is no such territory, it is conclusively presumed that the company 
is resident in a territory in which it is "subject to a lower level of taxation" 
(discussed at (iii) below) . 1 2 2  If there are two or more such territories, the 
company is regarded as being resident in only one of them, which is the 
country where the company’s effective management is located or, if that 
test does not resolve the matter, in that country where the greater amount 
of the company’s assets are situated . 1 2 3
(ii) Control
The definition of control is adopted from existing legislation which deals 
with close companies. "Control" is directed1 2 4  to have the meaning given in 
ICTA 1988, s. 416, subject to one amendment. The amendment consists of 
substituting for the test whether five or fewer participants do (or could) 
control the company the very much broader test of whether all the U.K.- 
resident shareholders together could exercise control. The effect of this 
statutory definition is that if any number of U.K. resident shareholders 
together control (or could control) the overseas company, it will be 
sufficiently "controlled" for the purposes of the legislation notwithstanding 
that such shareholders are not acting in concert nor could in practice 
exercise common control. 1 2 5
(iii) Lower Level of Taxation
The third requirement of a CFC is that it is subject to a lower level of 
taxation . 1 2 6  The meaning of the phrase "lower level of taxation" is 
explained in the legislation as follows: "a company .... shall be considered 
to be subject to a lower level of taxation in [a particular territory] .... if the 
amount of tax (the "local tax") which is paid under the law of that territory
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in respect of the profits of the company which arise in any accounting 
period is less than one half of the corresponding U.K. tax on those 
profits" . 1 2 7
To arrive at the figure of corresponding U.K. tax it is necessary to 
determine the profits of the company by applying U.K. tax rules. 
Chargeable gains are excluded from the operation of the CFC rules. Once 
the profits have been determined, it is necessary to establish what tax 
would have been payable in the U.K. on the assumption that the company 
was a U.K. resident company and did not obtain double tax relief for the 
local tax paid . 1 2 8  If the amount of U.K. tax so determined exceeds twice 
the amount of local tax, the company is regarded as subject to a lower 
level of tax for the purposes of the legislation.
(iv) The Excluded Countries List
The excluded countries list, a non-statutory list, was published by the 
Inland Revenue in July 1984.129 The list was published to meet objections 
made during the consultative process that the necessity to determine 
whether or not a country was a "low tax territory" for the purposes of the 
legislation (which would have fallen on the taxpayer) would have been an 
unacceptable burden. The list therefore comprises countries which the 
Revenue consider should not be within the scope of the legislation. The 
Revenue has stated that:
"The purpose of the list of excluded countries is to 
give assurance under the CFC legislation in respect of 
companies in countries named on the list" . 1 3 0
The list is divided into two parts. Companies resident and carrying on 
business in countries on Part I of the list are completely outside the scope 
of the legislation. Companies resident and carrying on business in countries
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on Part II of the list are outside the scope of the CFC rules only if the 
company does not benefit from any of the tax benefits specified on the list.
A company can take advantage of the list only if it is "resident and carrying 
on business" within one of the countries. For the purposes of the list, there 
is yet another definition of "resident": a company will be regarded as 
resident in a country on the excluded countries list if under local law it is 
liable to tax there by reason of its domicile, residence or place of 
management, or, if taxation in that country is not imposed by reference to 
these criteria, by reason of its incorporation there . 1 3 1  A company is 
regarded as "carrying on business" in a country on the excluded countries 
list if 90% or more of its commercially quantified income accrues in, arises 
in or is derived from, and is taxable in that country . 1 3 2
The excluded countries list is designed to be (and has been) amended from 
time to time to take account of tax changes overseas or if "exploitation" 
comes to the notice of the Revenue . 1 3 3
(v) Exemptions
Apart from the protection afforded by the Excluded Countries List, a CFC 
will not be charged under the provisions of ICTA 1988, s.s. 747-756 if one 
of the four following statutory exemptions can be satisfied: - motive; 
exempt activities; acceptable distribution; and public quotation conditions.
1. Motive Test
The motive test is satisfied if it appears to the Revenue that:-
(a) In so far as any of the transactions (or any two or more transactions taken
together) of the CFC achieved a reduction in U.K. tax, either the reduction
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was minimal or it was not the main purposes, or one of the main 
purposes, of the transaction (or transactions) to achieve that reduction, and
(b) It was not the main reason, or one of the main reasons, for the company’s
existence to achieve a reduction in U.K. tax by a diversion of profits from
the U.K..J3 4
2. Exempt Activities Test
The exempt activities test is so framed as to preclude the possibility of it 
being satisfied by, broadly, companies with passive income (technically, 
"investment business" ) 1 3 5  or companies buying and re-selling goods (e.g. re­
invoicing companies). A  CFC is regarded as engaged in exempt activities 
in an accounting period if each of the following conditions is fulfilled: 1 3 6
(a) Throughout the period, the CFC has a business establishment in the 
territory in which it is resident; and
(b) Throughout the period, the business affairs of the CFC are
effectively managed there; and any of (c), (d) or (e) below are
satisfied;
(c) The main business of the company does not consist of investment 
business or dealing in goods for delivery to or from the U.K. or to 
or from connected persons;
(d) In the case of a company which is mainly engaged in wholesale, 
distributive or financial business in an accounting period, less than 
half of its business is derived from connected persons;
(e) The company is a "local" holding company which derives 90% of its 
income from controlled foreign companies which are carrying on
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exempt activities or the company is an "international" holding 
company which derives 90% of its income from "local" holding 
companies or companies carrying on exempt activities.
3. Acceptable Distribution Test
A CFC will meet the acceptable distribution test in an accounting period 
if it pays a dividend during, or within eighteen months after the expiry of, 
that accounting period and the dividend amounts to at least 50% of the 
available profits of the CFC (in the case of a trading company). The 
dividend is required to be 90% of available profits in the case of any CFC 
which is not a trading company . 1 3 7
4. Public Quotation Condition
A CFC will meet this test if in a particular accounting period:
(a) At least 35% of its shares (in terms of voting power) are held by 
the public throughout that period; and
(b) Such shares have been dealt in on a recognised stock exchange; and
(c) Such shares are quoted in the official list of such a recognised stock 
exchange during that accounting period . 1 3 8
(vi) De Minimis Exemptions
No direction can be made to apportion chargeable profits of a CFC to 
U.K. shareholders if the chargeable profits of the accounting period do not 
exceed £2 0 , 0 0 0  (as rateably reduced for accounting periods of less then 
twelve months). 1 3 9
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The second de minimis limit applies not to prevent a direction being made 
but to prevent an assessment on, and recovery of tax from, a U.K. resident 
company. This will apply where the chargeable profits of the CFC which 
are apportioned to the company (and its associates or persons connected 
to it) are less than 10% of the total chargeable profits of the CFC in that 
period . 1 4 0  If the 10% limit is not met, there may be an assessment but this 
will be limited to the chargeable profits apportioned to the company; 
chargeable profits apportioned to associated or connected persons will not 
be assessed in the hands of that company. 1 4 1
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2 See generally, for example, Part X of the Taxes Management Act 1970.
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8 Note 4, Ibid, at p. 554
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the question - what are those circumstances and how can they be defined, 
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with arrangements which do affect the financial position of the taxpayer 
and yet are classed as avoidance activities (for example the creation of a 
dually-resident company; the purchase of a "capital loss" company, etc). 
Finally, of the five cases of unacceptable tax avoidance given by Lord 
Templeman, one ("CIR v. Duke of Westminster. 19 TC 490) was won at the 
time by the taxpayer and, even in Ramsay, the House of Lords did not 
overrule this case.
12 See further Chapter 2, passim.
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13 The tax incentives to encourage taxpayers to participate in the Business 
Expansion scheme are a case in point. See ICTA 1988, ss 289-312. The 
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15 Note 3 Ibid.
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17 Note 16, Ibid.
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recently, would probably have not been challenged - for example, factoring 
transactions may now be attacked by the Revenue on a quasi "thin 
capitalisation" basis.
24 The technical basis of the thin capitalisation challenge derives from the 
U.K. law on distributions, which is considered later in this chapter.
25 There is no official U.K. material available on the subject of "Thin 
Capitalisation". A summary (and critique) of the current Revenue practice 
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behalf of Deloitte Haskins & Sells. See Deloitte Haskins & Sells, "Thin 
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CHAPTER 7
U.K. CFC PROVISIONS - DETAILED CONSIDERATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the U.K. CFC legislation contained in ICTA 1988 cannot precisely 
mirror the approach taken earlier in the case of Subpart F. This is because the 
scheme of the U.K. legislation differs significantly from the U.S.legislation and 
therefore an identical approach would be inappropriate. For the same reason, the 
two legislative codes dealing with CFCs do not readily lend themselves to a 
detailed comparative analysis. (However, a brief evaluation of the comparative 
approaches of Subpart F and the U.K. CFC legislation follows in the next 
chapter.) However, an attempt has been made to group the analysis of the U.K. 
CFC provisions under parallel headings to those used in the consideration of 
Subpart F. This treatment will facilitate the drawing of conclusions in the last part 
of this thesis. As with the U.S. material considered in Chapter Five, this chapter 
is intended to consider the U.K. CFC provisions from the perspective of IFL, and, 
in particular, by reference to the primary objective underlying IFL and the policies 
and principles of IFL. There are certain areas where this view from the 
perspective of IFL leads to similar issues or conclusions as apply in the case of the 
U.S. CFC legislation and these are discussed in Chapter Eight by reference to 
both the U.K. and U.S. law.x
U.K. CFC PROVISIONS AND IFL
Despite the relatively lengthy period of consultation, certain matters of principle 
appear to have been largely ignored in the discussion of the proposed legislation. 
For example, there is virtually no official comment on whether the measures 
amount to an extension of the U.K. tax jurisdiction or whether they are 
constitutional (for example, on the basis that, in effect, they amount to extra- 
jurisdictional taxation). Although certain responses to the early Revenue papers 
argued that the proposed legislation would be unconstitutional, this was never a 
criticism the Revenue replied to. From the available published representations, 
opinion as to the constitutional legitimacy of the measure (to the small extent it 
was expressed) was split, although the issue was never discussed in anything
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approaching proper detail. The legitimacy of the measures from the perspective 
of the principles and policies of IFL is discussed at some length in the next 
chapter of this thesis.
Unfortunately, most of the published submissions made to the Revenue appear 
largely to concentrate on matters of detail and not to consider the overall 
principles of the changes proposed^ This is to be regretted because it is a poor 
reflection on the operation of the consultative process in general and it indicates 
that wider issues, not least the relationship between the proposed legislation and 
the principles and policies of IFL, were largely ignored^
Indeed, from the perspective of IFL, the three year consultative process was not 
a conspicuous success. As well as this failure to consider the wider ramifications 
of the legislation, the quality of analysis and argument of the consultative process 
could certainly have been improved.
One of the major concerns voiced appears to have been with the evidence 
adduced by the Revenue to justify the change. There was much comment on this 
and the suspicions of a number of respondents are reflected in the comments of 
the Accepting Houses Committee/Issuing Houses Committee:
’The tax haven proposals go well beyond the mere combating of tax 
avoidance... If - contrary to our belief - specific avoidance targets 
are in mind, then we urge that they be identified so that... specific 
solutions may be sought. 4
It was pointed out in the last chapter that the evidence advanced by the Revenue 
in support of their case was introduced relatively late in the consultative process 
and did not in itself demonstrate conclusively any need for the legislative changes 
proposed. Moreover, the fact that a special study was commissioned to gather 
evidence of the extent of the perceived problem some months after legislation in 
response to that problem had been prepared suggests a somewhat illogical
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approach. It is worth noting that the Revenue survey appears to have been 
commissioned only after the public clamour as to the lack of substantiation of the 
Revenue case. This may also suggest that, but for this reaction, the Revenue 
would have proceeded with the proposals in any event, regardless of the available 
evidence relating to the matter. Indeed, in the light of the discussion of the 
Revenue’s approach to dual resident companies in the last chapter, this is perhaps 
no idle speculation. As demonstrated, the quality of argument surrounding 
proposed changes to the tax legislation (particularly with regard to anti-avoidance 
legislation) is often quite appalling, with little or no empirical or economic 
analysis.
The Revenue’s contributions to the debate over the U.K. CFC measures do 
nothing to build confidence in this area. This is illustrated, for example, by the 
sole Revenue attempt to quantify the total benefit to the Exchequer in tax terms 
of the CFC legislation. In the foreword to the December 1982 document, 
Taxation of International Business’, it is stated that:
’the use of controlled foreign companies in low tax countries, where 
avoidance is the main purpose of the activity, is leading to a tax 
leakage of around £ 1 0 0  million a year. ’5
Typically, there is no further explanation of how this figure is derived or computed 
or how it has been ascertained that the figure relates to activities ’where 
avoidance is the main purpose’. Arguably, from the perspective of the principles 
and policies of IFL, one of the key failures of the development and promulgation 
of the U.K. (like the U.S.) CFC legislation is its wholly unilateral character. This 
feature is considered in more detail later in this thesis.
One particular result of this unilateralism is that the impact of the U.K. CFC 
legislation on the network of double tax treaties to which the U.K. is a party is 
virtually ignored. The subject of double tax agreements is raised briefly in one 
paragraph in the December 1982 document, Taxation of International Business’ . 6
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In that paragraph it is stated that the Government do not think it would be right 
to exclude a company from the charge because it operates in a country with which 
the U.K. has a double tax treaty. Nor, according to the paper, is it possible to 
revise these treaties to counter all the arrangements that cause concern. The 
alternative solution to terminate these treaties is regarded as being too drastic and 
damaging to the U.K. business community generally.
The matter is simply not discussed further and, surprisingly, there is no discussion 
whatsoever of the relationship between the U.K. CFC charge and the existing 
provisions of double tax treaties^ At the very least, it would seem necessary to 
explain the scope of the business profits article of these treaties in the light of the 
operation of the U.K. CFC legislation or to explain why the U.K. CFC legislation 
is irrelevant to the operation of double tax treaties. However, the lack of 
discussion suggests both that the Inland Revenue perceive no difficulty in 
reconciling the CFC legislation with existing double tax treaties and also that the 
possibility of bilateral action has not been seriously contemplated. Both these 
matters require further consideration but since the discussion relates to both the 
U.S. and the U.K. legislation, this will be deferred until the next section of this 
thesis.
U.K. CFC PROVISIONS AND EQUITY
In appraising the U.K. CFC provisions from the perspective of equity, the primary 
questions relate to the type of companies caught by the legislation and to the U.K. 
shareholders on whom a charge is levied. The former requires consideration of 
such matters as corporate ’control' and the type of transactions or arrangements 
which are now subject to the charge; the latter leads to a discussion of the 
criterion by which U.K. shareholders are either included or excluded, i.e. the 10% 
de minimis shareholding.
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Control
There are various definitions of ’control’ in existing U.K. tax law. The expression 
is normally taken to mean the ability (secured by holding shares or voting power 
or under powers in the company’s articles of association) by one or more means 
to ensure that the actions of the company are in accordance with the wishes of the 
relevant person (or persons). This is, broadly, the definition given in ICTA 1988, 
s. 840. In relation to close companies, however, a considerably expanded definition 
of control applies and it is this definition which the Revenue has chosen to apply 
to the CFC legislation. The wider close company definition contained in ICTA 
1988, s. 416 is used for the purposes of the U.K. CFC legislation with one 
adaption: whereas for close company purposes ’control’ is determined by 
reference to ’five or fewer participators’, for CFC purposes that term is 
substituted by the term ’persons resident in the U.K.’.g This means that a CFC 
is regarded as controlled by ’persons resident in the U.K.’ if such persons taken 
together can exercise ’control, whether direct or indirect, over the company’s 
affairs’*,
The wide notion of control means that control could be attributed to a U.K. 
shareholders having a relatively minor interest in a CFC because of the attribution 
to him of the interests of persons, possibly including non-resident persons, with 
whom he is deemed to be associated for that purpose.
The gauging of control is a theoretical test as to whether all the participators 
resident in the U.K. could together exercise control if they so chose. Under the 
legislation, it is irrelevant if these participators are not acting in concert or if, in 
practice, they are unable to do so (perhaps because they are unaware of each 
other’s existence). There is also the difficulty that the close company definition of 
control used takes into account a number of attributes other than voting control 
such as the ability to exercise or acquire direct or indirect control over the affairs 
of the company concemed. 1 0  Therefore in some cases it may be genuinely unclear 
where control lies.n
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Given that the CFC legislation is primarily concerned with the accumulation of 
income in offshore companies it is not surprising that the Revenue have employed 
the wider close company test of control (rather than the more general test in 
ICTA 1988, s. 840) since the close company legislation is itself particularly 
concerned with such accumulations in close companies. However, for the reasons 
discussed above, the modified test of control used in the CFC legislation is 
nonetheless rather too broad and too hypothetical.
The 10% Shareholder
As with the U.S. legislation, there arises the question whether the 10% de minimis 
figure in the case of a shareholder’s interest1 2  is set at the right level.
The Revenue view that a 10% de minimis limit is the correct figure appears to be 
justified by the statement that it is consistent with the distinction between 
’portfolio’ and ’direct’ investors. The Revenue also points out that a higher figure 
would encourage fragmentation schemes to avoid the charge. 1 3  A  further 
argument put forward in favour of the 10% figure in the U.K. context is that this 
percentage holding is the minimum level at which a company is entitled to 
underlying double tax relief. 1 4
However, it remains questionable whether a 10% shareholder, who has no power 
or right to obtain information on the CFC or to compel it to pay a dividend, 
should be caught by the legislation. The Revenue’s reliance on consistency with 
the distinction between ’portfolio’ and ’direct’ investors is perhaps not appropriate. 
The Chapter heading in the legislation is of course ’Controlled Foreign 
Companies’ and the emphasis should therefore be on control (or degrees of 
control) rather than on the question whether the investment is of a ’portfolio’ or 
’direct’ character, (a ’direct’ investment is far from being synonymous with a 
controlling or significant investment in any case). The emphasis should more 
properly be on whether the shareholder has significant influence (or a similar right 
to participation) in the company’s affairs. Current international accounting
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concepts would, on this approach, suggest a figure of approximately 20%.1S A  
figure of 25% is suggested by the Committee of London Clearing Banks. 1 6  
Obviously, if individual shareholders were shown to be acting in collusion, their 
aggregate interest could be taken for the purpose of this test.
In the June 1982 document, the Revenue appears to acknowledge the validity of 
arguments that the 1 0 % limit is too harsh in the case of an isolated shareholder 
with a 10% interest. The Revenue response to this is simply the posing of the 
question: "But is not such a case purely theoretical? ’ . 1 7  This is hardly a satisfactory 
response to the question. Moreover, on the basis of the information and research 
presented in the consultative documents it is impossible to say whether such a 
case is or is not ’purely theoretical’. (The Inland Revenue consultative papers 
present no evidence or discussion relating to the type or pattern of shareholdings 
in overseas CFCs.)
In the consultative document which followed the June 1982 document it is stated 
that because the foreign company must both be under U.K. control and also fail 
the motive test before being subject to the CFC charge it is ’most unlikely’ that 
tax would be charged on minority shareholders in isolation. 1 8  However, as will be 
seen from the discussion of the motive test later in this chapter, the proposed 
reliance on that test is of little comfort in almost any context.
In view of the lack of arguments supporting the 10% limit (beyond the Revenue 
assertion such a limit is necessary to prevent fragmentation schemes) it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that:
’The proposal to attack haven profits of a United Kingdom 
shareholder whose interest is as little as 1 0 % has nothing to do with 
control... It is an attack on low-tax jurisdiction investment as such’ . 1 9
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Overseas Tax - The ’Lower Level of Taxation'
One of the obvious inequities of the legislation is the legislative view taken of 
what tax paid in the overseas territory is to count for the determination of 
whether the CFC is subject to a lower level of taxation. Only local tax paid in 
respect of the profits of the company is taken into account^ This restriction on 
qualifying taxes will generally be acceptable in the case of states which operate a 
similar type of tax system to the U.K. However, some states levy a much higher 
proportion of their tax revenues by stamp duties and turnover, property and 
payroll taxes not linked to profits. Such taxes will be ignored in the determination 
of whether or not the CFC is subject to a 'lower level of taxation'.
It is of course the case that double taxation relief is given under ICTA 1988, s. 790 
for overseas taxes 'computed by reference to income’2 1  and not by reference to 
other indirect taxes. This might seem to justify the approach taken by the CFC 
legislation in restricting admissible overseas tax to tax paid on profits. However, 
that provision offers no suitable analogy in the present case due to the different 
function fulfilled by the test of 'lower level of taxation’ in the context of the CFC 
rules. Whereas the double tax relief provision provides a mechanism by which 
foreign taxes on income already suffered may be credited against U.K. taxes 
arising on the same income, the determination of whether there is a lower level 
of taxation is a means of testing whether the company in question is located in a 
'privileged tax regime’ (to use the words adopted in the early Revenue 
consultative paper^). As such, it is appropriate that the overall tax burden be 
considered and not merely a portion of it. The failure to consider the total tax 
burden affecting an overseas CFC, irrespective of the nature of those taxes, is an 
example of a somewhat illiberal attitude on the part of the U.K. fisc.
An immediate danger of this attitude is that the overseas CFC may thereby be 
subject to a considerably higher level of taxation since it will be taxed under the 
U.K. CFC rules on the basis of its profits and it may also be taxed in its local 
overseas jurisdiction by taxes which are not linked to profits. The effect of this
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may not be, as is claimed by the Revenue, to remove the tax advantages of 
operating overseas, but may be to create a positive discouragement to the 
operation of certain overseas subsidiaries.
A  further difficulty with the lower level of taxation concept is its apparent 
inequity. The legislation requires a comparison to be made between the tax 
charged on a CFC in its country of residence and a notional U.K. tax charge 
computed on the hypothesis that the CFC is resident in the U.K. and not entitled 
to double tax relief for any tax paid in the country of residence of the CFC^ 
Allowances for foreign tax paid in respect of activities outside the country of 
residence of the CFC are available in respect of the computation of hypothetical 
U.K. tax but not in respect of the tax charged in the CFC’s country of residence^ 
This means that if a CFC is resident in country A  and pays tax of £25,000 and has 
a branch operation in country B on which it pays tax of £200,000, the local tax to 
be taken into account for the purposes of determining whether it is subject to a 
lower level of taxation is the amount of £25,000. For this purpose, the £200,000 
tax suffered on the branch activity is completely ignored. A more appropriate 
comparison would be to consider the total tax borne by the CFC as against the 
U.K. tax that would be borne had the company been U.K. resident. The effect of 
this legislative approach is, according to the Law Society's Standing Committee on 
Revenue Law:
’... so far from being confined to cases of substantial tax avoidance, 
the legislation was capable of being applied to recover U.K. tax at 
a rate of less than 1  per cent.'^
One commentator justifies this approach, giving the rationale for it as follows:
’Disregarding foreign taxes paid to third countries is not 
unreasonable because taking them into account makes the 
definition of a tax haven too susceptible to manipulation by 
taxpayers. Tax haven activities could be sheltered rather easily by
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establishing a branch in a high tax country so that the total foreign 
taxes are equal to or in excess of the required percentage of the 
domestic tax’^
Even disregarding the practical tax and commercial difficulties that would arise as 
a result of the 'manipulation’ strategy suggested above, and assuming that the fisc 
would not otherwise be able to attack such a manoeuvre, it would remain the case 
that the foreign taxes paid would, as a result of the suggested strategy, equal or 
exceed the required percentage of domestic tax. In such a case it is therefore 
difficult to see why such an arrangement is to be deliberately precluded, since the 
legislative requirements would have been met by the taxpayer. Certainly, if this 
is the sole reason for the way the U.K. legislation has been framed, it is highly 
doubtful if the resultant 'advantage' to the fisc is justified in comparison with the 
inequity caused to the taxpaying community.
U.K. CFC PROVISIONS AND NEUTRALITY
Genuine Business Activities
One of the clearest themes of the Inland Revenue documents is the statement 
that genuine business activities will not be prejudiced by the CFC legislation. The 
first consultative paper of January 1981 states that:
'In order to maintain the free movement of capital, the scheme is 
designed to provide full and effective safeguards for genuine trading 
and commercial activity^
As the above quotation implies, the reason for not prejudicing 'genuine trading 
and commercial activity' is rooted more in economics than in any perception of 
fiscal equity. In December 1982 it is stated that the U.K. Government 'fully 
recognise the importance of preserving the international competitiveness of U.K. 
enterprises and the position of London as a financial centre’^
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In the December 1981 document emphasis is again given to the view that the 
proposals 'should in no way impair the international competitiveness of United 
Kingdom companies trading abroad'^ In the next paper in the series, the 
discussion of the exemption for genuine business activities again features 
prominently. This prominence is underlined by the statement by John Wakeham 
MP, Minister of State, Treasury, in December 1982, that 'we are determined that 
legislation to counteract avoidance should not in any way be damaging to genuine 
business activities'^ Such 'genuine business activities' may qualify for exemption 
from the charge by either the exempt activities test or by the (theoretically 
broader) motive test. Both are discussed below, starting with the motive test.
The Motive Test
The importance of the exemption accorded by the motive test is emphasised by 
the Revenue's acknowledgement that, although there are available certain specific 
statutory exclusions (at the time of the consultative document, two such exclusions 
were proposed), the motive test would be of much wider significance as a means 
of exempting a company from the charge:
'However, neither of these statutory exclusions is intended to be 
comprehensive; it is recognised that many companies could only 
avoid a charge by satisfying a motive test' . 3 1
Indeed, a much more forceful statement is made in the December 1982 
document:
The proposed tax charge would apply only where a main purpose 
behind the arrangements was deliberately to obtain a significant 
reduction in U.K. tax’ ^ 2  (emphasis added)
The Revenue in fact justified the relatively restrictive exemptions available under 
the acceptable distribution test and the exempt activities test (the public quotation
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exemption was added later in the consultative process) by the availability of the 
motive test.
In view of all the preceding comments it is somewhat surprising to find that the 
motive test which was finally enacted is most unlikely to fulfil the function so 
clearly assigned to it. As has been noted in the last chapter, the test is in two 
parts, both of which must be met in order to avoid a direction^ The first stage 
looks at the individual transactions of a CFC; the second stage at the reason for 
existence of the company.
Under the first stage, no direction shall be given if any of the transactions of a 
CFC (either alone or combined) achieved a reduction in U.K. tax for anyone but 
the reduction was either minimal or it was not one of the main purposes of the 
transaction (or transactions) to achieve such a reduction. A transaction is stated 
to achieve a reduction in U.K. tax if ’any person’ would otherwise have paid more 
tax or be entitled to a lesser tax relief. 3 4  This over-broad statutory definition 
therefore means the reduction is not restricted to the CFC’s parent or other group 
company. It would also appear that the Revenue take the view that the reduction 
need not arise solely due to the existence of the CFC and thus, for example, in 
the view of the U.K. fisc, a reduction takes place if a premium is paid to a captive 
insurance company even if the same payment would otherwise have been made 
to an unrelated insurance company^ These factors make the satisfaction of the 
first limb of the test rather more difficult than would appear from the phrasing of 
the test itself.
Even if this first test is satisfied, the second test must also be satisfied. Thus, it 
must also be the case that it was not one of the main reasons for the company’s 
existence in the relevant accounting period to achieve a reduction in U.K. tax by 
a diversion of profits from the U.K.
Whether such a reduction by means of diversion is achieved is determined in 
accordance with the provisions of ICTA 1988, Schedule 25, para 19. These
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provisions state that such a reduction is achieved if it is 'reasonable to suppose' 
that, had neither the CFC nor any related company existed, a substantial part of 
the receipts reflected in the profits of the CFC would have been received by a 
company or individual resident in the U.K. and therefore subject to U.K. 
taxation.
The supposition that the CFC does not exist for the purposes of determining 
whether there has been a diversion of profits from the U.K. seems prima facie a 
reasonable approach. However, the extension of this supposition to 'any related 
company' is more questionable, particularly insofar as the legislation is applied in 
practice by the Revenue. A 'related company' is defined to be a non-U.K. 
resident company which is connected or associated with the CFC and which fulfils, 
or could fulfil the same functions as the CFC^ The Revenue interpret the 
phrase 'fulfils or could fulfil' in the widest possible sense to include any related 
company which theoretically could carry on the CFC’s functions (i.e. not being 
prevented by local legal reasons from so doing) regardless of the normal activities 
of that related company. The effect is that entire overseas sub-groups or regional 
groups which may be quite autonomous and separate to the CFC are deemed not 
to exist for the purpose of the second limb of the motive test. This obviously 
makes the second limb of the motive test more difficult to satisfy.
The rather fanciful hypothesis in the second limb of the motive test is apparently 
designed to test whether the diversion is the reason for the existence of the CFC. 
However, the test is so open-ended and imprecise that its significance inevitably 
depends on how it is interpreted by the Inland Revenue.
On the hypothesis that neither the CFC nor any related company existed, it is 
probably 'reasonable' to suppose that the business activity carried on by the CFC 
would be conducted by the parent company, probably through a branch located 
in the country in which the CFC is located. The existence of the CFC is therefore 
in virtually all cases likely to lead to an effective diversion of profits from a
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company resident in the U.K. Therefore, on any strict view it will in almost all 
cases be theoretically impossible to satisfy the motive test.
In view of the emphasis placed on the importance of the motive test during the 
consultative process this potential lack of protection from a direction disturbed a 
number of those responding to the Revenue papers:
’We believe that this whole chapter [CFC proposals] puts excessive 
reliance upon the motive test, which cannot be a satisfactory 
substitute for proper legislative recognition of the complex realities 
of international business. Experience has shown that anti-avoidance 
legislation of this kind (and the motive test in particular) is over a 
period of time - in spite of assurances given by government 
ministers when introducing the legislation - almost always 
interpreted to the detriment of the tax payer...
Practice has borne out these fears and it is generally perceived that the Revenue 
is taking a relatively strict view on the use of the motive test. For example, it is 
known that the Inland Revenue has issued standing instructions to its Inspectors 
of Taxes to refer to the specialist Technical Division any CFC case where reliance 
is placed on the motive test by the taxpayer^ Whilst such a policy gives the 
Inland Revenue an opportunity to apply the test with a consistency of standard, 
it is perhaps to be regretted that in practice it appears that a very significant 
amount of evidence is required before the Revenue are prepared to contemplate 
the application of that test. 3 9  The motive test is therefore by no means the broad 
exemption that appears to have been envisaged in the consultative process. 
Instead, it is applied restrictively and therefore available in relatively few cases 
only. Indeed, it is arguable one of the worst failings of the CFC legislation that, 
notwithstanding the official statements made about the use of the motive test in 
the course of the consultative process, the following is unfortunately a fair 
reflection of the test from the perspective of the tax practitioner:
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'Practitioners therefore tend not to regard the motive test as having 
equal status with the other tests for exemption, and regard it rather 
as something to fall back on as a last resort when all else fails. The 
language of the distribution and exempt activities tests although 
complex, is at least relatively straightforward in its intent. The 
motive test, by contrast, is so obscure that professional advisers 
often feel they cannot recommend their clients to rely on it.'^
Exempt Activities
The other means by which companies carrying on what the Revenue perceives as 
'genuine business activities’ may be protected from the CFC legislation is by 
carrying on 'exempt activities' . 4 1  On the Revenue's own admission this is not a 
comprehensive test, chiefly on the grounds of the difficulty of drafting such a 
comprehensive clause and the availability of the motive test.
In general, certain business activities of an overseas business establishment will be 
exempt subject to a number of conditions. The most significant requirement is that 
such activities should not be certain specified activities (including, for example, 
dealing in securities other than as a broker and leasing business) . 4 2  The grounds 
for the exclusion in the case of leasing activities are explained by the fisc as 
follows:
'We recognise that bona fide leasing is often done through overseas 
subsidiaries for good commercial reasons. But there is also 
considerable scope for avoidance of U.K. tax in this area. It would 
be extremely difficult to draft a satisfactory statutory provision 
which distinguished these cases, except by means of a motive test ' . 4 3
The exempt activities test was initially called the 'genuine trading test'^ but later 
changed to the 'exempt activities test’. The change was made to avoid any
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implication that a company which fails to satisfy this test is in some way not 
engaged in 'genuine' activities. 4 5
The test attracted much comment by way of public response during the 
consultative process but, according to the Revenue:
'Much of this appeared to be based on a misunderstanding of its 
purpose, which was simply to exclude from the charge companies 
whose activities were not of the kind used to avoid U.K. tax. Thus 
although much leasing business is 'genuine', an overseas leasing 
subsidiary may lend itself to use as a vehicle for avoiding U.K. tax; 
and so leasing as such is not appropriate for general exclusion 
through the test’.^
The test is therefore more appropriately understood as an exemption for certain 
selected trading companies. If the test were designed to stand by itself as a 
comprehensive test this discrimination would be particularly inequitable. 
However, the (presumed) intention that this test will quickly exclude all those 
companies carrying on business which the Revenue do not wish to bring within the 
charge, leaving the motive test to sort out the remainder, is a reasonable 
approach. Unfortunately, as a result of the analysis of that latter test, it is unlikely 
that the motive test can be relied upon to do this.
Effect on Business Activities
In 1982 it was stated that the Government 'do not believe that anything in their 
present proposals would damage U.K. business generally, nor should it deter 
multinationals from using the U.K. as a base’ . 4 7  However, despite the official 
concern with the importance of preserving a neutral effect on 'genuine business 
activity’, there remain doubts, as a result of the framing of the motive test and the 
exempt activities test, together with the subsequent relatively restrictive Revenue
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approach to the motive test in practice, whether this objective has been achieved. 
There are a number of reasons which substantiate these doubts.
Unlike Subpart F (which will always apply in certain specified cases), the 
legislation is not certain in its application and there will therefore be some 
uncertainty whether the CFC provisions will affect a particular company.^ The 
uncertainty arises not merely for the reasons already discussed but also, inter alia, 
for the degree of discretion afforded to the Revenue, a matter which is discussed 
later in this chapter. The lack of certainty of application of the legislation 
therefore constitutes a ground for fear that the legislation may affect 'genuine’ 
business activities.
A  second concern is the information powers given to the Revenue under this 
legislation. The Revenue are empowered to enquire into who owns the CFC; what 
their respective interests are; what associates the CFC has; how much overseas 
taxes it bears; and the nature of its activities and income. 4 9  On this matter the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies working party commented:
'Very wide information gathering powers are given to the Revenue 
in the draft legislation. This information could concern the 
customers of a CFC and have damaging commercial consequences, 
particularly in the case of overseas banks' . 5 0
Third, regardless of what actually does happen under the CFC legislation, the 
perceptions of the way the legislation operates (both currently and in the future) 
are also relevant. The provisions clearly have an 'in terrorem' e ffe c t  but, in view 
of the concerns already mentioned, this effect may deter a wide spectrum of 
activities, including some the fisc appear not to wish to deter. 5 2
It is obviously impossible in the space available to survey in any detail the impact 
of the CFC legislation on legitimate business activity. However, taking the captive 
insurance sector as an example, one or two comments may be made as to the
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Revenue attitude to the application of the legislation and its likely impact in 
general.
It is clear that captive insurance companies themselves are a target of the 
Revenue in applying the CFC legislation. This arises from the fact that offshore 
captive insurance companies were cited by the Revenue in the course of the 
consultative process as representing clear abuse of the U.K. taxation system. 5 3  
The fact that captive insurance companies are regarded simply as means of 
offshore tax avoidance suggests an unsophisticated commercial awareness on the 
part of the Inland Revenue. In the majority of cases, such companies represent 
a means by which arrangements relating to a group's insurance could be improved 
and made more efficient with an additional saving in costs. Non-fiscal U.K. and 
E.E.C. legislation is largely responsible for the fact that such companies have not 
been established in Europe. Since these companies are effectively on the 
Revenue 'hit list', it is probably correct to say that, as a result of the CFC 
legislation;
'the ability of the captive to accumulate funds which would then 
enable it to retain a larger proportion of the group's risks without 
the need for extensive reinsurance will have been seriously 
curtailed' 5 4
Assuming that the CFC provisions apply to an offshore captive, it will be 
necessary to see if any of the exemptions are available to prevent a direction from 
arising.
A  captive insurance company is unlikely to be able to satisfy the exempt activities 
test because one of the requirements for that exemption to operate is, broadly, 
that most of the business of the company in question must be with non-connected 
parties. 5 5  Captives could possibly try to fall within the exemption by entering into 
arrangements with other (unrelated) captives so as to bring their gross receipts
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from connected parties down below 50% of gross income but this arrangement is 
likely to prove administratively cumbersome and may be expensive to operate.
Enough has already been said on the motive test for it to be reasonably clear that 
exemption is no panacea in the case of the offshore captive. Difficulties would 
be particularly acute in the case of the second limb of the motive test: given the 
attitude of the Revenue to captive insurance companies it will be a difficult task 
to show that the choice to locate the captive offshore (in a country probably 
regarded by the Revenue as a tax haven) was not motivated to achieve a 
reduction in U.K. tax by a diversion of profits from the U.K. This means that, if 
challenged, an overseas captive subsidiary would be able to avoid a direction 
under the CFC legislation only if it pursues an acceptable distribution policy. The 
Revenue have in practice been extremely reluctant to accept that a captive 
insurance company can be a trading company and would therefore require a 
distribution of 90% of available profits rather than the 50% which applies in the 
case of trading companies. The difficulties of persuading the Revenue that a 
captive can be a trading company stem largely from the fact that, as noted above, 
the Revenue appear to have decided already that the use of such companies 
amounts to an abuse of the U.K. taxation system. 5 6
A consequence generally of the above discussion on captive insurance companies, 
is that the CFC legislation is likely to be applied in many cases against captives, 
thereby reducing significantly the extent to which such companies can be used by 
U.K. based multinationals. It is therefore difficult to resist the conclusion that the 
U.K. CFC legislation does have an important (and adverse) effect on business 
activities and is non-neutral in its effect.
However, it may be argued against the above conclusion that captive insurance 
business is in any event not a legitimate business activity and, further, that the 
CFC legislation actually maintains neutrality as between U.K.-based and tax-haven 
based captive insurance companies established by U.K. multinationals. It is 
considered by the author that these objections are misconceived.
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If captive insurance business were not deemed a legitimate business activity then 
it would be necessary to explain why - and by what criteria - this conclusion has 
been drawn. Similarly, if CFC legislation is justified by reference to the need to 
preserve neutrality between, for example, U.K.-based and tax-haven based captive 
insurance companies established by U.K. multinationals, it would be necessary to 
explain the reasoning behind the apparent extension of the neutrality principle to 
the proposition (which is implicit in such a view) that the fisc of one state should 
tax not only its own residents but those of other states on an equal footing.
These questions lead to a number of difficulties which are taken up in the two 
concluding chapters of this thesis.
U.K. CFC PROVISIONS AND OTHER ISSUES RELATING TO IFL 
Acceptable Distributions
In considering the acceptable distribution exemption, the principal concern is with 
its artificiality. Given the extremely high level of distribution required (50% for a 
trading company, 90% for other companies) it is impossible to regard the 
exemption as based on an approximation of good business practice. There will 
perhaps be some companies in respect of which a 50% dividend is acceptable but 
in general the level of dividend declared by any company will depend upon a 
relatively large number of factors such as the type of company; current and 
proposed activities; capital expenditure planned; company law relating to 
distributable profits; level of gearing, etc. The absolute percentage requirements 
should therefore be tempered with a reasonableness test so that surrounding 
circumstances could also be considered and the level of required distribution 
reduced as necessary.
In enacting the CFC provisions, the fisc is seeking to attack the ’special 
arrangements, in which normal commercial activities are distorted largely for tax 
reasons\ 5 7  The stated aim is not to prevent the use of what they perceive as tax
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havens but to remove the artificial fiscal incentives to U.K. companies of such use. 
(The Revenue notes say 'the proposals would not prevent these transactions but 
would merely ensure no tax advantage would accrue from them'58). The required 
percentage distributions are part of this strategy and, presumably, designed to put 
companies located in privileged tax jurisdictions in a position of parity with 
companies conducting 'normal commercial activities'. This is achieved by ensuring 
that a portion of the profits of the overseas company are remitted to the U.K. 
where they will be taxed. 5 9
However, there is no clear rationale or explanation as to why the level of 
distribution varies according to whether or not the CFC is a trading company or 
notgo and it certainly seems somewhat odd that the degree to which the perceived 
avoidance of tax is moderated by the acceptable distribution test depends on the 
status of the activities concerned, judged by reference to the U.K. trading- 
investment company distinction. If it is considered that any particular activities 
should be subject to the CFC legislation and an acceptable distribution test there 
would seem no reason in principle why the same level of acceptable distribution 
should not apply. The point is perhaps all the more significant where the 
activities concerned could, depending upon the precise arrangements, be 
characterised as trading or investment activities, as might be the case with regard 
to factoring activities.
By failing to take a more realistic view of what could constitute an acceptable 
distribution for the purposes of the legislation, the Revenue is effectively creating 
an artificial test which will in many cases have little in common with the levels of 
distribution that would otherwise exist. As such, by the requirements of this 
exemption, the Revenue will bring about precisely what they have declared 
themselves to be opposing, namely, 'special arrangements, in which normal 
commercial activities are distorted largely for tax reasons’.
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There are a number of other more detailed problems associated with the 
operation of the acceptable distribution exemption and the mechanics of its 
operation but space does not permit further discussion of them here . 6 1
Inland Revenue Discretion
Although the criteria which should be observed in promulgating CFC legislation 
are discussed in more detail in the next chapter, one issue properly discussed in 
this chapter is the degree of discretion accorded to the Revenue by the legislation.
In the U.K. there is a generally held view which opposes the existence of Revenue 
discretion, as a significant instrument of the tax law. This attitude is aptly 
summed up by Lord Wilberforce in the case of Vestev v. IRC:
'One should be taxed by law, and not untaxed by concession. ' 6 2
The Revenue view on the amount of discretion available to them under the 
legislation is stated as follows:
There is widespread concern - almost all of it misconceived - about 
the extent to which the proposed legislation would operate at the 
'discretion' of the Inland Revenue. The fact is that the only 
significant discretion granted to the Board would be in deciding 
whether or not to make a direction after consideration of all the 
circumstances. In all other respects the procedure to be followed in 
apportioning a tax liability among those having an interest in a 
controlled foreign company and raising the appropriate tax 
assessments would be specified in the legislation' . 6 3
In the circumstances, the use of a de minimis threshold is to be welcomed, chiefly 
because the requirement for a direction to be made should eliminate a
T/7 345
considerable amount of work for both the Revenue and the taxpayer, although 
this potential benefit to the taxpayer may in some cases be lost due to the 
requirements of auditors that the potential effects of the legislation on U.K. 
companies be taken into account for the purposes of the computation of the tax 
provision contained in the company’s statutory accounts.
The single item of discretion admitted by the Revenue is not unimportant in itself. 
It is certainly made of more significance by the impact of the relatively low de 
minimis threshold of £20,000 relating to chargeable profits. Where profits fall 
below this threshold, it will be remembered, no direction under the legislation will 
be made> 6 4  Due to the relatively low level of the threshold, it is likely that most, 
if not all, companies will not fall within the exemption.
There is therefore the danger that, due to the large number of cases potentially 
subject to the charge, the Revenue will have only sufficient resources to make 
directions in a proportion of those cases. This could lead to hostility to the 
legislation by the business community if it is perceived that similar cases could be 
treated differently simply as a result of the scarce manpower resources of the 
Revenue . 6 5  This difficulty could be avoided and demands on Revenue resources 
relieved by increasing the minimum threshold to something in the order of 
£100,000, below which figure it is quite possible the Revenue would not, in any 
event, seek to make a direction due to the relative insignificance of the chargeable 
profits involved. Other reasons for a significant increase in the de minimis figure 
have also been advanced in the commentaries on the Revenue consultative 
papers.**
Despite the above Revenue quotation, the discretion afforded to the Revenue 
would appear to go beyond the single instance cited.
For example, the legislation provides that:
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the Board may, if they think it appropriate, treat a loan creditor 
of a controlled foreign company as having an interest in the 
company for the purposes of this Chapter. ’ 6 7
Similarly, discretion is granted to the Revenue in applying the motive test so that, 
for example, ’if it appears to the Board’ that a reduction in U.K. tax is ’minimal’ 
or ’not the main purpose or one of the main purposes’ of a transaction, relief 
under the motive test will not thereby be denied.^ Other instances could equally 
be cited. 6 9  Although there is a general right of appeal against these 
determinations made by the Revenue, it is clear that a fairly significant degree of 
latitude is granted to the Revenue in administering the CFC provisions.^ This 
explains the statement made by a leading commentator:
’In many respects with this legislation - not least in the fact that it 
is to be applied or not at the Revenue’s discretion - corporate 
taxpayers are, in effect, being asked to trust the Revenue to act 
reasonably and have good sense in using the legislation.^
Tax Havens
As is the case with Subpart F, the U.K. CFC provisions avoid specifically 
identifying the tax havens against which the measures are directed. In the U.K. 
this is achieved by the use of the concept ’lower level of taxation’72, which was 
referred to earlier in the consultative process as ’privileged tax regime’.
The application of this concept in the legislation may involve both uncertainty and, 
in effect, retrospective taxation. This is because the determination of whether the 
CFC is located in a state with a lower level of taxation is made separately for each 
accounting period. Given the constant changes to tax codes made by most fiscs, 
it will often be difficult to say during any accounting period whether a lower level 
of taxation exists. As such the effect of the CFC legislation will be known in many
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cases only after the end of an accounting period, thus possibly leading to effective 
retrospective taxation.
A  further difficulty with the operation of the lower level of taxation concept is its 
inequity, both as regards the type of tax that is to be considered for the 
comparison between notional U.K. tax and tax actually borne in the state of the 
CFC and also as regards the exclusion of tax paid in states other than the CFC’s 
country of residence. These points have been considered earlier in this chapter.
Notwithstanding the inclination away from listing states in which residence of U.K. 
CFCs will cause the legislation to apply, the Revenue has published a list of 
countries which are ’excluded’. The main features of this excluded countries list 
were mentioned in the last chapter.
Unfortunately, there is no official explanation of the specific basis on which the 
excluded countries list has been drafted. The official Press Release introducing 
the list merely states that:
’The purpose of the list of excluded countries is to give an 
assurance that a charge will not arise under the controlled foreign 
company legislation in respect of companies in countries named on 
the list. Where a company is resident and carrying on business in 
a listed country, it will be regarded as meeting the conditions for 
exclusion set out in the legislation itself’ 7 3
Presumably, the assumption made by the fisc is that by locating in a relatively 
high-tax country (and satisfying the requirement of deriving 90% of its income 
locally) a company would not have a tax-avoidance motive and may therefore be 
deemed to have satisfied the motive test of ICTA 1988, s. 748(3). The assumption 
would in fact appear to be that companies established in the states on Part I of 
the excluded countries list are never used for the purposes targeted by the U.K. 
CFC rules because of the relatively high tax rates generally prevailing in those
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states. This assumption is to some degree inconsistent in principle with regard to 
the approach adopted in the case of those companies in states which are not 
featured on the excluded countries list and which are subject to the legislation: 
Such companies are considered in terms of the effective rate of overseas taxation 
to which they are subject. There is, however, some attempt at ensuring that a 
relatively high effective rate of tax will apply to companies in states on Part I of 
the list. This is provided by the requirement that 90% of their income is derived 
locally. Nonetheless, this split approach may appear somewhat inequitable, 
particularly in contrast to the more even-handed approach of the Subpart F 
provisions.
The possible inequity of the U.K. approach lies in the fact that the Inland 
Revenue’s evaluation of a state’s fiscal system will have such a significant impact 
on how companies in that state are affected by the legislation: if the state is not 
so listed, a company will be in the quite different position of having to analyse its 
effective rate of local taxation and complying generally with the CFC measures, 
a burden which is not insignificant:
The burden on taxpayers in complying with anti-tax haven 
measures can be extremely onerous. Financial books and records 
must be kept, usually on the basis of domestic tax law; amounts 
must be translated from foreign currency into domestic currency; 
tax returns must be filed. Whenever two countries’ tax systems are 
involved, compliance difficulties are inevitable. The principles of 
financial accounting and tax law invariably differ considerably from 
country to country. Accountants and employees of the controlled 
foreign corporation will rarely be familiar with the tax law of the 
country of residence and similarly the controlling shareholders’ 
professional advisers will rarely be familiar with the foreign tax law. 
Misunderstandings are inevitable. The cost of professional advice 
is not insignificant. Language differences often compound the 
difficulties. 7 4
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It would clearly be quite incorrect to suggest that the excluded countries list as a 
whole has been prepared arbitrarily since the Inland Revenue has obviously 
devoted significant internal resources to its preparation. However, the fact that, 
for example, Venezuela appears on Part I of the U.K. list yet is black-listed as a 
tax haven by France, Germany and Japan, 7 5  does raise certain questions as to 
whether the U.K. Revenue have the necessary resources to devote to updating the 
list and ensuring its continued fairness.^
The Revenue has stated that the protection of the list of excluded countries 
effectively provides an automatic exclusion from the charge in respect of an 
estimated 90 per cent of all the overseas subsidiaries of British companies’^
Nonetheless, there is no statutory basis for this exemption and it can only apply 
if the various conditions are met (in the case of states listed on Part I of the list 
the CFC must be resident in the country under the terms of the definition of 
residence given in ICTA 1988 s. 749(1) and 90% of the company’s ’commercially 
quantified income’ must be derived from that country).
These two apparently straightforward conditions cause a number of practical 
difficulties. A CFC will be deemed to have satisfied the first condition if it is taxed 
in the overseas state under local law by reason of its ’residence, domicile or place 
of management’.^ Alternatively, where a state does not use any of the above 
criteria, incorporation is the test used. Unfortunately, this approach does not cover 
all situations. For example, if a non-resident U.K. company is used to carry on a 
business in a foreign state where incorporation is the criterion of residence (e.g. 
Denmark) it seems impossible for that company strictly to satisfy the requirement 
of the list since its income is not taxed in Denmark by any of the above-mentioned 
four criteria, even though 100% of its income may be taxed in Denmark.
With regard to the second condition, a company is regarded as carrying on a 
business in a country (and therefore as having met the condition) if 90% of its 
commercially quantified income is ’local source income’, which means income
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which is treated under a country’s own laws as ’accruing in, arising in or being 
derived from that country and which is within its charge to tax’ ^ 9  This means that 
the list can be operated only by a close scrutiny of the overseas state’s approach 
to taxation. This approach is perfectly acceptable where the overseas state has 
simple or well-defined source rules. However, where a state has very complex 
source rules under which there may be genuine areas of difficulty (such as the 
U.S.80) the approach of the U.K. excluded countries list becomes inherently 
problematic. In practice, the Revenue’s approach in policing this requirement is 
to ensure that income, which would be taxable under Case V of schedule D if the 
company receiving it were resident in the U.K., is excluded. This approach to the 
operation of the requirement assumes that the overseas state has a rule or 
concept similar in nature to that embodied in Case V of Schedule D but this may 
not necessarily be the case, in which case it may be difficult for this second 
condition to operate. 8 1
The fact that the list has been drawn up by the Revenue and not incorporated 
into statute is a further example of the discretion afforded to the Revenue in this 
area of the law. If the Revenue view that 90% of British companies will be 
removed from the charge by reason of the list is correct, then the amendments 
made to the list will be of considerable practical significance. As such, the 
effective decision to tax or not to tax should be assigned to Parliament and not 
delegated to the Revenue. Further, since the list has no statutory force there will 
be no right of appeal open to a taxpayer if the Revenue seeks to apply the CFC 
legislation to a company resident in a country located on the list. For these 
reasons, the list should have some form of statutory basis.
Impact on Use of Tax Havens
One consequence of the way in which the U.K. CFC legislation is formed is that 
it is likely to affect the actual ’tax haven’ states used by U.K. multinational groups. 
In view of the lower level of taxation concept, such states are now more likely to 
be used where profits will be taxed at a rate equal to or in excess of 50% of the
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U.K. tax that would be payable if the profits were subject to U.K. tax. Thus, a 
company resident in Jersey will generally be an attractive option because the 
Jersey 20% tax rate will (assuming a similar computation of taxable profits in both 
Jersey and the U.K.), prevent the U.K. CFC legislation from having any 
application^, thus allowing tax deferral in Jersey of 15% of the annual profits 
arising. The stimulus to the use of Jersey resident companies as a result of the 
U.K. CFC provisions may be contrasted to a state in which there is an opposite 
effect. Hong Kong, for example, will not represent an attractive location because 
a company established there cannot ever be outside the scope of the CFC 
legislation, regardless of whether or not the effective rate of local tax exceeds 50% 
of the corresponding notional U.K. tax. 8 3  This is because of the presumption that 
a company which is not liable to tax in any country by reason of domicile, 
residence or place of management is to be conclusively presumed to be a CFC 
subject to the U.K. legislation.^ Since Hong Kong taxes on a territorial basis, a 
Hong Kong company will inevitably be subject to the CFC legislation. Whatever 
the impact of the CFC legislation on ’genuine business activities’, it seems clear 
that the legislation has a non-neutral effect on the use of overseas states by U.K.- 
based multinationals.
The Anti-Tax Haven Initiative
Before leaving the subject of tax havens, one further comment on the U.K. CFC 
measures should be made.
Although there are no official comments on the immediate targets of the CFC 
legislation, a widely-held view amongst tax practitioners was that one of the 
primary reasons why the measures were being introduced was to stop the 
extensive use by U.K. companies of subsidiaries located in Jersey and Guernsey, 
where a 20% rate of tax applies to income tax companies. Ironically, this 
intention was partially frustrated by a measure introduced by the same Finance 
Act which enacted the CFC provisions. In 1984, Chancellor Lawson announced 
a reduction in the rate of corporation tax from 52% to 35%.8S The effect of this
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is that most types of Jersey and Guernsey income tax companies will now not be 
subject to the CFC provisions as companies established in those locations will not 
be subject to a ’lower level of taxation’ for the purposes of the U.K. CFC 
legislation (because the amount of tax paid in Jersey or Guernsey will not be less 
than half of the tax which would have been paid had the company been resident 
in the U.K.). Of course, this point applies only in respect of income tax 
companies and not the tax-privileged corporation tax companies which are taxed 
on a flat-fee basis.^ However, the point does lend credence to the view that the 
CFC provisions in reality represent the culmination of an initiative undertaken in 
a quite different economic and fiscal climate to that in which they are applied. 
When the measures were first proposed the U.K. tax rate of 52% represented one 
of the highest corporation tax rates in Europe : now that the measures have been 
enacted the U.K. corporation tax rate of 35 % 8 7  is amongst the lowest in Europe 
and, as has been mentioned earlier, the U.K. is being acclaimed as a leading tax 
haven. Somewhat unfortunately perhaps, these points have not in any way 
affected the statutory form of the legislation, nor the way it has been applied by 
the Inland Revenue.
Complexity of the Legislation
Comments on the Inland Revenue’s application of the CFC legislation made 
earlier in this chapter may suggest an over-partisan approach on behalf of the fisc 
toward the use and interpretation of this legislation. Whilst in many instances 
such an observation seems accurate, it is also necessary to consider the 
circumstances in which the fisc must apply the legislation. The CFC legislation 
is relatively new and, certainly, relatively complex.
The Revenue is therefore seeking to ensure a uniformity of interpretation, a task 
made necessary because, notwithstanding the long drafting and consultative 
process, ambiguities and unforeseen interpretations have emerged since the 
enactment of the measures in 1984 .gg In view of the above, the Revenue generally 
appears to be relatively waiy of accepting arguments or giving concessions which
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might undermine the purpose of the legislation. In consequence, a defensive and 
unbending attitude on the part of the fisc tends to be experienced in problem 
cases. g 9
To some extent, this is a difficulty which arises as an inevitable result of the 
complexity of the legislation; the more complex the legislation, the more likely it 
is that these difficulties will be made inevitable. The position with regard to the 
CFC legislation can be compared to the U.K. legislation on transfer pricing. The 
latter is simple, both conceptually and in its legislative form, which makes its 
operation and interpretation relatively straightforward. This suggests that there 
may be inherent problems with complex legislation, a suggestion which, it is 
submitted, finds substantial corroboration in the preceding discussion and in the 
discussion of the detailed Subpart F legislation. This factor of complexity is not 
recognised in either the U.S. or U.K. official discussions of the respective CFC 
legislation and it is therefore not possible to consider what account of it, if any, 
is taken by the fisc^o
The above points on the complexity of the legislation are obviously relevant to 
the U.S. CFC legislation as well as to the U.K. measures and they are therefore 
considered in more detail in the next chapter, which is concerned with an 
evaluation of unilateral anti-tax haven legislation from the perspective of the 
policies and principles of international fiscal law (based on the U.S. and U.K. 
discussions) on a more general basis.
CONCLUSION
As with the earlier material on Subpart F, conclusions on the key elements 
applying in common to the CFC legislation of the U.S. and the U.K. are discussed 
in the final two chapters of this thesis. However, certain ’localised’ conclusions 
on the U.K. CFC legislation may be made at this stage.
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Whereas the discussion of Subpart F was able to consider the policy changes to 
that legislation since its enactment in 1962, the discussion in this part of the thesis 
has, in recognition of the relatively short time the U.K. legislation has been in 
force, been more concerned with the consultative process preceding the enactment 
of the U.K. legislation. The discussion of that consultative process has highlighted 
the rather poor discussion of the issues by both the Inland Revenue and, with 
certain exceptions, by the representatives of the taxpaying community. With 
regard to the contribution made by the Inland Revenue, the case for the need for 
the measures was hardly conclusive, with virtually no proper analysis of the issues 
and no supporting economic data. Such ’empirical evidence’ as there was (i.e. the 
Inland Revenue survey) was introduced late in the consultative process and cannot 
in any event be interpreted as amounting to much more than a gesture in 
response to the calls for proper evidence of abuse. The contribution from 
taxpayers and their representatives was, generally, not a conspicuous success. 
With one or two notable exceptions^ there was very little recognition of the 
fundamental issues nor of their significance to the debate. Instead, the majority 
of the respondents seemed to confine themselves to making representations on 
the more detailed points of the (then) proposed legislation, although it is perhaps 
worth noting that these responses were generally of a relatively high standard if 
judged on their own terms.
It is submitted that, in all circumstances, the poor quality of the consultative 
process is fundamental to any appraisal of either it or the legislation it produced 
and therefore certainly not a matter of merely academic concern. In the present 
context the immediate concern arising from the pool quality of the consultative 
process is that various matters which are of fundamental importance from the 
perspective of IFL (and, in particular, by reference to the primary objective 
underlying IFL and the policies and principles of IFL) were given insufficient 
consideration or were completely ignored.
The final and concluding part of this thesis explores in further detail why a proper 
analysis is required of these matters and also draws certain conclusions on the
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issues discussed in this chapter. The conclusion indicates the fundamental issues 
which should be addressed prior to the enactment of CFC legislation and also 
offers certain conclusions on the consequences for IFL, and the development of 
IFL, which are likely to result from a failure to give those issues the attention they 
merit.
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CHAPTER 7 - NOTES
1 Admittedly, the organisation of the material between chapters Five,
Seven and Eight may make a clear perspective on the earlier material 
more difficult. However, conclusions on the major issues from the 
perspective of IFL which are common to both the U.S. and the U.K. 
material are deliberately postponed to Chapter Eight where they may 
be considered in the light of the more detailed and separate discussion 
of the U.S. and U.K. provisions.
2 The Institute of Directors took a quite different view and restricted 
itself in the early stages of the consultative process to replying in 
terms of the general principles of the proposed legislation. The 
Revenue appears not to have responded to this approach and it is left 
to another commentator, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, to reply to 
the effect that, in the limited context of the purpose set out for the 
legislation by the Revenue, the extension of the U.K/s tax base is 
justified. However, even in this reply, there is no detailed discussion 
or reasons advanced to justify the extension of the U.K. tax base (see 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, "Report to the Working Party on Company 
Residence, Tax Havens and Upstream Loans", IFS Report Series 
No. 3).
3 The reasons for this concentration on detail and the ignoring of 
certain more fundamental matters of principle are not immediately 
obvious. Primarily responsible is probably an attitude of narrow self 
interest on the part of many of the parties which responded to the 
Revenue"s consultative papers.
4 Comments submitted by the Accepting Houses Committee/Issuing
Houses Association in February and March 1982 to the Inland 
Revenue. See 35 Taxes International, September 1982, p. 14. These 
representations are published in 35 Taxes International, September 
1982, p. 14.
5 Note 30, Ibid, foreword by John Wakeham, M.P.
6  Note 30, Ibid, pp. 22-23.
7 The point is arguably all the more important because of Inland
Revenue practice in connection with TCGA 1992, s. 13 formerly 
CGTA1979, s. 15. S. 13 operates to attribute gains of non-resident but 
broadly closely held companies to U.K. persons holding shares in such 
companies on a pro-rata basis. In practice, the Revenue appear to 
accept that s. 13 cannot apply if its provisions are overridden by an 
applicable double tax agreement.
t n 357
89
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
T/7
ICTA 1988, s .756(3) amending ICTA 1988, s .416(6).
ICTA 1988, s. 416(2).
ICTA 1988, s. 416(2).
Under the close companies legislation a person is taken to control a 
company if he exercises, or is able to exercise or acquire (now or as 
of right in the future), control over the company's affairs (ICTA 1988, 
s. 416(2)). The phrase 'control over the company's affairs' is not 
defined and although certain instances of control are given by statute, 
these instances are stated not to detract from the generality of the 
concept of control, making the precise meaning of control impossible 
to ascertain.
ICTA 1988, s.747(5).
Note 31, Ibid, paragraph 9.
ICTA 1988, s. 790(6).
See for example, the U.K. Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 
No. 1, Accounting for Associated Companies, paras 14 and 15.
See 35 Thxes International, September 1982, p. 15.
Note 31, Ibid, paragraph 9.
Note 30, Ibid, pp. 29-30.
Institute of Directors, Submission on Inland Revenue Consultative 
Document of January 1981, p. 8 , paragraph 20.
ICTA 1988, s. 750(1).
ICTA 1988, s. 790(3).
Note 29, Ibid, p.ll.
ICTA 1988, s. 750(2)(3).
ICTA 1988, s. 750(1).
The Law Society, Memorandum by the Society's Standing Committee 
on Revenue Law, 'Taxation of International Business', February 1984, 
p.3.
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B.J. Arnold The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations : 
Defining and Designating Tax Havens - 1* British Tax Review, 1985, 
p. 286 at 298
Board of Inland Revenue, Tax Havens and the Corporate Sector’, 
January 1981, p. 2, para 4.
Note 30. Ibid, p. 8 .
Board of Inland Revenue, ’International Tax Avoidance’, December 
1981, p.lO.
Board of Inland Revenue, Taxation of International Business’, 
December 1982, Foreword.
Board of Inland Revenue, Tax Havens and the Corporate Sector’, 
June 1982, p.l.
Note 30. Ibid, p. 8 .
ICTA 1988, s. 748(3).
ICTA 1988, Schedule 25, para 17.
This point has been experienced in practice by the author, and is also 
referred to by D. Ross; ’Anti-Tax-Haven Legislation - Three Years’ 
U.K. Experience’ Tax Planning International Review, February 1988, 
p. 13.
ICTA 1988, schedule 25, para 19(2).
Note 4, Ibid.
This has been confirmed to the author in the course of practical 
dealings with the Inland Revenue.
This is to be regretted for two reasons. First, it increases the overall 
compliance cost to the taxpayer. Second, it creates considerable 
uncertainty as to the application in practice of the legislation.
D. Ross, ’Anti-Tax-Haven Legislation - Three Years’ U.K. Experience’ 
Tax Planning International Review, February 1988, p. 13.
ICTA 1988, s. 748(l)(b).
ICTA 1988, schedule 25, paragraphs 6  and 9.
Note 31, Ibid, section entitled ’Banks’, paragraph 4.
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44 See, for example, note 29, Ibid, at p. 11
45 Note 30, Ibid, page 24, paragraph 41.
46 Note 30 Ibid, page 24, paragraph 40.
47 Note 30, Ibid, p. 8 .
48 The Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies commented on 
the proposed legislation: The proposals are of such potentially wide 
application that they will inevitably impact on much legitimate 
commercial activity and the complexity of the provisions will create an 
uncertainty and heavy burden of compliance.’ (from public comments 
submitted to the U.K. Inland Revenue in March 1982, quoted in 35 
Taxes International, September 1982, p. 17).
49 See generally, for example, ICTA 1988, s. 755.
50 Institute for Fiscal Studies, ’Report of the Working Party on Company 
Residence, Tax Havens and Upstream Loans’, IFS Report Series 
No.3, p.26.
51 In the author’s own experience in advising in this area, for example, 
it is noticeable that some taxpayers are concerned to avoid any 
possible application of U.K. CFC legislation whilst in other cases the 
vagaries of the legislation combined with the expected hostile 
approach of the Inland Revenue in applying the legislation make it 
extremely difficult to know precisely how the CFC legislation should 
be applied. In practice, this uncertainty will often render any 
particular proposal unviable.
52 For example, it is not clear whether factoring is in all cases outside 
the scope of the definition of ’investment business’ for the purposes 
of the exempt activities test and therefore whether factoring activities 
may constitute exempt activities (see further ICTA 1988, Sch. 25 para.s 
6  and 9). In fact, there are various forms of factoring, some of which 
are economically similar to funding or investment (on which latter 
point, see ICTA 1988, Sch. 25 para. 9(l)(d)). It is not known whether 
the fisc wishes to deter factoring activities conducted in subsidiaries of 
U.K. resident parent companies.
53 Five categories of such companies were cited in the Revenue paper. 
See Board of Inland Revenue; Taxation of International Business’, 
December 1982, p. 12.
54 M. Finney; ’Impact of CFC rules on Captive Insurance’, The 
Accountant, 3 February 1986, p.26.
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ICTA 1988, schedule 25, para. 6(2).
Note 53, Ibid.
Note 30, Ibid, p. 7.
Note 31. Ibid, para 4.
However, even this simple objective may easily be circumvented by 
ensuring the 'acceptable distribution' made to the U.K. parent is 
routed through an intermediate 'mixing' vehicle so that on being 
remitted finally to the U.K. no U.K. tax is payable.
ICTA 1988, Sch. 25 para 2(l)(d) and (2).
For example, a company may be precluded from making a distribution 
under local company law provisions owing to the fact it has an 
opening debit balance on its profit and loss account and therefore has 
no legally distributable profits, notwithstanding profits have arisen in 
the year. Further where an acceptable distribution is made via a 
holding company which also receives income from another source and 
which makes a payment to yet another source, it is not clear what 
rules will apply for tracing the movement of cash and thus for 
determining whether the acceptable distribution test has been met. 
This problem is exacerbated where a CFC pays a dividend in order to 
satisfy the acceptable distribution test and the dividend is routed via 
a Dutch 'mixer' company. To ensure the dividend reaches the U.K. 
the Dutch company may find it necessary to specify that part of its 
dividend to the U.K. comes from the CFC. In consequence, there 
may then be problems in maintaining the 'mixer' function of that 
Dutch company as the Inland Revenue appear unwilling to accept, in 
the light of such a specification, that the underlying tax relating to the 
dividend from the CFC can be mixed with the underlying tax on other 
dividends received by the Dutch company from other subsidiaries.
Vestev v. IRC [1980] STC 10 at p. 19.
Note 31, Ibid, paragraph 26.
ICTA 1988, s.748(l)(d).
This point also raises questions of equity, which was defined in 
Chapter 1, following the analysis by Adam Smith in The Wealth of 
Nations', as fairness between the body of taxpayers. It would be 
expected that those in equal circumstances should pay an equal 
amount of tax or, in this context, be subject to the CFC rules equally. 
On the relevance of equity in this sense - 'horizontal equity' - see 
further J A Kay and M A King, The British Tax System, (2nd edition,
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1980 at pp. 203-204). It should also be noted that it is not considered 
that the discussion in the text on the scarce resources of the Revenue 
contradicts the point made earlier in the chapter in connection with 
the 'in terrorem’ operation of the legislation.
6 6  The Law Society, for example, advances two further reasons. First the 
costs to taxpayers in computing, and perhaps disputing, the extent of 
their liabilities will be out of all proportion to profits of £2 0 , 0 0 0  per 
annum. Second, new offshore business ventures which may be 
struggling to establish themselves should not be subject to additional 
tax burdens. The raising of the threshold would lead to the charge 
being levied only on businesses which have already succeeded in 
establishing themselves. (See the Law Society, Taxation of Interna­
tional Business', Memorandum by The Society's Standing Committee 
on Revenue Law, February 1984, pp. 5-6).
67 ICTA 1988, S. 749(7).
6 8  ICTA 1988, s.748(3)
69 Other examples include the following: the Revenue operate a
discretion as to whether or not the 18 month period referred to in the 
acceptable distribution test provisions may be extended (see ICTA 
1988, Sch. 25, para 2(l)(b)); they are also accorded a discretion in
effect under ICTA 1988, s. 748(2) and, further, are empowered to
change the terms of the Excluded Countries test at will. There are 
also various definitions or provisions (e.g. in para’s 5-12 of Schedule 
25) which are relatively opaque, such that the practical application 
and interpretation adopted by the Revenue is likely to prove of 
considerable significance in the operation of the law.
70 The degree of influence on the application of the legislation arising as
a result of the Inland Revenue’s attitude to it and 'discretion' in
applying it is perhaps well reflected by the recent change in emphasis 
of the Revenue’s use of the legislation. At a general meeting of the 
International Fiscal Association in London in 1987, there was 
widespread agreement amongst international tax specialists that a 
significant change in the Revenue's use of the CFC provisions had 
occurred as a result of the recent change in the chief Inland Revenue 
official overseeing the legislation. As a result of this change, it was 
generally agreed that there had been a move from a rigorous and 
somewhat pedantic application of the provisions by the Revenue to a 
'looser' approach under which the Revenue are prepared to 
compromise and make agreements. At the same time, it had been 
noticed there was also a change in the use of directions under the 
CFC provisions by the Revenue. Formerly, directions under the 
legislation were issued in extreme cases only and generally as a matter 
of last resort. Since the change of official referred to above, however,
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directions under the legislation appear to have become rather more 
common. In addition, the Revenue are generally following such 
directions up with assessments and taking a more aggressive stance in 
seeking to recover what they consider to be the tax due. The 
combination of these changes clearly has a significant impact on the 
application and operation of the CFC legislation.
Letter to Financial Times from Malcolm Gammie, 17 April 1984. 
Similar concerns are also expressed by M. Finney; Impact of CFC 
Rules on Captive Insurance', The Accountant, 3 February 1986, p. 27.
ICTA 1988, S. 750
Inland Revenue Press Release: 'Excluded Countries List and 
Clearance Procedure', 16 July 1984, para. 2.
B.J. Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations : 
Defining and Designating Tax Havens - II', British Tax Review, 
1985, p. 362 at p. 368.
See further the tabulation of countries designated as tax havens by 
one or more of Australia, France, Germany and Japan and Spitz Tax 
Havens Encyclopedia in B.J. Arnold, Tax Havens Lists', 52 Taxes 
International, February 1984, p. 15 at p. 18.
The fact that Venezuela, for example, can be, with confidence, 
regarded as a non-tax haven by the U.K. yet be regarded as clearly a 
tax haven by the other countries mentioned raises interesting 
questions which are pursued in the final part of this thesis.
Inland Revenue Press Release, 'Controlled Foreign Companies 
excluded countries list and clearance procedure', 16th July 1984, 
paragraph 3.
Inland Revenue Press Release, 'Controlled Foreign Companies 
Excluded Countries List and Clearance Procedure', 16th July 1984, 
p.3. See also ICTA 1988, s.749(1).
Note 78, Ibid.
With regard to the U.S. rules, see for instance, ss 861, 862, 863, 864, 
865, 871, 881, 884 and 904 of the Internal Revenue Code and 
accompanying regulations.
For example, in a U.K. context, there are occasional difficulties in 
determining whether trading activities are to be regarded as 
constituting an activity taxable under the rules of Schedule D Case I
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or Schedule D Case V (see further Mitchell v Egyptian Hotels [1915] 
AC 1022).
82 The definition in ICTA 1988, s. 750(1) of territories with a lower level 
of tax is to be changed as a result of the changes proposed in the 
Finance Bill 1993. the 'less than one half’ of corresponding U.K. tax 
test is to be amended to less than three quarters. See Finance Bill 
1993, Clause 118.
83 However, it would still be possible for a Hong Kong company to fall 
outside the CFC charge as a result of the application to it of other 
exemptions, e.g. by fulfilling the exempt activities test of ICTA 1988, 
s. 748(l)(b) and Schedule 25.
84 ICTA 1988, s. 749(3).
85 The rate is currently 33% following FA 1991 ss.23 and 24 and ICTA 
1988, s. 8(5).
8 6  For example a flat fee basis in the order of £500 formerly applied to 
Guernsey and Jersey exempt companies. The exempt company 
regime has now been amended in both locations. In Guernsey, for 
example, it is now also possible to take advantage of an 'International 
Company' which will pay tax at a rate up to 2 0 %, as negotiated with 
the Guernsey tax authorities.
87 Note 85, Ibid.
8 8  This point has been confirmed to the author by a member of the
International Tax Department of Deloitte Haskins & Sells, who was 
until 1987 one of the Inland Revenue's five-man team in Technical 
Division administering the CFC legislation. The task of ensuring a 
uniform application and interpretation of the CFC measures is 
necessary, according to this individual, in large part because of the 
borrowing of definitions from other parts of the Taxes Act and as a 
result of the required recourse to comparable legislation overseas.
89 The comments made in the text are based on the author’s own
experience of dealing with the Inland Revenue and based on 
discussions with a large number of fellow practitioners.
90 The position can be contrasted with the discussions involving the
Inland Revenue, Stock Exchange, Bank of England and The Stock 
Borrowing and Lending Committee in relation to the new U.K. stock 
lending and manufactured dividend regime (see ICTA 1988, s. 129 and 
Schedule 23 A). In the course of these discussions the Inland Revenue 
has acknowledged - even if on only an informal basis - the various
T/7 364
difficulties that would be created by particularly complicated 
legislation or regulations.
91 The contributions made by the Institute of Directors in particular gave
appropriate emphasis to the fundamental issues raised by the 
legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
This and the following final chapter represent the conclusion of this thesis. Since 
the conclusion is spread over two chapters it is necessary to set out below the 
object of each.
This thesis has concerned itself with the consequences of CFC legislation for IFL 
and the development of IFL. The nature of this chapter is to set out conclusions 
which may now be drawn in connection with the enquiries relating to CFC 
legislation: the emphasis is therefore directed to the CFC element of the thesis. 
Having drawn these conclusions it will then be possible to proceed in the final 
chapter to conclusions on the question posed at the outset, namely the 
consequences for IFL of unilateral anti-tax haven legislation. The emphasis in the 
last chapter is therefore directed to the broader issues concerned with IFL, such 
as the impact of CFC legislation on the primary objective underlying IFL.
Thus, this chapter draws together the main strands of the preceding chapters of 
this thesis and concentrates in particular on important issues which are common 
to both the U.S. and the U.K. CFC rules. This prepares the ground for the 
conclusions in the final chapter as to the consequences for IFL of unilateral anti­
tax haven legislation.
This chapter is organised into six distinct sections.
The first section considers the assumptions that are common to the approach to 
CFCs taken by the tax authorities of both the U.S. and the U.K.. The discussion 
focuses on the attitude and approach to "tax havens", the identification of tax 
avoidance activities and the assumed identity of interests between a CFC and its 
shareholder.
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The second section of the chapter is given over to a consideration of the official 
approach to analysis of the perceived problem of CFCs and its implications in the 
context of this thesis.
The third section of the chapter deals with the relationship of CFC provisions to 
existing double tax treaties and the implications of this point for IFL.
The discussion then moves on, in the fourth section of the chapter, to consider the 
degree to which CFC legislation in general satisfies the criteria to be applied in 
appraising substantive IFL - i.e. the policies and principles of IFL - which were 
established in Chapter One.
The above discussion leads - in section five of this chapter - to a consideration of 
the legitimacy of the CFC legislation in general and this in turn leads, in the 
concluding section of this chapter, to a consideration of the necessity for CFC 
legislation in general.!
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CFC LEGISLATION
There are certain assumptions which represent the basic premises on which the 
CFC legislation is based and which account for its selective nature. These 
assumptions relate to:
1. Tax havens.
2. The identification of tax avoidance activities.
3. The identity of interests between a CFC and its shareholder.
Each of these will be considered in turn.
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1. Tax Havens
It is clear from earlier chapters that the CFC measures of the U.K. and the U.S. 
are directed against tax haven companies, although both the U.S. and U.K. 
legislation avoid any reliance on (or mention of) the term "tax haven". By 
different routes, the U.S. and the U.K. legislation avoid the need to identify the 
tax havens against which the CFC measures are directed. The U.S. legislation also 
avoids completely the need to define what a tax haven is whereas the U.K. 
legislation, with its concept of lower lever of taxation (which grew out of official 
discussions on "privileged tax regimes") is rather more definite in setting out the 
nature of the tax jurisdictions against which it is directed.
The attitude to tax havens on the part of both the U.S. and U.K. fiscs has been 
specifically considered in detail in earlier chapters. When the earlier discussion 
of tax havens in Chapter Three is taken into account, it is clear that both the U.S. 
and U.K. consideration of tax havens is relatively simplistic. A  one-dimensional 
concept of "tax haven" is assumed, virtually without any analysis whatsoever. 
There is therefore no recognition of the varying types and functions of tax havens 
nor of the fact that in reality the "tax haven" concept is somewhat amorphous, 
covering a very wide range of states with a multiplicity of fiscal systems (including, 
as has been noted earlier, the U.K.).
Even if attention is directed only to states with no tax or relatively low rates of tax 
in comparison to the state operating CFC legislation (and this seems to be implicit 
in the official U.S. and U.K. analyses) some form of further analysis is still 
required.
The official approaches are markedly indiscriminate in their approach to such no­
tax or low-tax states. No distinction is therefore made, for example, between 
simple no-tax havens and offshore financial centres which have a genuine trading 
function in the market place^
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This underlying approach is therefore considered over-simplistic. However, even 
such a simplistic approach to tax havens is not without its difficulties from an 
operational point of view. As has been noted in connection with the earlier 
discussion of the U.K. excluded countries list, Venezuela appears on that "white" 
list yet is also featured on the "black" lists of the CFC legislation of France, 
Germany and Japan. Other countries (such as Ireland) are not on any CFC black 
list but are, for example, featured in Bany Spitz's leading Encyclopedia on Tax 
Havens3  and are regularly used for tax-planning purposes. 4
Whilst the U.K. "white" CFC list is occasionally updated, the 'black" CFC lists of 
France and Germany have not been updated since their initial publication. This 
is probably a reflection on the difficulty facing any tax authority in attempting to 
keep up to date with the numerous and increasing changes to tax systems around 
the world. Even the U.K., which has attempted to keep its list updated, appears 
to have overlooked certain of these developments^
There may in addition be something of a localised concern over the perceived 
problem of tax havens. According to one author:
"To some extent the jurisdictions specified as tax havens by a 
particular country reflect that country’s location. Therefore, Japan 
is primarily concerned with tax havens in the Pacific Basin and has 
listed a number of jurisdictions located there that are not listed by 
other countries. Similarly, France and Germany are more 
concerned with European havens" . 6
All the above factors undermine the validity of the simplistic approach to the 
subject of tax havens adopted by countries with CFC legislation and also raise 
doubts as to whether such an approach can be satisfactorily operated on an 
administrative level alone.
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Based on the discussions in earlier chapters on the attitude to tax havens of the 
U.S. and U.K. fiscs, it may be observed that both fiscs have a deeply suspicious 
attitude towards the use of tax havens^
The suspicion in respect of tax havens on the part of the U.K. and U.S. fiscs leads 
to the (unacknowledged) assumption by them that the use of a tax haven location 
is generally attributable to a tax avoidance motive. 8  There is therefore little 
apparent willingness to consider non-tax motivations for the use of such locations 
(such as are considered in Chapter Three of this thesis). This is reflected in the 
official analyses of the use of tax havens. Both the U.S. and U.K. fiscs provide 
evidence of the increased use of tax havens made by domestic taxpayer yet both 
fiscs fail to provide any further analysis: it is as though the mere use (or increased 
use) by domestic taxpayers of "tax haven" locations, if demonstrated, is sufficient 
in itself to establish the case for anti-tax haven legislation. In view of the 
increasing internationalisation of virtually all market sectors and the comments 
made in Chapter Three on the wider (non-tax motivated) uses of tax havens, the 
view taken by the U.S. and U.K. fiscs is clearly not adequate.
A proper analysis of the use made of tax havens is therefore required before the 
conclusions already drawn by tax authorities as to the existence and consequences 
of international tax avoidance can reasonably be substantiated.
It is likely that certain abuses may be highlighted by such an analysis. For 
example, in the transfer pricing area, tax havens have certainly been used in the 
past for the purposes of artificially diverting and accumulating profits and it is 
perhaps doubtful if all cases of such abuse have been completely eradicated by the 
various laws which regulate, for tax purposes, transfer prices used between 
connected parties. Tax havens may also be used for other activities involving 
international tax avoidance. There is also evidence linking tax havens with 
activities involving tax evasion and other criminal activities. 1 0  It is therefore not 
suggested here that low-tax or tax haven states are not used for tax-motivated 
purposes. However, it should be emphasised that evidence on the scale of such
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uses of tax havens is not available and there is therefore no reason to conclude 
that the use of tax havens for these purposes is necessarily materially different 
from the use made of non-tax haven states for the same purposes. 
Notwithstanding these comments, it is recognised that a low or no rate of tax 
applying in a "pure" tax haven is, ceteris paribus, likely to encourage the use of 
that state as a location for "money box" and similar companies in comparison with 
high-tax states. Therefore, it is understandable that tax authorities in high-tax 
states may wish to consider whether measures to prevent potential abuse are 
necessary. However, this by no means in itself establishes the case for legislation 
directed against controlled foreign companies. Indeed, even if evidence were 
available to confirm significant abuse of tax havens (assuming that the meaning 
of "significant abuse" could be properly clarified) it would still remain to be 
proven that CFC legislation would be effective to deal with such abuse and could 
be reconciled with the primary objective underlying IFL, (namely the removal of 
fiscal distortions to the free movement of capital and persons and the exchange 
of goods and services) and the policies and principles of IFL.
The earlier discussion in Chapter Three suggested that the use of a tax haven for 
tax purposes should not necessarily be attacked or deprecated. If a commercial 
operation is carried on in a tax haven using a subsidiary company as the trading 
vehicle (which may therefore be a CFC), rather than a branch, and this decision 
is made for tax reasons, the choice may simply reflect the wish to be subject to the 
tax regime of one state (the tax haven) as opposed to another (the state of the 
parent company). An alternative view of this same motivation is that it represents 
outright tax avoidance, or possibly evasion. These two positions represent the two 
poles of the possible spectrum of views. Unfortunately, both the U.S. and U.K. 
official analyses assume the latter view without any consideration of the rights of 
the taxpayer in this situation to choose which tax regime is to apply. This 
assumption seems to be based on further assumptions relating to the nature of 
international tax avoidance activity, a matter to which the present discussion now 
turns.
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2. The Identification of Tax Avoidance Activities
Even assuming that tax haven states can be readily identified, the fact that such 
states are (arguably in common with virtually all other states in the world) 
probably used for various tax-motivated purposes, (whether involving "legal" 
avoidance activities or unlawful "evasion" activities), does not in itself provide 
grounds for anti-tax haven legislation of the type enacted by the U.S. and the U.K. 
Before establishing such grounds it would logically be necessary to establish the 
following:
(i) The scale and type of activity involving tax havens by domestic taxpayers.
(ii) The degree to which domestic taxpayers were engaged in "abusive" 
activities involving tax havens, together with an explanation of the criteria 
by which activities are to be classified as "abusive".
(iii) The effect of the activity in (ii) above on domestic tax revenues.
(iv) The extent to which existing legislation could be applied to counter the 
"abusive" activities identified in (ii) above.
For the avoidance of doubt it should be made clear that it is not being suggested 
that there is any rule of international law or indeed any substantive enactment, 
policy or principle of IFL which dictates the use of the four steps referred to 
above. It would therefore be open to a state in which, for example, there is little 
perceived tax abuse by residents involving the use of CFCs, to enact legislation 
directed against CFCs. Such legislation in these circumstances may have limited 
impact (and might be rarely if ever applied) but there would be nothing in the 
above four steps to prevent the enactment of that legislation. Similarly, a state 
which did perceive significant and widespread abuse by CFCs may enact 
legislation directed against them, quite without regard to the above steps. As is 
explored in this chapter, there may be a number of grounds as to why that law is
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bad law, judged from the perspective of IFL, but the failure to comply with the 
four steps set out above would not in itself be an argument to prevent the 
enactment of that law. It would, however, provide a strong hint that those setting 
fiscal policy are doing so in a disorganised and illogical manner, completely 
overlooking, for example, whether such legislation is really needed in the first 
place. It may also suggest that those in charge of setting fiscal policy had moved 
away from the objective of raising revenuen to the objective of fighting avoidance 
- or even perceived avoidance - for its own sake. 1 2
In the U.K., a modest attempt was made by the fisc at tackling steps (i) and (ii) 
above (but without explaining properly the reasons why the activities were 
abusive) in the course of the consultative process.
Steps (iii) and (iv) were not seriously considered, although, in connection with 
point (iii), it was suggested (without any supporting evidence or comment) that the 
CFC legislation would prevent "tax leakage of around £100 million a year" . 1 3
Whereas the discussions in the U.K. centred around the phenomenon of 
international tax avoidance (one of the major Inland Revenue papers was entitled 
"International Tax Avoidance"), the discussions in the U.S. in the early 1960,s were 
primarily related to the availability to tax haven corporations of tax deferral, and 
the consequent postponement of U.S. tax as a result of the ability to retain 
income in a subsidiary company in a low-tax overseas jurisdiction. Thus, although 
the facts referred to by the official discussions in the U.S. and the U.K. were the 
same, the emphasis in the U.S. was on tax deferral and the consequent tax 
advantage available to overseas subsidiaries that was not available to companies 
operating solely in the United States. The official discussion was therefore 
primarily concerned with achieving parity of tax treatment between domestic 
corporations and CFCs. Probably largely as a result of this difference in emphasis, 
the U.S. discussion of steps (i) to (iv) above was almost non-existent.
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It is notable, however, that the U.S. discussion of tax deferral provides little 
analysis of the deferral concept itself. Indeed, the assumptions that were made in 
the U.S. in 1961-2 as to the nature and availability of deferral run virtually parallel 
to those made in the U.K. in 1981-4 as to the use of tax havens. 1 4  In the official 
U.S. discussions, the motivation of taxpayers gaining a deferral "benefit" is not 
subject to analysis. Despite the lack of empirical analysis however, it is stated 
that;
"Recently, more and more enterprises organised abroad by 
American firms have arranged their corporate structures... so as to 
exploit the multiplicity of foreign tax systems... in order to reduce 
sharply or eliminate completely their tax liabilities both at home 
and abroad. . . " . 1 5
Again, the evidence and analysis to support the pejorative view of such 
"exploitation" exclusively for tax purposes as is mentioned above is lacking, as is 
any analysis of deferral which would support the application of Subpart F.
The discussion of international tax avoidance in Chapter Two suggests that no 
clear explanation or definition of the concept of tax avoidance has yet emerged. 
Both the U.S. and the U.K. follow the trend identified in Chapter Two by 
avoiding any attempt to define the tax avoidance to which exception is taken but 
nonetheless setting out the type of activities (and types of income) to which their 
CFC provisions are to apply. The second assumption made, therefore, is that the 
activities (and types of income) to which the CFC provisions apply represent 
"avoidance" activities which are legitimate targets for domestic CFC legislation.
The chief element of this second assumption is the consequential selectivity of the 
legislation: both Subpart F and the U.K. CFC provisions apply only to certain 
selected types of income. The details of the income subject to the CFC provisions 
in the U.S. and the U.K. have been considered in earlier chapters. From that 
earlier discussion it is possible to summarise the position (somewhat broadly) to
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the effect that it is passive income and related party income which are the targets 
of the CFC legislation. 1 6
The difference between the above categories of income and all other categories 
of income seems to be that tax authorities perceive that the former types of 
income can easily be diverted to tax haven subsidiaries and should therefore be 
subject to the CFC provisions. It is worth stressing that there is nothing inherent 
in these "tainted" categories of income which distinguishes them from other types 
of income, other than that, according to the tax authorities, they can more readily 
be diverted to tax haven locations. Considered in this way, the heavy-handed 
nature of the CFC legislation becomes obvious; the position taken by the tax 
authorities enacting CFC legislation seem to be that the legislation is justified to 
close off in advance any potential opportunity to divert the tainted categories of 
income to a tax haven company.
It might be argued that passive income, and possibly also related party income, 
is not actually earned in the foreign jurisdiction concerned and therefore, on the 
basis that such income is merely a return on the capital of the domestic 
corporation, it may properly be taxed under CFC provisions. If such an argument 
were to be sustained, it would clearly need to be developed further (and this has 
not been done in the official U.S. or U.K. discussions of CFC legislation). For 
example, it would need to be clarified what is meant by saying that income is not 
earned in the foreign jurisdiction. Further, it would also be necessary (from a 
logical perspective) to address the four steps of analysis referred to earlier in this 
chapter. In that regard (and as will be considered in detail later), it is considered 
that the analysis arising from step (iv) - the extent to which existing legislation 
could be applied to counter the "abusive" activities - would in any event 
completely remove the need for CFC legislation even assuming that the above 
argument (that passive and related party income is not earned in the foreign 
jurisdiction) is correct.
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However, the assumption that passive or related-party income can simply be 
switched from one jurisdiction to another by the tax-avoiding taxpayer is over- 
simplistic. There are a number of constraints which limit the extent to which any 
such transfers of income or activities can be made. 1 7
It is notable that both the U.S. and U.K. fiscs have failed to make an adequate 
case in support of their respective CFC legislation. Such justification as there is 
for the measures seems to rest on the proposition that the categories of income 
attacked are potentially susceptible to diversion techniques involving tax havens. 
It is certainly questionable whether this justifies CFC legislation of the sort that 
has been enacted.
3. The Identity of Interests Between a CFC and its Shareholder
The third key assumption made by the fisc applying the CFC legislation is that 
there exists an identity of interest between the overseas subsidiary (the CFC) and 
its domestic shareholders such that income of the CFC may properly be attributed 
to the shareholders.
With regard to this point the conventional understanding of the relationship 
between a shareholder and the company in which the interest is held should be 
noted. The Commentary on the 1977 O.E.C.D. Model Convention on Income and 
on Capital states the position thus:
"The position is different for the shareholder; he is not a trader and 
the company’s profits are not his; so they cannot be attributed to 
him" . 1 8
Indeed, the legal distinction between a shareholder (whether a corporate 
shareholder or not) and the company in which the interest is held is the basis of 
corporate existence in both U.K. and U.S. law. 1 9
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Neither the U.S. Department of Treasury or Internal Revenue Service nor the 
U.K. Inland Revenue has ever published a reasoned justification as such of the 
attribution of the income of the CFC to the (shareholder) parent.
This attribution is presumably based upon the earlier two assumptions considered 
relating to international tax avoidance and tax havens. However, even if the earlier 
assumptions made with regard to international tax avoidance and tax havens are 
totally warranted, it would still seem necessary to consider whether or not, and in 
what circumstances and for what reasons, such attribution is acceptable. (It is 
assumed that the mere existence of any form of international tax avoidance is not 
in itself the grounds for the attribution discussed above.)
Such an argument as referred to above could perhaps be developed (as least in 
part) by reference to the principles of profit allocation. This principle is the basis 
of transfer pricing legislation and could be applied to justify the allocation of 
profits to a company in a state where those profits have in fact been earned or, 
for other reasons, are directly attributable to a taxpayer within that state. 
However, this argument would of course lead to the question of where the profits 
are in fact earned. Where it is the CFC itself which is earning the profits, the 
argument would not support an allocation of those profits to the shareholder. 
Moreover, it is clear from existing official statements that the respective fiscs do 
not contend that the basis of the CFC legislation is that the various types of 
income subject to current taxation under CFC legislation have been earned in 
their countries. For example, the U.K. fiscal authorities manifestly wish to apply 
the U.K. CFC provisions "where transactions take place between a controlled 
overseas company and a third party"^ Further, to the extent the argument could 
be applied to justify the attribution of income referred to above, there exists 
already legislation of a general nature in both the U.S. and the U.K. which is 
capable of subjecting the relevant income to taxation in any event. The 
relationship between existing provisions and the CFC rules is discussed further in 
the last section of this chapter.
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One justification which has been raised to substantiate the attribution of the 
income of a CFC to its parent is the argument that "tax deferral" is inconsistent 
with the granting of a foreign tax credit because the grant of such a credit 
"involves treating a foreign subsidiary as inseparable from its parent"^ A foreign 
tax credit is granted in respect of dividends remitted by an overseas subsidiary to 
its domestic parent by both the U.K^ 2  and the U.S . ^ 3
However, this argument would need to be developed in some detail before it 
could become a plausible justification for the attribution of income under 
discussion.
The foreign tax credit mechanism is not applied in situations which are directly 
analogous with those in which CFC provisions operate. For example, under U.K. 
law, the credit will be given if not less than 1 0 % of the voting power in the 
company paying the dividend is held and there is therefore no requirement for 
control of the overseas company in question as such. 2 4  Further, it is arguable that 
the sole function of the credit mechanism is to prevent economic double taxation 
and therefore the foreign tax credit mechanism is an essential part of IFL. It is 
also likely to be an attractive mechanism to a particular state because it will 
effectively remove the double tax barrier to remittances of dividends from 
overseas subsidiaries that may otherwise exist. This view is supported by the 
significance of the credit mechanism and its role in the various model double tax 
conventions and in double tax treaties generally. Whereas the foreign tax credit 
mechanism is adopted in most double tax treaties, the CFC provisions are not 
catered for at all and are arguably inconsistent with such treaties. (The 
relationship between CFC provisions and double tax treaties is considered below.) 
This suggests that there is some difference in character and function between the 
CFC provisions and the foreign tax credit mechanism and therefore that the mere 
existence of the foreign tax credit is not in itself a justification for the CFC 
provisions.
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Moreover, if the logic of the argument was correct, it would seem to follow that 
the attribution of only certain categories of "tainted income" (in the case of the 
U.S.) or non-exempted income (in the case of the U.K.) was itself inconsistent. 
Since the foreign tax credit applies to all dividend income remitted (regardless of 
the activity from which the income was derived) the argument surely leads to the 
conclusion that all overseas income should be attributed to the state of the parent 
company.
It is not considered that the mere existence of the foreign tax credit mechanism 
is sufficient justification for any form of income attribution of the type under 
discussion and the above points seek to reinforce this view. The credit mechanism 
fulfils an entirely separate function in circumstances which are not analogous with 
those in which the CFC provisions operate.
It has also been suggested that it is inconsistent to tax foreign branch profits 
currently (as both the U.K. and U.S. do)^ and yet to allow "deferral" of tax on 
the income of a foreign subsidiary^ This argument raises a number of points 
similar to those that have already been raised in connection with the foreign tax 
credit mechanism. The argument ignores the legal fact that a subsidiary is in law 
a separate and distinct entity from its shareholder, regardless of whether its 
shareholder is a corporate body or not. A foreign branch is dissimilar to a foreign 
subsidiary in a wide range of ways which lead to variances in the tax treatment of 
a number of events and transactions. For example, in the U.K. a subsidiary has 
until recently been subject to capital duty on incorporation, and will be subject to 
tax on its world wide profits (if the company is U.K. resident) but will qualify to 
take advantage of the wide network of U.K. double tax treaties^ A U.K. branch, 
on the other hand, would not formerly have been subject to capital duty and will 
be subject to U.K. taxation only in respect of U.K. income and gains connected 
with its branch activity. A U.K. branch will not be able to use the U.K/s network 
of double tax treaties^
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These differences in the treatment accorded to a branch as against a subsidiary 
might be referred to as "inconsistencies" but that word falsely assumes an 
equivalence between the two types of vehicle and is therefore somewhat 
misleading: even if the activities carried on by a U.K. branch are similar to those 
carried on by a U.K. subsidiary, the above legal and tax differences will hold. For 
tax purposes, this is due chiefly to the fact that although the subsidiary is likely to 
be resident in the U.K. and taxed as such, the branch will not be so resident. 
Legally, the obvious difference is that a subsidiary operation is accorded separate 
legal personality whilst a branch is not.
Moreover, the assumption behind this argument that the treatment of a branch 
(current taxation) is inconsistent with the treatment of an overseas subsidiary (tax 
deferral) in such a way as to justify current attribution of the profits of a CFC is 
open to two further counter arguments.
First, the reasoning would strictly lead to all profits of a CFC being taxed 
currently rather than the "tainted" U.S. or "non-exempted" U.K. profits. As such, 
the argument based on inconsistency is not in itself a justification of CFC 
legislation in its present selective form. This point has already been made above 
in connection with the foreign tax credit argument.
Second, the argument assumes that a potential investor in a country will always 
have a direct choice as to which vehicle is adopted. This may often be the case 
but local laws and regulations or local commercial factors may not permit such a 
choice.^ Also, the argument would seem to apply only to wholly-owned 
subsidiaries and not those where there are minority shareholders since in these 
cases there is clearly no equivalence between a branch operation and a subsidiary 
operation.
Therefore, in view of the above, it would appear that the argument based on 
inconsistency of treatment is here, as with the argument relating to the foreign tax 
credit, hardly proven. Certainly there are differences in treatment, but whether
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these differences amount to inconsistencies, and whether such inconsistencies, 
even if demonstrated to exist, justify legislation of the CFC character are matters 
which have yet to be established.
To a large extent, the attribution of income is implicitly based on the two earlier 
assumptions relating to the existence of international tax avoidance and tax 
havens. Therefore, the degree to which such attribution is warranted will turn on 
the view taken with regard to those two earlier assumptions which have been 
discussed above. Nonetheless, in view of the foregoing discussion it would appear 
that the third assumption made in the enactment of CFC legislation, relating to 
the attribution of income, is still in need of some further justification.
THE OFFICIAL APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
In view of the discussions earlier in this thesis, it will be clear that the analysis of 
the perceived problem by the U.S. and U.K. fiscs was somewhat incomplete. 
Clearly, both fiscs took the view that there was a significant problem which 
required new legislation. Regrettably, the basis of that view was never explored 
in any detail in the publicly available documents. There was little (if any) 
discussion of the principles involved in the official assessment of the need for the 
legislation and the empirical analysis was also somewhat thin. In the U.S., there 
was at the time of the promulgation of Subpart F no analysis of the uses of tax 
havens made by U.S. taxpayers, although an extensive general study of this was 
later conducted (almost twenty years later) by Richard Gordon, leading to his 
Gordon Report in 1981 ^  In the U.K., a study into the uses of tax havens by U.K. 
companies was mounted by the Inland Revenue3 1  but only after the legislation had 
been proposed and the consultative process carried on for some months. The U.K. 
study is in any event too brief and lacking in any analytical detail to shed much 
light on the use by U.K. corporate taxpayers of tax havens. 3 2
The quality of the analysis is exemplified by the amount of economic data 
conveyed about the CFC measures. The only statement remotely connected with
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the economic impact of the measures in the course of the U.K. three-year 
consultative process is the following:
"We have little doubt that there are problems in this area which 
need to be tackled. For example, the use of controlled foreign 
companies in low tax countries, where avoidance of U.K. tax is the 
main purpose of the activity, is leading to a tax leakage of around 
£ 1 0 0  million a year. " 3 3
There is no reference to how the figure of tax leakage has been determined nor 
to how the "main purpose" of the offshore activity has been identified.
With regard to the U.S., it would appear there was a similar lack of analysis at the 
time of the enactment of Subpart F. Professor Stanley Surrey, who was Assistant 
Secretary of the U.S. Treasury at the time Subpart F was adopted, has confirmed 
that the legislation was not discussed in any detail at the time of its adoption.^
The position appears not to have been rectified in the interim as there still seems 
to be substantial disagreement as to the economic effects of Subpart F: a U.S. 
Treasury department estimate in 1981 suggested additional revenue in the order 
of $365-$768 million as a result of the Subpart F measures yet another 
(independent) study in 1976 indicated that eliminating deferral would actually 
reduce tax revenue^
Both the U.S. and U.K. legislation makes the assumption that by putting the 
targeted income within the scope of the CFC legislation the perceived "loss" or 
"leakage" to the domestic fisc is corrected, either because the measures operate 
"in terrorem" to dissuade the taxpayer from using a controlled overseas company 
to which income is diverted or because the tax benefits arising from the use of 
such a company for such a purpose will be nullified by the operation of CFC 
legislation. In economic terms this appears to be an untested assumption. Leaving 
aside the possibility that the CFC provisions may not be effective in achieving
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their intended purpose as a result of tax planning manoeuvres by taxpayers (such 
as "decontrolling" companies which would otherwise be subject to the CFC laws), 
it would still not necessarily be the case that the targeted income becomes subject 
to the relevant domestic tax charge. This is because, in some cases, the offshore 
activity which generates the type of income against which the CFC measures are 
aimed may simply be terminated by taxpayers in response to the CFC measures. 
For example, the application of a CFC charge may cause a particular transaction 
to lack feasibility in after-tax terms.
In practical terms there are situations where the marginal cost of a tax charge may 
rule out the viability of a transaction with the effect that a particular transaction 
may be carried out either without a significant associated tax cost, or not carried 
out at all.
The view that the imposition of a CFC charge will result in increased revenues 
being earned by domestic companies is based on the premise that foreign and 
domestic investment are substitutes, such that when foreign markets or investment 
opportunities are, for one reason or another, rendered unattractive, the 
investment will simply be reallocated to the domestic market. This premise may 
well not be correct.
The point is recognised by a U.S. Treasury Study on the undistributed income of 
CFCs. In discussing the effects of the CFC charge, it is noted:-
"Some observers believe that investment would be partly shifted 
back to the United States, thereby increasing U.S. corporate
earnings  Other observers countered that little or no investment
would be shifted back to the U.S. They argue that profitable 
investment and production opportunities are highly specific both in 
time and place, and that the loss of foreign markets abroad does 
little to create new investment opportunities in the United States.
Indeed, the loss of foreign markets might "impair" the access of
T/8 385
American producers to new foreign technology, and might impede 
the realisation of economies inherent in large scale production and 
in international specialisation, with a consequent attenuation of 
domestic investment opportunities"^
A similar point is made by one commentator on the U.K. legislation:
"We do not accept the implicit assumption that a reduction in tax 
avoidance through the use of havens... causes an equivalent increase 
in United Kingdom tax revenue. At the very least, there will be a 
substantial wastage as taxpayers react to anti-haven legislation by 
rearranging their affairs, for example through emigration or a shift 
to other lines of activity; and the same process taken further will 
cause tax revenue to fall through the suppression of "avoidance" 
instead of rising. A fall in tax revenue through the suppression of 
avoidance is nothing improbable or untypical: for example, section 
482, ICTA 1970 may well have this effect at present..."^
It might be argued that the CFC measures are a success if they prevent these 
types of transactions notwithstanding that, in such cases, the measures do not 
actually generate revenue. Such an argument would be based on the premise that 
these types of offshore transaction are "abusive" and therefore should be 
prevented. However, any argument in favour of using the CFC measures to 
simply prevent certain activities of CFCs taking place will rapidly run into 
questions as to the justification of such legislative measures. As has already been 
suggested in that regard, the case for the CFC measures has not been convincingly 
argued or established in either the U.S. or the U.K.
Moreover, such an argument takes no account of the consequential economic 
effects of the offshore transaction. It may be that domestic revenue is actually 
reduced because the offshore transaction is not carried out. This might happen in 
any number of ways, for instance where there is onshore activity (which generates
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profits subject to taxation) arising as a direct or indirect consequence of the 
offshore transaction (e.g. onshore reinsurance by a domestic company of an 
offshore insurance policy written by its overseas associate; onshore underwriting 
of an issue organised offshore, etc) < 3 8
CFC LEGISLATION AND DOUBLE TAX TREATIES
There has been little official discussion in either the U.K. or the U.S. of the 
relationship between the CFC legislation and double tax treaties negotiated by 
those states. There is certainly no discussion of the apparent difficulties that arise 
when the operation of CFC provisions effectively produces a tax result which is 
different to the result which would have been applied under the terms of an 
existing double tax treaty. 3 9  Indeed, there seems to have been no discussion on 
this point in the course of the U.S. discussions and only the briefest of references 
to double tax agreements in the course of the U.K. consultative process.^ The 
difficulties are not confined to the realm of discussions on IFL but involve 
substantive legal issues also, although these are not discussed further here.
From the perspective of IFL, the difficulties stem from the fact that the CFC 
measures effectively represent the taxation of the CFC itself, notwithstanding that 
the charge is, legally, levied on the domestic parent of the CFC. (Since the 
computation of the CFC charge is determined by reference to the profits and 
circumstances of the CFC the economic reality is that the CFC itself is being 
taxed, although for the convenience of the domestic tax authorities applying the 
CFC legislation the tax is levied on and collected from the domestic parent) . 4 1  
However, as noted earlier, where CFCs are resident in a state with which the U.K. 
or U.S. (as the case may be) has a treaty, then, under the terms of that treaty, 
they should generally be subject to U.K. (or U.S.) tax only if they have a 
permanent establishment in that state, and then only on the profits properly 
attributable to that permanent establishment. It would therefore appear that the 
taxation of CFCs contradicts the double tax treaty approach. 4 2
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The relationship of the CFC provisions to double tax treaties and the difficulties 
identified above are not merely academic points. The U.K. has treaties with a 
number of states which are regarded as low or no tax havens (e.g. with Barbados, 
Cyprus, Isle of Man, 4 3  St. Lucia) and the U.S. similarly has treaties with such 
states (e.g. with Luxembourg and Trinidad and Tobago). It is therefore not 
possible to argue that no clash between CFC provisions and treaty provisions can 
in practice arise.
Since there is no considered official discussion of the matter, it is not possible to 
set out the view of the Inland Revenue or IRS on this issue. Presumably, it might 
be argued by those fiscal authorities that since the CFC provisions do no more 
than attribute income to the jurisdictions from which such income was artificially 
diverted, there cannot in principle be a clash between those provisions and the 
provisions of double tax treaties since the CFC provisions merely restore the fiscal 
result which should have arisen anyway. However, this line of argument would 
require some considerable development before it could represent a complete 
answer to the apparent conflict of CFC legislation and double tax treaties. For 
example, one of the most pressing matters that would need to be established in 
support of this argument is the existence in each case of an acceptable "nexus" to 
justify the taxation of the CFC by the state applying the CFC provisions. Applying 
the generally accepted views as to the circumstances in which a state may 
legitimately exercise its taxing powers, it is difficult to see how the existence of 
such a nexus can in such a case be established.
From the perspective of IFL the point of most concern is that the relationship of 
these CFC provisions to existing double tax agreements was effectively totally 
ignored in the enactment of both the U.S. and U.K. CFC legislation. Since double 
tax agreements have to date proved to be the most effective instrument of IFL, 
this aspect of the enactment of CFC legislation is of particular concern. 
Unfortunately, this unilateral disregard for double tax treaties is not confined to 
this single instance and the U.S. in particular has recently been heavily criticised 
for its apparent willingness to introduce unilateral measures which specifically
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override or contradict provisions of double tax treaties it has negotiated.^ The 
implications of this point for IFL are discussed further in the final chapter of this 
thesis.
CFC LEGISLATION AND THE POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES OF IFL
This section of this chapter concentrates on a consideration of the CFC legislation 
from the perspective of the two key policies of IFL, equity and neutrality. 
However, it should be noted that a number of the matters already discussed 
earlier in separate sections of this chapter are of equal relevance to the present 
section in view of their significance from the perspective of the principles of IFL 
(for example, the discussions on the assumptions of the CFC legislation and the 
relationship of that legislation to double tax treaties). The present discussion 
therefore provides an opportunity to deal with certain issues which have not yet 
been discussed in this chapter.
Equity
There are a number of issues which should be raised from the perspective of 
equity in connection with the CFC legislation.
One fundamental matter, reflected in the CFC legislation of all states which have 
enacted such measures, is the fact that the legislation completely ignores the 
autonomy and separate identity of the relevant subsidiary CFC. This approach is 
contrary to the conventional approach to the separate personality generally 
accorded to companies4 5  and also contrary to the approach adopted for the 
purposes of transfer pricing provisions. Whereas those provisions typically regard 
the parent and its subsidiary as two entirely separate entities to be treated as 
dealing at arm's length, the CFC provisions in effect ignore the status of the 
subsidiary as a separate and autonomous entity and instead attribute its profits (in 
whole or in part) to the parent in whose hands they are taxed. The conceptual 
justification for this treatment has been considered earlier in this chapter. At
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best, it may be concluded that the case has not been proven. In consequence, the 
treatment is somewhat suspect on that ground alone from the perspective of 
equity. Indeed, given that a domestic shareholder may be subject to a tax charge 
under the CFC provisions even if no remittance has been received from the 
overseas company, the fact that no proper justification in principle has been made 
is particularly regrettable.
The case supporting the inequitable nature of CFC legislation is further 
strengthened by the blatant lack of symmetry in their operation: although profits 
of a CFC are to be allocated to the parent for current taxation, losses are not. 
Again, a comparison with the transfer pricing principle provides an observation 
of relevance (although the comparison is not entirely straightforward^): whereas 
the transfer pricing provisions should normally be applied consistently in a way 
which may both increase or reduce taxable profits attributed to a state (in the case 
of a sale at an undervalue by a domestic company and a sale at an overvalue by 
a domestic company respectively^), the CFC provisions lack any analogous 
symmetry since, in view of the approach taken in the case of losses, they can only 
increase the taxable profits attributed to the state applying the CFC legislation.
This treatment seems clearly inequitable judged solely according to the 
assumptions that presumably underlie CFC legislation since, if the results of the 
CFC are to be attributed to a domestic shareholder on the presumed basis that 
those results are in reality his, it would seem necessary to apply this treatment 
consistently, and this would seem logically to mean the attribution of both profits 
and losses as appropriate.
A  further matter which has been referred to in the discussions on both the U.S. 
and U.K. provisions is the holding required by a domestic shareholder for that 
shareholder to become potentially subject to the legislation. In the case of both 
the U.S. and the U.K. a 10% holding is sufficient for this purpose. In the earlier 
discussion this figure was criticised for being set too low since a shareholder with 
a 1 0 % interest is in practice unlikely to have a significant voice in the
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management of the offshore CFC. It is therefore inequitable that such a 
shareholder is taxed under the CFC provisions on the contrary assumption. 
Domestic shareholders should not be subject to current taxation on the income 
of a foreign company under the CFC legislation if they do not have sufficient 
power to cause it to distribute funds with which such tax can be paid. However, 
the U.S. and U.K. CFC legislation will apply if more than 50% of the shares of 
a foreign company are owned in aggregate by domestic shareholders holding 1 0 % 
or more of those shares, even if those domestic shareholders are not connected, 
and even if they are not aware of each other’s existence. The approach seems to 
be based on the bizarre theory that all domestic shareholders have a common 
interest and therefore should be treated as a group which effectively controls the 
foreign corporation. In the case where there is no connection between domestic 
shareholders (let alone where they are unaware of each others existence), this 
approach seems completely unreasonable and without justification.^
The selective nature of the CFC legislation has already been referred to in the 
earlier discussion in this chapter relating to the identification of tax avoidance 
activities and it is also of relevance to the discussion of neutrality below. It should 
also be noted that the matter is also relevant from the perspective of equity since, 
unless the selectivity can be justified (and the earlier discussion concludes that the 
available arguments fall well short of justifying the CFC legislation), the result will 
amount to an arbitrary, and therefore inequitable, basis for taxation.
Another concern from the perspective of equity is the degree of discretion in 
applying the legislation which is delegated to the tax authorities. The situation is 
possibly of more concern in the U.K. due to the fact that a direction from the 
Board of Inland Revenue is required before the U.K. legislation can apply, 4 9  
whereas Subpart F applies automatically. The U.K. requirement that a direction 
be made before the legislation can apply raises a number of questions as to 
whether the Inland Revenue have the resources and ability to apply the U.K. 
legislation on an even-handed basis. Concerns on the point are perhaps 
exacerbated by the more detailed legislative points (discussed in Chapter Seven)
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which the Inland Revenue is effectively given discretion to resolve (e.g. application 
of motive test, treatment of loan creditor as a person with an interest in a CFC, 
etc). Notwithstanding the automatic application of Subpart F, there are similar 
concerns concerning the discretion of the Internal Revenue Service in applying the 
legislation. These have been referred to in the discussion in Chapter Five.
Where important rules are either not contained or not fully clarified in the 
relevant legislation but left to the tax authorities, the application of the CFC 
provisions becomes less certain and potentially uneven comparing the position of 
one taxpayer to another, the primacy of the legislation is undermined and the 
taxpayer made subject to administrative dictate rather than the rule of law. All 
of these results would have deleterious consequences for the policy of equity of 
IFL.
Neutrality
Although official comments on the CFC legislation claim that the legislation has 
a neutral effect, it is doubtful, on a number of counts, if this is so.
The official reasoning behind the need for the legislation has been discussed in 
connection with both the U.S. and the U.K. in earlier chapters. As a result of the 
different emphasis given to the official discussion of the legislation in the U.S. and 
the U.K. prior to its enactment it is not possible to give a single statement of the 
official intention behind the two sets of provisions. In the U.S. the intention was 
to prevent what was perceived as unjustified tax deferral whilst in the U.K. the 
intention was to prevent what was perceived as the improper diversion and 
accumulation of profits overseas. However, the different U.S. and U.K. emphases 
are arguably two sides of the same coin and, in both cases, the official view was 
that the measures would prevent tax-driven arrangements to shelter income from 
domestic taxation. On this basis, the official position in both cases was that 
genuine business activities would not be affected.
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As has been seen in the discussion in earlier chapters, seems unlikely to be true. 
Indeed, it may be argued, on the basis of the discussion in earlier chapters, that 
it necessarily could not be the case. With regard to the U.S., for example, and 
accepting (somewhat unrealistically) for one moment the propriety of the anti- 
deferral approach, even if all forms of deferral had been stopped by an expanded 
Subpart F as was originally intended, this would not have a merely neutral effect 
but would clearly favour domestic investment, a point conceded by a 1976 U.S. 
Treasury study on Subpart F.so With regard to the U.K., the earlier discussion has 
established that there are various grounds (both conceptual and practical) for 
doubting whether the U.K. CFC provisions could ever function solely to enable 
the taxation in the U.K. of profits diverted and retained overseas for tax purposes.
The different approaches to a motive test illustrate the point. In the U.S. 
legislation, there is now a purely objective test which has been substituted for the 
earlier subjective test of whether or not the CFC had been formed or availed of 
to reduce its tax liability. The new test, following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
requires the relevant income actually to be subject to tax at a rate of 90% or 
more of the corresponding U.S. taxation on the income. 5 1  The major weakness 
of the U.S. approach is that the percentage amount of tax suffered on overseas 
activities is arguably completely irrelevant in determining whether genuine 
business activities are being conducted. The policy approach that the overseas 
activities are not "genuine" and therefore should be taxed under Subpart F where 
the applicable foreign tax rate is less than 30.6% (34% (U.S. rate) x 90%) is 
certainly a failure from the standpoint of the criterion of neutrality.
The U.K. motive test is perhaps even less satisfactory, although the U.K. taxpayer 
will of course only need to consider it if a direction under the U.K. CFC 
legislation is given. 5 2  The U.K. test has been discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, 
from which discussion it may be concluded that the test is most unlikely to provide 
adequate protection in the case of CFCs conducting non-tax motivated operations 
overseas.
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Therefore, despite the various official protestations of the U.S. (for example, 
"there is absolutely no thought of penalising private investment abroad which rests 
upon genuine production or market activities" ) 5 3  and the U.K. (for example, "we 
are determined that legislation to counteract avoidance should not in any way be 
damaging to genuine business activities" ) 5 4  the respective motive tests appear 
unreasonably restrictive and therefore unlikely to ensure that the respective CFC 
provisions have a neutral effect on genuine business activities.
The selective nature of the legislation is also likely to have a non-neutral effect on 
certain types of business activities. Most obviously, the types of activities which 
are made subject to CFC legislation are made relatively unattractive in 
comparison with other types of activities which are not subject to the legislation. 
Further, as has been noted in the earlier discussions on the impact of the CFC 
measures on the banking and insurance sectors, the U.S. and U.K. CFC measures 
may have the effect of simply ruling out the viability of certain types of overseas 
business.
Similar concerns have been experienced in the case of the CFC legislation of 
other states . 5 5
Against the above arguments it might be objected that CFC legislation is required 
to restore neutrality between, for example, U.K.-based and tax haven-based 
companies established by U.K.-based multi-nationals. However, such a view 
would involve the fisc concerned in taxing not only residents within the jurisdiction 
of that state but also residents in overseas states (i.e. the CFCs). Such taxation 
would need to be justified by reference to the established concepts of taxation, 
residence and taxable presence, which have been discussed throughout this thesis, 
and particularly in Chapter One. This matter is discussed further in the next 
section of this chapter below. For present purposes, it should be noted that any 
argument that CFC provisions are required to restore neutrality between domestic 
and tax-haven based operations organised by a domestic-headquartered multi­
national inevitably raises a number of fundamental issues of relevance to IFL and
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is not therefore a comprehensive justification of CFC legislation from the 
perspective of neutrality.
For all the above reasons (and the more detailed discussions in Chapters Five and 
Seven) the CFC legislation in general is not a conspicuous success according to 
the criterion of neutrality.
There are, of course, further detailed points on the degree to which the CFC 
provisions comply with the policies of IFL and which are of specific relevance to 
the U.S. and U.K. legislation. These points have been considered as relevant in 
earlier chapters.
LEGITIMACY OF THE TAXATION OF CFCs
The question of the legitimacy of measures enacted to tax currently the overseas 
profits of a CFC in the hands of its shareholders is an issue of fundamental 
importance which received relatively minor attention in both the U.S. and the
u .k ..36
In both the U.S. and the U.K. the legitimacy of the measures was assumed by the 
fisc, presumably, as a result of the key assumptions behind the legislation (which 
have been discussed earlier in this chapter).
Since the CFC tax charge is levied on domestic shareholders in the case of both 
the U.K. and U.S. legislation, there is arguably no strict legal reason to deny the 
validity of the tax charge. However, since this thesis is concerned with the primary 
objective underlying IFL and the policies and principles of IFL which flow from 
that objective as explained in Chapter One, the strict legality of the substantive 
CFC provisions is in any event not necessarily an adequate response to the 
question of their legitimacy, judged from the perspective of IFL adopted in this 
thesis. Therefore, there remain questions as to how the measures are reconciled 
to the conventional (and widely-accepted) approach to taxation adopted in the
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U.S. and the U.K. and as to the wider effects of such provisions from the 
perspective of IFL. The latter question, relating to IFL, is explored in the final 
chapter. The former question is discussed below.
In Chapter One, it was explained that foreign source income accruing to a 
resident of a state is generally either not taxed under either the "territorial" basis 
of taxation (as in Hong Kong) or under the "exemption" method (as in the 
Netherlands) or subject to tax on a "world-wide" basis but with a credit for foreign 
taxes suffered (as in the U.K. and U.S.). These approaches to the taxation of 
foreign source income could not strictly be applied to tax the income of a CFC 
since such approaches apply only if the taxpayer is initially within the taxing 
jurisdiction, usually as a result of being resident in the relevant state. The 
alternative means by which corporate taxation is levied on non-residents is, as has 
also been explained in Chapter One, according to the basis of "taxable presence" 
(also referred to as the treaty concept of "permanent establishment"). It will be 
recalled that, under this basis, a state taxes the income arising within its 
jurisdiction from activities carried on by a non-resident entity, such as a branch of 
an overseas company. This basis is also not available to tax the income of CFCs 
since there is, (it is assumed) no activity amounting to a "presence" in the state of 
the parent company. Therefore, the widely-accepted bases of taxation, residence 
and taxable presence, do not in themselves support the taxation of CFCs.
Applying the above traditional concepts of residence and taxable presence it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in effect, the CFC provisions represent an 
extension of the tax jurisdiction of the state enacting the provisions. The CFC 
provisions are directed against the parent (shareholder) and not the CFC itself 
(no doubt for reasons for enforceability), so that, from a purely mechanical (or 
strictly legal) perspective, no taxation is ever levied on the CFC itself. Thus, it is 
possible to argue that the tax charge is directed against a company resident within 
the jurisdiction in which the CFC provisions are applied.
T/8 396
However, the reality or substance of the situation is that taxation is exacted on the 
profits of the CFC, even though this is achieved by the domestic collection 
mechanism referred to above. In the absence of any official discussion of this, it 
seems that the CFC provisions represent an extension of the domestic tax base 
and that there is no adequate nexus (judged by reference to the conventional and 
widely-accepted approach to taxation discussed in detail in Chapter One) which 
would justify the tax charge. 5 7
Illustrating the point by reference to the established law on the jurisdiction of 
U.K. taxation, it is clear that the approach adopted to tax the profits of CFCs is 
at best highly incongruous. There is a significant body of U.K. law dealing with 
the territorial limits of U.K. taxation. 5 8
The decided authorities and the relevant law5 9  indicate that the U.K. jurisdiction 
to tax arises in three situations: where the taxpayer is fiscally resident in the U.K.; 
where the taxpayer is fiscally present in the U.K. and carrying on trading activities 
or where income is derived from property situate in the
In the light of the above, and given that the charge to taxation under the U.K. 
CFC rules is levied on a resident of the U.K., two alternative conclusions follow. 
First, it may be accepted that the charge to tax is in reality a charge on the U.K. 
resident. 6 1  In this case (and assuming the points made above and the perspective 
adopted for the purposes of this analysis) the tax charge (which is solely a function 
of the profits, but not the losses, of an entirely separate overseas company) 
appears somewhat arbitrary, with no more justification than the levying of a tax 
charge by reference to, say, the results of the 3.45 at Wincanton. 6 2  Alternatively, 
it may be concluded that the tax charge is in substance levied on the overseas 
company notwithstanding that the tax collection arrangements involve a U.K. 
company. In this case the imposition of the U.K. tax charge is flagrantly in breach 
of established principles of the territorial scope of U.K. taxation. (Further, where 
there is an applicable double tax treaty between the U.K. and the country in
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which the CFC is located, the CFC charge may, as noted earlier, represent a 
unilateral breach of that treaty) . 6 3
The discussion earlier in this chapter on the assumptions behind the CFC 
legislation has already noted that it is at least doubtful whether an adequate 
justification for the CFC legislation has been made by the states enacting such 
measures. This is on the assumption that there is in fact no nexus of residence 
or presence (i.e. that the CFC is not resident in the state with the CFC legislation 
and has not established any taxable presence there). Naturally, either or both of 
those bases may apply in any particular case. If so, taxation of the CFC would be 
justified by reference to whichever of those bases applied. However, if a nexus 
of either residence or taxable presence were to apply, CFC provisions would be 
irrelevant in any event because other domestic legislation would be available to 
impose the charge to tax. Since, on this view, the CFC provisions are made otiose 
by other legislation to the extent that CFCs may legitimately be subject to tax, the 
necessity for CFC legislation appears questionable. This matter is discussed 
further below.
THE NECESSITY FOR CFC LEGISLATION
As has been noted, the generally accepted bases of taxation, residence and taxable 
presence, may in some cases be available to tax to some extent the profits of a 
CFC.
With regard to the U.K., if a CFC were in fact resident in that state by virtue of 
the fact that the central management and control of the CFC was exercised in the 
U.K. (or if the CFC were resident as a result of being a U.K. company)^ then the 
world-wide profits of the CFC would immediately become subject to U.K. 
taxation. 6 5  If the CFC were not resident in the U.K. but in fact earned some of 
its profits in the U.K. then such U.K. activity would be likely to establish a taxable 
presence in the U.K. under general principles.^ Even if the CFC was neither 
resident nor had any taxable presence in the U.K., it may still be possible to
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effectively tax some or all of its profits by the operation of domestic transfer 
pricing rules. 6 7  For example, if the CFC engages in related party transactions with 
an associate which is either resident or has a taxable presence (i.e. a branch) in 
the U.K. for tax purposes, the transfer pricing provisions might be applied to 
ensure that the transfer prices used correspond to market or arm's length rates. 
Similarly, if a U.K. resident or a U.K. branch of a foreign company negotiated a 
business transaction and then purported to assign the benefit of the transaction 
to a CFC associate for no consideration or at an undervalue, the relevant profits 
would on general principles remain taxable in the U.K . . 6 8
The position in the case of the U.S. is, broadly, the same as that stated above for 
the U.K., although the criterion of the residence of a company for U.S. purposes 
is different, being determined by reference to the country of incorporation alone . 6 9  
This means that artificial arrangements whereby profits earned in the U.S. or the 
U.K. are imputed to a CFC located in a tax haven can be taxed in the U.S. or 
U.K. as the case may be without reference to specific CFC legislation.
It is clearly not the case that all powers of the U.K. and U.S. CFC legislation are 
rendered otiose by other pre-existing legislation. Most obviously, income earned 
outside the state of the parent (shareholder) company by a non-resident CFC (for 
example, income earned by the CFC in transactions with other overseas third 
parties) could not be subject to tax in the state of the parent in the absence of the 
CFC provisions. However, as noted in the earlier discussion, it is in precisely this 
sort of situation that there appears to be no acceptable basis or justification for 
taxation. It is therefore possible to conclude that, to the extent that the CFC 
provisions are not rendered unnecessary by pre-existing legislation, there remain 
doubts as to the necessity (and justification) of the legislation.
The process in the U.S. of the enactment of Subpart F did not deal in any detail 
with the adequacy of existing legislation. The consultative process in the U.K. did, 
however, briefly touch on the question. In the June 1982 consultative document
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the Inland Revenue replied to the argument that existing legislation was adequate 
to prevent abuse:
"Those who believe that existing anti-avoidance legislation is 
adequate are invited to show how it is effective against avoidance 
through the artificial diversion of trading activities or investment 
income from the U.K. or where transactions take place between a 
controlled overseas company and a third party" ^ 0
The comments already made dispose of the first point in the above quotation: 
existing legislation and existing principles of taxation (other than CFC measures) 
will operate to tax income earned in the U.K., but artificially diverted to a tax 
haven. If the income has not been earned in the U.K., then it is difficult to see by 
what criteria it can be described as having been subject to any "artificial diversion" 
from that state. The second point in the above quotation (relating to transactions 
between a CFC and a third overseas party) is not dealt with by existing legislation. 
However, in light of the earlier discussions on the assumptions behind the CFC 
legislation, the almost non-existent analysis of the perceived problem, and the 
questionable nexus for taxation, it is perhaps rather more reasonable to invite the 
U.K. Inland Revenue to first show the propriety of what appears to be an 
extension of the U.K. tax base. The same invitation applies equally to the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service or Treasury in the case of Subpart F. Until this is done, 
the necessity for (and legitimacy of) CFC legislation (whether of the U.S. or U.K. 
variety) remains in doubt.
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CHAPTER 8  - NOTES
1 The reader will be aware that the detail supporting the more general 
discussion contained in this chapter is set out in Chapters Four to Seven 
with further relevant background material in Chapters One to Three. The 
intention behind the discussion in this chapter is to concentrate on those 
areas which are of fundamental importance from the perspective of IFL 
but which are relevant to both the U.K. and U.S. CFC legislation.
2 It appears to be irrelevant that Hong Kong, for example, developed its 
domestic source-based taxation system with a heavy reliance on the 
deduction of tax at source for the entirely pragmatic reason that such a 
system seemed to be the only viable means of collecting taxation; or that 
Cyprus developed as it has largely due to its geographical position which 
facilitates commercial penetration of the Middle East markets. All these 
factors are of no relevance in the face of the U.S. and U.K. CFC 
legislation which simply makes the underlying assumption that all these 
states are just as much "tax havens" as, say, the island of Sark for the 
purposes of the CFC legislation. It is of course understood that the U.S. 
for example, does not, in legislative terms, direct its CFC legislation 
specifically at any state or set of states, much less at "tax havens". The 
discussion in the text is concerned not with the legislation itself but with 
the assumptions underlying the legislation.
3 B. Spitz, Tax Haven Encyclopedia, (loose leaf service), Butterworths, 
London.
4 In the case of Ireland, for example, there are several well known tax- 
planning structures which involve Irish companies and these are not by any 
means restricted to structures which involve Dublin IFSC companies or 
activities.
5 See discussion in Chapter seven.
6  B.J. Arnold; "The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: Defining 
and Designating Tax Havens - II", 1985, British Tax Review, p. 362 at p. 367.
7 For example, during the U.K. consultative process, the Inland Revenue 
stated that "the need for legislation of some sort to counter tax haven 
abuse is generally accepted". See Board of Inland Revenue, "Tax Havens 
and the Corporate Sector, June 1982, para 3. Similarly, as regards the 
U.S., the entire thrust of the U.S. Gordon Reportg reflects the anxiety on 
the part of the fisc with regard to the use made of tax havens by U.S. 
taxpayers - see A Report to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the 
Assistant Attorney General (Tax Division) and the Assistant secretary of 
the Treasury (Tax Policy), submitted by Richard A. Gordon, special 
counsel for International Taxation, 12 January 1981. See also Senate 
Committee Report, 87th Congress, 2d session, s. Rep. No. 1881 (1962) 78.
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8  The discussion later in this chapter on the official approach to analysis of 
the issues provides further evidence regarding the assumption by the tax 
authorities that the choice of a tax haven location for a company is driven 
by unacceptable tax avoidance motives.
9 In respect of the U.S., see, for example, a report to The Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, the Assistant Attorney General (Tax Division) and the 
Assistant secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy), submitted by Richard A. 
Gordon, Special Counsel for International Taxation, 12 January 1981, 
passim. In respect of the U.K., see, for example, Board of Inland 
Revenue, 'Tax Havens and the Corporate Sector", June 1982, para 7.
10 See for example, T Clarke and J G Tigue, Dirty Money. (Millington 
Books, 1975). The book deals with the use of tax havens for the purposes 
of money laundering and commercial fraud.
11 It is probably true to say that most economists writing on tax would see the 
objective of raising revenue as the primary objective behind any tax system. 
See, for example, comments implicit in Adam Smith, "The Wealth of 
Nations", Book V, Chapter II, Part II.
12 The distinction between raising revenue on the one hand and combatting 
avoidance on the other has been discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
13 Board of Inland Revenue, 'Taxation of International Business; December 
1982, foreword, by John Wakeham, M.P.
14 For example, with regard to the "benefit" of deferral it appears to have 
been assumed that U.S. taxpayers could in many instances simply redirect 
income otherwise accruing to a U.S. corporation to a tax haven 
corporation. This is similar to the (implicit) assumption in the official U.K. 
approach to CFC legislation that taxpayers could easily divert certain types 
of income to tax havens. The ability of taxpayers generally to divert 
income in this way is discussed in the main body of the chapter.
15 The President’s 1961 Tax Recommendations, reprinted in 1 House 
Hearings on the Tax Recommendations of the President, 87th Congress., 
1st session 8-10 (1961).
16 However, it will be recalled from earlier chapters that the official concept 
of "passive" income is extremely broad and is used, for example, to catch 
financial trading and similar activities such as securities trading, financing, 
etc.
17 For example, the existence of minority shareholders in a company which 
may be part of an international group requires a local "profit centre" 
approach. Local shareholders, even if a minority, could oppose a transfer 
of the profits from the company in which they have invested and any
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transfer in such circumstances may be an actionable fraud. Even where 
there are no minority shareholders, market conditions may impose limits 
to any avoidance schemes. The auditors of the corporate group would be 
another factor. Since international companies are usually audited by 
international firms of accountants, they will be subject to an audit with a 
global scrutiny which requires a proper allocation of income and expenses 
between the group members. A suitable local "profit centre" approach is 
often also required to ensure local management morale and performance 
appraisal and to facilitate the operation of employee bonus schemes. All 
these factors combine to reduce significantly the ability of top level 
management to channel income or activities artificially to subsidiaries in tax 
haven locations.
18 Report of the O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs; Model Double 
Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital (Paris, 1977) p. 91, 
paragraph 3.
19 With regard to the U.K., see Salomon v Salomon, [1897] AC 22. In the 
U.S. corporations are accorded separate legal personality under state law. 
For tax purposes, this characterisation of corporations as legally separate 
persons is preserved by IRC s. 7701 (a) (3), (4).
20 Note 70, Ibid.
21 This point is made by Brian Arnold; 'The Taxation of Controlled Foreign 
Corporations", Taxes International, issue 6 6 , April 1985, p. 5.
22 ICTA 1988, s. 790.
23 IRC s. 902.
24 ICTA 1988 s. 790 (4).
25 In the U.K., a resident company is subject to tax on all its profits, wherever 
arising, under ICTA 1988, s. 8 . In the U.S., a resident company is subject 
to tax on its gross income, wherever arising, under IRC s. 61.
26 This argument is also referred to by Brian Arnold (see note 21) above.
27 The capital duty charge formerly arose under FA 1973, s. 47 (1) and 
Schedule 19, paragraph 1 . The charge was abolished by FA 1988 with 
effect from 16 March 1988. The charge to tax on world wide profits arises 
under ICTA 1988, s. 8 . The network of U.K. double tax treaties is available 
due to the (assumed) U.K. residence of the subsidiary for the purposes of 
those treaties.
28 The charge to tax on U.K. income and gains arises under ICTA 1999, s. 11 
and the network of U.K. double tax treaties is not available due to the fact
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that the company which has established a branch in the U.K. will be 
resident outside the U.K. for the purposes of the U.K. double tax treaties.
29 The point may be illustrated by reference to financial sector inward 
investment into Japan. As a result of pressure by the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance, it is extremely rare for such inward investment to be structured 
using a Japanese company. Instead, a branch structure is typically 
adopted, being a branch of a Hong Kong incorporated company in a large 
number of cases.
30 Note 7, Ibid.
31 See Board of Inland Revenue; Taxation of International Business, 
(December, 1982 pp. 12-16.
32 For example, the U.K study, which merely lists the types of companies it 
believes take advantage of tax haven locations, gives no information as to 
what uses are made by such companies of their retained funds, nor any 
information as to what percentage of revenues are distributed by way of 
dividend to shareholders. Without this sort of information, the study does 
not facilitate the drawing of conclusions on the need for the CFC 
measures.
33 Note 13 Ibid.
34 See B.J. Arnold; "The Taxation of Controlled-Foreign-Corporations", 
Conference Report, Taxes International, April 1985, p. 3 at p. 6 .
35 Note 34, Ibid at p. 4. The 1976 study was carried out by G. Hufbaver and 
D. Foster; "U.S. Taxation of the Undistributed Income of Controlled 
Foreign Corporations; in U.S. Department of Treasury; Essays in 
International Taxation: (Washington, D.C. 1976).
36 U.S. Department of Treasury; Taxation of the Undistributed Income of 
Controlled Foreign Corporation, (1976), reprinted in I.B.F.D. Bulletin 
p. 391 at pp 391-2.
37 Submission by the Institute of Directors on the Inland Revenue 
Consultative Document of January 1981, p. 3 ,28th June 1981. ICTA 1970, 
s. 482 has now been partially replaced. In its revised form it is ICTA 1988, 
s. 765.
38 It should be stated that the comments in the text on the possible economic 
consequences of the CFC legislation are inevitably somewhat speculative 
and clearly far from complete. It is not the purpose or intent of this thesis 
to offer any specific economic analysis as such of the CFC provisions.
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39 See further the detailed discussion contained in the second and third 
sections of Chapter Nine. A detailed example illustrating the point 
referred to here is contained in a footnote to the discussion in Chapter 
Nine.
40 As has been noted in the last chapter, the U.K. Revenue, in responding to 
representations on the matter, stated that it would not be right to exclude 
the operation of the CFC provisions merely due to the existence of a 
double tax agreement; that it would be impractical to revise all double tax 
agreements and that to terminate them would be too drastic a step, (see 
Board of Inland Revenue; Taxation of International Business, (December, 
1982) pp 22-23). This suggests that the problem was, at least in part, 
recognised although no proper response is made to it.
41 The analysis in terms of economic substance rather than strict legal form 
requires no justification in these circumstances and, in any event, is 
normally a mode of analysis much favoured by the Revenue, particularly 
in their approach to international tax avoidance.
42 Even if the CFC had a permanent establishment in a state which applied 
CFC legislation against it, this would not change the analysis. The taxation 
of the profits of the permanent establishment would of course be fully 
justified on normal principles but this would be irrelevant to the operation 
of CFC legislation.
43 Although the domestic rate of tax is comparatively high (20%) it is well 
known that there are privileged regimes which apply to certain companies, 
resulting in a very much lower tax charge: for example, the "exempt 
company" regime under the Income Tax (Exempt Companies) Act 1984 
which involves an annual tax charge of £250 or the non-resident company 
regime (annual tax charge £450).
44 For instance, a good recent example relates to the "commensurate with 
income standard" to be applied to royalties and other intangibles as a 
result of TRA 1986 amendments to s. 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
These "superroyalty" provisions as they are known, require periodic 
adjustment of transfer prices under domestic law.
45 The approach referred to in the text is not, however, unique. As has been 
discussed in Chapters Four and Six, there are in the U.S. and U.K. various 
measures which tax in the hands of shareholders the undistributed income 
of a company. For example, the FPHC legislation in the U.S., as discussed 
in Chapter Four, and the provisions in ICTA 1988, s. 739, directed against 
the transfer of income abroad by an individual, as discussed in Chapter Six.
46 The comparison is not entirely straight forward because although there are 
some states in which domestic transfer pricing provisions are applied 
consistently to increase or reduce taxable profits (as appropriate) it is by
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no means always the case that domestic transfer pricing legislation will 
have an entirely symmetrical treatment and only some double tax treaties 
provide for symmetrical treatment where the associated enterprises article 
applies.
47 For example, the informal capital doctrine under Dutch tax law illustrates 
the principle that, under Dutch law, transactions between a company and 
its shareholders, in so far as these are not at arm's length, should not have 
an influence on determining the taxable profit of the company. The 
informal capital doctrine has been developed by Supreme Court case law 
and in essence constitutes the "mirroring" position of a deemed distribution 
to a shareholder. Where, for example, a subsidiary sells an asset to its 
parent below market value then, in principle, the difference between 
market value and transfer value gives rise to a recognition of a taxable 
profit that is regarded as instantly distributed on a net basis. Where the 
situation is reversed, i.e. a parent distributes an asset at a value below its 
market value, then the difference between the market value and the 
transfer value is taken into account as well. This is done through the 
informal capital doctrine which would result in the subsidiary recording the 
asset it required from its parent at market value. The difference between 
market value and transfer value does not constitute a profit but is regarded 
as informal capital. See further H.R. April 3, 1957, BNB 1957/165 and
H.R. May 31,1978, BNB 1978/252. In the latter case, an interest free loan 
from a Swedish ultimate parent company to its Dutch subsidiary company 
was regarded as constituting an informal capital contribution for an amount 
equal to the arm's length rate of interest. Thus, without actually having to 
pay the interest, the Dutch company could nevertheless accrue an account 
for an interest charge in its books for tax purposes.
48 Of course it is not suggested that the situation described in the text -10% 
shareholders not being aware of each others existence - is a situation which 
will be common. However, if this is correct, then it would not seem 
necessary for the legislation to deal with the situation in the way it does.
49 ICTA 1988, s.747 (1).
50 Note 36, Ibid, p. 434.
51 IRC, s. 954.
52 The U.K. motive test is contained in ICTA 1988 s. 748 (3). The
requirement that a direction be given before the legislation can apply is to
be found in ICTA 1988, s.747 ( 1 ).
53 President’s 1961 Tax Recommendations, reprinted in 1 House Hearings on 
the Tax Recommendations of the President, 87th Cong. 1st sess. (8-10) 
1961, at pp. 27-28.
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54 Board of Inland Revenue; 'Taxation of International Business", December 
1982, foreword.
55 For example, an International Fiscal Association Seminar Paper records 
the following comments on the effect of the French CFC provisions which 
are contained in Article 70 of the Code General des Impots: "It may be 
feared that the system organised under Article 70 is of a nature to 
jeopardise French enterprises on the international market, the more so as 
it extends as well to international joint ventures since an interest of 25% 
is enough to make the French taxpayer subject to Article 70". Section on 
France by J.C. Goldsmith, "Recourse to Tax Havens, Use and Abuse", 
IFA Seminar Paper (Kluwer, 1980), p. 47.
56 In the U.K. the question of the legitimacy of the taxation of CFCs was 
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papers, such as the Institute of Directors. In the U.S., there is no apparent 
record of discussions on the legitimacy of the measures although subpart 
F was pronounced to be within the constitution in the case of Garlock Inc. 
v. Comr 58 TC 423 (1972), affirmed 489 F.2d 197 (2nd Cir. 1973).
57 In this context it should be noted that a major focus of debate on IFL has 
been the question whether there are limits to the jurisdiction of a state to 
levy tax imposed by general international law. That debate (including 
references to the works of Norr, Knechtle, Qureshi and Akehurst), and its 
relevance to this thesis is discussed in Chapter One under the heading "The 
substantive enactments which constitute IFL". A more recent article on 
this same subject which provides a helpful summary of the main issues is 
D. Martin, "Extraterritorial Enforcement of Tax Law", Journal of Asian 
Pacific Taxation, May/June 1992, p. 11.
58 For example, the general principle is stated by Lord Herschell in a well-
known statement in Colquhoun v. Brooks: "The Income Tax Acts,
however, themselves impose a territorial limit; either that from which the 
taxable income is derived must be situate in the United Kingdom or the 
person whose income is to be taxed must be resident there" (2 TC 490 at 
499). Other leading U.K. cases, such as Clark v Oceanic Contractors Inc 
[1983] STC35 and National Bank of Greece v Westminster Bank Executor 
and Trustee Co. (46 TC 472) are fully in accord with this general principle.
59 ICTA 1988, ss.6 , 8 , 11.
60 This explains the significance of the extensive body of U.K. law dealing
with such matters as where the situs of assets is for these purposes - see,
for example, New York Life Insurance v. Public Trustee ([1924] 2 Ch. 101) 
on the general rules for determining the situs of debts under English law.
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rules in the U.S. or the "close company" rules (ICTA 1988, ss. 423-429 as 
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transfers of income abroad (ICTA 1988, s. 739), which have been enacted 
in the U.K..
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63 This is not a point which is in practice accepted by the U.S. or U.K. tax 
authorities as they will not accept that the "business profits" (or other) 
article of a treaty precludes taxation under the CFC provision.
64 FA 1988, s. 6 6 .
65 ICTA 1988, s. 8 .
6 6  ICTA 1988, s. 1 1 .
67 ICTA 1988, s.770.
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1982, para 6 .
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS ON THE CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL 
FISCAL LAW OF UNILATERAL ANTI-TAX HAVEN LEGISLATION
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the likely consequences for IFL, and the 
development of IFL, of unilateral anti-tax haven measures. In attempting to 
evaluate those consequences it has been necessary to consider (in part A) the 
nature and scope of IFL (and, particularly, the primary objective underlying IFL 
and its policies and principles) and the concepts which are fundamental to any 
discussion in this area, namely the concepts of international tax avoidance and tax 
havens. Parts B and C of this thesis have been concerned with the unilateral anti­
tax haven legislation itself, taking the legislation of the U.S. and the U.K. 
respectively as illustrative examples.! Having drawn certain conclusions on that 
type of legislation in the last chapter, (and on the basis of the discussion in the 
preceding eight chapters) it is now possible to proceed to the conclusions which 
may be drawn on the fundamental issue underlying this thesis, namely the likely 
consequences for IFL, and the development of IFL, of unilateral anti-tax haven 
legislation.
This chapter is organised into five distinct sections.
The first section, dealing with the consequences of the unilateralist approach, 
draws conclusions on how an issue (such as the approach to the taxation of CFCs) 
which is of major importance to IFL should best be considered. Having regard 
to the earlier discussion in Part A of this thesis (particularly that contained in 
Chapter One), it would be expected that a multilateral approach would be 
required. The first section considers some of the consequences of the failure to 
adopt a multilateral perspective, looking at the results that are produced by the 
unilateralist approach.
The second section of the chapter is given over to concluding on some of the 
major effects or consequences of the CFC rules and includes a discussion on the 
relationship of the CFC rules to the policies and principles of IFL and to the
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provisions of double tax treaties. Consideration is also given to the effect of CFC 
legislation on low or no tax states.
The third section of the chapter deals with the degree to which the CFC rules 
contribute toward the realisation of the primary goal underlying IFL, namely the 
removal of fiscal distortions to the freedom of movement of capital and persons 
and the exchange of goods and services, particularly in relation to the 
phenomenon of international double taxation.
The discussion in the fourth section of the chapter is directed at conclusions on 
the economic basis for CFC legislation in the light of the earlier discussions in 
Chapter Two and the section also draws some conclusions on the complexity of 
CFC legislation and the likely effect of this.
Finally, the fifth section of the chapter concludes the discussion in Part D of this 
thesis with some overall conclusions and observations on the consequences for 
international fiscal law of unilateral anti-tax haven legislation.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNILATERALIST APPROACH
As has been discussed in Chapter One, international tax measures may be 
developed unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. The first matter to be discussed 
in this chapter is the approach adopted by the U.S. and the U.K. fiscs to the 
perceived problem created by the existence of CFCs located in tax havens, i.e. the 
unilateralist approach.
It must be noted at the outset that a state may not always have the ability or 
opportunity to pursue fiscal policy on a multilateral (or bilateral) footing to the 
same extent as a unilateral route. For this pragmatic reason, even if a multilateral 
approach is generally regarded as preferable on theoretical grounds, the use of a 
unilateral route to deal with a particular issue is not in itself necessarily grounds 
for criticism. Nonetheless, it must also be borne in mind that the relative
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importance of an issue will also be of significance in determining how it is dealt 
with: where an issue is clearly of major significance and raises fundamental 
matters of principle in terms of the policies and principles of IFL, it is to be 
expected that it will receive appropriate treatment.
As is now evident from the discussion in earlier chapters, any approach to the 
taxation of CFCs raises a number of fundamental issues of IFL. For this reason 
it would seem hardly tenable to argue that, due to the relative insignificance of the 
matter, discussions on the treatment of CFCs could not be accommodated on a 
multilateral agenda. Indeed, other issues discussed recently by such organisations 
as the O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs (which is arguably the most 
influential of multilateral forums) emphasise this point. That committee has 
recently been considering in some depth the subject of the taxation of 
entertainers, artistes and sportsmen and has now prepared a report on the 
subject^ Whilst this subject is of some international importance, it is submitted 
that the issues involved do not compare in terms of breadth, complexity or 
significance with those raised by the measures designed to tax the profits of CFCs 
located in tax havens.
For the above reason, the CFC provisions are a prime candidate for multilateral 
discussion and, if appropriate, for concerted multilateral action. However, there 
has, until very recently, been no such discussion nor any suggestion by the fiscs 
concerned that a multilateral approach should be considered. The 1987 O.E.C.D. 
report entitled "Tax Havens : Measures to Prevent Abuse by Taxpayers'  ^ may 
perhaps be interpreted as a modest correction of the position, although that 
report, which is referred to further below, contributes relatively little to the subject 
and wholly fails to discuss the issues which are identified in this thesis as of most 
fundamental relevance to IFL (particularly in relation to the policies and 
principles of IFL).
It should be acknowledged that at the time of the enactment of Subpart F in 1962 
no credible multilateral vehicle existed for this purpose. 4  This position has since
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changed and it is therefore somewhat surprising that the U.K. fisc, during 1981 to 
1984, appears not to have considered taking up the issue on a multilateral basis. 5  
Similarly, Canada (in 1972), Germany (also in 1972), Japan (in 1978) and France 
(in 1980) have all adopted CFC measures without pursuing any form of bilateral 
or multilateral approach. The reasons for this are not immediately clear. In the 
absence of any published explanation it is only possible to speculate as to what 
these reasons may be. In view of the fact that the various tax authorities perceive 
the problem as being one of a leakage of domestic tax revenues6  it is possible 
that the problem is perceived as being of an exclusively national interest, rather 
than being a problem raising fundamental international issues relating to fiscal 
law. In the light of the discussion so far in this thesis, such a view would appear 
misconceived. 7  Alternatively, the perception that a leakage of revenue resulted 
from the existence of CFCs located in tax havens may have prompted these states 
to act unilaterally on a self-interested basis, disregarding as comparatively 
unimportant considerations of IFL. In this case, such action would not merely run 
counter to the development of the policies and principles of IFL but may also be 
counter to the best interests of the state concerned, both in terms of its 
international standing and its attractiveness to foreign investors^
Another possibility is that there may be some reluctance on the part of the fiscs 
concerned to take up the issue in a multilateral forum due to the slower pace the 
discussion would inevitably take. (It is, after all, generally acknowledged that 
business in international committees and similar institutions is conducted 
comparatively slowly). However, there are sound reasons why progress in dealing 
with the problems raised by the taxation of the profits of CFCs may be relatively 
slow where some form of multilateral institution is concerned: the existence of a 
number of participants (from a variety of states) in the discussion would be more 
likely to lead to consideration of all the problematic issues which the unilateralists 
have so far failed to deal with adequately (if at all); namely the justification for 
the apparent extension of the tax base; the criteria by which the appropriate type 
of international tax avoidance activity is recognised; the concept of a tax haven;
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the effect of CFC measures on the sovereignty of the "tax haven" to levy tax 
according to its own fiscal system; etc.
As has been demonstrated in the case of the U.K. and the U.S. these problematic 
issues have not been treated with anywhere near the requisite degree of 
thoroughness and, effectively, a number of key issues of IFL have been virtually 
ignored in the unilateral enactment of CFC legislation.
One further unwelcome consequence of the unilateral character of CFC legislation 
is the tendency on the part of states enacting CFC measures to legitimise the 
legislation by citing other countries which already have similar CFC measures^ 
Although the fact that other countries have CFC measures may be of relevance 
in any discussion of proposed CFC measures, it remains the case that the number 
of countries not having CFC legislation is massively superior to those that do.
The tendency to cite the CFC measures of other states in support of the 
enactment of CFC legislation should be discouraged because it imparts an 
apparent (but unjustified) legitimacy to the particular measures being discussed 
and it consequently impoverishes the analysis of any particular proposal. 1 0
The chief danger arising from the above is that defective legislation may be 
enacted by a state as a result of the "importation" without proper analysis of 
foreign approaches to a particular issue.n
This is of particular concern in the context of CFC measures because of the 
fundamental issues of IFL raised by the enactment of that legislation. 
Unfortunately, as a result of the above process, these issues are receiving wholly 
inadequate attention and are arguably almost ignored by the fisc enacting the 
unilateral CFC legislation. In those circumstances, it does not seem unreasonable 
to assume that a multilateral discussion would improve the overall quality of the 
analysis of such measures.
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In view of the above comments it might have been expected that the O.E.C.D. 
paper referred to earlier (entitled 'Tax Havens : Measures to Prevent Abuse by 
Taxpayers" ) 1 2  would have provided a more analytical review of the problems 
associated with unilateral measures directed against tax havens. Unfortunately, 
that paper is somewhat disappointing in this (and most other) respects. There is 
in the report hardly any discussion of any of the issues identified in this thesis to 
be of crucial significance to IFL. 1 3  Instead, the detailed sections of the report are 
concerned with a (reasonably familiar) discussion of the characteristics and use of 
tax havens: an overview of relevant anti-avoidance legislation; experience of that 
legislation and options for international co-operation. The possibility of a 
multilateral approach is canvassed in the last section of the paper, but this is in 
connection with an international exchange of information and administrative 
assistance, rather than a multilateral consideration of the fundamental issues 
relating to IFL which are raised by the CFC legislation.
The O.E.C.D. report therefore appears to have accepted without question the 
implicit assumptions behind unilateral CFC legislation. 1 4  In view of the 
composition of the membership of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, it is perhaps 
not surprising that such assumptions have been readily (and uncritically) adopted. 
The prior existence of unilateral CFC measures in a number of developed states 
will inevitably have some impact in guiding the approach taken by a multilateral 
committee of tax officials. In this respect, it would appear that the influence of 
existing CFC legislation not merely reaches other states in the manner described 
earlier but also shapes the multilateral discussion by tax officials of the use of tax 
havens. For all the reasons stated earlier, this influence, which appears to ignore 
some basic questions of IFL, is clearly not in the best interests of IFL.
The earlier comments may suggest that unilateral action in the field of IFL is 
always to be deprecated. However, no such suggestion is intended and there is no 
reason why, at least theoretically, appropriate unilateral measures could not be in 
the vanguard of the development of IFL. Nonetheless, the available empirical 
evidence does not generally support the use of a unilateral approach as a means
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of developing issues of IFL. This is probably a result of the tendency of a fisc to 
act in a very self -interested manner when it acts in isolation (a tendency referred 
to briefly in Chapter One). Moreover, from a practical perspective, it is difficult 
to see how IFL can be developed effectively other than by a multilateral 
approach. This international approach is implicit in the primary objective 
underlying IFL (namely, the removal of fiscal distortions to the free movement of 
capital and persons and the exchange of goods and services) particularly as that 
primary objective is usually interpreted in the context of cross-border movements 
and exchanges. However, as the earlier discussion (especially that in Chapter 
One) has also shown, an international approach is also a vital component in 
shaping the policies and principles of IFL and the pre-substantive patterns of IFL 
as these all involve international issues or problems of fiscal law. As such, it is 
arguable that the only proper response to their development is an international 
approach.
For all the above reasons, some conclusions on the unilateral approach adopted 
towards the taxation of the profits of CFCs can now be drawn. First, a unilateral 
approach to matters of IFL is from an empirical perspective likely to be unhelpful 
per se to the development of IFL in comparison with a multilateral approach. 
Second, due to the self-interested motives behind a strictly unilateral approach to 
problems of IFL, legislation enacted with regard solely to unilateral considerations 
may often be difficult to reconcile with the policies and principles of IFL (this 
point is revisited below in the discussion of international double taxation). Third, 
progress in the development of IFL may be impeded by the existence of unilateral 
measures of the sort discussed above. This conclusion is suggested by the above 
discussion and substantiated in further detail below in the discussion relating to 
the wider implications of the CFC provisions. 1 5
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WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE CFC PROVISIONS
It has been stated that progress in the wider development of IFL may be impeded 
by the existence of such unilateral measures as the CFC provisions. This 
proposition will now be considered further in relation to three areas:
1. The accepted "nexus" for taxation.
2. The impact of CFC provisions on double tax treaties.
3. The position of low tax states in the development of IFL.
1. The Accepted "Nexus" for Taxation.
It was explained in Chapter One that some of the more developed principles 
underlying IFL concern the "nexus" that is required to exist before one state may 
tax a company which is a resident of another state. In the last chapter it was 
suggested that the taxation of CFCs is not easily reconcilable with the application 
of either of the widely accepted principles of taxation; residence and taxable 
presence.
Of course, it may be that exceptions to the principle that taxation is to be levied 
by reference to residence or taxable presence can be justified. However, if such 
exceptions to those principles are claimed, it would certainly be necessary to 
substantiate the reason for the existence of the exceptions. In view of the 
discussion in the last chapter, it remains doubtful whether either the U.S. or the 
U.K. has established (or even attempted to establish) the existence of any 
acceptable nexus which justifies the imposition of taxation by means of CFC 
legislation.
This is an important point since, in developing a generally accepted approach to, 
or set of principles on, the nexus required before a state may seek to exercise its 
taxing powers, significant progress is being made toward eradicating the 
phenomenon of international double taxation and toward creating a more certain
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fiscal environment which in itself is conducive to securing the primary objective 
underlying IFL. The importance of this wider point seems to have been 
overlooked in the enactment of both the U.S. and U.K CFC legislation, although 
it is given substantial support by the tax authorities of those countries in other 
contexts, making the omission in the case of the CFC legislation all the more 
remarkable. 1 6
Prima facie, since companies are subject to tax under CFC rules without 
justification according to the accepted principles of residence and taxable 
presence, the risk of double taxation is increased. 1 7  If states levy taxation without 
having first demonstrated how that the method of taxation adopted conforms to 
an accepted basis or nexus of taxation, then such a development may undermine 
seriously the development of the principles and therefore also the policies and 
primary objective underlying IFL. If such a development became widespread, the 
climate for co-operation between states in connection with matters of IFL would 
not be favourable. There would be less common ground between states and the 
prospect for international agreements or co-operation would be diminished. 1 8
It is therefore considered that if states individually begin to adopt measures which 
are perceived as unjustified or contrary to the accepted principles, policies and 
primary objective of IFL (and it is suggested that the enactment of unilateral CFC 
measures is more rather than less likely to lead to such a development) then the 
prospects for the beneficial development of IFL (in its broadest sense) are thereby 
reduced.
There are two further immediate dangers arising from the unilateral taxation of 
CFCs in the case where an acceptable tax nexus has not been established. First, 
there would appear to be some increased danger of international double taxation. 
This matter is discussed in a separate section later in this chapter. Second, there 
are potentially adverse consequences as regards the position of low tax states in 
the development of IFL. This matter is also specifically addressed later in this 
chapter.
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2. CFC Provisions and Double Tax Treaties
The relationship of the CFC provisions to existing double tax treaties was 
considered in the last chapter. It is now necessary to proceed to evaluate the 
consequences of the position in terms of the development of the policies and 
principles of IFL.
The fact that the CFC provisions seem to have been enacted with no official 
consideration of their relationship to double tax treaties and apparently contradict 
the provisions of such treaties is likely to have the effect of undermining 
confidence in, and therefore reliance upon, such treaties. 1 9  Where legislation is 
passed unilaterally which contradicts the provisions of existing double tax treaties, 
the entire purpose of the double tax treaty concerned is destroyed. As noted in 
Chapter One, a comprehensive double tax treaty represents the agreed allocation 
of taxing rights between states. If one state subsequently enacts legislation which 
has the effect of contradicting that allocation, the treaty is to that extent rendered 
redundant. This undermining of confidence in treaties affects both taxpayers and 
other fiscal authorities since taxpayers will become more hesitant in relying on the 
provisions of double tax treaties and fiscal authorities may take the view that 
existing treaties are unlikely to be respected by co-signatories. It is also a 
significant impediment to the future development of IFL, the principles of which 
have, as explained in Chapter One, been so far largely developed through the 
medium of double tax treaties.
This development is particularly to be condemned in view of the efforts which 
have sought, over the past twenty years or so, to create internationally acceptable 
model tax treaties - or pre-substantive patterns of IFL - (such as the O.E.C.D. 
model double tax treaty) as a means of reducing international double taxation and 
increasing international co-operation in tax matters. In this respect the objectives 
of the pre-substantive patterns of IFL run parallel to the principles of public 
international law. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (a 
codification of the observed principles of customary public international law)
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reiterates the internationally accepted rule that each contracting state is bound to 
perform and observe the obligations it has assumed in the relevant treaty^ In 
consequence, unilateral measures which are counter to those obligations constitute 
a breach of public international law.
In addition to the damage done generally to the institutional status of double tax 
treaties, the unilateral abrogation or overriding of treaty measures may also 
adversely affect the state concerned. This may result either from foreign taxpayers 
being discouraged from making investments in that state or from foreign states 
becoming unwilling to enter into double tax treaties with that state. In either case, 
economic damage to the state concerned may be sustained.
The above discussion leads to an additional reason why the strictly unilateral route 
adopted in the case of CFC legislation may be comparatively unhelpful. In Part 
B of this thesis, the development of Subpart F since its enactment in 1962 was 
briefly surveyed. It is evident from that discussion that there appear to have been 
various different intentions of policy behind Subpart F during its life on the statute 
book to date. These changes of policy are probably the inevitable consequence of 
varying fiscal policies adopted by the governments of the day.
However, they do suggest that in practice CFC legislation may be constantly 
modified or shaped to suit a current fiscal policy. Such changes in policy are 
obviously frustrating to the taxpayer when purely domestic tax law is involved. In 
the case of measures affecting the taxation of overseas transactions or 
arrangements, such changes have the more serious potential to cause international 
double taxation, in addition to creating an unstable environment for international 
trade and investment. This is in itself a reason generally to prefer that substantive 
tax provisions which affect international transactions should be produced as a 
result of multilateral collaboration and the application of agreed principles of IFL, 
since this would probably lead to the production of more clearly defined fiscal 
objectives and measures which are less prone to be varied unilaterally^
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3. The Position of Low Tax States in the Development of IFL
One of the questions raised in Chapter Three was the role of low tax states in the 
development of IFL in its broadest sense^ The discussion concluded that the 
development of IFL would be considerably assisted by the participation of such 
states in the development and formulation of the policies and principles of IFL. 
However, legislation of the type exemplified by the CFC legislation of the U.S. 
and the U.K. does little to promote such participation and is likely to lead to the 
creation of attitudes of hostility on the part of those states in which CFCs subject 
to the provisions are located. There are two reasons why CFC legislation is likely 
to lead to such hostility.
First, the CFC provisions are blatantly engineered to be "anti-haven" legislation. 
As such, they amount, in fiscal terms, to an economic attack on tax havens. This 
result might be mitigated if a sound argument (or arguments) had been made to 
justify the provisions by reference to accepted principles of IFL. In the absence 
of such an argument, the CFC provisions may well be interpreted by low tax states 
as a punitive measure directed against the mere use, for whatever reason, of a low 
tax state. Such an interpretation seems fully justified in the context of official 
pronouncements on the matter. For example, in the Gordon Report (to which 
reference has already been made), various measures are advocated to isolate 
"abusive" tax havens (which are described as states which do not co-operate by 
providing full information required by the U.S.). The purpose of such measures 
is stated bluntly to be "to discourage U.S. business activity in the tax haven".^ In 
the Report, the perceived interests of the U.S. are regarded as paramount and the 
rights and sovereignty of the tax haven states are completely ignored or 
overridden. This indicates that the U.S. approach to those states is highly self- 
interested, an attitude which is hardly likely to generate an atmosphere of trust 
and co-operation between the states involved.
A second reason why hostility may be generated is that, despite the mechanism 
adopted for the collection of tax, the CFC provisions amount in substance to a tax
T/9 421
charge levied on the profits of the CFC itself. Therefore, low tax states may 
interpret the CFC measures as amounting to an extension of the jurisdiction of 
overseas fiscs at their expense. Arguably, CFC provisions are in effect equivalent 
to sending tax collectors from overseas fiscs into the jurisdiction of the states in 
which CFCs are located. On this view, low-tax states will no doubt consider such 
legislation an affront to their fiscal sovereignty. Again, the lack of any apparent 
justification for the CFC measures does little to suggest that the infraction is other 
than arbitrary.
In view of the discussion in the last chapter it is not a tenable counter-argument 
to propose that the tax charge is not directed at tax haven companies because the 
tax is collected from their parent companies located in the territory applying the 
CFC legislation. It is not possible to comment with any authority on the reaction 
to, or perception of, the CFC measures on the part of low tax states since there 
appears to have been no public comment by any such state as to its attitude to 
these provisions. However, on the basis of the above discussion (and the general 
discussion in Chapter Three) it is perhaps reasonable to form the tentative 
conclusion that the two factors referred to are more, rather than less, likely to 
provoke hostility on the part of low-tax states and further remove such states from 
the process of development of IFL. 2 4
DOUBLE TAXATION
The question of international double taxation is of primary relevance in the 
context of this chapter and goes to the heart of the primary objective underlying 
IFL since it will be recalled from Chapter One that the main concern in the 
context of the discussion of that primary objective is the phenomenon of 
international double taxation. As explained in the earlier discussion in Chapter 
One, international double taxation is conventionally classified into juridical and 
economic international double taxation; juridical international double taxation 
arising where the same income (or capital) is taxed twice in the hands of the same 
taxpayer and economic international double taxation arising where the same
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income (or capital) is taxed twice in the hands of taxpayers who are legally 
separate persons but who, from an economic perspective, are identical or closely 
associated.
International double taxation may result from the operation of the CFC provisions 
although it is not clear if the double taxation is more correctly viewed as juridical 
or economic.
Double taxation arises because the fiscs of both the U.S. and the U.K. fail to 
make any allowance for the fact that the jurisdictions against which their CFC 
legislation is chiefly directed raise the majority of their corporate tax from non­
income based taxes. (For example, in the case of the Cayman Islands, revenues 
are raised chiefly by stamp duties and licence fees). Although the U.S. and the 
U.K. CFC provisions permit double tax relief for overseas local taxes suffered by 
the CFC, this relief is restricted to income based taxes and no account is taken of 
stamp duties, licence fees and the like^ The effect of this is that overseas 
subsidiaries subject to CFC provisions are taxed by reference to the approach 
adopted by their local fiscal jurisdiction and are also in effect taxed according to 
the approach adopted by the fisc in the state in which their parent is based^
It is submitted that this is a clear case of international double taxation although, 
as noted above, it is not immediately clear that the circumstances fall into either 
the juridical or economic category of international double taxation. The situation 
is not easily viewed as juridical international double taxation because, strictly, it 
is not the same taxpayer on both occasions: the foreign subsidiary is taxed by 
stamp duties and licence fees and the parent is taxed, as a result of the 
"transparency" effect of the CFC provisions, according to the income-based 
approach of its domestic fisc. Neither is the situation clearly a case of economic 
international double taxation. It is true that the taxpayers are in most cases 
economically identical, despite being legally separate. However, before 
conventional economic international double taxation is found to be present, it 
must also be the case that the same income (or capital) is taxed twice. Since one
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form of taxation (in the state of the parent) is levied by reference to income and 
the other form of taxation (in the state of the subsidiary) is levied on the quite 
separate bases of executed documents (in the case of stamp duties) or licences 
granted (in the case of licence fees) it is not clear if the same income (or capital) 
is taxed twice^ 7
However, the above difficulties arise as a result of the unsatisfactory nature of the 
conventional classification (and explanation) of international double taxation and 
they should not be taken as meaning no double taxation has occurred. The case 
for the existence of international double taxation in the circumstances under 
discussion is founded on the fact that the consequence of the operation of the 
CFC provisions is quite clearly that the foreign operation concerned is subjected 
to the basis of taxation adopted in both its local tax jurisdiction and also in the tax 
jurisdiction of its parent.
Of course, in many cases the extent of the international double taxation which 
arises as a result of the circumstances discussed above is relatively modest, due 
to the low level of taxation in states such as the Cayman Islands against which 
CFC legislation is directed. However, the existence of the point is to be noted for 
two significant reasons. First, as discussed in detail in Chapter One, the objective 
to remove international double taxation is almost inextricably bound to the goal 
of achieving the primary objective underlying IFL, namely the removal of fiscal 
distortions to the free movement of capital and persons and the exchange of 
goods and services.^ Yet this is an instance of international double taxation (even 
if of modest proportion) being created as a result of the implementation of CFC 
provisions. Second, so far as can be ascertained, no acknowledgement of the 
different approach to taxation adopted by countries such as the Cayman Islands 
(and other countries against which the CFC provisions are in general directed) has 
ever been made in the formulation, enactment or administration of the CFC 
provisions, whether in the U.S. or the U.K.
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Both the above matters taken together further corroborate the points already 
made in connection with the unilateralist approach adopted by the U.S. and the 
U.K. to the perceived problem. This further emphasises the necessity of a wider 
discussion and a more analytical examination of the activities to which objection 
by the fisc is taken.
A potentially more serious consequence of the CFC legislation is the possibility 
of it creating a triple charge to taxation. An example may illustrate the point. It 
is assumed that a Cayman Islands company, which is a wholly owned subsidiary 
of a U.K. company bears, say, an aggregate 5% tax cost in the form of stamp 
duties, licence fees and the like on its profits, which are derived from certain 
related-party transactions. It is further assumed for the sake of the example that 
the U.K. company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S. company and does not 
derive profits from any activities or transactions caught by Subpart F. The 
structure outlined will lead to the Subpart F rules applying to the profits of the 
Cayman company with the result that those profits will be subject to U.S. tax at 
the rate of 34%. Where a direction is given by the Board of Inland Revenue, the 
same profits will also be subject to U.K. taxation at the rate of 35% ^ 9  The total 
tax charge is therefore in the order of 69%.30 Given the significant amount of 
takeover and merger activity involving U.S. and U.K. groups of companies, the 
example reflects a situation which is likely to arise in practice. In such an instance 
the obvious solution is to transfer the shares in the Cayman company to the U.S. 
company, although this may well involve a string of other tax issues or 
difficulties. 3 1
The major point illustrated by the example, however, is that such difficulties will 
almost inevitably arise when anti-avoidance legislation aimed at international 
transactions or arrangements is enacted unilaterally without regard to the accepted 
principles of IFL. The U.S. CFC legislation makes no provision for the U.K. 
legislation (and vice versa) because both sets of legislation represent self- 
interested attempts by the U.S. and U.K. fiscs to maximise their revenue 
irrespective of the dictates of the policies and principles of IFL. 3 2
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ECONOMIC ASPECTS
Economic considerations have been raised on two previous occasions in this thesis. 
In Chapter Two it was suggested that the phenomenon of international tax 
avoidance cannot be understood without an adequate investigation into its 
economic characteristics and effects. The same is also true, it was suggested, of 
anti-avoidance legislation. In the last chapter, the official economic analysis 
relating to the U.S. and U.K. CFC measures was considered and found to be 
somewhat inadequate, particularly in the case of the U.K.
The problem of the lack of proper economic analysis goes to the heart of much 
anti-avoidance legislation and it is certainly not a problem connected with CFC 
legislation alone. This is well illustrated by a recent O.E.C.D. report on thin 
capitalization^ No part of the thirty-six page report is given over to anything 
remotely approaching an economic analysis of the perceived problem. The long 
discussion on what anti-avoidance measures may be applied by the fisc is preceded 
with the mere statement:
"Faced with the fact that the use to loan financing rather than 
equity financing may have consequences for tax revenue, those 
concerned with tax policy may have to consider a variety of factors 
in deciding what, if any, action should be taken in relation to 
particular cases of the use of loan financing" (emphasis added)^
Whereas the first possibility (that the use of loan financing rather than equity 
financing may have consequences for tax revenue) is then completely ignored in 
the paper, the second possibility (that those concerned with tax policy may have 
to consider appropriate action) is fully explored on the assumption anti-avoidance 
legislation is needed. Countless other instances of the complete failure to consider 
economic issues when discussing anti-avoidance legislation could equally be 
mentioned. In other instances where an attempt at an analysis is attempted, the
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attempt is usually so partial or so superficial that it can hardly be taken seriously. 
In another O.E.C.D. publication, for example, it is concluded that:
"The foregoing considerations indicate that although measures 
against international tax avoidance have traditionally been justified 
in purely fiscal terms, the need to stop a tax loss to national 
treasuries, there are also strong economic arguments to support 
governments' actions" 3 5
Singled out as one of these "strong economic arguments" is the existence of the 
competitive advantage enjoyed by multinational enterprises over purely domestic 
businesses as a consequence of increased opportunities for avoiding tax, for 
example as a result of their ability to use base companies^
The document in question appears to assume an exact equivalence between purely 
domestic businesses and international businesses. It therefore evidences no grasp 
of any theoretical understanding of the economic basis of the multinational 
corporation and equally ignores the possibility that the same legitimate economic 
advantages that accrue to international (as compared to purely domestic) 
businesses may also be relevant in the sphere of taxation. 3 7
It is an advantage of an international business that there may be available a 
choice as to how the business is structured and a choice as to which location 
should be adopted for certain activities. These choices may amount, directly or 
indirectly, to choices between tax jurisdictions and such choices are obviously not 
available to businesses located in a single country. However, this does not in any 
way suggest an improper or unfair state of affairs but merely reflects fundamental 
economic differences between domestic and international enterprises. In spite of 
the unsupported assumption to the contrary (which is implicit in the official 
approach referred to above), it is considered that the availability of these choices 
to international businesses cannot be described as a "strong economic argument" 
for anti-avoidance legislation.
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The poor quality of analysis generally is to be deprecated particularly strongly in 
the case of the CFC legislation due to the very significant issues of IFL which are 
involved, since it is precisely in such circumstances that the benefit of an economic 
analysis would be of use. Indeed, the lack of economic analysis in the case of the 
CFC provisions exemplifies the complete lack of such analysis more generally.
In all the official U.S. and U.K. documents considered earlier in this thesis, it is 
assumed without question that the existence of CFCs must, in the absence of anti­
avoidance legislation, lead to a loss of revenue for the state in which the parent 
company (or shareholder) is located. It would also appear to be assumed that by 
preventing such "avoidance" opportunities, the fisc will increase the amount of tax 
collected generally^
These assumptions about the impact of CFCs should be tested by empirical 
investigation and analysis. A  relatively sophisticated economic analysis would be 
required before conclusions on the economic effect of untaxed CFCs and on the 
effect of anti-CFC legislation could be drawn. As has been suggested earlier in 
this thesis, such an approach to analysis is particularly needed in view of the doubt 
that surrounds certain conventional assumptions on the economic function and 
necessity of anti-avoidance provisions. For example, if the ideas propounded by 
Dr Bracewell Milnes (discussed in Chapter Two) are correct (or even if only the 
basic distinction which is made by Bracewell Milnes between raising revenue on 
the one hand and fighting avoidance on the other is correct), this should have a 
potentially enormous effect on the entire approach to the subject of tax avoidance.
For present purposes, the point to be emphasised is that, to the extent CFC and 
other anti-avoidance provisions are founded on economic assumptions as to loss 
of tax revenue, they (and the perceived problems against which they are directed) 
should be subject to proper economic analysis. Regrettably, such analysis is 
almost completely lacking on both a domestic and international level.
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One of the basic impediments to the use of sophisticated economic analysis is the 
traditional approach of the tax authorities in any particular state. The basic ethos 
of the tax authority is to ensure taxpayer compliance and to prevent or minimise 
avoidance and evasion of tax. Wider questions relating to tax yield, the economic 
impact or commercial considerations are at best subordinated to these primary 
goals and at worst not even recognised^ It is therefore to be expected that tax 
authorities will seek legislation which will give them the means to achieve their 
immediate goals more easily, perhaps without enquiring too closely into the wider 
implications of such legislation. It is submitted that the CFC provisions of the 
U.S. and U.K. (inter alia) represent an example of this tendency.
An obvious consequence of the attitude taken by tax authorities is that potential 
legislation promoted by those authorities is likely to be primarily of an anti­
avoidance character. Therefore, if it is accepted that the wider matters referred 
to above should be reflected in such legislation, it may not always be advisable to 
rely solely on the domestic tax authority for the preparation and framing of 
legislation. It is arguable that this is particularly so in the case of legislation 
affecting international transactions where wider policy aspects are of particular 
significance. There is, therefore, support for some form of role for an 
international body or institution in advising on the approach to be taken to 
matters such as the existence of CFCs. The chief advantage in the use of such a 
body should be its ability to take a wider view of a particular issue or problem. 
To this end, representation on such a body should not be confined to members 
of the various tax authorities but would include economists, tax practitioners and 
tax payers.
The obvious complexity of the CFC legislation is also relevant to this chapter 
generally and is of specific relevance to this discussion on the economic aspects 
of unilateral CFC legislation. It has already been observed in earlier chapters that 
Subpart F and the U.K. provisions are amongst the most complex provisions in 
the U.S. and U.K. tax laws respectively. Indeed as early as 1970, before many
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statutory complications had been added to Subpart F, a Presidential Task Force4 0  
stated in connection with Subpart F that:
"The multiplicity of complex tax concepts and techniques makes it 
difficult for taxpayers to comply with the law and for Internal 
Revenue Service to enforce compliance.... Even the largest 
corporations with their staff of experts finds it exceedingly 
burdensome to comply with the requirements of the statute and the 
regulations. The smaller company, without experience in operating 
abroad and with no staff of experts, runs a serious risk of being 
subjected to unanticipated and harsh penalties which could have 
been avoided by proper but costly tax planning" . 4 1
The above quotation suggests that the complexity of CFC legislation can cause 
significant practical problems of compliance to smaller corporate taxpayers 
involved in international transactions. This would be particularly the case as 
regards Subpart F due to the mandatory requirement to report all overseas 
income subject to the provisions. It is perhaps for this reason that Subpart F has 
been referred to in the U.S. Courts as "a veil of confusion" . 4 2  Complicated tax 
legislation will of course also cause difficulties for tax authorities in managing the 
tax system as a whole, 4 3  particularly where the complexity is compounded by more 
and more detailed amendments to the relevant legislation over time.^
If this complexity is an unavoidable consequence of necessary legislation it would 
be difficult to say anything further on the matter. However, the complexity of the 
legislation may itself indicate something about the likely economic benefit of 
having the legislation on the statute book at all. In a context not related to the 
CFC provisions, and arguing against the existence of the 'Vested interest thesis" 
(the thesis that tax systems are so complicated because of constant political 
pressure from vested interests), the economist Professor John Kay of the London 
Business School has argued that there are some parts of a tax system that work 
well and others that work badly. 4 5  Kay has concluded that it is the complex parts
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which, in the main, are devoted to "ineffectual reinforcement of the bits that work 
badly" > 4 6  The argument against complexity is developed thus:
"Most revenue is in fact collected from relatively brief and 
comprehensive statutory provisions that require relatively little 
annual refinement and amendment. The appropriate direction of 
reform is to develop on and from the bits that work and to reduce 
the scope of the bits that do not work and reduce the dependence 
of revenue upon them" . 4 7
This line of argument is of relevance to legislation of the type adopted to tax 
CFCs in low tax states, since it suggests that the enactment of complicated 
legislation may be a mistaken policy.^ Naturally, further work would be required 
in analysing, from an economic standpoint, the need for (and effect of) the CFC 
provisions. However, the argument against complex legislation is itself prima facie 
a further ground for adopting a much more rigorous economic appraisal of tax law 
in general and substantive provisions of IFL in particular.
SUMMARY
Perhaps the most surprising feature relating to the CFC provisions considered in 
this thesis is the dearth of analysis that preceded their enactment. Due to the 
relatively recent events in the U.K., it has been possible in earlier chapters to 
demonstrate this point with some force in connection with the U.K. provisions. 
With regard to the U.S., the evident difficulties relating to Subpart F have also 
been considered in part B . 4 9
It may therefore reasonably be concluded that the CFC provisions of both the 
U.S. and the U.K. have not been enacted within the confines of any single 
conceptual overview of the issues raised by the activities against which those 
measures are directed. Without any underpinning by such a conceptual overview, 
the CFC provisions, as exemplified by the U.S. and U.K. provisions inevitably
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raise a number of problems which have immediate consequences for the general 
development of IFL and particularly for the policies and principles of IFL and the 
primary objective underlying. IFL. These problems have been explored in the 
course of this thesis.
The discussion of the U.S. and U.K. CFC provisions suggests that the approach 
of those states has largely failed to tackle the fundamental conceptual issues 
involved. With regard to international tax avoidance, those states enacting CFC 
legislation have provided no reasoned analysis of the criteria by which activities 
or arrangements are to be classified as amounting to "avoidance" which requires 
counteracting measures. Similarly, low-tax states have been targeted on the basis 
of an unsophisticated, one-dimensional grasp of what the tax haven concept 
amounts to. It is therefore virtually inevitable that the CFC provisions either fail 
to deal with (or amount to an implicit rejection of) certain fundamental policies 
and principles of IFL (e.g. the questions raised on nexus; the relationship with 
double tax treaties; the effect on tax havens; the unilateralist approach; etc). For 
this reason, and judged from the general perspective of IFL, the development of 
unilateral anti-tax haven legislation is to be deplored.
The CFC provisions have been considered in this thesis as a model to facilitate 
an examination into how developed states are attempting to deal with perceived 
international fiscal abuse and to evaluate how those attempts affect the 
development of IFL. The CFC provisions were selected originally because they 
were considered to involve the relevant issues in a particularly acute form. There 
is however no reason to surmise that the approach adopted by developed states 
in enacting and applying CFC rules is any different to that approach adopted with 
regard to other legislation designed to counter other forms of perceived 
international tax avoidance. It is therefore submitted that the discussion and 
conclusions contained in this thesis have a general (and not merely specific) 
relevance to the subject of IFL.
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As explained in Chapter One, IFL in its widest sense is not an esoteric creation 
of relevance only to arcane treatises. It is rather a shorthand embodiment of 
policies and principles designed to achieve those fiscal goals for which there is in 
general a wide agreement and in respect of which there are sound grounds for 
support. The need to eradicate international double taxation and the need to 
promote equitable and (to the extent possible) neutral international tax law is a 
fundamental part of the development of IFL.
Until a number of the key issues raised in this thesis are fully addressed by those 
involved in creating substantive IFL, it is doubtful whether significant progress can 
be made to achieving the primary objective underlying IFL.
Richard Stuart Collier 
Washington Square 
New York
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CHAPTER 9 - NOTES
1 As explained in Chapter Three, the approach to CFC legislation in the 
U.K. and the U.S.A. is each illustrative of a more general approach which 
has been adopted in framing CFC legislation. The approach adopted in 
the U.S. case, that of targeting only certain "tainted" or passive income is, 
for example, characteristic of the approach reflected also in the CFC rules 
of Canada and Germany. The U.K. approach on the other hand, which 
involves attributing all the income of the CFC to its shareholders unless 
certain exemptions apply, is characteristic of a similar approach adopted 
in, for example, the rules of Japan and France.
2 O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs; "Taxation of Entertainers, Artistes
and Sportsmen", published in "Issues in International Taxation No. 2", 
O.E.C.D., (Paris, 1987).
3 O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs; "Tax Havens: Measures to prevent
abuse by Taxpayers" in International Tax Avoidance and Evasion; Four
Related Studies, Issues in International Taxation No. 1, (Paris, 1987).
4 Although there were available certain international committees (eg. the
forerunners of the O.E.C.D.’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs) the influence 
and standing of those committees was less developed than currently. It 
would therefore have been quite exceptional for the U.S. to refer 
discussion or consideration of Subpart F to any other than a domestic 
forum at that time.
5 The comments in the text are not intended to suggest that there was never 
any discussions at all with other governments or fiscs by those states 
seeking to enact CFC legislation but rather that, fundamentally, the main 
provisions of the CFC legislation, the process of its gestation and 
enactment and ultimately its application have all been effected on a 
unilateral basis. The detailed research carried out on the position in the 
U.K. supports this conclusion. The author has also discussed informally 
many of the conclusions in the Chapter (including the comments on the 
unilateralist approach) with a member of the Inland Revenue’s Technical 
Division unit which was given responsibility for applying the U.K. CFC 
rules from their inception.
6  See for example, note 9 Ibid, foreword by John Wakenham M.P.
7 The view that domestic issues only are involved fails to take account of 
issues such as the justification for the apparent extension of the tax base; 
the criteria by which certain international structures or activities are 
considered to be abusive; the concept of a tax haven, the effect of CFC 
legislation on the "sovereignty" of the tax haven states affected, etc.
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8 It is just this sort of self-interested approach which has led to severe
international criticism of the U.S. See Tax Notes, (weekly service, Tax 
Analysts Arlington, Va) November 7, 1988, pp. 594-596.
9 For example, one of the purported justifications given by the Inland
Revenue in introducing the U.K. CFC provisions was that "Introducing a 
new tax charge on certain U.K. controlled foreign companies resident in 
a low tax country would bring the U.K. into line with a number of its 
industrial competitors". Board of Inland Revenue, Taxation of 
International Business; December 1982, p. 8.
10 For example, one of the justifications used by the Inland Revenue in
defending the 10% de minimis limit in the case of U.K. shareholders on
whom an assessment under the legislation can be raised was that "the 
percentage used corresponds with that of most countries which have 
provisions of this sort". As has been suggested in earlier chapters, the 10% 
threshold is in itself suspect for reasons specified earlier (both as regards 
the U.S. and the U.K). The reference in the U.K. paper to foreign 
provisions is therefore somewhat spurious and deflects attention from the 
real requirement, namely an analysis of the arguments for and against a 
threshold set at that level. Board of Inland Revenue, "International Tax 
Avoidance; December 1981", p. 11. This is by no means an isolated 
example of this process of self-legitimacy by reference to similar foreign 
legislation. For further U.K. examples, see Board of Inland Revenue, 'Tax 
Havens and The Corporate Sector", June 1982, paragraph 6 and Board of 
Inland Revenue, 'Taxation of International Business", December 1982, pp 
8,30 and 46.
11 This point was emphasised by one commentator writing in 1975 in relation 
to the development of CFC legislation. "In 1972, Canada adopted anti-tax 
haven legislation similar in concept and complexity to that of the United 
States. Although not yet in effect, Canada has had to introduce numerous 
amendments to cure defects in its initial legislation, discovered merely by 
review of that legislation, even before the legislation was tested by practical 
applications. Germany has followed the same tortuous path. This 
illustrates the concern expressed about comparative tax law: that a country 
will import bad tax legislation of another country because it does not fully 
learn how the tax operates in practice and fails to heed the warnings of 
unbiased and experienced observers in the exporting country". Quoted in 
Sydney I. Roberts; "Fundamental and Long-term Prospects for the U.S. 
Tax system", remarks before the National Convention of the Taxation 
Institute of Australia at Hobart, April 14-20, 1975, reprinted in I.B.F.D. 
Bull, volume xxix, December 1975 No. 12 p. 486 at p. 487.
12 Note 3, Ibid.
13 The report contains very little material or "analysis" which is not already 
available and cannot be said to bring any new insight or technical analysis
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to bear. Compared with the report on "Thin Capitalization" (see note 3 
above), where wider problems appear at least to be recognised and the 
technical discussion introduces a number of interesting issues, the overall 
quality of this report is below standard.
14 Although the report itself contains no discussion of the more fundamental 
issues of IFL raised by anti-tax haven measures, it should be acknowledged 
that there is a General Introduction serving all four reports in the 
published volume which does discuss tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax 
planning. This discussion seems to repeat some questionable assumptions 
(for example, it appears to equate tax avoidance and tax evasion) and 
relies on obviously inadequate distinctions (for example, tax planning is 
said to relate to "consciously designed" features of a country’s tax system 
and tax avoidance is relegated to residual activity "of the kind discussed in 
the reports that follow". Again, the discussion simply does not tackle the 
issues which are considered in this thesis to be fundamental to IFL. See 
"General Introduction" (Note 3, Ibid, at p. 10, especially at pp 12-13).
15 Before leaving the subject of the unilateralist approach, some further 
comments should be made on existing multilateral institutions. Although 
the tenor of the foregoing discussion is clearly to favour the use of a 
multilateral institution, this should not be misinterpreted as an unequivocal 
endorsement of existing institutions. The leading such institution is the
O.E.C.D.’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs and, although that Committee has 
already made a valuable contribution to the development of IFL, (most 
notably with its model double taxation treaty of 1977, it may not be suitably 
equipped to deal with all issues relevant to the development of IFL. The 
chief disadvantage to the Committee on Fiscal Affairs is that it is staffed 
exclusively by representatives drawn from the fiscal authorities of the states 
which comprise the O.E.C.D. As such, commercial understanding of certain 
transactions considered by the Committee may be somewhat lacking and 
the perspective is inevitably somewhat one-sided. This is a serious 
disadvantage in the field of fiscal law and it is likely that taxpayer 
confidence (and support) might be increased with a more widely-drawn 
multilateral policy unit, including respected economists and taxation 
practitioners with wide commercial experience. No doubt a detailed 
discussion on the character and type of institutions which would most 
favour and promote the development of I.F.L. would be of assistance. 
However, discussion of this matter is not germane to this thesis beyond 
noting that the recommendation here for multilateral attention to major 
issues of I.F.L. does not represent a wholly uncritical endorsement of 
existing unilateral institutions.
16 There are, for example, the following comments in the U.S. white paper 
on s. 482: "The arms’ length standard is embodied in all U.S. tax treaties; 
it is in each major model treaty, including the U.S. Model Convention; it 
is incorporated into most tax treaties to which the United States is not a 
party; it has been explicitly adopted by international organizations that
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have addressed themselves to transfer pricing issues; and virtually every 
major industrial nation takes the arm’s length standard as its frame of 
reference in transfer pricing cases. This overwhelming evidence indicates 
that there in fact is an international norm for making transfer pricing 
adjustments and that the norm is the arm’s length standard. It is equally 
clear as a policy matter that, in the interest of avoiding extreme positions 
by other jurisdictions and minimizing the incidence of disputes over 
primary taxing jurisdiction in international transactions, the United States 
should continue to adhere to the arm’s length standard." See U.S. 
Department of Treasury; "s. 482 White Paper on Intercompany Pricing", 
October 18, 1988, p. 58.
17 This point is discussed in detail later in the chapter.
18 The development of taxation by reference to the concept of "unitary
taxation" in certain parts of the U.S. is an example in point. Under this 
approach the global profits of a multinational group are calculated and 
allocated between the various associated enterprises comprising the group 
according to a formula which is generally based on the three factors of 
sales, property and payroll. The unitary tax approach is a method of 
allocating income within a multinational group and is therefore an 
alternative to the more usual (and more widely accepted) approach of 
treating associated enterprises as if they were independent entities. The 
unitary tax approach is concerned primarily with providing a basis for the 
allocation of revenues rather than with establishing a nexus for taxation, 
although there is clearly some relationship between the two. Therefore, the 
example of unitary taxation is not exactly analogous to the situation or 
concerns discussed above. However, the debate surrounding unitary 
taxation is illustrative of the inevitable international squabbles that will 
arise when it is perceived that the basis of taxation adopted by one state 
affecting international transactions or groups of companies is unjustified. 
This is precisely what happened in the case of unitary taxation, which was 
perceived by many states outside the U.S. to lead to a number of 
difficulties, and chiefly to international double taxation. Strong protests 
against the method were voiced by Japan and the E.E.C. and the hostilities 
provoked by the issues are illustrated by the description of unitary taxation 
by the President of the U.K. International Fiscal Association as a "tax 
animal which has come up from the sewers and which feeds on state 
greed". See H. Kogels; "Unitary Taxation - An International Approach" 
(1983) B.I.F.D. Bull p. 65 at p. 68.
19 The point can be illustrated by reference to the U.K.-Swiss treaty, it is 
provided in Article 7 that "the profits of an enterprise of [Switzerland] shall 
be taxable only in Switzerland" (emphasis added). Articles 11 and 21 make 
similar provisions in the case of interest and items of other income. These 
rules are subject to the usual exclusion concerning profits of permanent 
establishments but it is assumed that is not relevant to present purposes. 
Reverting to Article 7, two questions need to be answered: are the profits
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of the (assumed) Swiss CFC profits of an "enterprise of Switzerland"? and 
would the effect of the CFC legislation be to tax in the U.K. the profits of 
the CFC, a Swiss enterprise? the answer to the first question is 
determined by reference to the provisions in Articles 3 and 4 of the treaty. 
The CFC is liable to tax in Switzerland because it is a Swiss corporation 
which is managed in Switzerland. It is therefore under Article 4, clearly a 
resident of Switzerland and it follows from the definition in Article 3 that 
its profits are profits of an enterprise of Switzerland. The answer to the 
first question is therefore "yes". On the second question, it appears 
irrelevant that the CFC legislation purports to tax the U.K. parent 
company and not the non-resident Swiss subsidiary. The U.K.-Swiss treaty 
does not say that the Swiss company cannot be taxed by the U.K. but 
rather that its profits cannot be so taxed. Under the treaty, therefore the 
U.K. parent cannot be taxed on or by reference to the profits of the Swiss 
subsidiary because that would be taxing those profits - contrary to the 
terms of the treaty - in just the same way as if the U.K. attempted to tax 
the Swiss subsidiary itself on those profits. The answer to the second 
question therefore also appears to be "yes".
20 See, further, H. Becker and F. Wurm; "Double Taxation Conventions and 
the Conflict between International Agreements and Subsequent Domestic 
Laws", Intertax, 1988/8-9 p. 257 at pp. 260-261.
21 For example, the O.E.C.D. Model Convention on Income and on Capital 
has led to a substantial degree of multilateral agreement which continues 
to exist. It is possible that part of this international agreement is to be 
attributed to the multilateral obligations accepted by the signatories, 
obligations which are of course absent in the case of existing unilateral 
CFC law.
22 It is considered that states, including low tax states, have a role to play in 
developing IFL, particularly as regards the policies, principles and pre­
substantive patterns of IFL. For example, considerable work is required 
on the principles that are required to govern such matters as financial 
instruments and financial trading activities to name but one area in which 
the sphere of influence of the policies, principles and pre-substantive 
patterns of IFL could be profitably extended.
23 R.A. Gordon; Tax Havens and Their use by United States Taxpayers - An 
Overview, January 12 1981, pp. 213-214.
24 The type of animosity that can be aroused is perhaps well illustrated by the 
example of the impact of unitary taxation on fiscal relations between the 
U.S. and the U.K. The U.K. has now passed retaliatory legislation which 
can be applied to U.K. subsidiaries of U.S. companies situated in those 
U.S. states using the unitary tax methods. Under the new legislation, the 
entitlement to advance corporation tax credits on dividends paid by U.K. 
subsidiaries to such U.S. parents can be withdrawn (ICTA 1988, s. 812).
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The measure is a blatant retaliation in tax terms to what is perceived in the 
U.K. as an unfair and unacceptable means of taxation in the U.S. Of 
course, the example does not concern low tax states or CFC provisions and 
is a retaliation to a basis of tax adopted by local U.S. states rather than the 
U.S. federal fisc. However, it does serve to illustrate that hostilities can be 
provoked by unilateral measures which seem to lack any fiscal legitimacy. 
Indeed, the example is perhaps more striking because it involves two states 
which otherwise seem to enjoy warm relations with each other, in both 
fiscal and general terms. The probable existence of the sort of hostility 
discussed above makes the enfranchising of low tax states in the 
development of IFL and their participation and co-operation in such issues 
as exchange of information less likely.
25 With regard to the U.S. see IRC s.901(b)(i). In the U.K. see ICTA 1988, 
ss. 788(1) and 790.
26 It may be objected that the criticism made in the text is relevant to double 
tax relief generally but is not a valid criticism of the CFC legislation. 
However, it is considered that in the context of the discussion in this final 
chapter, the criticism of the CFC rules is indeed valid. Primarily, it is the 
effect of the CFC rules which is the cause of the double taxation referred 
to, not the effect of the double tax provisions. (But for the charge under 
the CFC provisions, no double taxation of the sort referred to would arise). 
As such, it is considered a legitimate criticism of the CFC rules that 
international double taxation of the sort discussed in the text can be 
caused. It is not considered a sufficient response to this criticism to 
suggest that the fault is one of the framing of double tax relief provisions 
alone (although clearly the point does additionally raise questions as to the 
acceptability of double tax relief provisions more generally).
27 The difficulty in bringing this situation within the conventional category of 
economic international double taxation (to which it more closely 
corresponds) arises as a result of the assumption of the conventional 
classification that taxation is levied by reference to income (or capital) 
rather than by reference to other criteria.
28 See especially the discussion in Chapter One at pp. 17-28.
29 The U.K. rate of corporation tax was reduced to 33 % for the financial year 
1992 by F(No. 2) Act 1992, s. 21.
30 Under U.S. domestic provisions, a tax credit is available but only to the 
extent allowed for under the rules in IRC s. 960 as determined under s. 902. 
With regard to the relevant treaty (i.e. the U.S.-U.K. double tax treaty) it 
appears unlikely that a credit would be available to the U.S. company for 
the tax paid by the U.K. under the CFC provisions. Although credit is 
generally given under Article 23 of that treaty, the credit is effectively 
restricted - in this type of situation - to cases where a dividend is paid up
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and even then is restricted to the tax on the profits out of which the 
payment is made - i.e. "with respect to the profits out of which such 
dividends are paid" (see Art. 23(1)).
31 The transfer of the shares may well crystallise a chargeable gain for U.K. 
tax purposes and there may also be stamp duties and VAT difficulties.
32 It is inconceivable that those enacting and administering the legislation are 
unaware of the result of two sets of CFC legislation applying to a single 
arrangement in the manner demonstrated in the text. The failure to 
modify the legislation in any way to take account of this possible situation 
provides further support for the self-interested nature of the CFC 
legislation in general.
33 O.E.C.D. Committee on Fiscal Affairs, "Thin Capitalization" published in, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Issues in 
International Taxation No. 2" (Paris, 1987), p. 8.
34 Note 33, Ibid, p. 12.
35 Note 3, Ibid, General Introduction, para. 22, p. 14.
36 Note 35, Ibid, at paras 22 and 10. As usual, the existence and use of both 
companies is uncritically assumed to involve international tax avoidance.
37 In am indebted on this point to some illuminating discussions with the 
French economist Henri Le Page.
38 The same assumptions appear again (equally without question or analysis) 
in the official documents of the latest country moving toward the 
enactment of CFC measures, New Zealand: "The use of tax havens in 
particular has become widespread and has been a drain on government 
revenue... It is overwhelmingly clear that the New Zealand tax base must 
be protected from international tax avoidance". Consultative Document 
on International Tax Reform, New Zealand Ministry of Finance, December 
1987, preface by Roger Douglas, Minister of Finance.
39 In commenting on the proposed U.K. CFC legislation, the Institute of 
Directors made the following comments: "The maximisation of tax revenue 
is preferable as an aim of policy to the minimisation of avoidance, 
especially if the interests of the taxpaying community are taken into 
account and not merely those of the tax authorities. The consultative 
document shows no sign of recognising the distinction either (a) between 
the maximisation of tax revenue and the minimisation of avoidance or (b) 
between the interests of the tax authorities and those of the economy as 
a whole." (Submission by the Institute of Directors on the Inland Revenue 
Consultative Document of January 1981, p.4, 28 June 1981).
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40 The Task Force was established by the President of the U.S. to review the 
provisions of Subpart F. The Task Force was an eminent group 
experienced in tax matters, including two former secretaries of the 
Treasury and leading economists, lawyers, accountants and corporate 
officials.
41 Quoted in Sidney I, Roberts "Fundamental and Long-term prospects for 
the U.S. Tax System", Remarks before the National Convention of the 
Taxation Institute of Australia at Hobart, April 14-20, 1975, reprinted in 
I.B.F.D. Bull., volume XXIX, December 1975 no. 12 p. 486 at p. 487.
42 Tannewald J. in Greenfield v Comr. 60 TC 425 at 429.
43 For example, in 1972 a report of the Committee of the New York State 
Bar Association entitled "Complexity and the Income Tax" observed that 
"the present course of the development of the tax law, if not reversed, may 
well result in a break-down of the self-assessment system. Indeed, some 
members of the Committee believe that the break-down has already 
occurred." See note 41, Ibid, at p. 492.
44 It is a little early to say whether the U.K. legislation will evolve to become 
more and more complicated as a result of statutoiy changes, although the 
history of the U.S. legislation gives no grounds for optimism. In a U.S. 
Treasury report of 1976 it was said that "It can be argued that no further 
legislation is needed on the deferral issue. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 
substantially extended Subpart F, and as a result the principal areas of tax 
abuse have been closed off. Further legislative restrictions could prove 
counterproductive by accelerating actual distributions, triggering legislative 
reactions abroad, reducing the profitability and growth of American firms, 
adding complexity to the Internal Revenue Code and placing administrative 
demands on the Internal Revenue Service" (see U.S. Department of 
Treasury; Taxation of the Undistributed Income of Controlled Foreign 
Corporation, (1976), reprinted in I.B.F.D. Bull. p. 427 at p. 435. In view of 
the number of detailed changes to Subpart F since 1976, particularly those 
in the Tax Reform Act 1986, the above statement provides an ironic 
indicator of the likely future direction of both the U.S. and U.K. CFC 
provisions.
45 J. A. Kay, "Is Complexity in Taxation Inevitable?" Institute for Fiscal
Studies Working Paper 57, IFS, (London, February 1985).
46 Note 45, Ibid, p. 6.
47 Note 46, Ibid.
48 The position of John Kay in this matter is, in effect at least, not far
removed from the position adopted by Dr Barry Bracewell-Milnes which
was considered earlier in Chapter Two. Bracewell-Milnes would
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(probably) argue that the CFC legislation was misconceived on the 
erroneous assumption that legislation directed at preventing avoidance will 
therefore contribute to the raising of revenue. For Bracewell-Milnes, there 
is a clear distinction to be made between efforts (and legislation) directed 
to prevent avoidance or evasion on the one hand and efforts or legislation 
directed to raising revenue on the other. See further the discussion in 
Chapter Two.
49 Professor Stanley S. Surrey, who was assistant secretary of the U.S. 
Treasury at the time Subpart F was promulgated, confirmed during a 
conference held in 1984 that the U.S. CFC legislation was not discussed 
very thoroughly at the time of its adoption and that certain parts of it were 
not analysed in any detail at all at that time. (See conference report by 
Brian Arnold, "The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations", Taxes 
International, issue 66, April 1985, p. 6).
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APPENDIX I 
SUBPART F-SUMMARY
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SUBPART F ■ SUMMARY
IRC Section Summary
Subpart F
951 Requirement that amounts of tainted earnings and profits of a CFC 
be included in gross income of a U.S. shareholder.
952 Subpart F income defined
953 Provisions relating to income from insurance of risks outside the
country of incorporation of the CFC
954 Categories of Subpart F income defined
955 Provisions dealing with the withdrawal of previously excluded
Subpart F income from qualified investment
956 Provisions that direct or indirect investment of earnings in U.S. 
property be treated as constuctive dividend to U.S. shareholders
957 Definitions section: CFCs, U.S. persons
958 Rules for determining stock ownership - direct,indirect and
constructive ownership
959 Provision to prevent double taxation
960 Special rules for foreign tax credits
961 Provisions relating to the adjustment of basis of stock of a CFC 
following operation of other Subpart F rules
962 Permits individuals to elect to be taxed at corporate rates on 
Subpart F income
963 Repealed
964 Miscellaneous - determination of earnings and profits of a foreign 
corporation; treatment of blocked earnings and profits; records and 
accounts to be kept and made available to U.S. shareholders
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Related Provisions
1248
1491
Gains on sale or liquidation of stock in CFC taxed as income to 
extent of corporations undistributed and untaxed earnings and 
profits
Imposition of excise tax on transfer of appreciated property by U.S. 
persons to CFCs.
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APPENDIX II
U.K. CFC PROVISIONS - CONSULTATIVE HISTORY
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APPENDIX III 
U.K. CFC PROVISIONS - SUMMARY
ICTA 1988 Summary
5.747 Definition of CFC; power of Board to make a direction; imputation (and 
amount) of chargeable profits and creditable tax of a CFC.
5.748 Limitations on direction-making power: exemption and exclusions.
5.749 Statutory definition of residence and interested persons.
5.750 Meaning of lower level of taxation and meaning and determination of 
corresponding U.K. tax.
5.751 Provisions identifying commencement, duration and termination of an 
accounting period. Meaning of creditable tax.
5.752 Apportionment and method of apportionment among interestedpersons; 
treatment of direct and indirect interests.
5.753 Notice of making of direction to be given to company and information to 
be given with notice: Appeals procedure.
5.754 Assessment, recovery and postponement of tax.
5.755 Revenue power to request ’relevant’ information relating to potential 
CFCs.
5.756 Interpretation, construction and commencement.
Schedule 24 Assumptions for calculating chargeable profits, creditable tax and 
corresponding U.K. tax of foreign companies.
Schedule 25 Cases excluded from direction-making powers: acceptable 
distribution policy; exempt activities; the public quotation 
condition; diversion of profits (motive test).
Schedule 26 Reliefs against liability for tax in respect of chargeable profits: 
trading losses and group relief, etc; advance corporation tax; gains 
on disposal of shares in a CFC; dividends from a CFC.
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